TWO RAJPUTS – CARIAPPA AND NATHU SINGH

TWO RAJPUTS – CARIAPPA AND NATHU SINGH

By

Maj Gen VK Singh

This is the story of two Indian soldiers, one famous and the other almost unknown, even in the Army. One rose to the rank of General, becoming the first Indian Commander-in-Chief, while the other retired as a Lieutenant General, after declining the post that went to the other. Though there was a difference in three years between their dates of commission, they were born in the same year -1900.  Both joined the same unit - 1st Battalion the 7th Rajput Regiment (Queen Victoria's Own Light Infantry), known in short as 1/7 Rajput (2 QVOLI). Though they had many similarities, their personalities were totally different. One was a 'pucca' sahib, even more than the British themselves, while the other was a nationalist who hated the British. 

            Kodandera Madappa Cariappa    was born on 28 January 1900 at Mercara in Coorg. His father, Madappa, was an official in the revenue department. After finishing his education at Presidency College, Madras, in June 1918 he joined the Temporary School for Indian Cadets (TSIC), which was also called the Daly Cadet College, at Indore. He passed out on 1 December 1919 with a temporary commission and was placed seventh in overall order of merit, out of 39 cadets. Subsequently, he was granted a permanent commission with effect from 17 July 1920.   Incidentally, the first two Indians to pass out from Sandhurst - Syed Iskander Ali Mirza and Iqbal Ali Beg -   were commissioned on 16 July 1920, and were senior to Cariappa by one day. Beg did not join and Iskander Ali Mirza was transferred to the political service.

              Nathu Singh was born at Gumanpura, in the princely state of Dungarpur, in Rajputana. He was the only child of Thakur Hamir Singhji of Gumanpura, a noble man from the vassalage of Dungarpur.  Unfortunately, he lost both his parents before he was seven years old. Taking the orphaned boy under his wing, Maharawal Vijay Singhji, the ruler of Dungarpur State, sent him to his own alma mater, the Mayo College at Ajmer. In 1911, the Maharawal took Nathu along to the Coronation Durbar at Delhi. Instead of being impressed by the pomp and pageantry, the young Nathu was filled with shame and revulsion at the sight of Indian rulers paying obeisance to the Crown. This made a deep impression on the young boy, and he felt the first stirrings of nationalism. In 1915, he met Jawahar Lal Nehru for the first time, and thereafter, his father, Moti Lal Nehru. The Maharawal, himself a great patriot, implanted the seed of nationalism in Nathu Singh's mind, which took root, and flowered, as he grew older. 

             Nathu Singh's background and heritage - he was from the Mairtia clan, of Rathore Rajputs, renowned for their valour - resulted in a natural inclination for the military profession. His guardian, the Maharawal had also expressed a desire that he should follow the martial tradition of his forbears, and join the Army. Unfortunately, the Maharawal died in 1918, when Nathu Singh was still at school. Soon after he returned from school in 1920, he had a row with the Political Officer in Dungarpur, the first of his many brushes with the British. The Political Officer later developed a liking for the young firebrand, and advised the Rajmata to send him to Sandhurst, which had just been opened to Indians. Nathu Singh wanted to become a soldier, but not under the British. However, he bowed to his guardian’s wishes, and applied for the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. After clearing the written examination and the interviews with the C-in-C and the Viceroy, he sailed for England, in July 1921.

         Nathu Singh spent a year and a half at Sandhurst. His British instructors and colleagues were impressed by his intellect, but somewhat surprised at his boldness and lack of servility, which they had come to expect from all Indians. Nathu Singh disliked the British, and made no effort to conceal this.       During his stay at Sandhurst, General Jacob of the Indian Army, addressing the cadets, told them that since the British were likely to stay in India for a long time, the best among them should join the Indian Army. Nathu Singh immediately sought an interview with the Commandant, and told him that if the British had no intention of leaving, he was not interested in getting his commission. During his stay in England, he also met Subhas Chandra Bose, who was in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) at that time. They had a common meeting ground, in their dislike of British rule, and desire to be rid of it. However, they differed in their views regarding the best method to achieve their goal.

            After passing out from the Daly Cadet College, Cariappa served in 2/88 Carnatic Infantry, 2/125 Napier Rifles and 7^th Dogras before joining 1/7 Rajput, which was one of six units of Infantry Indianised in 1923. The battalion was at in Waziristan, on the North West Frontier. Meanwhile, Nathu Singh, who had passed out from Sandhurst on 1 February 1923 and assigned to 1/7 Rajput, was doing his attachment with a British battalion, the 2^nd Prince of Wales' Volunteers, located at Mhow. After spending year with the Volunteers, he joined his parent unit in 1924, where Cariappa was already serving, in Waziristan. Unlike most subalterns, Nathu did not follow the dictum of being seen, but not heard. He had strong views, and he did not hesitate to articulate them. His antipathy for the British, and their ways, could not be hidden, and this soon brought him into conflict with his superiors.

             Nathu Singh's first brush with authority was over the matter of dining in the officers’ mess. He refused to dine in the mess with other officers, on the grounds that he was a high caste Hindu. This created an uproar. Finally, he agreed to dine in the mess, but considered it an act of condescension. According to the custom then in vogue, apart from the CO, two other senior officers of the battalion were required to give their recommendations regarding retention of an officer in service. In his report dated 1 February 1925 , his CO, Lt. Col. A.H. Macleverty, wrote:

  "......I do not consider him well suited for regimental life........he has strong religious convictions, which colour every question......He finds mess irksome, and states that he cannot dine with Europeans when at his home.....I do not think that his heart is in his profession, as he has more than once stated that his ambition is service in his state.....".

            The opinion of the CO was seconded by two other officers of the battalion, Major B.S.A.F. Greville and Major E.M.C. Brander. However, while recommending that Nathu Singh should not be retained in service, all three praised his intelligence, professional knowledge and prowess at games. Finally, General Claud W. Jacob, GOC-in-C, Northern Command wrote: "The sooner this officer is removed from the Army the better."  With this, it appeared that Nathu’s fate was sealed. He was called for a final interview with the Army Commander, where his CO was present. After talking to Nathu , the General was so impressed by his family and educational background, as well as his obvious intelligence that he decided to give him another chance. After advising him to adjust himself to Army life, he sent  Nathu out of his office, the Army Commander then gave dressing down to the CO, for not appreciating the background of the young Indian officer, and told him to handle him properly. Nathu Singh was standing outside the door, and heard the whole conversation, which he often related in later years.

            Unlike other Indian officers had been trained at Sandhurst, Cariappa  had not visited UK and  other countries in Europe. In 1925, he decided to go on a Grand Tour and applied to General HQ in Delhi, which not only accorded him permission, but arranged for his stay with British units, wherever possible. Cariappa went around the World, and visited Europe, USA, Japan, China and several other countries. The trip was a great education for him, and he returned a much wiser and better man. The battalion had moved to Fatehgarh in 1925, and It was here that he got his nick name, 'Kipper'. It is said that a British officer's wife found his name difficult to pronounce, and started calling him Kipper.

            When Nathu Singh’s  first report had been written, he had been in the battalion for just three weeks. After a year, the perceptions of his CO and other officers had changed. Nathu Singh had become moderate in his views as well as his behaviour, based on the advice of the Army commander. On 1 April 1926, LT. Col. Greville, who was now commanding the battalion, wrote:

  "A keen, hard working officer who takes great interest in his work.....With regard to the adverse remarks in last year's report he has shown much improvement in all respects and appears to be much more broad minded in his views.....His manners in the mess are now satisfactory and he finds no difficulties in the feeding arrangements....conveys the idea that he is very pleased and happy with Army life."

