NATIONAL SECURITY – WHAT’S THAT?

NATIONAL SECURITY – WHAT’S THAT?

By

Maj Gen VK Singh

          A few weeks ago, an innocuous news item buried in the middle pages of the newspapers informed readers that the CBI has filed a closure report in the five year old case of the theft of the DRDO computers due to ‘lack of evidence’. And so was buried the last traces of what was perhaps the biggest blow to national security since independence. To protect the interests of a few individuals, those of the country were given the go by.

In October 2003, around 20 computers were stolen from the Scientific Analysis Group (SAG) and Institute for Systems Studies and Analyses (ISSA), which are DRDO facilities located in Metcalfe House in Delhi. The SAG evaluates communication equipment, encryption codes and algorithms for the defence ministry, home ministry, armed forces and some paramilitary forces. The ISSA, in turn, develops strategic and tactical war-games, threat analyses and weapon-performance evaluation. According to the initial media reports, the security at Metcalfe House was extremely lax. The SAG was supposed to keep all the codes under strict lock and key but this was not done. There were about 20 officials and scientists who had free access to the laboratory.  The thieves knew exactly what they were looking for. They did not touch the other expensive equipment lying outside. They just took away the storage devices like CDs and computer hard discs, which stored the sensitive codes.

An ‘internal inquiry’ was ordered by the Government, which included officials from IB and RAW. However, ultimately, no one was found guilty. The SAG came out with a statement that none of the computers had any sensitive data. Of course, no one asked them what the computers were being used for, if not for storing data. Surely, the scientists were not playing computer games during office hours. The theft was committed by insiders, who knew exactly what they wanted. They would not waste their time if the computers did not have anything worthwhile. Later, the case was handed over to the CBI, with predictable results.

After this incident, security was tightened and additional guards were employed. But the extent of loss was not made public. If this had been done, the organisations whose codes had been cleared by SAG in recent years could have promptly taken remedial action, such as changing the algorithms or the equipment itself. However, since this was not done, there would be many who took the SAG’s assurance at face value and did nothing. Perhaps they are still using the codes which could have been compromised. Experts agree that the theft of data from SAG was probably the biggest intelligence disaster since independence. At one go, all codes and ciphers being used by the defence services, police, para military organisations and intelligence agencies could have been compromised.

Considering the serious security implications of the SAG case, it should have been investigated by the CBI ab initio, rather than by an ‘internal inquiry’.  Why this was not done will remain a mystery. Perhaps the authorities did not want to reveal the extent of damage, in the interest of national security. Possibly similar considerations prompted the ‘internal inquiry’ into the escape of Rabinder Singh, the RAW officer suspected to be a CIA mole who escaped to the USA in 2004. It was later reported that 67 officers were found to be implicated in the case, but their names were never revealed, no doubt in the interest of national security.

Internal inquiries are nothing but ‘enquiries’, which rarely result in prosecution or disciplinary action.  In most cases, they are ordered to silence critics and divert attention of the media, rather than carry out a systematic investigation. In the bargain, the guilty go unpunished. If the government is serious about finding the culprits, it should entrust these probes to the CBI, or a retired judge under the Commissions of Inquiry Act. 

Intelligence agencies are notoriously tight fisted with information about themselves, even if it pertains to instances of wrong doing. Until very recently, the defence services were prone to a similar mind set, but Kargil changed all that. The military realised that media coverage actually benefits them, and have put in place systems that highlight their activities without compromising security. But the intelligence agencies are yet to learn this lesson. Perhaps they fear that increased transparency will bring out their faults, leading to restrictions being placed on their functioning. As a result, national interest frequently takes second place to the interest of individuals.  In the bargain, national security is sometimes compromised for the sake of a few individuals, as happened in the case of the DRDO computers and Rabinder’s escape.

26 May 2008