INDIA'S
EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE – PAST, PRESENT AN FUTURE
By
Maj Gen VK Singh
Introduction
In recent years, Indian intelligence agencies have been in the news for all the
wrong reasons. This is unfortunate, considering their unimpeachable past. During
the British Raj, the Criminal Intelligence Department (CID) had a formidable
standing. In recent years, their reputation has taken a beating. Apart from
several major intelligence failures at the international level, they have not
been able to prevent a single terrorist attack in the recent past. It is
necessary to examine the reason for their dismal performance and institute
suitable remedial measures.
Brief History
There is no
official record of the creation of the intelligence department in India. Unlike
the military, intelligence services do not maintain a war diary or digest of
service. However, until the beginning of the 20th century, the
primary role of intelligence agencies was to gain information about the
adversary's military potential. In 1885,
Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor was appointed Quartermaster
General and head of the Intelligence Department for the British Indian Army.
The objective then was to monitor Russian troop deployments in Afghanistan,
fearing a Russian invasion of British India through Central Asia.
Russia had strong imperial ambitions and a special interest in South Asia.
Shortly afterwards, the "Central Special Branch' was set up by an order of
the Secretary of State for India in London, on 23 December 1887. In 1902-03,
the Central Special Branch was remodeled and redesignated as the 'Central
Criminal Intelligence Department', which was made responsible for all matters
pertaining to national security in addition to its role in prevention of
inter-provincial crime, and was designated as the nodal agency of the
Government of India. 1
By 1918 the
word 'Criminal' was dropped from the name of the organisation. The present
name, the Intelligence Bureau, was adopted in the year 1920. In 1921, a new state-run surveillance and
monitoring agency — Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) - was established. The
IPI was run jointly by the India Office and the Government of India and
reported jointly to the Secretary of the Public and Judicial Department of the
India Office, and the Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) in India, and
maintained close contact with Scotland Yard and MI5. In 1947, it was
reorganized as the Central Intelligence Bureau under the Ministry of Home
Affairs.2
Soon after
Independence, the IB (Intelligence Bureau) was set up, with Sanjivi Pillai as
its first Director. After Mahatma Gandhi's assassination in 1948, Sanjivi was
replaced by BN Mullick, who remained the head of the organisation for an
unprecedented 17 years. During his tenure, the IB became an extremely powerful
organization, looking after external as well as internal intelligence, in
addition to playing a major role in deciding foreign policy. Mullick's
proximity to Nehru added to his clout, and during the 1962 conflict with China,
he even decided the location of border outposts manned by the Army, with
predictable results. During the 1962 and the 1965 conflicts the Army complained
that it did not get adequate intelligence, and demanded its own foreign
intelligence agency, on the lines of the CIA in USA and MI6 in UK. Based
on directions of the Army Chief, General JN Chaudhuri, a paper on the subject
was prepared by Major General MN Batra, the DMI (Director of Military
Intelligence).
MN Batra's
paper, which proposed the establishment of a foreign intelligence agency under
the Ministry of Defence, was put up to the Prime Minister. After she came to
power, Indira Gandhi had felt the need for an independent intelligence agency
to gather external intelligence, on the lines of the CIA in USA. She approved
the creation of the agency, but decided to keep it under her own control
instead of the Ministry of Defence, as recommended in the paper. The new
organization, known as the Research & Analysis Wing of the Cabinet
Secretariat, was established on 21 September 1968. Rameshwar Nath Kao was
selected to be the first head of the RAW, with K. Sankaran Nair as his deputy,
both being from the IB.
In 2001, the roles of IB and RAW were formalized as a result of the
recommendations of the Group of Ministers on National Security, which was set
up after the Kargil Review Committee submitted its report in 2000. The
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was also set up at the same time, with
control over all military assets for gathering intelligence. The roles of the
three agencies – internal, external and military - are different, but some
overlap still exists. Lack of coordination and sharing of intelligence, the
bane of intelligence agencies in India, still exists. If anything, it has
become worse. This appears to be the major lacunae in the functioning of Indian
intelligence agencies, the others being lack of accountability and
parliamentary oversight.