              In 1926, Nathu Singh was posted to the 10/7 Rajput, the Regiment's training battalion at Fatehgarh.  During this period, he continued his association with the Congress leaders, such as the Nehrus, Jinnah, and Sarojini Naidu, whom he had met while giving evidence before the Skeen Committee, which was examining the question of an Indian Sandhurst. Motilal Nehru and M.A. Jinnah were members, along with several others. The Committee examined 122 witnesses, which included KCIOs, their parents, and VCOs. Among the KCIOs who gave evidence were Cariappa and Nathu Singh. During this period, Pandit Motilal Nehru, who had resigned from the Committee in March 1926, heard about Nathu Singh’s desire to leave the service, and dissuaded him from it. He strongly advised Nathu Singh to stick to the Army and not join the National movement or political department of the Government of India, or return to Dungarpur State service, all options which he was considering.

            During his stay in Fatehgarh, the C-in-C, Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood, visited the battalion. All officers were lined upto be introduced to him. Nathu Singh was wearing a 'safa' (turban), instead of a regulation hat. He had been wearing the 'safa' since he had been commissioned, and surprisingly, nobody had objected to it. When the C-in-C came to Nathu, he took him to be a Viceroy's Commissioned Officer (VCO), who normally wore such head gear. Shaking his hand, he asked, in Hindustani: "Kaisa hai, Sahib" ("How are you?"  VCOs were normally addressed as 'Sahib', as JCOs in the Indian Army are even today). Without batting an eyelid, Nathu replied, in Hindustani: "Bahut accha hai, Sahib". ("Very well, Sir"). By now the CO had realised the confusion, and introduced him to the C-in-C, as Mister Nathu Singh. The Chief quickly said: "How do you do, Nathu Singh." In chaste English, Nathu replied; "Very well, Sir."

            In 1929, Nathu Singh returned to 1/7 Rajput, which was in Razmak, in Waziristan. The battalion moved to Peshawar in 1930, and the next year, Nathu Singh was promoted Captain. Cariappa was also in the battalion at that time. At that time, the Staff College at Camberley trained officers of the British Army, whereas the one in Quetta had been established primarily for the Indian Army. July 1931, Cariappa was posted to HQ Peshawar District, as DAQMG. Based on the advice of his  superiors and colleagues, he decided to appear for the Staff College examination. In January 1932, he went to England for tuition by the Royal United Services Institution (RUSI). He was also able to get a month's attachment with a British battalion, and attended two short courses, at the Small Arms School and the Royal Artillery School. As a result, Cariappa passed the entrance examination, and became the first Indian officer to attend the course at the Staff College, Quetta.

            Cariappa found that British officers treated those from the Colonies with contempt and disdain. He tried to take the sarcasm and discrimination in his stride, and rarely got into a confrontation. However, on one occasion, he spoke up. In a large gathering, towards the end of the course, student officers were invited to comment on the course, and suggest improvements. Cariappa felt that the number of vacancies for Indian officers at the Staff College was too small. This would deprive a large number of deserving Indians from attending the course. In the ultimate analysis, it would affect the quality of the Imperial Army, and may prove to be their undoing in a major war. Everyone, including the Commandant, was stunned by these remarks, and the audacity of the Indian officer. Subsequently, the Commandant called Cariappa and advised him to broaden his views and think in terms of the Army as a whole, rather than 'Indianisation,' which showed a narrow vision.

            After the course, Cariappa asked for an appointment at the India House in London, or the War Office, but this was not accepted. Instead of being given a staff appointment, which he deserved, he posted back to his unit at Kohat in 1934, for a third tenure of regimental service on the North West Frontier. It was two years before  he was posted as Staff Captain, in March 1936, to Deccan Area, in Secunderabad. It was a non graded appointment, but Cariappa did not complain. Finally, in 1938, he was promoted Major, and appointed DAA & QMG in the same HQ. In 1939, when World War II started, he was posted as Brigade Major to 20 Indian Brigade, in Derajat. 

            While Cariappa was doing his staff course, Nathu Singh was with the battalion in Peshawar. He again had a spat with the British, over the issue of club membership. At that time, Indian officers were members of the officers mess, but were not given membership of the club, which admitted only Europeans. This created a peculiar situation, and a solution was found by making them honorary members. In 1933, three Indian officers, who were honorary members of the Peshawar Club, applied for permanent membership, and were black balled. When Nathu Singh heard about it, he was furious. He had already resigned his honorary membership earlier, and he now advised other Indian officers to do the same. As a result, all Indians resigned en masse. When the Club President wrote to him, to reconsider his decision, offering to renew his honorary membership, Nathu Singh declined. Soon afterwards, a dinner was held in the club, to celebrate the satisfactory conclusion of the Mohmand operations, for which  Nathu was later "Mentioned in Dispatches". He decided to boycott the dinner, and other Indian officers did the same.

             There was an uproar. His CO, Lt Col. V.R. Munton, who was on leave in England, wrote to Nathu Singh on 16 November 1933:

            “…..But I do feel it was a damned silly thing not to go to the dinner. A regiment is rather a sacred thing, if you work it out & it is hallowed by a hundred odd years of tradition & blood. To let it down merely to vent a private grievance sounds very petty. You probably didn't mean it as such but it savours of non-cooperation - & the latter in the Army is absolutely disaster. To take up the attitude of a "die-hard" isn't going to do much good. Quite apart from the fact that at the next show the Bn. will probably be left behind, your own military career may be affected. A successful staff officer has to show tact & sympathy, & be prepared to advance to a half-way line."

            On his return from England, Colonel Munton went into the affair. He found that it was some British officers who had done the mischief, and not Nathu Singh. Of course, he had declined to attend the dinner, but this was in reaction to the black balling of the three Indian officers. In fact, by standing up for his Indian colleagues, Nathu Singh gained the respect of several British officers, who felt that the club rules were unfair.

        In 1934, 1/7 Rajputs moved to Secunderabad. Like Cariappa, Nathu Singh also wished to apply for the Staff College. More than ambition, he was spurred by burning desire to prove to the British that he was better than they thought him to be. For three years, he was denied the recommendation to compete for the examination, on the grounds that he lacked experience. Naturally, he was livid with rage, especially as several other officers, junior to him, were granted permission. However, there was little he could do, but wait. Then, a new CO took over, and in 1935, Nathu Singh was given the necessary recommendation. He appeared in the entrance examination, and not only qualified, but secured a competitive vacancy. In fact, he secured 915 marks out of 1000 in the Strategy paper, a record which was never surpassed. The fact that he had done so, without any guidance or coaching, was noticed, and commended by his CO.

         At Quetta, one of his instructors was B.L. Montgomery, who later achieved fame as the victor of El Alamien. 'Monty' was greatly impressed by Nathu's sharp mind, and grasp of tactical problems, and predicted that he would go far in the profession. He was known for his anti Indian bias, and held a poor opinion of Indians, and their intellectual capabilities. Once, he is said to have remarked "I do not like things Indian", drawing a prompt retort from Nathu Singh, "then what are you doing here, Sir?"

          After successfully completing the course at the Staff College, Quetta, in 1937, Nathu Singh was posted as Staff Captain of the Naushera Brigade. After the outbreak of   World War II, he was promoted Major, and appointed Brigade Major of the same brigade. He was on excellent terms with his first brigade commander, Brigadier Nye, who later became Vice Chief of Imperial General Staff. However, he was at logger heads with Nye's successor, due to his views supporting the stand of the Congress Party. In 1942, he was packed off to Imphal, as GSO 2 (Chemical Warfare), of IV British Corps. He was mainly concerned with the evacuation of refugees, who poured into India, as a result of the Japanese invasion of Burma. He literally saved thousands of refugees from certain death, and his contribution was acknowledged when he was transferred to 2/7 Rajput, as the second-in-command.

