THE SAGA OF CAPTAIN PK GHOSH, VrC
By
Maj Gen VK Singh
The exploits of Captain
(later Brigadier) Prashanta Kumar Ghosh form an important part of the history
of the Corps of Signals during the operations for the liberation of Bangla Desh
in 1971. Strangely enough, the story has never been told, partly because of the
innate modesty of the person involved. For this lapse, the Corps also must
share a part of the blame. Had he been from any other arm or service, there is
little doubt that he would have been made much of. The task entrusted to him required the
highest standards of courage, initiative and resourcefulness. He not only
completed the mission but exceeded the expectations of those who had planned
it. The fact that he was selected for
the assignment, which involved the highest degree of risk – he had to go behind
enemy lines, alone – is itself a tribute not only to him but to all signallers.
His feat was recognised by the well deserved award of a Vir Chakra, which he
almost missed, thanks to some misunderstanding about his parent formation.
Mercifully, the confusion was sorted out in the nick of time and Ghosh got the
coveted decoration.
Contrary to popular belief,
Ghosh was not para-dropped with a signal detachment into East Pakistan. He
crossed the border on foot, all by himself, with only a local lad of 14 years
to help with him with local dialects He infiltrated in mid November 1971 with
the help of FJ Sector, then commanded by
Brigadier Sant Singh MVC**. The brigade major of the Sector was a signaller -
Major S.G. Mookerjee, who later became a lieutenant general and the
SO-in-C. Ghosh soon established contact
with ‘Tiger’ Siddiqui near Madhupur, north of Tangail and set about carrying
out his tasks. Briefly, he selected the
main and alternate dropping zones and with Siddiqui’s boys was able to secure
them, and make sure that the drop by 2 Para was organized safely. He had to
ensure that the battalion was guided to
Poongli Bridge without loss of time and all the ‘heavy drop’, meaning light vehicles,
guns, ammunition and sundry logistics were recovered from water and
deployed/hauled to appropriate locations. He established road blocks on Road
Madhupur-Tangail, north and south of Poongli Bridge to prevent pressure
building up on 2 Para before they were fully deployed and guns were in place.
The drop took place on 12 December 1971 and everything went off well, thanks to
the preparatory work done by Ghosh. Siddiqui disappeared on the evening of the
air drop as he had no intention of taking orders from the Indian Army or anyone
else. With his immediate entourage he moved quickly towards Dhaka, on the night
of 11 December, to exploit the situation to his best advantage.
The saga of Captain P.K.
Ghosh is best described in his own words:
By May 1971, the
General Elections were over and the situation in East Pakistan was boiling
over. Refugees had begun to pour into India and voices frequently heard in the
media and elsewhere that war with Pakistan could no longer be avoided. As the
excitement was building up I was detailed for the Combined Course at Joint Air
Warfare School in Secunderabad. By the time I returned to Calcutta (50 Para
Brigade had been moved there in January 1971 in view of the Naxal threat to
disrupt the Elections). Brigadier Mathew Thomas had taken over from Brigadier
T.S. Oberoi. In October the Commander summoned me and said that I was to report
to HQ Eastern Command and meet General Jacob, the Chief of Staff. I did so and
was congratulated by the Chief of Staff for ‘volunteering’ for the ‘Mission’.
Seeing the look of utter bewilderment on my face, General Jacob smiled and
proceeded to put me at ease in the most avuncular fashion. I still recall his
words, “Look young man, you’re a paratrooper, a signaller, a commando, a
Bengali and your Commander says that you topped the last course at JAWS. Can’t
think of a better lad for this job”. The ‘job’ as it turned out was to get into
enemy territory as soon as possible in the event of a war breaking out,
establish a good working relationship with Mukti Bahini (hereafter MB), locate
a couple of good DZs for a possible airborne assault and, when the time came,
to ensure the assaulting unit was led to the Objective area and to ensure that
all heavy drops were to be secured without loss. The Chief of Staff waved me
off with a big reassuring smile and said orders would follow in due course.
In the middle of November I was
ordered to report to HQ 101 Communication Zone Area in Shillong along with CO 2
PARA, Lt Col KS Pannu and to come back to Calcutta thereafter. Travelling ‘hush
hush’ in civvies we were met at Guwahati Airport by a shady looking character
who took charge of our luggage and whisked us off to Shillong in his Amby.