During the
British Raj, the intelligence agencies did excellent work. In 1913, the Ghadr
(Revolution) party came into being in 1913 in San Francisco, taking its name
from the newspaper brought out by Lala Hardayal. It found support among the
large number of Indian emigrants in Canada and the USA, who had left their
homelands due to famine and unemployment, especially in the Punjab. The Ghadr
party wanted to end British rule by fomenting armed revolution. Then, just
before World War I began, the Komagata Maru incident took place, when several
hundred Sikhs who wanted to emigrate were not allowed to land at Vancouver. On
their return to India, British troops fired and killed many when they tried to
enter Calcutta after landing at Budge Budge. Subsequently, many Ghadrites were
sent to India from Canada and the USA, to carry out acts of subversion and
sabotage. The CID caught most of them as soon as they landed.
During
World War II, the Indian National Army was formed in South East Asia with the
help of the Japanese. During the Burma campaign, dozens of intelligence
operatives of the INA were sent to India to carry out acts of sabotage. Almost
all were caught as soon as they arrived, many being executed. Intelligence
operations were then handled by the CID, staffed almost completely by Indians,
except for a few British officers in senior appointments. Not surprisingly,
when Lord Mountbatten took over as Viceroy, he remarked that he had inherited
one of the best intelligence services in the World. The present IB and RAW
descended from the same CID of the British Raj. With such an impeccable
pedigree, why can't they do half as much?3
The Present State of Affairs
Before talking about the future, it is prudent to talk
about the present. Is the performance of Indian intelligence agencies
satisfactory? Are they worth their keep? If not, what can be done to make sure
that they do the job for which they being paid? These are simple questions, but
the answers are complex. Let us examine their failures of and successes.
The
first major intelligence failure after independence was the intrusion of
Pakistani tribesmen in Kashmir in October 1947, known as Operation 'Gulmarg'.
Though indications of the Pakistani design were available through several
sources, these were not taken seriously. The political leadership waited until
the Maharajah signed the instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, before
flying in Indian troops. Srinagar was saved in the nick of time. Had they
reached even a day later, it is possible that Kashmir would not be part of
India today.
The next
major intelligence failure occurred in Aksai Chin in 1954-57 when the
Intelligence Bureau (IB), which was then in charge of foreign intelligence,
failed to find out that the Chinese had built a strategic road through Indian
territory linking western Ladakh with Xinjiang. This was followed soon
after by the Chinese intrusion in NEFA, which resulted in the ignominious
defeat of the Indian Army in 1962. Indications of the Chinese build up were
obtained from local sources, but these were either ignored or not taken as
seriously as they should have been. During Operation 'Gibraltar' in 1965, the
IB failed to correctly interpret evidence and warn of Pakistani plans to send
thousands of infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley to spark a rebellion. Later
the same year the, Pakistan launched Operation 'Grand Slam' using the new
armoured division which she had raised. The IB, still in charge of foreign
intelligence, failed to detect the raising of the armoured division that was
launched in September 1965, with disastrous consequences.