                    

            By now, Nathu Singh had put in almost twenty years service, and should have been promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, and given command of a battalion. However, his promotion was delayed by almost a year, and he remained the second-in-command. This was probably due to his pro nationalist stance. During the Quit India movement in 1942, he was asked to suppress an agitation. He placed a picket on the route of the rally, but persuaded the Congress leaders, who were known to him, to take another route. Next day, the CO again asked him to do the same. Nathu Singh objected, saying that it was not fair to ask him to shoot at his own countrymen, who were only asking for their freedom. He requested the CO to give the job to some other officer, but this was refused, and he was told that if he disobeyed orders he would be court martialled. Nathu Singh refused to carry out the orders, and the matter was reported to the District Commander, Major General Bruce Scott. When he was marched up to General Scott, Nathu Singh defended his action, as a 'concientous objector', quoting the example of similar cases in Ireland. To his good luck, Scott turned out to be an Irishman. He appreciated the stand taken by Nathu Singh, and let him off.

            In October 1943, Nathu Singh was promoted and given command of 9/7 Rajput, at Chhindwara.  When he took over the battalion, it had been graded 'unfit for war', after having been mauled by the Japanese in Burma. Nathu Singh set to work like a man possessed, and within a few months, had turned it round. He was full of energy and determination, and his hard work paid off. During the next inspection, the Brigade Commander could find little fault, and the battalion was graded 'fit for war'. In fact, it was graded as the best battalion in the division, and Major General 'Tiger' Curtis, GOC 14 Indian Division, congratulated them at a parade, in front of the entire division.

            Shortly afterwards, Nathu Singh was transferred to 3 Maratha Light Infantry, in Italy. Command of a battalion in action would entitle him to quick promotion, and he would probably get a chance to command a brigade in field, and become the first Indian to do so. But Nathu Singh wanted command of his own battalion, and nothing else. He appealed to the C-in-C, General Auchinleck, under whom he had served in the NWFP, and who had become his mentor. The Auk promptly had his transfer orders rescinded, and Nathu Singh assumed command of 1/7 Rajput on in September 1944. When World War II ended, he was commanding the battalion, in the Andamans, and accepted the formal surrender of Japanese troops in the Andaman and Nicobar islands on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia. It was from Andamans that he wrote the famous letter to Auchinleck protesting against the INA trials. Running into eight pages, and couched in the strongest language, it brings out his anger, and anguish, at the unfairness of the trials, and its repercussions. As an example of courage, and candour, it has few equals.

            In his letter, dated 17 December 1945, Nathu enclosed a Note, which bore the heading REPERCUSSIONS OF THE I.N.A. TRIALS ON THE MINDS OF AN INDIAN IN THE ARMY. Listing the  main reasons which led to the formation of the INA, he felt that these factors, put together, led to grave doubts whether the British were serious about Indianisation, or it was merely 'window dressing,' to impress the public and the outside World. Though two and a half million Indians had fought in two wars, they had not been able to produce a single General. Important appointments dealing with operations were denied to them, and just a handful were given command of units. Drawing a parallel with the Soviet Union, which took shape at about the same time as Indianisation began in India, the disparities were obvious. However, his most scathing comments were reserved for the unfair treatment meted out to Indians, which he covers at length. Nathu Singh wrote:

"..... The creation and growth of the INA was a direct result of the continuous unjust treatment of Indian officers in the Army. It is the natural heritage of years of dissatisfaction, disappointment and disgust of various elements in the Indian Army. The present members of the INA are to be blamed for their conduct, but equally to blame is the Imperialist Anti-Indian British element in the army who by their talk and action daily estranged the otherwise loyal mind of the Indian, and last but not the least to blame are the British reverses in the Far East, which left the Indian soldier to their fate.

            Time is critical, and at this juncture, large issues are at stake. Momentous decisions have to be made, and on them will depend the future Indo-British relations. The previous services of those in the INA who actually fought for the British till they were captured by the enemy deserve lenient treatment. Wisdom and foresight suggest that the crimes of the members of the INA be condoned."

            One can only marvel at the brashness of a Lieutenant Colonel, addressing the C-in-C, on such a sensitive political issue. No less surprising is the Auk's response. Far from taking offence, he realised that the feelings expressed by Nathu Singh stemmed from nationalistic fervour, rather than a rebellious disposition. He not only chose to ignore the fact that the writer had disobeyed orders, in addressing the C-in-C directly, but replied, in his own hand. He could sense the anguish in the heart of Nathu Singh, and could empathise with him. However, he felt disturbed and hurt at the bitterness in Nathu Singh's letter, and admonished him, much as a school master would his favourite pupil. Written in a human vein, the letter brings out the Auk's deep attachment to the Indian Army, and his fondness for his Indian subordinate.

            Marked 'Personal and Private', the Auk's hand written letter of 19 February 1946, reads:

  "....I know that many of the views expressed by you are based on fact. All the same, I do feel that you are wrong to dwell so much on past mistakes and bitterness and I know that many of your opinions are exaggerated and unfair. I say I know this and it grieves me to think that you, whom I regard as an old friend, should deliberately rake up old errors and misunderstandings......You are one of the people on whom I had hoped to rely....I was deeply disturbed and I may say, disappointed by the general attitude of mind expressed in your note, but I still hope that it does not represent your permanent frame of mind, as this would cause me sorrow.....Needless to say you have my assurance that this matter is private between us. Your note will not be seen by anyone else and it will not have the slightest effect on your official standing, so far as I am concerned, because I realise that you would not have written as you did had you not had full trust in my good faith and friendship for you.....I do value your having written to me as freely and openly as you did..." 

            As mentioned before, Cariappa was Brigade Major of to 20 Indian Brigade, in Derajat when World War II started in 1939. In January 1941, he was posted as DAQMG of 10 Indian Division, which was then in Iraq. The GOC was 'Bill' Slim, and he was overjoyed when Cariappa joined his staff in Baghdad. Cariappa spent the next one year in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and in North Africa.        In March 1942, he was posted as second-in-command of 7 Rajput Machine Gun Battalion, a new raising, at Fatehgarh. In April 1942, he was promoted Lieutenant Colonel and appointed the Commanding Officer, becoming the first Indian to command a battalion in the Indian Army.

            Cariappa's battalion comprised Muslims and Rajputs, in the ranks. Among officers, two thirds were British, and one third Indian. The unit was equipped with Vickers machine guns, which required considerable skill in handling. After three months, the unit was redesignated as 52 Rajput, and moved to Lahore, as part of  43 Indian Armoured Division. It was converted into an Armoured Corps unit, and its machine guns were replaced by tanks. But within two months, they were reverted to Infantry, redesignated as 17/7 Rajput, and moved to Secunderabad. With two conversions, and two moves within as many months, the unit and the CO were not only confused, but tired, and breathed a sigh of relief when they reached Secunderabad.

            In April 1943, Cariappa was posted to HQ Eastern Command as AQMG. He thus missed the opportunity to lead his battalion in battle, and could not earn a decoration. He shared  this misfortune with Nathu Singh, who also did not get any award, having declined command of a battalion other than his own. In August 1943, the South East Asia Command was formed, and the Fourteenth Army was placed under its command. There were several changes, and Cariappa volunteered to serve in an active formation. He was posted as AQMG, 26 Indian Division, then located near Buthidaung, in Burma. It was a staff job, but at least it was on the battle front. Cariappa did an excellent job, and was awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE), for his services.

            In November 1944, Cariappa was promoted to the rank of Brigadier. However, instead of being given command of a brigade, which he expected and deserved, he was posted as a member of the Reorganisation Committee. Cariappa protested to the Military Secretary, but to no avail. After about a year on the Reorganisation Committee, he was finally given command the Bannu Frontier Brigade, in Waziristan in November 1945. 

