WHY DID THE BRITISH LEAVE
IN INDIA IN 1947?
Who was responsible for the decision of the British leave India on 15th
August 1947? Was Mahatma Gandhi the
chief architect of Indian independence? What was the role of the Indian
National Army led by Subhash Chandra Bose? Did the Indian soldier also
contribute to the British decision to quit India? Some of these questions will
be discussed in this article, which is based on chapter 11 (The Soldier’s
Contribution to Indian Independence) of the book titled CONTRIBUTION OF THE
ARMED FORCES TO THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT IN INDIA, published in 2009 after a
research project by the author under the aegis of the United Service
Institution of India.
The end of World War II
in August 1946 coincided with the victory of the Labour party in the general
elections in Britain. With Churchill’s removal from the scene, the Indian
problem began to receive serious attention. The Viceroy, Lord Wavell’s
suggestions to hold elections for the central and provincial assemblies, lift
the ban on Congress organisations and release political prisoners that were
being opposed by Churchill were approved and he was asked to come to London for
consultations. Sir Penderel Moon gives an interesting hypothesis as to the
reasons for the change in Britain ’s
outlook after the war, which explains the central role of the Indian army in
bringing about the end of British rule in India
Even before the war British rule over India
had become an anachronism, and two of the reasons that had then deterred the
British from relaxing their grip had now, as result of the war, lost all
validity. One of these was the fear that an independent Indian Government might repudiate all India’s
foreign debt, most of which was held in England; but by the end of the
war this had all been liquidated and
Great Britain had become the debtor, owing India over 1,000 million pounds. The
second and less selfish reason was that in the pre-war years there were not nearly
enough trained Indian military officers to take over the Indian army and
provide for India’s defence; but now there were over 15,000 trained Indian
officers, and though only two or three had reached the rank of brigadier there
was a sufficient number of them capable of filling the higher posts except in
the technical arms, and plenty of regimental officers. 1
Towards the end of 1945
Wavell was confronted with a new problem - the trials of three officers of the
Indian National Army in the Red Fort at Delhi India
The
decision to carry out the trials in the Red Fort at Delhi
The year 1946 opened with
mutinies in the RIAF, RIN and the Indian Army at Jubbulpore. In the last week of
March the Cabinet Mission, led by Sir Stafford Cripps, arrived in Delhi, with the
task of reaching an agreement with the principal political parties on two
issues: one, the method of framing a constitution for a self-governing,
independent India and two, the setting up of a new Executive Council of Interim
Government that would hold office while the constitution was being drafted. The
Viceroy was fully involved in the deliberation of the Cabinet Mission, but the
problem of the disaffection in the armed services caused him not a little
anxiety. In a dispatch addressed to King George VI on 22 March 1946, he wrote:
The last three months
have been anxious and depressing. They have been marked by continuous and
unbridled abuse of the Government, of the British, of officials and police, in
political speeches, in practically the whole of the Press, and in the Assembly;
by serious rioting in Bombay; by a mutiny in the RIN, much indiscipline in the
RIAF; some unrest in the Army; by an unprecedented drought and famine
conditions over many parts of India; by threatened strikes on the Railways, and
in the Posts and Telegraphs; by a general sense of insecurity and lawlessness. …….
The most disturbing feature of all is that unrest is
beginning to appear in some units of the Indian Army; so far almost entirely in
the technical arms. Auchinleck thinks that the great mass of the Indian Army is
still sound, and I believe that this is so. It may not take long, however, to
shake their steadiness if the Congress and Muslim League determine to use the
whole power of propaganda at their command to do so. 3
On 27 March
1946 Sir J.A. Thorne, the Home Member of the Viceroy’s Council, was asked to
prepare a brief appreciation of what
would happen if the Cabinet Mission does not achieve a settlement. One of the
important points covered was the staunchness
of the Indian Services if called upon to quell civil disturbances. According to
Thorne’s appreciation, the loyalty of the Services could no longer be taken for
granted. In the 1942 disturbances the Services were nearly 100 percent
staunch, but this would not be so on a future occasion. If faced with the
prospect of firing on mobs, not all units could be relied upon. As regards the
behaviour that could be expected of troops generally under these circumstances,
there would be a lot of disaffection, and downright mutiny, especially in the RIAF,
RIN and Signals units. Thorne suggested
that an appreciation on these aspects be prepared by the War Department. 4
The
C-in-C directed the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Brigadier B.P.T.
O’Brien, to assess the present state morale and degree of reliability of the
three Indian fighting services, with special reference to the ICOs, from the
point of view of their capacity to under three conditions – in aid of civil
power in widespread communal or ant-present-Government disturbances; in
operations on the Frontier; and as garrisons over seas. The DMI submitted the Note to the C-in-C on
25 April, who expressed his general agreement with its contents. Extracts from
the Note are given below: 5
........We consider that the Indian Services could not remain
in being in the face of communal trouble started by, or turned into, a Jehad;
neither can we suggest any action which might increase the likelihood of them
staying firm under these circumstances.
