Writing for a living

Writing for a living

By

Major V K Singh

            It was the twenty-sixth of the month. We were having tea on the verandah. "The ayah wants five rupees. She is having a Satyanarayan ki katha in her house" said my wife.

            "Hmm"

            "What Hmm"?

            "I only said Hmm".

            "What is that supposed to mean?".

"OK. Give her five rupees"

"But I don't have any money".

"Now look, I gave you a tenner only this morning".

"You are drinking it now. The tea had finished, so I sent the boot-boy to get some from the canteen. And also some sugar. Now I've got only two rupees and some paise left".

"OK, take it from my purse".

She came out after a minute.

"There is only an eight anna bit left in your purse".

"That solves the problem. No fiver".

 "Very simple".

"Elementary".

"You're not funny".

"I wasn't trying to be".

"Oh God. I don't know why I married an Army officer. Now I'll have to borrow again from Pinky's piggy bank".

"She'll scalp you".

"I know. The poor thing was hysterical when she found it empty last time. Honestly, I just don't know what to do. And I wanted to see that picture in Dreamland tomorrow".

There was silence for a full minute. That chap who said it was like gold was talking sense, I'll say.

"Listen, didn't you get twenty rupees last month from the Signalman?".

"Yes".

She went inside, and returned with a pen and a pad.

“Write".

 "Write?"

"Yes, write".

"Write what?".

"Write anything. Just write. And from now on, you're going to write every month".

"But the Signalman comes out only once in three months".

"Never mind. We'll make those twenty rupees go for three months. In any case, we run short of just six or seven rupees every month".

"But what am I going to write?”

"Write anything. They're so bored up for contributions, they'll publish anything".

"But you can't write just anything. I need time to think".

"Listen, mister, today is the twenty-sixth. And you are supposed to send in contributions a month in advance. That leaves just few days for the deadline for the next issue, and there's no time to think. Get it?”

"Yes. Now beat it".

And that is how you came about reading this. I hope some other people get the idea too, and start writing. At least, I hope the gentlemen in the Third Pay Commission get the idea.

(Published in The Signalman, Apr 1973)

Victory Into Defeat

Victory Into Defeat

By

Lt Col VK Singh

The history of warfare is the history of man. No sooner there were two of them - Cain and Abel - they fought, and killed. Over the years, the art of war has flowered, and it has now crossed the dividing line, and become a science. Along with this transformation, warfare has become a complicated and sophisticated subject, making use of the latest developments in science and technology, and gobbling up almost a quarter of the resources, in terms of time and money, of the human race.

Though the science of warfare has made rapid progress, in no other sphere has this been as rapid as in communications. The developments in military communications during the last half century have revolutionised warfare. A modern army depends on communications for its very survival, and no Commander in his right mind would take the field today, without guaranteed communications. Understandably, communications is widely regarded as one of the most important battle winning factors today.

This, unfortunately, is far from the truth; good communications may have improved the passage of information and orders, but whether it also helps in winning battles, is doubtful, as we shall soon see. History is replete with instances of victories which were made possible only because of lack of communications between the field commander and his superiors, and defeats, which were the result of good communications.

During the early part of the last century, Gulab Singh, the ruler of Jammu, despatched one of his Generals, Zorawar Singh to subdue hill tribes on the Frontier. Zorawar Singh went on to conquer Ladakh, Skardu, Gilgit, Hunza, and later Tibet. Gulab Singh came to know of these victories only from the treasure and •tribute which Zorawar Singh sent back to Jammu, after each conquest. If communications had existed between the two, it is inconceivable that Gulab Singh would have permitted Zorawar Singh to undertake the apparently foolhardy campaign in Tibet, in which he later lost his life.

Robert Clive is regarded by historians as the founder of British rule in India. However, there, are no two views that Clive was an extremely audacious adventurer, who succeeded, by intrigue and deceit, in creating dissensions among Indian rulers, thereby consolidating his own position. His victory in the Battle of Plassey laid the foundation of British dominance in the subcontinent. However, it is rarely that one wins a battle in which he is outnumbered 17 to 1, as Clive was, and his decision to take on a vastly superior enemy was definitely foolhardy. It is doubtful if the Hon'ble East India Company's Directors, in London, would have lent their countenance to Clive for this venture, had it been possible for the latter to obtain their concurrence on telephone. And perhaps, the British Empire in India would never have existed, but for the lack of communications between Clive and his superiors.

We have seen how important victories have been gained only due to lack of communications. Let us now consider the other side of the coin, and see the effect of good communications.

In May 1940, Hitler decided to put into effect an audacious and brilliant plan, suggested by Von Manstein for conquering Western Europe. As part of this offensive, German Panzers crashed through the Ardennes forest in Belgium and raced for the English Channel. Guderian, spearheading the advance, was almost within sight of Dunkirk, when he was ordered to halt, by an inexplicable order from Hitler, conveyed on the radio. This enabled the beleaguered British Expeditionary Force to cross the Channel at Dunkirk, and escape to England. If Guderian had not been halted, it is quite likely that over a million Allied soldiers would have been captured, and the Second World War brought to an end, with German suzerainty over Europe established. The history of the world may have been altered, had not Guderian's communications with Von Rundstedt been as good as they were.

On 24th April, 1980, American Commandos landed in Iran. Their task was to rescue 56 hostages, imprisoned in the US Embassy in Teheran. However, out of eight helicopters that took off from the aircraft carrier NIMITZ, only five landed at the rendezvous, the remainder having broken down, due to mechanical trouble. The force Commander, Col Charles Beckewith, relayed this information to the Pentagon, and this in turn was conveyed to President Carter, who gave orders to cancel the mission. Apart from resulting in loss of face, this incident was also instrumental in Carter losing the election for the US Presidency, later during the year. A hundred years ago, when communications were not as good as today, it is inconceivable that Colonel Beckewith would have cancelled the mission on his own. He still had five helicopters, he had not lost a. single man; and he had achieved complete surprise. It is ten to one that had he gone ahead with the mission, it would have succeeded, resulting in a well earned decoration for himself, as well as considerable increase in prestige for his country. However, this was not to be, and the reason is only one - good communications.