Depositing us at the Area Officers’ Mess he disappeared. Major Bammi the GSO2
(Ops) met us after dinner and asked us to be ready to meet the GOC next morning
at 0400 hrs! When Pannu protested he was told that the Old Man liked to get an
early start. We were ushered into General Gurbux Gill’s bedroom next morning at
four. The General lay on his bed while we took up military postures. The
bedroom looked more like a macho Command Post than a place for carefree
slumber. Taking hold of a long pointer staff he briefed us with the help of the
‘ceiling to floor maps’ at the foot of his bed. He then asked us to immediately
proceed to Garo Bhada in the Tura Hills District to be further briefed at HO 95
Mountain Brigade. When Pannu asked him for further orders he was told that he
should collect as much info as he could and go back to Calcutta and wait for
the ‘balloon to go up’. As for me, I was to be launched into East Pakistan
without further delay! Pannu looked at me with a ‘better you than me, boy’
smirk on his face.
Landing up at HQ 95
Mountain Brigade, we realized that heavy and serious skirmishing was even then
going on in border areas with East Pakistan. Brigadier H.S. Kler, the Commander
briefed us and for the first time it became clear to me that, of all the
planned thrusts being aimed at Dhaka, the Northern thrust under 101 Communication
Zone had a good chance of succeeding since there were no major water obstacles
impeding its projected path. The role of the planned airborne assault in
preventing a possible long drawn out ‘delaying battle’ at Tangail also became
clear. Brigadier Kler, who knew me from my days in 19 Division at
Baramulla/Haji Pir, where he was the GSO1 (Ops), then discussed with me how I planned to get on
with my job. Remarking that other than the fact that there wasn’t enough time
for me to get circumcised, I did not have the foggiest notion of how to proceed
in the matter. Brigadier Kler told me not to worry as he had had a chat with
Brigadier Sant Singh of F-J Sector and that I was to immediately report to
Major Mookerjee, the BM of F-J Sector for further briefing. Major Mookerjee
turned out to be none other than S.G. Mookerjee of Signals who I knew from my
days at Mhow while attending SODE Course. Now I came to grips with my
‘Mission’. I was given codename ‘Peter’, dressed up in a ‘lungi, a half torn
shirt with a ‘jhola’ and a sheet to cover myself. I was also given Rs.10,000/-
in Pak currency and an unmarked Sten Machine Carbine with two magazines of
unmarked ammunition. Captain T.I. Donald, the Sparrow of F-J Sector then handed
over a small little radio trans receiver which he called Radio Set HX. Working
on battery cells, the crystal tuned set could be used to send and receive
messages using Morse Code. Two wire antennae came with the set, a normal end
fed wire and another Y shaped centre fed. I was told that I could expect a
range of about 10 to 15 Kms with the former and about 30 Kms with the latter.
In the event I was able to get as much as 65 to 70 Kms on good days. Of course
I took the precaution of discreetly passing it on to Donald’s boys that my Morse
was a bit ‘rusty’.
I do not the recall the
exact date on which I set course from Tura to cross the border, it was mid Nov
or thereabouts. At a personal level I do recall being a bit uneasy. I was young
but not so young as not to realize that my wife was in the family way with our
second child. She was due in December and it would be hard on her if something
were to happen to me. I had taken the precaution of writing out about seven odd
letters and sent them back to the Company with Pannu, with instructions to
‘Bags’ (late General Andy Bhagat) to post them at regular intervals to my wife.
(As it turned out, this ploy failed miserably since my letters were impossibly
out of ‘sync’ with her letters, not to mention the well known ‘women’s
intuition’ factor). At a professional level I realized that my Mission was
important and that I ought to feel excited. I also realized that what I was
doing was ‘clandestine’. General Gurbux had made it quite clear that once I
crossed over, the Indian Army would disclaim all knowledge of my existence.
Nonetheless, all in all, once I had spent 24 hours inside enemy territory, the
urgency of ‘here and now’ completely took over my consciousness and thereafter
it was more a question of thinking on my feet and getting on with the job.
I had with me
‘Badshah’, a 14 year old boy who I had picked out from the batch of MB trainees
in F-J Sector. He came in handy as a local guide and as an interpreter, when
required. I was after all a ‘Bong’, born and brought up in Kanpur but so far as
local dialects of rural East Pakistan were concerned, I may as well have been
of Greek parentage. I soon established contact with Siddiqui, the MB boss of
the area. For the next 8 to 10 days we operated between Mymensingh and Tangail
passing back all information, military and otherwise, to HQ F-J Sector. During
this time I had recced two suitable locations for the para drop and had passed
this information back to F-J Sector. Needless to add, operating mainly at
night, we regularly ambushed Pakistani military convoys moving up and down the
Kamalpur/Mymensingh – Madhupur – Tangail Axis creating as much confusion and
insecurity in the Rear Areas, as we could. I have to say that the MB boys were
in high spirits and fairly charged up.