After the creation of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 1968, the IB was
divested of its responsibility for external intelligence. Since them, external
intelligence has been almost the exclusive preserve of RAW, whose successes in
the 40 years of its existence have been more than matched by its
failures. According to a Pakistani author, the major 'successes' of
RAW were the creation of Bangladesh; the assassination of General
Zia-ur-Rahman; Project Poornima (Pokharan nuclear explosion); the Kahuta
Blueprint (the Indians were on the verge of obtaining it, but Morarji Desai
refused to sanction the $ 10,000 demanded by the RAW agent, and informed
Pakistan, who caught and eliminated the RAW mole); induction of Sikkim into the
Indian Union; engineering a revolt in the Maldives (to increase India's
influence); and monitoring Pakistani telecommunications. Among RAW's 'failures'
are the promulgation of Emergency in 1975 (Kao supported it, whereas the IB had
advised against it); Operation Blue Star (RAW failed to assess the strength of
Bhindranwale's forces); Mujib-ur-Rahman's assassination (RAW had advance
information about Mujib's assassination but failed to prevent it); defeat of
Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam in Mauritius elections (Indira Gandhi wanted him to
win); and support to LTTE, which later turned against it.4
There are several other failures of external intelligence which can be
added to the list. One is the blowing up of Air India Flight 182 in 1985 by
Khalistani terrorists, which RAW failed to prevent. This was followed by the
Kargil war in 1999, when RAW was severely criticised for inadequate
intelligence about the Pakistani intrusion that had been taking place for
several months. One reason for this failure was the lack of coordination
between the intelligence agencies, which zealously guard their turf and resent
sharing intelligence with other agencies. This was clearly brought out by the
Kargil Review Committee chaired by K. Subrahmanyam, which pointed out several
lacunae in the existing intelligence set up in the country, the chief being the
existence of multiple agencies reporting to different heads. It decried the
virtual monopoly of RAW in respect of external intelligence, and commented
adversely on the wisdom of saddling one agency alone with multifarious
responsibilities of human, communication, imagery and electronic
intelligence.
The recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee were examined by the Group
of Ministers (GoM) established in April 2000. Home Minister LK Advani chaired
the GoM, the other key members being Defence Minister George Fernandes,
External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha.
The GoM constituted four task forces, which studied intelligence, internal
security, border management and defence. The GoM completed its task in February
2001 and submitted its report to the Prime Minister. The Cabinet Committee on
Security (CCS) considered the Report on 11 May 2001 and accepted all its
recommendations, except the one dealing with the appointment of the Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS).5
The GoM report was formally made public with much fanfare at a ceremony on 23
May 2001 when it was discovered that the entire chapter on intelligence had
been deleted. The Home Minister admitted that the deletions were carried on
the advice of the intelligence agencies, though the ministers had accepted it
with some reservations. The intelligence agencies felt that the deleted parts
pointed to specific shortcomings that people inimical to the country's security
could have exploited. A few omissions pertained to observations that could have
had adverse diplomatic implications.6
Apparently, the decision to delete
the chapter on intelligence was taken at the last moment, leaving not enough
time even to inform the Press Information Bureau (PIB), which issued an
official release on the same day, containing the gist of the deleted chapter
dealing with intelligence. In fact, the salient features of the deleted
portion of the report were the subject of several articles even before the formal
release, most notably the article titled "for a paradigm shift" by
Praveen Swami in the Frontline issue of 13 April 2001. Writing in the same
journal two months later, Swami found the deletions mystifying, since the
contents had already been made public by the Frontline issue of 13 April. The
Hindustan Times of 16 August 2001 gave out a verbatim reproduction of the
recommended charter of RAW, claiming it had a copy of the 'order1. 7
The Government claims that most of
the recommendations of the GoM Report have been implemented, such as the
setting up of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Technical
Resources Organisation (NTRO). However, insiders feel that little has changed
on the ground. If anything, the situation has become worse. The NTRO was the
brain child of former President Abdul Kalam, who was at that time heading the
DRDO. It was intended to bring the technical resources of all agencies under
one roof, to avoid duplication and improve coordination. However, RAW refused
to part with the Aviation Research Centre (ARC), while all military SIGINT,
TECHINT and IMINT resources went to the DIA. The NTRO naturally had to create
its own assets, resulting in considerable expense and aggravating the
duplication. Significantly, the most important recommendation of the GOM – the
creation of a Chief of Defence staff (CDS) – has still not been implemented. In
true bureaucratic tradition, it has been shelved until a consensus is achieved
between all political parties.
The Future of India's External Intelligence
The future does not look very bright. If Indian intelligence agencies continue
to muddle along as they are doing now, things can only grow worse. The utter
incompetence of our intelligence has been proved beyond doubt by their failure
to prevent the large number of terrorist attacks that have occurred in recent
times. Most of these were serial blasts, involving dozens of saboteurs. There
must have been many more who provided the funds and the logistics. How is it
that not one of these groups was infiltrated and information obtained? It is
understandably difficult to develop moles in groups based abroad. But what
about those based in India? There is no dearth of funds with the agencies. What
then is the problem?