It follows, therefore, that while good communications may be an important factor for fighting battles, it is not necessarily so for winning them. Communications have deprived the field Commander of his precious prerogative - tactical decisions. In future wars, it is quite conceivable that even minor tactical decisions, will be taken at a political level. Military commanders will no longer be commanders - they will become messengers, just like the ambassadors of today, who no longer enjoy plenipotentiary powers, thanks to communications. This dilution of authority to take tactical decisions will severely curb the initiative of field commanders, who will have to look back over their shoulders for orders, before taking any step which involves the slightest amount of risk. It may well happen, as it did in the case of Heinz, Guderian and Charles Beckewith, that good communications turn out to be not a blessing, but a bane, and turn victory into defeat.

(Author's Note            :-Budding Sparrows are advised to take the article with a pinch of salt and not try too hard to ensure failure of communications. However, it is hoped that the instances quoted above will improve the health of some of our conscientious colleagues, who take their job too seriously, and get a stroke every time the line goes out, or a radio net is not through.

 A perusal of the above article, every Monday morning before breakfast, is guaranteed to prevent heart attacks, ulcers, and grey hair, which is taking a heavy tall of our Commanding Officers).

(Published in The Signalman, Sep 1985)

THE SIGNALS PLAN - A NEW CONCEPT

THE SIGNALS PLAN - A NEW CONCEPT

Col VK Singh

INTRODUCTION

In modern warfare, communications have proved to be an important battle winning factor. The accent on mobile warfare, involving quick changing battle situations, has enhanced this importance. The rapid growth of electronics, and its application  in almost every field, including 'gunnery, navigation, target acquisition, electronic surveillance, RADAR, communications and electronic warfare, makes it imperative for commanders at all levels to consider its implications and effect on their operational plans. It is, therefore, incumbent on commanders to actively involve themselves in formulation of the communications plan and its implementation at each stage, instead of leaving it to the Signals adviser. Communications planning, like fire planning, is a command responsibility and commanders who ignore or neglect it are likely to pay a heavy price.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to discuss the importance of communications in the Army and the methodology involved in formulation of the Signals Plan.

COMMUNICATIONS IN THE ARMY

Present Communications Set Up

In the Army, the Corps of Signals is responsible for providing all types of communications, down to the level of abattalion/regiment.            Communications below battalion/regiment are manned by regimental signallers, from within the unit. The means of communications employed by Signals include line, radio, radio relay, troposcatter and despatch riders. In addition, the Corps of Signalsis also responsible for electronic warfare against all electronic emission used by theenemy,   including non- communication electronics.

The present concept of communications in the Army is linear, and follows the chain of command. This implies that each level of command, or headquarters, is connected to the one above and the one below it. Except in rare cases, there is no lateral communication, and neither does it exist to levels other than the ones immediately above or below. The basic Signals unit is a signal regiment, one of which is provided for every headquarters at the level of a division or above. Thus, there are divisional, corps, command and Army Headquarters signal regiments. In addition, there are composite signal regiments which are not affiliated to anyheadquarters, but provide communications rearward of the corps zone, on line, radio or radio relay. There are other types of signals units, for specialized communications for air support, for carrying out monitoring of own radiolinks, for interception of enemy links, and for electronic warfare. At eachheadquarters, down to the brigade, aSignals officer is available as adviser tothe formation commander.

Importance of Communications in Battle

The      Army comprises Arms and Services. There are five Arms, vizArmoured Corps, Artillery,Engineers, Signals and Infantry, of which the first and last are also called the "teeth" Arms, the others being "supporting" Arms. The rest,like AOC, EME, ASC, AMC, Postal, Provost etc., are called Services. While every Arm or Service has its own special role, and each is vital, in its own way, for success in battle, there is one feature which distinguishes Arms from Services, and that is their role, and the effect of their failure or success in fulfilling it. While the role of Services is vital to the overall war effort, it does not affect the immediate battle, where success or failure depends on the ability of the Arms to fulfil their assigned tasks. For instance, consider the case of a division or brigade going into attack. The immediate result of the battle will not be affected if the Supply Point is closed down, or the Ordnance Depot catches fire, or the Field Hospital fails to fetch up, or if the EME Workshop is shelled out. On the other hand, consider the effect of the failure of any of the Arms. The Armoured Corps and Infantry, who Physicallyassault and capture the objective, are obviously beyond discussion. But can the attack go in, and succeed, without covering fire from theArtillery, or before the Engineers have breached the mine fields and made the bridges or if the radio communicationsfail? The answer is No. And this is thesubtle difference, between Arms andServices, which has to be understoodbefore the role of any of them, and theiremployment, is considered.

Organisation and Employment of Signals

Considering the Arms, there are Marked similarities, and differences, between their roles. However, there are some peculiar characteristics in the organisation and employment of Signals, Which are interesting to note. Some of these are asunder :-

(a)    Artillery, Engineers and Signals are called "Supporting Arms". However, While other Arms are affiliated withformations, the Signals element is integral, at each level of command. For instance, there is no Army Headquarters Artillery Regiment, Command Engineer Regiment, or Corps Armoured Regiment, but there are signal regiments at these headquarters. Even at divisional, and brigade and battalion level, all the artillery and engineer resources are not integral, but allotted for a specific operation whereas the signal resources are integral to the formation or unit. In fact, when a brigade moves, the signal company moves alongwith it, but not the affiliated field regiment or field company.