We consider that
the very great bulk of Indian Armoured Corps, Gunners, Sappers
and Infantry, could be relied on to act in communal trouble not amounting to a
Jehad but would advise against bringing other services in the Army, the R.I.N.
or the R.I.A.F. into direct contact with rioters.
….Our views on the reliability of the Indian Services in
widespread Congress inspired trouble are
(a) The Indian Armoured Corps, Gunners, Sappers and Infantry can in the main be
depended on provided that their
I.C.Os, particularly the senior ones, remain loyal and any waverers among them
are dealt with firmly and immediately…
(b)
The Indian Signal Corps cannot at present
be considered reliable….
(c) The Ancillary Services of the Army as a
whole should not be relied on to act
against rioters…
(d) The Royal
Indian Navy cannot at present be regarded as reliable….
(e) The Royal
Indian Air Force must be regarded as doubtful…
….the key to the
reliability of the Services, particularly the Army, is the attitude of the
I.C.O. …the morale of the I.C.O. can be greatly improved by the example and
attitude of British officers…
Auchinleck forwarded Brigadier O’Brien’s
Note to the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission, giving copies to Army Commanders
as well as the Chiefs of the RIN and the RIAF.
As can be imagined, it caused considerable dismay and alarm in
all quarters. Meanwhile, the Cabinet Mission requested the Viceroy for an
appreciation of the situation that was likely to arise if their proposals fail
and for a general policy on India London India Britain Calcutta , Madras ,
Bombay , Karachi –
and to Delhi Southern
India to the North. Stressing the need to avoid at all cost being
embroiled with both Hindus and Muslims, he suggested a ‘worst case’ solution –
to hand over the Hindu Provinces to the Congress and withdraw to the Muslim
Provinces the North-West and North-East. 6
Three days later,
the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy sent a ‘Most Immediate’ telegram to the
Prime Minister, stressing the urgent need for the British Government to announce
a clear policy in the event of the negotiations between the Cabinet Mission and
the political parties breaking down. They expected the crisis to be reached any
time between 5 and 15 June, and the necessity for urgent decision on the line
of action that the Viceroy was to adopt. The first point to be decided was whether
they should attempt to repress a mass movement sponsored by the Congress and maintain
the existing form of government. This was possible only if the Indian Army
remained loyal, which was doubtful. It would also cause much bloodshed and achieve
nothing, unless it was intended to stay on in India India
The
appreciations of the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission reached London
while the latter were still carrying out their negotiations in Delhi London
and the ‘liberals’ in Delhi India
Right
at the beginning, the Chiefs of Staff – Alanbrooke, Cunningham and Tedder – spelt
out the strategic requirements of Britain
in India India Delhi India
Before
proceeding to examine the military implications of the courses proposed by the Cabinet
Mission, the Chiefs of Staff eliminated the first three. The first and second courses that envisaged a
complete withdrawal, with or without a time limit, were ruled out since they did
not safeguard Britain India
An important
part of the Report deals with the reinforcements required to deal with internal
disorders, based on estimates given by the C-in-C, India. In case the Indian
Armed Forces remained loyal, it was estimated that in addition to the existing British
forces then in India India was visualized as six brigades in Burma and Malaya; two brigades in Hong Kong and Japan ; two battalions in the Dodecanese and
three battalions in Iraq India ; six brigades for Burma and Malaya and three battalions for Iraq
The Report
examined the availability of reinforcements and implications of providing them.
There was at that time one British division in the Middle East; two in Greece ; one in Italy
and one division and seven brigades in Germany India India
The last
course proposed by the Cabinet Mission was granting independence to Hindustan
and withdrawing to Pakistan India
would have a strong army immediately, it would take many years for Pakistan Pakistan Hindustan , the Muslims may be ill-treated.
In the worst case, there may even be civil war, leading to British troops being
involved in fighting with Hindustan and controlling communal strife in parts of
Pakistan Pakistan
The Report
ended with the conclusions, which stated:
….A policy of remaining in India and firmly accepting responsibility
for law and order would result, if the Indian Army remained loyal, in an acceptable military commitment and
would safeguard our long term strategic interests….If however, the Indian Armed
Forces did not remain loyal… we would be faced with the necessity of providing five British divisions for India, with the
consequent abandonment of commitments in other areas hitherto regarded as
inescapable, serious effects on our import and export programmes and world-wide
repercussions on the release scheme. The only alternative to this would be
ignominious withdrawal from the whole of India. 8
The Report
by the Chiefs of Staff is an important document that brings to light several
important points connected with India Pakistan London and Delhi
is also clearly visible; for the former, Britain India
Early in September
1946 the Viceroy forwarded to London a plan for
phased withdrawal from India India India ,
and proposed further European recruitment to augment British troops in India Punjab , resulting in sizeable casualties among Hindus as
well as Muslims. A new Interim Government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru had been
installed at Delhi India
Refusing to
take no for an answer, Wavell sent a strongly worded note to the Secretary of
State on 23 October, in which he reiterated his demand for a firm declaration
of the policy of the British Government. His plan, he wrote, was based on two
main assumptions: (1) the object was to transfer power to India without undue
delay and with the minimum of disorder and bloodshed; to secure the interests
of the Minorities and to provide for the safety of the 90,000 Europeans in
India; (2) the power of the British Government in India was weakening daily,
and could not be sustained beyond 18 months.
