INCOMPETENCE IS REWARDED IN THE
MILITARY – SAYS WHO?
The
article by Mohan Guruswamy in the June 2017 issue of Fauji India made my blood
boil. His comment that ‘upper echelons of the military are now visibly dense
with incompetent and uninspiring leaders’ is uncharitable and unjust, to say
the least. Does a person who does not have a law degree teach a lawyer how to
argue in court? Similarly, should a person with no medical qualifications
lecture a surgeon on the best method of carrying out surgery? Then why do our
so called security experts lecture those who have spent decades in military
uniform on how to fight battles?
According
to Guruswamy, ‘the Indian military does not appreciate standout talent and
personality, and prefers a uniform greyness. The system beats out the commander
and dashing leader in an officer long before he becomes a general.’ This is
sheer nonsense, as I intend to prove by examples. He has quoted examples from
the US and British Army. I will give him examples from the Indian Army. Presumably,
a well read ‘expert’ like Guruswamy would have read about Cariappa, Nathu
Singh, Thimayya, Harbaksh, Prem Bhagat, Sagat Singh, Zoru Bakshi, Hanut Singh,
to name just a few. In
case he hasn’t, I would recommend that he read the book LEADERSHIP IN THE
INDIAN ARMY – BIOGRAPHIES OF TWELVE SOLDERS, published by Sage in 2005.
Field Marshal KM Cariappa
In 1948, after the UN called for a cease
fire in J&K, Army HQ issued instructions
that no major operations were to be undertaken without their sanction. Lt Gen Cariappa,
who was the GOC-in-C, disregarded these orders, and decided to capture Zojila
and open the road to Ladakh. Had he not done so, Ladakh may not have been part
of India today. The country owes an eternal debt to Cariappa, for the risks he
took. If he had failed, it would have ended his career.
General
KS Thimayya
In
May 1948, Leh had almost no troops except a State Forces detachment. Major
Prithi Chand, commanding the detachment in Leh, sent an urgent message that the
situation was critical, and if reinforcements did not reach next day, Leh would
have to be evacuated. No aircraft had ever landed at Leh before, but if the
town was to be saved, this was the only answer. Maj Gen Thimayya went to Air
Commodore Mehar Singh, who was commanding No 1 (Operations) Group of the Air
Force, and asked if he was willing to take the risk. 'Baba' Mehar, as the fiery
Sikh was known, agreed to take a Dakota, for a trial landing. Thimayya decided
to accompany him, and on 24 May 1948, they landed at Leh, writing their names
into the history books of aviation. Leh was saved, and troops were flown in
regularly during the next few days.
The first attack on Zojila on 3 September 1948 failed,
due to the heavy snow and strong defences built by the enemy. A second attempt
on 14 September 1948 also failed. Winter was fast approaching, and soon the
pass would be closed, making vehicular movement impossible. Time was at a
premium, and it was necessary to try different methods, to achieve success.
Thimayya then suggested another attack, using tanks. A squadron of Stewart
tanks of 7 Cavalry was moved from Jammu to Srinagar, and then to Baltal. When
the attack was launched on 1st November, the presence of tanks
completely surprised and unnerved the enemy. Thimayya was himself in the first
tank, leading the assault. The operation was a complete success, and Zojila was
captured by nightfall. Shortly afterwards, Dras and Kargil were secured, and a
link up established with a column pushed out from Leh, on 24 November 1948.
With this, the threat to Leh and the entire Ladakh region, had been removed. A
cease fire was ordered on 1 January 1949 after Pakistan agreed to accept the UN
Resolution. The war in Kashmir was officially over, after almost fifteen months
of hard fighting.
Lt
Gen Harbaksh Singh
During the 1965 Indo Pak war, Lt Gen Harbkash Singh was
GOC-in-C Western Command. At one stage, the COAS, General JN Chowdhury,
telephoned him late at night and ordered him to withdraw his troops to the line
of the Beas river. Harbaksh refused to obey the order, which would have
resulted in losing a large chunk of Punjab to Pakistani forces.
Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw
During
a Cabinet meeting on 27 April 1971, to which Gen Sam Manekshaw, as Chairman of
the Chiefs of Staff Committee was invited, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asked
him to undertake military operations in East Pakistan. Sam expressed his
inability to do so citing several reasons, and asked for time until December,
which was accepted. The rest is history, which need not be repeated.
Lt
Gen PS Bhagat.
In
1971, Lt Gen Prem Bhagat was GOC-in-C Northern Command. Work had started on
building residential accommodation for officers, at Udhampur. The land for the
project had still to be acquired, but Bhagat nevertheless ordered the
construction to commence, since there was an acute shortage of accommodation.