(b)   The resources and equipment authorised to Artillery, Engineers and Signals are      based on their role, and employment. However, it is interesting to note that only Signals has been authorised reserve equipment at every level, down to the battalion. For instance, there are no reserve guns in an artillery battery, or reserve minelayers, trawls or bridges in an engineer regiment, but there are reserve radio sets in every divisional signal regiment, brigade signal company, and battalion/regiment signal section. Why? In an Army, where economy is the byword, and there are restrictions on everything, how have Signals got away with such a lavish allocation of resources? The reason will be explained a little later.

(c)    Before any operational plan is made, it is necessary to carry out an appreciation of the situation. One of the factors considered is Relative Strength and Assessment of Troops to Task. However, it is an interesting fact that while all other Arms, like Armour, Artillery and Engineers are considered, alongwith supporting weapons like MMG, rcl guns, as well as air support, there is no mention of Signals. Why? Is it because Signals have no role in battle, and can be ignored? Again, the answer will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

(d)   Every commander, before finalising his tactical plan, ensures that the engineer plan and the arty plan have been dovetailed into it. To do this, he relies on a plethora of planning data which is available in pamphlets and hand books; such as the Staff Officers Hand Book, issued by the Defence Services Staff College, and the Commanders Hand Book, issued by the College of Combat. It is interesting to note that while these hand books contain fairly exhaustive planning data for Engineers and Artillery, there is little or no planning data for Signals. Thus, while every commander knows the bridging and mine laying capabilities of a field company, or the time take by a field battery to deploy, and the ranges of its guns, as well as the rates of fire, effective area of neutralisation, safety distances, and so on, hardly anyone knows the time taken to establish a radio relay link, or to lay a kilometre of cable, or the maximum ranges obtained by different types of radio sets. Needless to say, this data is important in planning a tactical operation. In fact more often than not, certain important operations such as siting and move of headquarters or rate of advance of break out force, has to be dependent            entirely on      the communications, and restrictions imposed by ranges of radio sets or cable.

The reason for making Signals integral at each level and for the lavish allocation of resources is only one. Over the years, commanders, both vanquished and victorious, have learned that in order to ensure that they are always in touch with the battle situation, and that their orders can be passed quickly to their command, they must have good communications. And to make sure that each commander has his own communications, which he does not have to share with anyone else, the signal resources have been given to him as an integral part of his command, instead of being affiliated, like otherArms. And the reason for the lavish allotment of resources is that no commander is willing to risk a break in communications, even for a moment. Accordingly, reserve radio sets, cable, telephones and generators have been catered for at every level. Communications is one field where frugality is suicidal, and it is prudent to cater for reserves, even though it is an expensive proposition.

Coming to the Assessment of Troops to Task, the reason for not considering Signals is the lavish allocation of resources, as discussed above. Every commander knows that adequate signal resources have been catered for every possible contingency, and he does not have to allocate them separately for a particular operation of war. In a defensive battle, the radio sets may not be used at all. Similarly, in mobile offensive operations, telephones and cable Will hardly be used. But these resources are there, and that is what matters. Hence, the reason for not considering Signals is not that they are least important, but rather that they are most important - in fact, so important that there is no scope for discussion. This is an important point, which commanders and their staff be over the years, failed to grasp, often With disastrous consequences.

THE SIGNALS PLAN

Present Concept

It is an anomalous fact that even though the importance of communications has been underlined, hardly any time thought is devoted to this subject by commanders while formulating their plans. Fairly exhaustive guidelines and treatises exist on the methodology involved in making out a tacticalPlan, a fire plan, and an obstacle plan, but there is no general staff publication Whichexplains the procedure of evolving a communication plan. In fact, this vital aspect is neglected even in the training institutions, such as the DSSC and the College of Combat, and communication planning is left to Signals, who treat it as an "in house" affair. In all operational orders and instructions, the subject is brushed off with a line "Signal Instructions will be issued by Chief Signal Officer (or Officer Commanding Signal Regiment)." Of course, Signals have fairly detailed and exhaustive formats for their signal instructions or operational orders, containing a vast amount of technical data. But the important thing is that the Signals plan is not dovetailed into the tactical plan, as a fire plan or an obstacle plan is. This is because the Signals Plan is made by the Signals adviser in isolation, based on the tactical plan, and there is no involvement of the commander or his staff. This is a serious draw back, andresults in loss of flexibility andsubsequent           disruption in communications when the situation changes abruptly, for which communications have not been catered for. This is because at present, the Signals adviser goes by his own intuition and anticipation, in allocating reserves and catering for alternative circuits. In case he has been able to read his commander's mind, all goes well. If not, communications break down at a crucial moment, with disastrous results. This situation can be avoided only if the commander himself approves the Signals plan, and it is put into effect only once it has been thoroughly screened by him and his staff, so that suitable modifications can be incorporated to cater for all possible contingencies.

The other serious drawback is that the Present system is wasteful, and does not contribute to optimum utilisation of resources. In a division, all brigades are rarely committed at the same time, andeven when they are, there is considerable difference in their commitments. However, the signal resources of each brigade are identical, and cannot be used by others. For instance, if one brigade is in a holding role, and the other two are being used for an attack, the requirement of radio communications for the latterwillbe more than that of, the former. However, with the present set up, which has no flexibility, the Signals adviser cannot, on his own, reallot signal resources, as can be done by the Artillery or Engineer adviser, to ensure that optimum utilisation is made of all equipment and manpower.

The following steps are suggested in formulation of the Signals plan :-

(a)        The commander, after carrying out his appreciation, makes out a tactical plan in out line.