            In February 1946, Cariappa   was appointed  Presiding Officer of one of the General Courts Martial constituted to try members of the INA. Before the trial, he visited some of the detention camps, where the prisoners were lodged. He found them full of rancour and hatred against the British, for treating them badly, and holding them without trial. Cariappa was pained by their plight, and wrote to the Adjutant General, requesting him to expedite the trials. He also recommended that some of them, such as Shah Nawaz Khan, G.S. Dhillon, and P.K. Sehgal, should be pardoned. It would be fair to assume that the British decision to let off most of the prisoners was prompted as much by the impassioned pleas of soldiers, such as Cariappa and Nathu Singh, as it was by the strong reaction from the general public and the political leaders.

            Soon after his famous letter to Auchinleck written from the Andamans, Nathu Singh was promoted Colonel  and posted as Deputy Director, Personnel Services, in the Adjutant General's Branch in Army HQ, which was then at Meerut. Very soon, he had differences with the Director, Brigadier Duke, which necessitated the transfer of one of them.  Under normal circumstances, Nathu Singh should have been moved out, but the Auk decided to post out Brigadier Duke instead, and Nathu Singh was promoted Brigadier and appointed Director in his place. Nathu Singh pleaded with the C-in-C to transfer him, instead of Brigadier Duke, but he did not agree. When the Auk came to know about his differences with Brigadier Duke, he called Nathu Singh to Delhi, and made him stay in his own house. He even took him to England, to enable him to study the selection procedure for officers in the British Army. When the time came for Nathu Singh to return to Meerut, he asked the ADC for the bill, for the drinks he had, while staying in the C-in-C's house (This was later renamed as Teen Murti, and became the Prime Minister's House, in Nehru's time). The ADC told him to talk to the C-in-C himself, which he did. The Auk said: "Don't be silly, Nathu. You are my guest." To this Nathu Singh replied: "Sir, I wish I had known this earlier. I would have had a few more drinks."    

            Soon after becoming the Director, Nathu Singh submitted a paper on the reorganisation of the Army, and its officer cadre, which was approved by Auchinleck. A training school was immediately started at Yol, for emergency commissioned officers (ECOs), so that they could be granted permanent regular commission (PRC). This helped about 4,000 ECOs to get absorbed in the regular Army, as ICOs.  It was at this time that he was offered the post of the C-in-C, after Independence. Sardar Baldev Singh was then the Defence Minister of the Interim Government. At a tea party held at his house, Baldev Singh conveyed this to Nathu Singh, in the presence of several other leaders, including the premiers of Punjab and the North West Frontier Province. He followed it up with a letter, on 22 November, 1946, addressed to Nathu Singh:

Your letter of 21st November has reached me. You have been selected and earmarked to be the First C-in-C of India, with Command over the three Defence Services. This decision has been arrived at, after the Muslim League joined the 'Interim Government', and with the consent of all the Political Parties comprising the Government. It is on the recommendation of the present C-in-C, and with the approval of the Governor General, the Viceroy, and may be the HMG. The approval of the officers senior to you does not arise.

           The letter goes on to address  several other issues raised by Nathu Singh, such as acceleration of nationalisation, integration of the three Defence Services, 'Dominion Status' for the country, and the appointment of an Indian as the next Governor General, after Lord Wavell. Baldev Singh also made it clear that after the 'Transfer of Power', the  C-in-C would be working under the Ministry of Defence. Nathu Singh is said to have declined the offer, since he felt that Cariappa was senior, and the appointment should rightfully go to him. However, the next letter from Nathu Singh contains no reference to this offer of promotion. Instead, it deals with a very important subject - the partition of India. Dated 24 November 1946, it reads:.

".....In our case, unless we remain within the Commonwealth maybe for a short period of a year or two, it is clear to me that by the Cabinet Mission's latest suggestion of groupings into zones, they may have may have made sure of cutting the country into three pieces and controlling India, the subcontinent, as they have no doubt they will play havoc with us. To put them in their place, I know Pandit Nehru, and through him, the Congress are trying to do so. But please beware lest India is broken up by bolstering the Muslim League and other communal forces - Sikhs demand for Khalistan, the Princes bid for Federation and encouraging Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir becoming independent by joining hands with other reactionaries...."

 The Defence Minister replied, on 27 November 1946:

       "Your letter of 24th has reached me, its contents are much appreciated by Pt Jawahar Lalji, Sardar Patel, and my other colleagues of the Executive Council, including the members of the Muslim League....I know you are keeping yourself well out of the present constantly changing political developments, much influenced by the British Imperialists in combination with Mr. Jinnah and other leaders, and I expect of you to keep a special eye on the various communities that are being tapped and influenced by them.....I understand you are preparing a paper on acceleration of Nationalisation.....I would much like to discuss this very vital matter with you before you finalise your proposals for the consideration of the Gopalaswamy Nationalisation Committee."

            Nathu Singh and Sarojini Naidu had given evidence before the Skeen Committee on the same day, and they had become quite close to each other. Sarojini Naidu insisted that Nathu Singh should call her 'Mah' (Mother), and that is the way she signed her letters to him. The two often corresponded, and at this juncture, he wrote to her, about the problems facing the Country, and nationalisation of the Army. Sarojini Naidu responded, on 9 January 1947, and wrote:

"Dear Nathoo Singh,

Many Thanks for sending me your very illuminating 'Shot in the dark'. It gives a correct picture of the situation from every angle.

.....As the security of the country depends entirely upon the Army, the army should not be based on what the country can afford to have for its defence. It will be fatal to rely on a small armed force, however efficient and modernly equipped it may be; because our country is vulnerable, bristling with traitors and the fifth columnists, in millions in every part of India. We all know the character and honesty of our potential enemies and so called friends.

Our leaders should get advice from us Indians in the army and other branches..... and not repeat not from hirelings, who have their own axes to grind;....

One thing more, probably you have noticed but have not mentioned; is how the army is at a disadvantage because of that 'steel frame', who wants to have the last word in everything pertaining to the Army. That steel frame must go.

Once again, many thanks for sending me the most illuminating 'Shot in the Dark.'

                                                  Yours

                                                                     Mah

            In February 1947, Nathu Singh was called to give evidence before the Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee. The Committee was set up in November 1946, and consisted of Sir Gopalaswamy Ayyangar (Chairman), Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru, Muhammad Ismail Khan, Sardar Sampuran Singh, Major General D.A.L. Wade, Brigadier K.S. Thimayya, Wing Commander Mehr Singh and Commander H.M.S. Choudri as members, with Lieut Colonel B.M. Kaul as Secretary. Auchinleck had indicated that out of 22,000 officers in the Indian Army, only 8,500 were Indians, with most of them being ECOs, with very little service or experience. If the Indian Army were to be nationalised immediately, officers with less than nine years service would be commanding battalions. While this could be acceptable in war, it would do incalculable harm if resorted to in peace, where officers needed to have judgement, wisdom, patience and a knowledge of human nature, which could only be acquired by experience. He warned against the dangers of entrusting the command of the Army to officers who lacked experience, especially in the prevailing circumstances, when disruptive forces were swaying public opinion.

            Nathu Singh was in Meerut, when he received a questionnaire, which covered several aspects of the problem. He wrote a personal letter to Thimayya, who was member of the Committee, on 8 February 1947, in which he suggested that each issue should first be discussed 'in house' by the Army, before Indian officers give evidence. Unless this was done, the Committee may arrive at wrong conclusions, since most officers lacked knowledge and experience, and did not have at their disposal the necessary data to arrive at valid conclusions. He felt that "Each problem should be thrashed out by experienced Indian officers selected by the Nationalisation Committee, prior to the matter coming up before them. It is in this manner that the Committee will be able to get well considered opinions for their final recommendations."