In 1972, the Government imposed several restrictions, on new projects, as part
of general financial stringency measures, after the 1971 war. This placed a ban
on all new construction. For projects which had already commenced, only those
which had reached roof level were to be completed, and the rest to be stopped.
Bhagat was informed by his staff that construction of the officers’
accommodation would also have to be stopped, since only the foundation had been
laid. When told about the stipulation regarding roof level, he gave a reply
that is classic, and is still quoted.
"Make out a certificate that it has reached roof level, and I will
sign it. Nobody can tell an Army Commander that he is a liar".
If it was not for him, the accommodation at Udhampur, aptly named Bhagat
Enclave, would not have come up, since the land acquisition proceedings were
never completed.
Lt
Gen Sagat Singh
In 1961, it was decided
to liberate Goa from Portuguese occupation. The main offensive from the East
was to be conducted by 17 Mountain Division, while 50 (I) Parachute Brigade,
under Brig Sagat Singh was to undertake a subsidiary thrust from the North. In
a classic example of a bold and audacious manoeuvre, Sagat reached Panjim in
just 24 hours, and Goa was liberated, while the main thrust was still
floundering.
In 1965, when Maj
Gen Sagat Singh was GOC 17 Mountain Division, the Chinese served an ultimatum,
and demanded that the Indians withdraw their posts at Nathu La and Jelep La. Accordingly,
orders were issued by Corps HQ to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La. Jelep la was vacated by 27 Mountain Division,
which the Chinese promptly occupied. However, Sagat did not vacate Nathu La,
arguing that that the discretion to vacate the posts lay with the divisional
commander, and he was not obliged to do so, based on instructions from Corps
HQ. Ultimately, Sagat's fortitude saved the day for India, and his stand was
vindicated, two years later, when there was a show down at Nathu La. Today, the
strategic pass of Nathu La is still held by Indian troops, while Jelep La is in
Chinese hands.
During the 1971 operations
for the liberation of East Pakistan, Lt Gen Sagat Singh's decision to cross the
Meghna proved to be crucial to the entire operation. This was also the first
instance in military history of an 'air bridge' being used for crossing a major
water obstacle, by a brigade group. In his book, 'Victory in Bangla Desh',
Major General Lachhman Singh, who commanded 20 Mountain Division, which was
part of 33 Corps during the campaign, writes, "It was here that Sagat
Singh exhibited the genius and initiative of a field commander. It was this
decision which finally and decisively tilted the scale in our favour and led to
the early surrender of the Pakistani forces at Dacca." It was a bold decision, fraught with risk, and
if he had failed, the responsibility would have been entirely his.
Lt
Gen ZC Bakshi
In
1965, Brig Zoru Bakshi was commanding 68 Infantry Brigade, which was assigned
the task of capturing the Hajipir pass. At one stage, the Divisional Commander
spoke to Bakshi, and told him that Bedori must be captured at the earliest, and
had priority even over Hajipir pass. The capture of Bedori had been announced
on All India Radio on 26 August, and its immediate capture was essential, to
avoid embarrassment. Bakshi decided to make no change in the plan for the
capture of Haji Pir, by Major Ranjit Dayal. At this stage, 19 Punjab,
volunteered to capture Bedori using a subsidiary axis, for which Bakshi readily
granted permission. Hajipir was captured, without a single casualty. Had the attack failed, there is little doubt
that Bakshi would have been held responsible, since he had undertaken it
without the approval of higher authorities. He had taken a grave risk, but it
had paid off.
Lt
Gen Hanut Singh
During the 1971 war with
Pakistan, Lt Col Hanut Singh was commanding 17 HORSE, also known as the Poona
Horse. There was a fierce tank battle,
on 16 December, followed by another one on 17th, when the full
weight of Pakistan's 8 Armoured Brigade was brought to bear on the Poona
Horse. Inspired by Hanut's leadership,
the regiment fought like lions, and in a single day’s battle, destroyed 50
enemy tanks, losing 13 of its own. In the Battle of Basantar, one of Pakistan's
oldest and proudest cavalry regiments, 13 Lancers, was decimated, while
another, 31 Cavalry, was crippled. It was during this action that Second Lieut
Arun Khetarpal, a young officer with barely six months service, sacrificed his
life, and was awarded a PVC. Arun's refusal to abandon his tank, at grave
personal risk, on the grounds that the CO had forbidden such a course of
action, is a manifestation of the fierce sense of loyalty which Hanut commanded
from his subordinates.
In 1965, Brig Hanut
Singh was appointed Commander 14 (Independent) Armoured Brigade. During an
Exercise with Troops, his brigade was tasked to execute a breakout. At the
planning stage itself, Hanut pointed out to the commander of the infantry
division which was establishing the bridge head that the site selected was
incorrect, because due to the presence of lakes on two sides, the armour would
have to break out through a defile, which could be easily blocked by the enemy.