Using exceptionally strong language, Wavell made it clear that as the man
on the spot, it was his responsibility to advise the Government of the action
to be taken to achieve these objects. ‘If
the H.M.G. consider that my advice shows lack of balance and judgment, or that
I have lost my nerve, it is of course their duty to inform me of this and to
replace me’, he wrote. ‘But they take
a very grave responsibility upon themselves if they simply neglect my advice’.
Wavell ended by emphasizing that they
‘must have an emergency plan in readiness; and if it is agreed that we cannot
hope to control events for longer than 18 months from now, we shall have to
make up our minds and make a definite pronouncement at least in the first half of 1947. While I agree that we should not
leave India till we have exhausted every possible means of securing a
constitutional settlement, we can make no contribution to a settlement once we
have lost all power of control’. 9
In
December 1946 the British Government invited Nehru, Baldev Singh, Jinnah and
Liaqat Ali Khan to London India India and Burma
Committee decided to recommend that 31 March 1948 should be announced as the
date by which the British would hand over power in India
Moutnbatten
reached India on 22 March 1947. Before he left London ,
he had been told that India India Britain Bay of Bengal , covering the sea routes to the East. Mountbatten
strongly opposed the plan, informing London that
any attempt ‘to claim the Andaman Islands
as colonies, to be treated in the same way as Aden, will cause an absolute
flare-up throughout the length and breadth of India.’ In view of
Mountbatten’s strong opposition, the British Government decided to drop the
proposal. 11
The crucial
role of the Indian Armed Forces, especially the Indian Army, in the British
decision to quit India
The well
known historian, Dr. Tara Chand, has written: ‘The most controversial measure of the Viceroy was the decision to
advance the date of transfer of power from June 1948 to August 15, 1947. On
this issue Mountbatten recorded his reasons in his conclusions appended to the
Report on the Last Viceroyalty submitted to His Majesty’s Government in
September 1948. His defence for expediting the transference of power to the
Indians was on these lines… “Secondly,
the ultimate sanction of law and order, namely, the Army, presented
difficulties for use as an instrument of government for maintenance of peace…’13
Mangat Rai, a
colleague of Penderel Moon in the Indian Civil Service before Independence
How far were the competence and size of the Indian army
factors in persuading the British to contemplate withdrawal from India India
Charles
Raikes, a British Civil servant of the Mutiny days, had bluntly asserted that
the British ‘should legislate and govern
India as the superior race’, adding with some prescience, ‘whenever that superiority ceases, our right
to remain in India terminates also’. This was in line with the view held by
most Britons, who felt that British rule was a blessing for India USA
It is
interesting to reflect on the course of history if the Indian soldier had not
been affected by nationalistic feelings and continued to serve loyally as he
had during and before World War II. Though the freedom movement had developed
considerable momentum by the time the war ended, the assumption that it would
have achieved independence on its own would be erroneous. With the vast
resources at their disposal, it would not have been difficult for the British
authorities in India India
would not have been partitioned, the Kashmir
problem would not have existed, and the Indo-Pak wars of 1948, 1965 and 1972
would not have been fought. Who knows, with its large size, population and a long
spell of peace unfettered by the threat of war, India
would have been a World power, equalling or even surpassing China
END NOTES
1. Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India
2. Maj Gen D.K. Palit, Major General A.A Rudra – His Service in
Three Armies and Two World wars, (New Delhi, 1997), p.
277
3. Nicholas
Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.)
The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London
4. Mansergh and Moon, The
Transfer of Power, vii, p.150.
5. Mansergh and Moon, The
Transfer of Power, vii, pp. 406-7.
6. Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of
Power, vii, pp. 731-7.
7. Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of
Power, vii, pp. 787-95.
8. Mansergh and Moon , The Transfer of
Power, vii, pp. 889-900.
9. Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of
Power, viii, pp.794-9
10. Moon, pp. 1164-5
11. Mansergh and Moon, The
Transfer of Power, xi, 306
12. Major General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, (London
13. Dr Tara Chand, History of the Freedom
Movement in India
14. Moon, pp. 1195
15. Moon, pp. 1187
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