(b)        The Commander gives out his communications requirements to the Signals adviser. This is done in terms of type of communications, ie. speech and/ or telegraph (and not means of communication ie., line or radio), for each phase of the operation, including contingencies.

(c)        The Signals adviser makes out an outline Signals plan, to cater for the commander's communication requirements, making use of all available resources. He also decides the means of communication for each unit or formation, such as radio, radio relay, line, or a suitable combination of these.

(d)       The Signals adviser puts up the Signals plan to the commander for his approval, alongwith suggested modifications in the tactical plan, wherever it is not possible to meet the communication requirements within the existing resources.

(e)        The commander suitably modifies the tactical plan, if required, or arranges for additional resources. The Signals plan is then approved by him, after suitable modifications.

(f)        The Signals adviser affects the Signals plan by issuing a Signals Operational Order, or Signal Instructions.

The suggested concept would involve certain changes in the command and control set up, and the functioning ofsignal units. Some of these are asunder :-

(a)        The commanding officer of a divisional signal regiment will have the authority to move and deploy signal resources within the division. This may involve certain changes in the concept of integration of signal elements with their parentformation. A signal company will not have to be allotted to each brigade on a permanent basis. However, signal companies will be affiliated to brigades,like field companies or artillery regiments.

(b)        Allotment of signal resources to brigades would be done in accordance with the Signals plan. Thus, the composition of signal companies, in terms of manpower and equipment, will vary, depending on the task in hand. This would be done by attaching or detaching detachments of radio, line or radio relay. It may be mentioned that  the smallest functional entity in Signals is a detachment and this term includes thepersonnel, vehicles, and equipment carried by them.

(c)        The lowest level at which signal communications will be planned will be a division. Communication plans will be coordinated at corps field army by the respective Chief Signal Officers.

(d)       To ensure reliability and flexibility, reserves will be catered for in the form of reserve detachments.Reserve detachments may be allotted to signal companies, based on the nature and likely duration of the operation, terrain, weather conditions, and distance from the Regimental HQ. In addition, some reserve equipment may be kept centrally with the Quartermaster in the Regimental HQ.

(e)        For communication tasks in the corps or communication zone, specialist signal bricks, held by composite signal regiments, may be attached or detached under orders of the Chief Signal Officers at corps or command HQ. These bricks will be in the form of sections, comprising a number of detachments, as at present.

For the successful conduct of a battle in an environment saturated with electronic activity, it is essential that commanders exercise utmost discretion and caution in formulating their communications plans. Failure to do this would leave their communications, weapon systems and other electronic devices susceptible to enemy electronic counter measures, and this may well be the hinge on which the eventual outcome of battle rests. It must be realised that communication planning is a command responsibility. The Signals plan must beinitiated by the commander, and approved by him before it is implemented by Signals, who are responsible for its execution, and not its evolution.

(Published in The Signalman, July 1992)

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

BY

Major V K Singh

After reading Major Gokarn's excellent feature "Eclipsing the Communications Gap" in the January 1976 issue, I came to a startling conclusion - we don't really use the chain of command! Being essentially communicators, we probably do not pay attention to what can appropriately be called the bedrock on which the complex structure of the Army rests. Break it, and the edifice will come tumbling down. Lest that unfortunate day dawn on us, it would be worth our while to have a closer look at this facet of the Service.

In the few units that I have had the occasion to serve, I have found that the chain of command is taken to mean exactly what Major Gokarn has depicted - the CO, Adjutant, Subedar Major, Company SJCO, CHM, Section NCO, and the Jawan. It would not be entirely incorrect to assume that a similar concept of the term exists throughout our Corps! A little reflection on the issue, with its implications, will bring to mind the gravity of the situation. We are not only breaking, or not following the chain of command - we simply do not know what it means!

It is a well known rule of social, political and military science that authority cannot be divorced from responsibility. The man who makes the decisions is also the one who is answerable for failure or success-which are the sequel to these. Why, then do we adopt this parallel chain, for day to day administration, and sometimes even for operational tasks? There is only one chain of command- the CO, the Company Commander, the Section Commander and the Jawan. There can be no duplication in this, just as responsibility can never be divided. If a company or section fails to carry out its assigned tasks, its commanders are answerable, not the SJCO, or the CHM, or section NCO. Yet, it is a common practice to use this chain. Why?

Let us consider the case when an NCO is to be sent to the MCTE to collect the Corps diaries for the unit or to the Ordnance Depot to collect some equipment. The Adjutant passes the orders down the 'chain of command’, i.e., to the Subedar Major, who in turn passes it to the RHM or one of the company SJCOs. Hav XYZ is detailed, and despatched the same evening. The CO, next morning, orders No 1 comp-any commander to send out a radio detachment. The company commander suddenly finds that his detachment commander, Hay XYZ, is half way to Mhow. There are last minute changes, tempers go up, fur flies, and the job is not completed in time. Who is to blame? The company commander, by nature of his appointment, or the Adjutant, for using an incorrect channel for passing orders? Such instances occur every day, and we are all only too familiar with their effect on esprit-de- corps and harmony in an unit.