The excessive dependence of
intelligence agencies on technical sources has bred a sense of complacency. If
one can get information sitting in his office why should he risk his life
outdoors. At present, almost 90% of the intelligence comes from SIGINT,
with HUMINT accounting for just 10%. One reason for the excellent performance
of intelligence agencies during the British Raj was the almost total dependence
on HUMINT. The only way to gain intelligence was through spies, agents and
moles. While it is true that the richest sources of intelligence today are the
Internet, satellite links, mobile phones and radio, human sources can never be
discounted. Spying is a dying art and is visible today only in James Bond
movies. Unless the art is revived, the intelligence agencies will not be
able to deliver the goods.
Everyone knows that intelligence agencies spend large amounts of money to 'buy'
or cultivate agents. Where does the money go? One only has to read The
Kaoboys of RAW written by B. Raman, a retired additional secretary of RAW,
for the answer. He writes that most RAW officers posted abroad had a fancy for
Mercedes cars. PV Narasimha Rao, who was then the Foreign Minister, once
remarked that he had noticed that officers of RAW and IB posted in foreign
embassies had the largest and most expensive cars. "How do they manage to
find the money," he asked. He also pointed out that the CIA and other
foreign intelligence agencies could easily identify Indian intelligence
officers from the expensive cars maintained by them, since no other officer
could afford such cars.8
The reason for the misuse of so called 'secret' funds is lack of accountability
and financial audit. India is perhaps the only democracy in the World where the
intelligence agencies are not subject to parliamentary oversight. In USA, the
CIA has not one but four levels of oversight – the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence; the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence; the Inspector General (IG, CIA); and the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, which comprises trustworthy and eminent citizens
with experience whose job is to see that intelligence agencies do not violate
laws of the land or indulge in unethical practices. In UK, oversight is
exercised by the parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) that
is appointed by and reports to the Prime Minister. Canada has a Security
Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) that oversees the functioning of the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and reports to the Canadian House
of Commons. In addition, there is an IG, CSIS who carries out functions similar
those of the IG, CIA in the USA.9
Similar mechanisms are in place in other democracies aslo. In Australia, the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Intelligence exercises
oversight over the Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Secret Intelligence
Service (ASIS) as well as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD). In addition,
oversight is exercised by the Office of National Assessments (ONA) and
the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS). New Zealand has
three tiers of supervision, in the form of the Cabinet Strategy Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Security, chaired by the Prime Minister, the Intelligence and
Security Committee and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
(IGIS). These oversee the functioning of New Zealand's two intelligence
agencies, the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) and the Government
Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).
The demand for parliamentary oversight has been made several times in the past,
even by officers who have served in intelligence agencies. The need for
accountability and parliamentary oversight is accepted by several officers who
were once part of RAW, including B. Raman, an ex Additional Secretary.
According to him, "India is amongst the countries. …which continue to
follow the dictum that the intelligence agencies are the most patriotic, can do
wrong and hence don't need external checks and balances. There is no desire on
the part of the political leadership to make the agencies accountable for their
performance." The only attempt to introduce an oversight mechanism was
made during the tenure of Prime Minister VP Singh. The suggestion had
reportedly come from Jaswant Singh, who was then Chairman of the Estimates
Committee of the Lok Sabha. When the RAW chief convened a meeting of senior
officers to seek their views on the proposed measure, he was surprised to find
that most of them favoured such a measure as it would make them less vulnerable
to undesirable pressures from the executive. Interaction with Members of
Parliament would also give them a chance to acquaint the public with the work
being done by them, removing from their minds many wrong impressions about
intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, before the exercise could be completed
the VP Singh government fell due to withdrawal of support by the BJP.