Hanut was over ruled, and was assured that his tanks would be given a safe
passage. When the exercise began, the situation developed exactly as Hanut had
feared. Hanut immediately called off the break out, and ordered his tanks to deploy.
Next morning, the Army and Corps Commanders visited the site, and met Hanut.
When asked why he had not carried out the manoeuvre, he replied: "I am not
prepared to order my leading regiment to undertake a mission, which I know to
be suicidal." They left without a word. Subsequently, Hanut was given a
clear passage through the defile, and the armoured brigade broke out as
planned.
In 1982, Maj Gen
Hanut Singh was appointed GOC 17 Mountain Division. He found the operational
plans to be passive, and wanted to introduce a more aggressive form of defence.
This concept called for substantial reserves at every level, and the only way
they could be created was by restructuring the deployment. As was his practice,
Hanut ran a sand model exercise, which he conducted personally, in order to
apprise the officers of the division with the concept. The Corps Commander, Lt
Gen SS Brar, who
attended the discussion, did not agree with the concept, and was openly
critical. In order to avoid an unseemly argument, in front of junior officers,
Hanut terminated the discussion, saying that: “So long as I am the GOC, this is
how I will fight the defensive battle."
And that was that.
In 1983, Maj Gen
Hanut Singh was appointed GOC 1 Armoured Division. Soon after Exercise 'Chetak',
an operational discussion was held at the Corps HQ. Lt Gen K. Sundarji, who was
then GOC-in-C Western Command, was also attending. A large number of concepts
had emerged, regarding the employment of the Armoured Division, with which
Hanut was not in agreement. When Hanut expressed his strong reservations about
the concept, it led to a verbal duel between the Hanut and Sundarji. Finally,
Hanut ended his argument, making it clear that as long as he was in command of
the Armoured Division, he would fight the battle the way he was advocating.
Having said this, Hanut sat down. There
was a stunned silence. Sundarji was the
Army Commander, and his promotion and appointment as the Army Chief was almost
a certainty. Crossing swords with him
was tantamount to sacrificing one's career, and Hanut seemed to have done just
that. However, they were wrong. After taking over as COAS, one of the first
things Sundarji did was give Hanut command of 2 Corps, which was expected to
play a crucial role in Exercise Brass Tacks.
After
reading the above examples, will anyone agree with Guruswamy’s view that the
Indian Army nurtures pedestrian leaders and rewards incompetence? He quotes two
examples to support his view. (I wonder why he is shy of giving their names).
The first is of an Indian GOC in 1965 who went to war with his briefcase
containing papers pertaining to his passing over for promotion and withdrew in
haste in the face of a Pakistani counter attack. He did not add that Maj Gen
Niranjan Prasad was subsequently sacked by Lt Gen Harbkash Singh, as was
another general who withdrew leaving his guns behind. The other incident
relates to an IAF pilot (later an Air Marshal) landing his Gnat in a Pakistani
airfield. It is true that Squadron
Leader BS Sikand lost his bearings in 1965 and landed in Pasrur, mistaking it
for a disused Indian airfield. But does a navigational error make him ineligible
to become an air marshal? In the 1971 war, he did a good job in the battle of
Boyra and was awarded an AVSM. Navigational errors are not uncommon, in the
militaries of all countries. Guruswamy
has probably not heard what an American GI said when he was asked what he
feared the most: “A second lieutenant with a map.”
Guruswamy
goes ga ga over an article by a serving officer in the US Army on the
incompetence of American generals, and asks: “Can anyone imagine an Indian Army
officer writing such an article and the Army War College journals publishing it?”
Just for his information, this subject is discussed in almost all premier military
institutes. In 1989, when I was doing the LDMC at the College of Defence Management,
the subject of my dissertation was “Creativity in the Armed Forces”. It
discussed the importance of encouraging bold and unconventional methods, which
usually pay dividends in battle, rather than hide bound and predictable text
book solutions. Incidentally, it was adjudged the best dissertation for that
year. My thesis in the National Defence College in 1994 was on similar lines.
Coming to the Army War College, during a talk to the Higher Command course on
29 December 2016 on leadership, I covered just one aspect – the need for a
backbone in the officer cadre, which seems to have vanished. I was pleasantly
surprised when several officers contested my hypothesis, and gave examples of
present day generals and brigadiers who stood up for what they thought was
right. I came away elated with the feeling that all is well and the Army is
still the same, as it was fifty years ago.
23 Jun 2017
No comments:
Post a Comment