The Subedar Major occupies an unique position in an unit. He is the eyes and ears of the CO. So far so good. The trouble begins when he is used as the mouthpiece, a privilege which should be confined to the 2IC or Adjutant. The 'chain of command’ as we understand it, should be more correctly called an 'administrative chain' or a channel of information. It can, of course, be used for passing routine instructions, such as where the morning parade is to fall-in, what games are to be played that evening, and how many men are to go in a particular working party. Even in the matter of information, the chain of command should be followed if possible. Take for example, the case of a soldier running amok, or an affray in the barracks at night. The present system, in most units is that the CHM reports the matter to the RHM or the SJCO, who in turn reports it to the Subedar Major. In most cases, the company and section commander come to know only the next morning! At times, the CO comes to know of such cases earlier, and one (as a company or section commander) has perforce to give a blank look when questioned on the subject by the Old Man! Such a state of affairs is clearly not desirable.  It is perhaps a legacy of colonial India, when due to the difficulties posed by language, officers had to resort to this method to exercise command. The situation today is entirely different. The officer and the men speak a common tongue, and there is a close rapport between them. The need for interpreters is no longer there, and hence should be discouraged. I am not, for one moment, contemplating that we do away with JCOs and NCOs. They are an essential link in the chain of command, but only when they function as platoon or section commanders. They should not be used as 'staff officers', who disseminate the orders of their commander.

Returning to Major Gokarn's article, if one adopts PLAN AREN, and 'breaks' this chain, as suggested, the orders should reach the Jawan exactly as the CO wants!

Adopt AREN, but retain the chain of command! (With luck, the two might fall in love and result in a happy marriage!)

(Published in the Signalman, October 1976)

WHY THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT WILL NEVER BE AMENDED

WHY THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT WILL NEVER BE AMENDED

The Second Administrative Reforms Commission chaired by Shri Veerapppa Moily, the present Law Minister, submitted its report titled ‘Right to Information – Master key to good governance’ to the Prime Minister  in June 2006. The report recommended that the Official Secrets Act, 1923 should be repealed or amended, to bring it in line with the Right to Information Act, 2005.

           In 2008 I filed RTI applications with the Ministry of Law and the MHA, asking for the action taken by the Government on the Report of the ARC. The DOPT, to whom the application was transferred by the Min of Law, informed me that this recommendation has been rejected by the Inter Ministerial Group (IMG) set up in the MHA. When I brought this to the notice of Shri Moily, he had assured me that he would pursue the matter with the Prime Minister.

           Meanwhile, the MHA said that the information could not be given since the meetings of the IMG were attended by officers from agencies under the RTI Act. I filed a complaint with the CIC, who asked the MHA to show him the files dealing with the case. On 25/1/2010 the CIC issued an order directing the MHA to give me a copy of the file noting on a particular page of the MHA file. He also directed the MHA to provide the titles and designations of the officers sitting in the IMG.

           The MHA sent a reply on 11/2/2010. They gave the ranks of officers from the MHA, CBI, Delhi Police, Min of Law etc. They also mentioned that a “Jt Secretary level officer from an organization exempted under Section 24 of the RTI Act’ was a member of the IMG. They did not give the titles ie appointments of the officers or a copy of the file noting, stating that they had sought some clarifications from the CIC.

           The important point to note concerns the composition of the IMG. It has representatives from the Police, CBI, Intelligence Agencies, Law Ministry etc, but not from the Armed Forces. The genesis of the OSA was the need to prevent spying and wrongful communication of military secrets. The importance of military secrets is highlighted by the provisions of Section 3 of the OSA, which prescribe a punishment of 14 years imprisonment for disclosure of military secrets, but only 3 years for all others. It appears odd that the military has been kept out of the deliberations of the IMG. 

I have written to the Home Minister as well as the Law Minister on 2/3/2010 pointing out this anomaly.

VIGNETTES FROM 1947-48

VIGNETTES FROM 1947-48

By

Maj Gen VK Singh

Introduction  

            The years 1947-48 were perhaps the most turbulent in India’s history. There was widespread jubilation when the country became free after 200 years of British rule. The joy of liberty was blighted by Partition, which resulted in a mass migration of hundreds of thousands of people across the newly created borders, accompanied by terrible atrocities. Barely two months after Independence, the nation’s armed forces were called upon to repel an invasion in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, becoming embroiled in a war that lasted well over a year and a conflict that continues even today. The history of those turbulent times has been documented by many historians. However, many stories remain untold, hidden in documents that are not seen by the general public. The vignettes recounted in this article have been collated from various sources, some hitherto unpublished. 

The Sacking of Mirpur

            One of the saddest events of the Jammu & Kashmir operations in 1947-48 concerns Mirpur, which was sacked by the Pathans after being evacuated by the  State Force garrison on 26 November 1947. Mirpur could have been saved – it was just a day’s march from Jhangar, which 50 Para Brigade had occupied on 19 November. Brigadier YS Paranjape, Commander 50 Para Brigade wanted to do exactly this, but was ordered to proceed to Kotli instead. Why did Major General Kalwant Singh, GOC JAK Division, decide to forsake Mirpur, against the advice of his subordinate as well as his superior? More important, why did the Mirpur garrison, comprising 600 troops, pull out without a fight? A much smaller force at Skardu withstood sustained attacks for six months. Punch was besieged for a year before it was relieved. Was it poor leadership, or the fighting quality of the troops that made the difference?  Probably both played a part. Colonel Puran Singh, the commander of the Mirpur garrison, was not made of the same mettle as Brigadier Pritam Singh and Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa. Also, Mirpur was garrisoned entirely by State Force troops, while Punch and Skardu both had a fair number of regular Indian Army soldiers.

            On 13 November 1947, elements of 50 Para Brigade consisting of 1 Patiala and a troop of 7 Light Cavalry had reached Akhnur.  On 16 November Major General Kalwant Singh, GOC JAK Division, issued orders for the relief of Naushera, Jhangar, Mirpur, Kotli and Punch.  According to his plan, 50 Para Brigade was to relieve Naushera by 16^th, Jhangar by 17^th, Kotli by 18^th, and Mirpur by 20^th November. Another column from Uri, consisting of two battalions of 161 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier LP Sen, was to move on the Uri-Punch axis on 16 November, reaching Punch the same day.