            When Nathu Singh appeared before the Committee, the date for transfer of power had been announced as June 1948, by the British Prime Minister. He suggested that by that date, Indians should be in full control of the Army, and if this was to be achieved, they must begin to hold responsible positions straight away. He strongly refuted the Committee's suggestion of a Military Mission, to continue after transfer of power, and recommended advisers, who would be responsible to the Indian Government instead of the War Office, as would happen in case of a Military Mission. He also objected to the concept of keeping Indian officers as apprentices or under studies, for important appointments, and felt that they should be deputies instead, so that they had authority as well as responsibility. When asked about the partition of the Army, in case power was transferred to more than one State, Nathu Singh stated that he would hate to do that. In fact, he said that it is not possible to split up the army. He closed by saying, "I suggest that Indians should be consulted in all future planning at A.F.H.Q. This has not been done in the past. We are going to be holding the baby soon. We must be taken into confidence."

            The Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee submitted its report on 12 May 1947. However, by this time the date of transfer of power had been advanced to 15 August 1947, and the Committee's recommendations became redundant.  Nathu Singh again wrote  to the Defence Minister on 31 May 1947, after reading his broadcast, about Partition. By this time, he had been transferred to Derajat Force, in Dera Ismail Khan. He wrote to Sardar Baldev Singh:

  "...I was amazed and shocked to read your broadcast in the paper at the possibility of a division of the defence services. As an Indian I hate it. My conception is that to partition India would be equivalent of committing rape of our Motherland and to partition the defence services means nothing short of civil war within a few years time......You will play an important part in the final shape of things to come. What about your collecting a selected number of senior officers from all classes and communities from the services and forcing down the throat of uncompromising political leaders, the wisdom of a united India staying within the Empire...."

            The Defence Minister replied, on 12 June 1947:

  " .....I entirely agree with you that the division of India would be equivalent to committing rape of our Motherland and the division of the Defence Forces will have a serious effect on the Military. If in case there is no other solution to our political problem except the division of the country, then division of the Army is inevitable, and this is what I have stated in my statement...I have noted  your suggestion about certain officers. We have at present a number of problems facing us and we will need the help of senior Indian officers, but the final decision will have to be taken after the Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab have given their verdict about partition of the Provinces."

            Nathu Singh's correspondence with Sardar Baldev clearly brings out his concern for the unity and integrity of India. He was of the opinion that the British deliberately partitioned India, to make it weak, even hoping that it would be 'ungovernable', and force the warring factions to ask them to extend their stay in the Colony. He felt that the Armed Forces, being unaffected by the virus of religion and communalism, were capable of holding the country together, and partition could have been avoided. He never forgave Nehru and the other leaders for their failure to consult the  Armed Forces, or take them into confidence, before taking the decision to accept partition. At this time, Nathu Singh was posted on the North West Frontier, from where he could do little but write letters. Also, he was only a Brigadier, and though the most voluble of the KCIOs, he was not the senior among them. Had this been the case, perhaps he could have influenced matters, and events may have taken a different turn. It is pertinent to note that in January 1947, Cariappa had been sent to the Imperial Defence College, in UK, from where he was recalled only in July, and was thus absent at a very crucial juncture, when the fate of the Indian Army was being decided.  

            Cariappa was sent to UK, to attend the Imperial Defence College, along with J.N. Chaudhuri, who was only a Colonel. This was the first time Indian officers had been sent on this prestigious course, and was the result of the foresight of Auchinleck, who knew that the British would be leaving India soon, and appreciated the necessity of training Indian officers to fill senior appointments in the Government and the Army. Cariappa's old commander, and mentor, Bill Slim, was the Commandant of the Imperial Defence College. He saw Cariappa as the future C-in-C of the Indian Army, and often invited him for discussions on the situation then unfolding in the sub continent. During this time, there was a lot of talk of India, and the Indian Army, being divided.  Cariappa, realising the dangers of dividing the Army, and the lack of experience of officers at senior levels, made a statement that it would take at least five years before the Indian Army could stand on its feet, without the help of British officers. This was picked up by the press, and caused a furore in India. Liaquat Ali Khan, of the Muslim League, felt that Cariappa's intentions, in keeping an undivided Army, were suspect, and took up the issue with Mountbatten. Cariappa was summoned to India House, in London, where Lord Ismay, Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, was present. Cariappa clarified that he had made the suggestion only because he felt that an undivided Army could help the two newly independent nations in getting over their teething problems. He was admonished, told to knock the idea out of his mind, and not to mention it again. In a telegram to Mountbatten, on 4 May 1947, Ismay wrote: "It is hard to know whether Cariappa in putting forward his idea was ingenious and ignorant or disingenuous and dangerous, or both."

            Cariappa took the advice, and did not talk about it again. However, he was not the only one who felt this way. Nathu Singh had already taken up this matter with the Defence Minister, Sardar Baldev Singh, several months earlier. Cariappa could not complete the course, as he was recalled in July, to supervise the reorganisation of the Army, before Partition. Immediately on his return, he wrote to Nehru, making another fervent appeal to prevent the division of the Army. Nehru's reply was non committal. On one occasion, he collared Jinnah at a social function, and told him categorically that if the Army was split, both India and Pakistan would be vulnerable to outside attack. Jinnah laughed it off, saying that if this happened, both countries would get together and face the enemy.

        On 15 August 1947, the day India became independent, Cariappa was promoted Major General, and appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff, at Army HQ. The Indian Army was partitioned also, and there was considerable wrangling and heart burning over the division of regiments, military establishments, and weaponry. In November 1947, he took over as GOC-in-C Eastern Command, relieving Lt. Gen. Sir Francis Tuker. He remained at Ranchi for just over a month. As the Kashmir situation worsened, he was moved to replace Lt. Gen. Dudley Russel, who resigned as GOC-in-C, Delhi and East Punjab (DEP) Command, which was then located at Delhi. Cariappa renamed it as Western Command and moved his own HQ to Jammu.

       Cariappa had some of his finest hours during the Kashmir operations. Operation KIPPER, for the capture of Naushera and Jhangar, was planned by him, and succeeded. This was followed by Operation EASY, for the link up with Punch, and Operation  BISON, for the capture of Zojila, Dras and Kargil. If he had been given additional troops, and the necessary permission, he would have succeeded in pushing the Pakistanis out of Kashmir, for which plans had been made. Unfortunately, this did not come about, due to the intervention of the United Nations, after an appeal by India. Characteristically, Nehru took the decision to appeal to the UN Security Council without consulting the Armed Forces.

            The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on 21 April 1948, calling for a cease fire, a plebiscite, and the appointment of a commission. Both India and Pakistan rejected the resolution, but agreed to receive the commission. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was then formed. The UNCIP adopted a resolution, asking both countries to agree to a cease fire, and conclude a truce agreement, for further consultations for a plebiscite. India accepted this resolution, while Pakistan refused.

            On 6 July 1948, Army HQ issued instructions that no major operations were to be undertaken without their sanction. Cariappa was told to concentrate on stabilising the existing positions, and not to expect any additional troops, as none could be spared, keeping in mind the Hyderabad operations, and overall  situation in the country. Cariappa protested that such a defensive policy would be harmful, since the enemy was on the offensive in Tithwal, Punch, and Hajipir pass. There was a threat to Leh, and if this fell, Kargil could be reinforced, posing a serious threat to the Kashmir valley. He pleaded for continuing the offensive operations, for the capture of Kargil, Domel and  Mirpur, and asked for two additional brigades. With great reluctance, he was given permission only for the advance to Kargil, and allotted a brigade for the task. To make matters worse, the Indian Air Force was forbidden to attack installations near the border, to avoid reports from the UNCIP.

            Considering the restrictions placed on him by his own Government, and the lack of support in terms of troops, it is indeed commendable that Cariappa succeeded in achieving what he did. Due to political considerations, a defensive policy was imposed on the Army. As a result, India lost several key objectives, in Uri and Tithwal sectors. Since the road to Ladakh could not be opened till Zojila, Dras and Kargil were captured, Cariappa decided to do so, on his own. In disobeying orders, which forbade all offensive operations, he took a grave risk. But had he not done so, Ladakh may not have been part of India today. As it happened, these key objectives were captured, after a brilliant manoeuvre, including the use of tanks, for the first time, at such altitudes. The country owes an eternal debt to Cariappa for the risks he took. If he had failed, it would have ended his career.             