I had earlier indicated
to HQ Eastern Command via F-J Sector that, given the local situation, paucity
of Pak troops in Tangail and road blocks that I had planned to establish, a
morning drop would be feasible and advisable. The para drop, however,
eventually took place after last light on 11 December. A dozen of our Signal
Company boys (later called the Dirty Dozen) with a jeep based Tentacle formed
part of the ‘2 PARA Battalion Group’. On looking back one does feel that with
about 200 excited MB boys under my control on the DZ, we did contribute
substantially to the success of the operations in terms of getting the
battalion to Poongli Bridge, north of Tangail, without delay and recovering all
the heavy drop including arty guns, ammunition, light vehicles and other stores
to respective earmarked areas, with dispatch. By mid day on 12 December advance elements of 1 MARATHA of 95 Mountain
Brigade commanded by General ‘Bulbul’ Brar with General Satish Nambiar as 2IC
had linked up with 2 PARA. I would have to add that had the drop taken place in
the morning we would have been able to cut off a major portion of the
Pakistanis falling back from Mymensingh and Kamalpur and inflict far more
casualties than we actually did.
By the evening of 12
December we had occupied Tangail and advance to Dhaka resumed without further
delay. Brigadier Kler, speaking to all officers on 13th morning made
it very clear that given the progress of XXXIII, IV and II Corps he was
convinced that 101 Communication Zone with 95 Mountain Brigade leading, had the
best chance of being the first to enter Dhaka and he expected nothing less from
us. The ‘Race’ for Dhaka was now well and truly on! In the event we were the
first to enter Dhaka on 16th morning. Since 2 PARA was leading the
advance at that point of time, it was again the Red Berets who marched
triumphantly into Dhaka on 16th morning to a tumultuous welcome by
the populace.
This story would have
turned out even better had it not been for a slight miscalculation on my part.
It was the evening of the 16th Dec and the stage was set for the
Surrender Ceremony at the Ramna Race Course. A contingent each of Indian and
Pakistan Army had been constituted. The Indian Contingent was taken entirely
from 2 PARA with self included. After General Niazi handed over his pistol to General
Aurora and the latter reviewed the contingents, both Generals repaired to the
table set up for the actual signing. The contingents broke off and surged
forward to get a ringside view of the historic event. It was difficult to say
who was the more excited, our boys for having trumped the enemy, or the Pakis,
relieved that the whole sordid affair was over and they could now go back home!
Seeing that the crowd
was too dense to penetrate, Nirbhay Sharma (Adjutant 2 PARA and an ex Signals
officer) and I stepped aside and stood next to Niazi’s staff car. I casually
stole a glance to my left to admire the shiny black Mercedes with Niazi’s flag
still hoisted atop the bonnet. Suddenly it dawned on me that the flag was no
longer ‘authorised’ and it was now a ‘finders –keepers – losers – weepers’
situation. This was my big chance! I saw a vision of this flag adorning the HQ
Mess at Mhow (with my name in the small caption below!). As I was mustering
courage and looking for a chance to swipe the thing there was a sudden swelling
of the crowd with much shoving and elbowing. I soon regained proximity to the
Staff Car again just in time to see a Naval officer disappearing with the flag.
I believe that the darned thing is displayed prominently in the Eastern Naval
Command Mess. Whenever I reminisce over the Dhaka days this incident still
rankles. Who says life is fair?
As already
mentioned, Ghosh was awarded the Vir Chakra for his exploits. Ironically, he almost
missed the award. When his name did not
come up in initial lists of awardees, Brigadier Mathew Thomas took great
umbrage and dashed off a DO letter to General Jacob, who immediately took up this issue with 101 Communication
Zone Area. It transpired that the confusion arose since General Gurbux Gill was
injured in early December and General
Gandharv Nagra was brought in overnight from 2 Mountain Division to take over.
As result, no one was clear whether Ghosh had fought the war under 95 Mountain
Brigade or F-J Sector, each assuming that the other formation was doing the
needful. Fortunately, HQ Eastern Command intervened and ruled that Ghosh had
fought the war under F-J Sector! Thereafter Brigadier Sant Singh had no
hesitation in dashing off the citation.
(The above account will from a part of
the History of the Corps of Signals,
Volume 3, which is presently being compiled)
31 Aug 2009
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