               The plan was ambitious and had several flaws. The officiating C-in-C, Lieutenant General FRR Bucher, felt that the advance of two columns was 'positively dangerous', and the despatch of a column from Uri to Punch, with the enemy still in position, was 'almost foolhardy'. Brigadier YS Paranjape, Commander 50 Para Brigade, had several objections. Apart from the dates being unrealistic, he felt that after establishing a firm base at Jhangar, Mirpur should be relieved first, so that the advance to Kotli was not interfered with by the raiders. Both his battalions, 1 Punjab and 3 Rajput were below strength, with 350 to 400 men in each. However, he was over ruled by the GOC and the operations commenced on 16 November 1947.1

               Naushera was occupied on 18 November, after a brief engagement. Paranjape had just three companies with him, and wanted to wait till the rest of the column fetched up. However, Kalwant ordered him to continue and capture Kotli. The advance was resumed on 19 November and Jhangar occupied the same day. From Jhangar, two roads forked out, one leading to Mirpur, and the other to Kotli. Paranjape was in favour of relieving Mirpur before going for Kotli, so that his flank was secure. However, Kalwant did not agree and ordered him to head for Kotli. The advance from Jhangar was resumed on 20 November and Kotli was relieved only on 26 November, after negotiating 47 road blocks. By this time the fate of Mirpur had been sealed - it was torched by the raiders the same day. About 400 soldiers and 10,000 refugees managed to escape, and reached Jhangar. The Pathans killed several hundred soldiers and civilians, capturing hundreds of women who were taken away as war booty. Many of them were sold for 150 rupees after being paraded naked through the streets of Jhelum by the exultant Pathan tribesmen.                

               On 27 November, the day after it had been relieved, Kalwant ordered Paranjape to fall back on Jhangar. This was accomplished on 28 November. Soon after this, Brigadier Paranjape was hospitalised, and Brigadier Mohd. Usman took over command of 50 Para Brigade. If Kalwant's decision to rush to Kotli without securing his open flank by securing Mirpur was surprising, even stranger was his decision to fall back to Jhangar, immediately after its capture. In the event, Mirpur was lost. Why was Kalwant in such a tearing hurry to reach Kotli? It is said that the wife of one of Maharaja Hari Singh's ADCs, who was rumoured to be one of his many mistresses, lived in Kotli. Reportedly, a large treasure belonging to the Kashmir State was also kept in Kotli. Was Kalwant’s haste to relieve Kotli attributable to these two factors, rather than tactical reasons? The lady and the treasure were probably saved, but the lives of several thousand men and the honour of several hundred women were lost. 2

Why was Mirpur evacuated even before it was attacked? The report submitted by the garrison commander, Colonel Puran Singh, states:

‘The original Mirpur Grn consisted of 600 S.F tps approx 12,000 non-Muslims. On the night 25/26 Nov, the enemy with a force of approx 3 Bns attacked on all sides, sp by Mtn Arty. Own cas due to shelling were 50 to 100 killed. The cas among the refugees amounted to approx 100 to 1000. The refugees were pouring into the mil camp and it was decided to withdraw. The camp site with the tents and army vehs incl the dead were left, lest any suspicion should be raised. About 500 OR and the refugees withdrew Eastwards after last it on 26 Nov through the mountains and not by rd.  The party was attacked en route once during the night; own cas estimated were 30 IOR and 500 refugees. Eventually approx 400 IORs and 10,000 Civ got back to Jhangar safely. The rear gd of 100 IORs and 1000 refugees have not yet reached. (this rear gd with refugees is reported to be hiding in the jungles at Puna 15 miles South West of Jhangar)’.3

         The story of the sack of Mirpur is best told by one of the survivors. Given below are extracts from the statement of Mr. Inder Singh Bali, son of Sardar Tehil Singh, State Jagirdar  and Chief of the Punjab, aged 24 years, of Mirpur proper:-.

  “On 25^th Nov 1947 our town (Mirpur) was bombarded and what looked like canon and mortar fire was opened on the town resulting in the complete blowing up of the roofs of the houses and causing lots of casualties among the civilians. The state troops did not put tough fight and the raiders occupied the town at 2 pm and set the entire town on fire. There were about 350 men of the state troops in the town itself and had placed pqts around the town and about 200 men were in the Cantt. When the posn became hopeless the troops in the town decided to surrender and run away and placed themselves in touch with the Offr commanding in the Cantt, and with the concerted action of troops both in the town and the Cantt, the civilians from the town managed to reach the Cantt.

             

              Out of our party about 300 girls were forcibly taken away and when we reached Thatala camp we heard from the Hindus that had already reached there that their 500 girls had also been taken away. At Thatala we found that not less than 2,000 Pathans all with 303 rifles were present.

             

              The concentration at Thatala swelled up to about 5000. Here again the Pathans sorted out young girls and carried them away. Thatala is about 15 miles from Jhelum city. Among these Offrs there were one Lt Col, one Capt and a few JCOs and men in all numbering 50. These officers and men were not wearing Regtl Signs. All these offers and men were wearing black caps and from their uniform I would see that they belonged to the Punjab Regt. We spent two nights at this camp. Out of the raiders three men who belonged to my town and were very well-known to me took pity on me and managed to deliver me at Jhelum camp (at the house of Lt. Avtar Narain) after they had relieved me of all my belongings. I am the only survivor from Mirpur.”4

The Abduction and Sale of Captured Women

            The two major incentives for the tribesmen who invaded Jammu & Kashmir in 1947 were money and women. Instances of rape and looting occurred at almost all towns and villages that came in the way of the tribal lashkars, including Uri, Baramula, Rajauri and Mirpur. However, Mirpur seems to have come in for special attention, its fall being accompanied by the town being set on fire and the abduction of a large number of women who were sold like cattle in Jhelum and other towns. This engaged the attention of the highest in the land, including Prime Minister Nehru, who took up the matter with the authorities in Pakistan almost on a daily basis. In a telegram dated 1 December 1947, shortly after the fall of Mirpur, he wrote:

            For Prime Minister, Pakistan, from Prime Minister, India.