            When India achieved Independence, Nathu Singh was in command of the Derajat Force, at Dera Ismail Khan. Thanks to his penchant for disagreeing with his British superiors, he was transferred, in quick succession, to Kamptee Sub Area and then to the refugee camp at Kurukshetra. After a visit to the camp Edwina Mountbatten was so impressed that she told Nathu Singh: "You must be a genius." Shortly afterwards, when Mahatma Gandhi visited the camp, they had a discussion about non violence. Nathu Singh asked the Mahatma how he expected his principles of non violence to work, in the existing circumstances. He also asked: "In 1921, you had said that we would achieve independence in one year. What happened? You had said, division of the country over my dead body. And the country has been divided." Gandhiji had no answer.     

             Very soon, Nathu Singh was promoted Major General, and appointed GOC Deccan Area, where he was involved in the planning of the Hyderabad operations, which took place later. While he was there, he was called to Delhi, to attend a briefing, so that he could take over command of the operations in Jammu and Kashmir, which had already commenced. Due to some reason, he could not reach Delhi in time, and Brigadier Kalwant Singh, who was then Director of Operations at Army HQ and familiar with the situation, was promoted and appointed GOC JAK Force. When Nathu Singh reached Delhi, he went to the Operations Room, and came to know of this development. After studying the situation, he went to meet the Prime Minister, which was then a normal practice, for senior Army officers.

            When he reached the Prime Minister's house, he found him sitting on the lawn, talking to some ministers, and civilian officials. Presently, Nehru got up and went inside. The others present there asked Nathu Singh for his views, on the best way to deal with the crisis, in Kashmir. Nathu Singh replied that if he had his way, he would use the minimum troops, to hold the passes, and with maximum force, attack and capture Lahore. This would force Pakistan to withdraw, and vacate all occupied territory in Jammu and Kashmir. The civilians were impressed by the logic of this argument, and when Nehru returned, they told him that the General had a plan to throw out the invaders. When Nehru asked him to repeat what he had said, Nathu Singh demurred, saying that he would rather not, since he knew it would not find favour. But Nehru insisted, and Nathu repeated what he had told the others. Nehru became angry, and said that a responsible senior officer like him should not have thought of such a foolhardy scheme, which could cause an international crisis. It is interesting to recall that in 1965, a similar plan was approved by Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was then the Prime Minister, and it was the threat to Lahore which saved Kashmir, from Pakistani aggression. 

            In December 1947, Nathu Singh was posted to Lucknow, as GOC UP Area. Sarojini Naidu, who had been appointed Governor of the United Provinces after Independence, was also in Lucknow. Apart from being a well known patriot and freedom fighter, she was a renowned poetess, and known as "The Nightingale of India." She was very close to Mahatma Gandhi and other Congress leaders, and had played a prominent part in the struggle for freedom. Nathu Singh discussed with her the problems of India's security, and the Armed Forces. He had put down his views in a paper called 'Notes on National Security', and he gave her a copy. She forwarded them to Nehru, who was the Prime Minister, and prevailed on him to through them. Nehru's comments on the Note make interesting reading. In a hand written note, dated 1 January 1948, he wrote:

".....It is axiomatic that India must be strong militarily etc or otherwise she will not only not progress but might break up. How best to build up strength in various sectors is a question of balancing resources....

.....       Strength, and even purely military strength, depends today far more than before, on our industrial growth & scientific research. It depends also on internal cohesion and peace in industry etc. This latter is a political & economic problem of exceeding complexity and cannot be dealt with simply by military or police methods.

  .....The whole question of defence is intimately tied up with international questions as well as economic questions. The Notes (of General Nathu Singh) though they refer to international matters do not show an intimate knowledge of the international set-up or economic questions which are of vital importance today both internally and externally.

......No British officer will be in operational command in the Indian Army after 31.3.1948.

  .....Some of the lines of approach in these notes are arguable. They may land us in difficulties. But generally Major General Nathu Singh's notes are helpful and it is desirable that urgent thought should be given to these matters by our senior officers and those in control of the political destinies of the nation.

                                                                     (Signed) J. Nehru                                                                                                               1//1/48"

            The divergence of views between Nehru and Nathu Singh are obvious. The ideals, so dear to Nehru's heart, and his consciousness of the international role which he saw for India, are also evident. However, one cannot but help remark that he also appears to pontificate, much as a school master would on a student's essay, submitted for evaluation. His remarks about Nathu Singh's ignorance of international matters are ungracious, when one recalls that having been in office for just five months, he himself had little experience, as Nathu Singh was to subsequently remind him. He was also out, by almost a year, in his assertion about British officers not being in command after 31 March 1948.

         Nathu Singh's tenure in Lucknow was short, but eventful. He had to put down two mutinies, at Allahabad and Jhansi, which were nipped in the bud, and did not affect the rest of the Army. During this time, he also had an unfortunate misunderstanding with Nehru, concerning his absence at a parade held at Lucknow. Though he had known Nehru for several years, their relations soured, and were never cordial after this. In January 1948, soon after taking charge, he had written an Appreciation on the Defence of India, and forwarded it to Army HQ. He was greatly perturbed by a directive issued from the office of the C-in-C, which sought to reduce the size of the Regular Army to 150,000 - during World War II, it had risen to 2.5 million -  with an annual budget allocation of 45 crore rupees (a crore is ten million), for the next three years.

            In the preamble, he wrote:

            "We as soldiers must approach our leaders and submit our minimum requirements and make it clear that if funds are not provided for such a force, the responsibility will be upon them. A soldier is but a servant of the State. He must however, point out any weaknesses in the defensive structure of the country with all the emphasis at his command. In order to arrive at a correct appreciation, we must consider both military and allied factors and not be swayed by any notions of idealism or allow political considerations to affect our judgement.....

A NEWLY CREATED NATION WHICH HAS ONLY JUST THROWN OFF HER BONDAGE OF FOREIGN RULE OF 200 YEARS AND MORE CANNOT RISK A REVERSE ALMOST AT HER REBIRTH.

.....We must NOT decide on the size of our Defence Service on what we can financially afford but on what we need in the form of a Modern Defence based on the following considerations :-

(a)       What is the strength and armament of present and potential enemies of India?

(b)       What is the force required by India to meet this threat

(c)        What will be the cost of maintaining such a force?

(d)       What is the maximum amount the country can afford to pay for its Defence Forces?

(e)        To arrive at a compromise between (b), (c) and (d0 above, consistent with the safety of our land.

Keeping the above in view, the Land Forces which India should maintain are given in the enclosed appreciation. They are only my first thoughts."

            Nathu Singh proceeded to list out the frame work of the Indian Army, for the future. By present standards, he was extremely conservative - he asked for one corps headquarters, one armoured division, two infantry divisions, one parachute brigade, one armoured brigade, and the associated complement of Artillery, Engineers and Signals. The number of infantry battalions was only 28. However, he advocated a large complement of territorial army, which would provide the second line of defence, and boost the resources of the regular army, during war.

             In April 1948, he was promoted Lieut General, and appointed GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, at Ranchi. Like many other Indian officers, he had risen from the rank of Lieut Colonel to Lieut General, in less than three years. He continued his efforts to convince the political and military leadership of the necessity of maintaining a strong Army. When asked for a run down of the Army, by Army HQ, he replied, on 24 October 1950 :-

  "....The situation facing the country from the military point of view is today virtually the same if not worse because, although Pakistan outwardly appears to be fraternising with our country, recent speeches of their leaders leave no room for doubt that they are preparing for a show-down with our country over the KASHMIR issue.