I have also been informed that 3,000 abducted Hindu women have been brought to Gujarat from the Bhimbar area and they are being sold like cattle at Rs. 150 each. I am asking an Offr on the staff of the Deputy High Commissioner at Lahore to go personally to make enquiries to Gujarat district and I hope you will ask West Punjab Govt to give him all facilities.5

The next day, on 2 December 1947, the Prime Minister sent another telegram:

For Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan from Jawaharlal Nehru.

I have recd info that Mirpur town has been completely destroyed and out of 13,000 (half of 26,000) non – Muslims only 2,000 (half of 4,000) have reached within 15 miles of Jhelum. The fate of these refugees as well as of about 3,000 (half of 6,000) from the rest of Mirpur area is not known, but there are reports that large numbers of abducted Hindu women have been brought into Jhelum district by Pathans. The Pathans are causing panic among non-Muslims refugee pockets in that district are firing indiscriminately and shot dead a Mahratta soldier the other day.

I am gravely concerned about the fate of the non-Muslims pockets in Jhelum district and of the Hindu refugees in particular the abducted women who have been brought from Jammu by the raiders. I shall be grateful if you will give all facilities to our MEO org to evacuate them to India.6

The very next day, i.e. 3 December 1947, Nehru sent yet another telegram to Pakistan:

            I have been drawing your attention to large concentrations of tribesmen and others in West Punjab near the border of Kashmir State and to the abduction of large numbers of women from Kashmir who are being offered for sale in West Punjab….7

            The report of the sale of abducted girls in Jhelum is corroborated from several other sources. An extract from a report forwarded by a civil intelligence officer of the Government of India in Pakistan says:

           In Jhelum no Hindu except our staff is left. The district liaison officer, who has to depend either on the information received from the high district officials or from some of his Muslim friends reports that in Jhelum girls abducted from Mirpur side are sold in Jhelum city at Rs 20/- each. The local police refuse to interfere on the ground that the girls were not removed from the Punjab and also they express their helplessness because of the attitude of the armed Pathans possessing these girls.8

The Capture of Zoji La

            The capture of Zoji La in November 1948 was a spectacular feat of Indian arms, paving the way for the relief of Leh. Though innovative use of armour and bold leadership were the decisive factors in the battle, the state of morale of the enemy also played a part. It was reported that in the Ladakh Valley the enemy morale was very low on account of shortage of rations, clothing and the fast approaching winter. About 400 body guards of the Mehtar of Chitral in Skardu refused to go to Leh, and the matter was reported to Burhan-ud-Din in Gilgit for necessary action by Mata-ul-Mulk.  Burhan-Ud-Din not only berated his nephew Mata-ul-Mulk, but told him that he would be reaching Skardu shortly to sort out the matter. (Burhan-ud-Din was the brother and Mata-ul-Mulk the son of the Mehtar of Chitral). 

             The low state of morale of the enemy is obvious from intercepted messages that were exchanged between enemy commanders. One such message from the enemy commander at Dras – Zoji La to the Supreme Commander at Gilgit is given below:

“FROM JAMIL (XOB) TO GEORGE (QLC) RPT JAL (.) A 174 (.) SECRET (.) REF YOUR D 255 (.) MY MEN ARE UNDER FED AND UNDER CLOTHED (.) FOR DAYS THEY GO WITHOUT FOOD (.) BELIEVE ME THEY WILL NOT SIT IF AFTER FORTNIGHT ON THE HIGHEST PEAKS OF ZOJILA IF NOTHING WILL BE DONE FOR THEIR RATIONS AND CLOTHING SINCE NOW (.) RATIONS AND CLOTHING SO FAR RECEIVED FROM AS TO REAR USUAL TO NOTHING FOR A C D WINGS (.) TPS HAVE FRANKLY TOLD US THAT THEY WILL NOT WORK IF THEY WILL NOT BE PROPERLY FED AND CLOTHED (.) PLEASE REALISE THE COMING WINTER HIGHEST PEAKS OF ZOJILA AND SEND RATIONS AND CLOTHING OTHERWISE IT WILL BE TOO DIFFICULT FOR US TO MAKE OUR MEN TO FIGHT (.)”9

            An intercepted message from Burhan-ud-Din to Mata-ul-Mulk not only brings out the deteriorating relations between them but gives an indication of the extent of involvement of the Government of Pakistan in the operations. (Shortly after this, Burhan-ud-Din himself took over from Mata-ul-Mulk).

“FROM QLC TO XOD (.) S – 89 (.) SECRET (.) FOLLOWING FROM NASIM IN REPLY TO YOUR ….. TO END VERY DISAPOINT AFTER ALL THAT I HAVE DONE FOR YOU AND YOUR MEN (.) IS ONLY FOR ME THAT YOU HAVE NOT BEEN SENT UNDER ESCORT TO CHITRAL IN SPITE OF GOVERNOR NWFPS INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT (.) WHAT EVER MEN DO WILL REFLECT ON YOU (.) WARN YOU NOT TO GET YOUR SELF IN TROUBLE AND RUIN THE MEN ALSO (.) ISLAM IS IN DANGER (.) YOUR RECALLING OF YOUR MEN FROM NUBRA HIGHLY ENRAGED ALL PAK OFFICIALS (.) DEFENCE SECRETARY ESPECIALLY COMING FOR PURPOSE OF LOOKING INTO YOUR CONDUCT (.) SEND SOME ONE AND HAVE IMMEDIATELY THEM RECALLED (.) THEY SHOULD GET BACK BY FORCED MARCHES (.) I WILL REACH (.)” 10

Nehru and Zoji La

            The first prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a Kashmiri. His attachment to the land of his forbears is well known. What is not known is his extensive knowledge of the terrain in Kashmir and the interest he took in operational matters. By inclination, he was adventurous and fond of the outdoors. He had trekked extensively in the hills of Kashmir, Himachal, Garhwal and Kumaon and is said to have spent his honeymoon in a travellers’ hut at Baltal. It was no surprise that he took a special interest in the plans being made by Thimayya and Cariappa to capture Zoji La. This is brought out by the two letters reproduced below, one from SS Khera, the Commissioner at Meerut, addressed to Nehru and the other from Nehru to Major General Kalwant Singh, who had recently moved to Delhi as the CGS. Significantly, Nehru wrote to the CGS and not the C-in-C, who was then a British officer. 11

_________________________________________________________________

DO No 200/L&OG

                                                                                    Commissioner’s OFFICE, MEERUT

                                                                                    July 8, 1948

Dear JAWAHAR Lal Ji

1.           I take the liberty of sending this bit of information in case it is of any use.

2.           In the MAHCHHOI area beyond the ZOJILA there are certain rather obscure routes which have been traversed either by me or to my knowledge within the last three or four years.  I have marked them on the attached Map.  The routes in each case are difficult and not possible for animals, but men with loads can traverse them.  The one from the telegraph hut just beyond the high point of the ZOJILA pass is fairly easy and gives access to the head of the AMARNATH valley and so down towards BALTAL and also through PANCH-TARNI towards SHESHNAG.   The snag about this route is that unless care is taken to keep right under the shoulder of the AMARNATH peak, the party will find itself on the edge of impracticable precipices.  There is another route which goes up the long nala between MAHCHHOI and MATAYAN.  It is a long nala about ten miles to the head, with many bends and apparently leads nowhere; but there is a way over the top down into the PANCH-TARNI plain.

3.           Both these routes provide access between PAHALGAM and the MAHCHHOI-MATAYAN area.

4.           There are other routes over the ridge of the main HIMALAYAN Range between ZOJILA and NUN-KUN, but these are fairly obvious and well known.

5.           Incidentally, as I have trekked a fair deal over the area between the ROHTANG pass at the head of KULU valley and the SASERLA which is about 60 miles NORTH OF LEH, and also in the ZASKAR valley from its head down through DRAS to the ZOJILA, I would be happy to answer any questions, although of course probably our Army know all the answers themselves by now.

            Kind regards,

                                                                                                Yours sincerely,

                                                                                                Sd/-x-x-x (SS KHERA)

_____________________________________________________________

PRIME MINISTER

INDIA                                                                                                            NEW DELHI

                                                                                                            JULY 10, 1948

My dear KALWANT SINGH,

I am sending you a letter I have received from the Commissioner of MEERUT Division, also a map which he has sent me.

I might mention that in 1916 I crossed the ZOJILA, went to MATAYAN, and then tried to go to AMARNATH cave from MATAYAN across the high mountains.  We climbed some glaciers, reached the top of a huge ice field and were only about 3 or 4 miles from AMARNATH cave.  It started snowing then which made it very difficult to cross the crevasses.  Indeed I slipped into one and had to be pulled out by the rope which was tied around me.  So I did not succeed in reaching AMARNATH and had to come back to MATAYAN.

I rather doubt if we can take much advantage of these difficult mountain routes which KHERA has pointed out.  But if you wish to enquire further into this matter, please write to KHERA or even ask him to come up here for a day.

                                                                                                            Yours sincerely

                                                                                    Sd/-x-x-x-x (JAWAHARLAL NEHRU)

Major General KALWANT SINGH

Chief of the General Staff

Army Headquarters,

New Delhi

______________________________________________________________

            The two letters along with the map were sent the very next day to HQ Western Command with copies endorsed to the Director of Military Intelligence. It not known whether the maps were found useful or the services of SS Khera were utilised in the plan for the capture of Zoji La.  However, they bring out the personal interest that our first Prime Minister took in matters military. Soon after Zoji la was captured, Nehru visited Kashmir to personally congratulate the troops who had taken part in the operation. Exactly a year earlier, he had visited Kashmir immediately after the recapture of Baramula accompanied by Indira Gandhi.

Endnotes

1.               SN Prasad SN and Dharam Pal, History of the Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48), History Division, Ministry of Defence, New  Delhi, 1987. pp.52-55

2.               Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 160-62.

3.                  Appendix to J& K Division Intelligence Summary (ISUM) of 5 December 1947, Document No. 601/14172/H/I, History Division, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi. 

4.                  White Paper on Kashmir, Government of India, 26 Feb 1948, New Delhi. History Division, MOD, File No 601/14189/H,  p.47

5.                  White Paper on Kashmir, p. 67

6.                  White Paper on Kashmir, p. 55

7.                  White Paper on Kashmir, p. 115

8.                  Appendix ‘A’ to J& K Division Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No.2 of 20 January 1948, Document No. 601/14172/H/I, History Division, MOD, New Delhi. 

9.                  Appendix ‘A’ to HQ Western Command Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No. 43 for the period 29 Aug to 08 Sep 1948, Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi. 

10.              Appendix ‘B’ to HQ Western Command Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No. 43 for the period 29 Aug to 08 Sep 1948, Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.

11.              HQ Western Command Intelligence Summary (ISUM) for the period Jun to Sep 1948, Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.

(Published in the USI Journal)