  .....Communist China's complete success over the KUOMINTANG and the establishment of the Peoples' Government, their recent activities, their declared policy towards liberation of Tibet, and the recent Mission from the latter country clearly indicate the writing on the wall. The Communist menace is gradually spreading towards the very borders of India.

  .....To ensure the security of our borders and our State, the Defence service ratio between INDIA  and  PAKISTAN should be two to one . If this is reduced, we will be laying our country open to an ever present danger of a major war."

            Nathu Singh's remarks, especially with reference to Pakistan and China, display an insight of international affairs which very few Indians had, at that time. Even Nehru, who orchestrated India's foreign policy for almost two decades following Independence, failed to grasp the nuances which Nathu Singh had perceived. As a result, the Defence Forces were neglected, with disastrous results in 1962. Nathu Singh cried himself hoarse, trying to convince the political and military leadership of the need of maintaining a strong Army. An intimate knowledge of military affairs is important for those who decide the fate of peoples, and nations. Among his contemporaries, such as Churchill, Stalin, Chiang Kai Shek, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Tito, and Nasser, Nehru was one of the few who had never worn an uniform.   

            Soon after Independence, the Prime Minister held a conference of senior Army officers, to elicit their views regarding keeping British officers for some more time, as advisors. Nehru felt that Indian officers lacked the experience to take over the responsibility for such a large Army, and wanted to retain British officers for a longer period, as Pakistan had done. Almost everyone agreed with Nehru, except for Nathu Singh. He said: " Officers sitting here have more than 25 years service, and are capable of holding senior appointments in the Armed Forces. As for experience, if I may ask you Sir, what experience do you have to hold the post of Prime Minister?" There was a stunned silence, and Nehru did not reply. Finally, it was decided to keep the British advisors for some more time, as proposed by Nehru.  

2030, 17 sep 2010

            On 15 January 1949, Cariappa succeeded General Roy Bucher, as Chief of Army Staff and Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army. In fact, Cariappa was the third choice for the job, and got it only after the other two Army Commanders, Nathu Singh and  Rajendra Sinhji, declined the offer, in deference to Cariappa, who was senior to both of them. When Cariappa became Chief, he was 13 days short of his 49th birthday. After almost 200 years of British rule, an Indian had finally assumed command of the Indian Army, and to mark this historic occasion, 15 January became the official Army Day, in India.

              Cariappa served as Commander-in-Chief for four years, retiring on 14 January 1953. His greatest achievement was keeping the Indian Army apolitical, and establishing healthy traditions. Unlike Pakistan and Burma, which achieved independence from British rule at about the same time, the Indian Army has stayed out of politics, even during times of crisis. Most of the credit for this must go to Cariappa. In fact, he refused to take back INA personnel, primarily for this reason, since he was convinced that they would bring politics into the Army. There was a lot of pressure on him for this, and Nehru relented only after Cariappa threatened to resign on this issue. However, he adopted the slogan 'Jai Hind', used by the INA, and ended all his talks with this. 'Jai Hind' soon became the Indian Army's slogan as well as form of greeting, between men and officers.             

            Though he was a staunch 'Rajput', he never did anything to favour his own regiment. In fact, just before he retired, Major (later Colonel) Mustasad Ahmed, the Centre Adjutant, went to Delhi to get the new regimental headgear approved. Cariappa called him over for lunch, and while they were talking, Mustasad blurted out; "Sir, now that you are laying down the office, we feel that you have not done anything special for the regiment." Cariappa smiled, and remarked, "So that is what you all think". Fifteen years later, in 1968, they met again in Delhi. Mustasad mentioned that with the Chief being a gunner, the Artillery was now getting the best foreign assignments. Cariappa immediately retorted; "You remember, you once told me that I have not done anything special for the regiment. If I had, people would be saying the same about me."             

             In 1951, he visited the Rajput Regimental Centre to present the Cariappa Banner, which was awarded to the best training company of the year. There was a doubt whether the banner should be escorted, on parade, like the Colours. The Centre Commandant, Colonel Guman Singh, did not believe in polite gestures, and after consulting the orders on the subject, decided that the banner was not entitled to an escort.     When Cariappa arrived on parade, and saw that the banner named after him was not being properly escorted, he went crimson with rage. The initial blast was borne by Lieut General Nathu Singh, who was GOC-in-C Eastern Command. He in turn gave a dressing down to the Adjutant, Major Mustasad Ahmed, who could do little else than look at the Centre Commandant, who happened to be the Army Commander's son-in-law. Without batting an eye lid, Guman Singh told the Chief that he had read the rules carefully, and the banner was not entitled to an escort. Cariappa immediately cooled down, and became his charming self.  

        Like Nathu Singh, Cariappa also had his brushes with Nehru. He had foreseen the Chinese threat, and wanted to defend the border more effectively. In May 1951, he presented an outline plan for the defence of the North East Frontier Agency. Nehru dismissed his plans, adding that it was not the business of the C-in-C to tell the Prime Minister how to defend the country. He advised Cariappa to only worry about Pakistan and Kashmir; as far as NEFA was concerned, the Chinese themselves would defend our frontiers! Cariappa was terribly hurt, but like a good soldier, accepted the rebuke from the Prime Minister. In later years, he realised his mistake. If he had persisted, and corrected Nehru's fantasies with more forceful arguments and facts, perhaps the debacle of 1962 would not have taken place.   

            Cariappa was a meticulous host, as well as a guest. Even after his retirement, when he lived alone, he entered his own drawing room fully dressed. Once when he was the Chief, Lieut General Thakur Nathu Singh, then Army Commander of Eastern Command, was a house guest. Nathu Singh wanted to pull Cariappa's leg. So he put on a 'kurta' and 'pyjama', and sat in the drawing room. When Cariappa entered the room some time later, he immediately ticked off Nathu Singh, who replied that what he was wearing was the national dress, and Cariappa had better get used to it.

  One quality that Nathu Singh and Cariappa shared was uprightness. There can be no better illustration of Cariappa's sterling character, than that concerning his son, Nanda Cariappa, a fighter pilot who was shot down in Pakistan, during the 1965 War (Nanda rose to be an Air Marshal, and retired as AOC-in-C, South Western Air Command). Field Marshal Ayub Khan sent a message to Cariappa that his son was safe and would be well looked after. He also offered to release him, if Cariappa desired. Cariappa replied, "I will ask no favour for my son, which I cannot secure for every soldier of the Indian Army. Look after all of them. They are all my sons."

      Cariappa's love and affection for the Indian 'Jawan' was well known. He often said," Our Jawans are absolute gems." After his retirement, when he moved to Roshanara, his house in Mercara, he had a statue of a Jawan kept on his mantlepiece, next to a photograph of his father. Cariappa started his day by paying obeisance to both. He never accepted any criticism of the Indian Army, or the Jawan, and was quick to rise to their defence. He once filed defamation charges against a newspaper which carried derogatory remarks about the Indian Army. When the Editor apologised, and retracted the remarks, Cariappa withdrew the suit.

          Though Cariappa was a strict disciplinarian, he also had a great sense of humour, and could be extremely charming and full of fun. One such incident was described by  Harjit Malik, in a 'middle', entitled THE GENERAL DANCED, in the Times of India, of 3 June 1993. When Cariappa was the Chief, he went on a visit to France, where the ambassador, H.S. Malik, asked him to stay at the embassy. When he heard that the French celebrate the Quatorze Juillet by dancing on the streets, he expressed a desire to join the celebrations. There was great consternation, in the embassy as well as his staff, but Cariappa was firm.  Accompanied by the Maliks and their daughter, Harjit,  the General proceeded to the Latin Quarter, and the party luckily found an empty table at one of the pavement cafes. Cariappa sat for a while, erect as a ramrod, looking at the thousands of Parisiennes, dancing with gay abandon, or locked in embrace, oblivious of the World around. Then the music, and the atmosphere, became too much, and he got up, and asked Harjit for a dance. And soon, people saw a sedate old gentleman, impeccably dressed, with a young girl on his arm, dancing the foxtrot, in a crowd of long haired and scantily dressed bohemians.

            Soon after his retirement, Cariappa was offered the job of Indian High Commissioner in Australia, by the Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru. After some deliberation, he accepted, and sailed for Sydney in July 1953. His niece, Sagari, volunteered to go with him, and keep house. When Cariappa arrived at Canberra, the Governor General, Field Marshal Slim, broke protocol, and called on Cariappa at his residence, even before he had presented his credentials.

       His stay in Australia was eventful, and soon everyone was talking of the Indian High Commissioner. During  one of his trips, he saw a war memorial, which was not being looked after, and surrounded by bushes. Cariappa stopped his car, walked up to the memorial, and began clearing the growth with his own hands. Soon, a crowd had collected. The incident was widely reported in the Press, and the Australians felt ashamed that a foreigner had to show them how to respect their martyrs.

      On another occasion, when Cariappa was going to attend a function organised by ex servicemen, his car broke down. Cariappa took a lift in a truck. During the journey, the truck driver asked him who he was. When Cariappa replied that he was the Indian High Commissioner, the driver laughed and said, "In that case I am the King of Nepal." When they reached their destination, Cariappa thanked the driver, saying," Thank you, Your Majesty." The driver, seeing his hosts, realised that he had indeed been travelling with the Indian High Commissioner, and apologised.

            

            Cariappa's tenure in Australia was not without controversy. Once, he made certain remarks about Australia's white migrants policy, which favoured immigration of white races only. This created a furore in the Press, and there were demands for his recall, for interfering in the domestic affairs of another country. But Cariappa remained unfazed. He knew that he was right, and his views had many supporters. Ultimately, the Australian Government was forced to review its immigration policy, and make it more liberal.

        Cariappa returned to India in 1956, and retired to his house, Roshanara, in Mercara, in Coorg. But he continued to take a keen interest in all matters concerning the Army. When the Chinese attacked India in 1962, he went to the local recruiting office, and offered to enlist, as a soldier. In 1965, after the cease fire, he expressed a desire to visit the troops, on the front. During his visit to 17 Rajput, the battalion he had raised in 1942, the troops raised their war cry, after he had spoken to them. The Pakistani battalion commander on the other side was agitated, and asked his men to man the trenches. He then registered a strong protest. When he was told the reason for the war cry, he immediately came across, saluted Cariappa, and requested him to come over, so that his men could also have a glimpse of the legendary General.

                              

            Though Cariappa had been C-in-C of the Indian Army for four years, he was only 53 years old when he retired. Today, the Chief retires at 60. Not only Cariappa, but several other senior officers had very short tenures. Nathu Singh retired at the age of 51, and Thimayya and Thorat at 55. This was one of the biggest blunders of the Nehru Government, which insisted on keeping British officers after Independence, on the grounds that Indian officers lacked experience. At the same time, it allowed its most experienced officers, such as Cariappa, Nathu Singh, Thimayya and Thorat to retire, at a very young age. In the event, the Nation was deprived of their services when it needed them most. When the Chinese attacked India in 1962, both Thimayya and Thorat had spent just a year out of uniform. Who knows, if they had been still serving, the Nation would have been spared the humiliation it suffered. 

        The welfare of ex servicemen always remained Cariappa's prime concern. In 1964, he founded the Indian Ex Servicemens League (IESL), by amalgamating the Federation and the Association, which were rival organisations, often working at cross purposes. He was also responsible for creation of the Directorate of Resettlement. In 1957, he took up cudgels on behalf of Major  General Tara Singh Bal, who had been unjustly retired by the Government, and had him reinstated. Keeping the IESL free from politics was one of his major achievements.

            Cariappa also had made a brief foray into politics, in early 1971. Convinced that the country could not be governed by the present system of elections, he recommended that the general elections scheduled in 1971 be cancelled, and President's rule be imposed for a few years, keeping the Constitution in suspended animation. Political parties were to be abolished, and Martial Law imposed in disturbed States. Once the situation had stabilised, elections could be held, with just two or three parties, as in UK or USA. As was expected, there was a violent reaction from all political parties, and Y.B. Chavan, the Home Minister, denounced in Parliament the call for 'Army Rule by an ex C-in-C'. Cariappa wrote an angry letter to Chavan, berating him for misleading the House, and demanded an apology, which never came.

            A number of his friends and admirers had been trying to persuade him to join politics and stand for elections, so that he could contribute to the Nation's development. After deep reflection, he agreed, and decided to contest foe the Lok Sabha seat from the North East Bombay. Lieut General S.P.P. Thorat, and several other retired officers came forward to assist him in his campaign, in addition to several well known industrialists and the erstwhile Maharaja of Mysore. Cariappa declined to join any political party, and stood as an independent candidate. Unfortunately, two of his opponents were V.K. Krishna Menon and Acharya J.B. Kripalani, both veterans and political heavy weights. Cariappa, though widely respected, was a novice in the rough and tumble world of politics. He refused to use money or muscle, to get votes, and in his campaign speeches, talked of honour, integrity and probity, which seemed unintelligible to his audiences. Most of them came to his meetings with a sense of amusement, and laughed at his 'fauji Hindustani', which few in Bombay could comprehend. Not surprisingly, he lost, and came a poor third, behind his two seasoned opponents, who had several decades of experience, backed by the resources of their respective political parties. Apart from lack of experience, he went wrong in the choice of his constituency. If he had stood from his native Coorg, perhaps he would have won.

        In 1986, the Government decided to appoint him a Field Marshal. Technically, a Field Marshal never retires, and therefore, retired officers cannot be given this rank. However, the decision stemmed from the deep sense of respect and esteem in which Cariappa was held, by all sections of Indian society. Cariappa graciously accepted the honour. On 28 April 1986, at a Special Investiture Ceremony held at Rashtrapati Bhawan, he was presented the Field Marshal's baton by President Zail Singh. In deference to his age - he was 86 - he was offered a chair, while the citation was being read out. True to his character, Cariappa declined the offer, and stood ramrod straight, throughout the ceremony.

         After 1991, Cariappa's health deteriorated. He was suffering from arthritis, and a  weak heart, and needed constant medical attention. He was shifted to a cottage, in the Command Hospital, at Bangalore. The end came on 15 May 1994. Cariappa died in his sleep, peacefully. Two days later, his mortal remains were cremated at his ancestral home at Madikeri, in Coorg. The cremation had all the ceremony and pomp which befitted a Field Marshal, and the three Service Chiefs, along with Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, were in attendance, when his son Nanda Cariappa lit the funeral pyre, and the buglers sounded the Last Post, with the Honour Guard reversing arms. Many of the mourners, including some soldiers in uniform, had tears in their eyes, as they bade farewell to the man who had always treated them like his sons, and whom they called the 'Father of the Indian Army'. 

          Kipper is no more. But if the adage about old soldiers never dying, but fading away, was ever true, it was in his case. He had become a living legend, even before he rose to the highest military rank. Every man has faults, and perhaps Cariappa too had some. But they are hard to find. Even those who did not openly adore him respected him, grudgingly. He had the strongest character and sense of values, qualities that are hard to come by today. Although a strict disciplinarian, he was always just and fair, and even those who felt the rough end of his stick vouch for this. The Indian nation owes him an eternal debt, for his contributions, which are too numerous to recount. Of course, if Cariappa had been alive, and told this, he would have said that he only did what he felt was his duty. Though anglicised in habits and behaviour, he was a patriot and kept the interest of his country always uppermost, followed by that of the soldier. Every Indian Army officer is reminded of the immortal words of Field Marshal Lord Chetwode, as he takes the Final Step, and passes out, from the Indian Military Academy. " The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time; the honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next; your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time."  One of the few who followed it, in letter and spirit, was K.M. Cariappa.        

25 Oct 2010