Another major drawback of Indian intelligence agencies is the obsession
with secrecy that is totally misplaced. The fixation is carried to such
ridiculous extents that the agencies are reluctant to use even their names. RAW
prefers the all embracing euphemism Cabinet Secretariat which fools no one. A
search for the list of intelligence agencies worldwide reveals no less than 13
agencies in USA, including CIA, while MI5 and MI6 are clearly listed under UK
and Mossad in Israel. The intelligence agencies of almost all nations in
Europe, including erstwhile soviet states of Eastern Europe are also listed, as
are those of South America and many African nations. But under India, one will
find Cabinet Secretariat and Ministry of Home Affairs.10
The irrelevance of the obsessive secrecy that envelopes RAW and its
activities was brought about by Shashi Tharoor, during the first RN Kao
memorial lecture on 20 January 2007. Tharoor, then Under Secretary General for
Communications and Public Information at the United Nations, stressed that the
facelessness of RAW may be working to its disadvantage, since its personnel
were not getting the recognition they deserved for their valuable contribution
to India's foreign policy. Noting that the agency was not accountable to
Parliament and its funds were subject to only a limited scrutiny, Tharoor felt
said that RAW was being distrusted and criticised by the media and the public,
without it having any chance to defend its actions. "RAW's exact locus
within the Indian strategic establishment has remained a puzzle", he said.
He went on to add: "I think it is a great pity if it true that, as I am
told, secrecy has gone to the point where many who serve in RAW themselves do
not have a sense of their own history."11
The cloak of secrecy that an external intelligence agency such as RAW covers
itself with hides little else than its faults, which remain uncorrected.
Strangely enough, the so called 'secret' agency possesses very little that can
be called secret. Whatever secrets it has concerns foreign countries, whose
disclosure can harm them, not India. Unlike the defence forces or the DRDO, it
has nothing that can be of interest to a foreign country. Yet it treats all
information it gathers as highly secret. The only reason for keeping such
information under wraps is to protect the source. In case such information is
made public, accidentally or otherwise, it is only the source which is compromised,
with little effect on national security. An example was the tape of the famous
Musharraf – Aziz conversation during the Kargil war, which was made public to
show Pakistan's complicity. It did result in the drying up of the source of the
intercept, but there was certainly no effect on our national security.
There are glaring anomalies between
the functioning of our intelligence agencies, even at the grass roots level. In
the armed forces, information about the enemy is always sent in clear. It is
not encoded since that would weaken the code, as the information is already
known to the enemy. However, information about own troops and plans is always
sent in code. This basic rule of security is violated everyday by RAW, which
insists that all information in its possession is secret. At many places along
our borders, where Army and RAW stations are located next to each other, the
same information is being sent in clear by one agency and in code by the other.
Can there be a more obvious example of lack of coordination between our
intelligence agencies?
What are the
challenges that Indian intelligence are likely to face in the near future?
According to Sunil Sainis, this will be on four main fronts. The definition of
what constitutes
our `national space' is much broader now and now includes issues such as
economics, media and science. Another challenge is the change in the tenor of
revisionist sentiment within the country, which is manifested in advanced forms
of terrorism. This is likely to pose a serious threat to the country's security
and integrity, by widening the fissures and divisions in society i.e. caste,
religion, ethnicity, and economic disparity. The third major challenge is
organised crime, which is no longer only a means to ill gotten wealth. The
merger of the local crime syndicates with narcotics distributors and arms
smugglers has increased their destabilizing influence on society, by funding
revisionist elements and terrorists. The fourth challenge is the proliferation
of nuclear and missile technology among India's hostile neighbours which has
heightened the need for accurate and actionable intelligence assessments
regarding these threats. 12
Conclusion
The future if India's external intelligence does not appear to be very bright.
The intelligence services have become somnolent and lazy. They need to be
shaken out of their slumber, and asked to pull up their socks. This is only
possible by making them accountable and subjecting them to performance and
financial audit. If this is not done soon, the country is likely to face
serious threats to its security and social fabric, which once torn, will be
difficult to mend.
Endnotes
1. Maloy Krishna Dhar The Intelligence Bureau: India's Prime Intelligence
Agency, http://frontierindia.net/the-intelligence-bureau-india
3. V.K. Singh, Terror lessons from the Raj, New Indian Express, 04 Nov
2008. http://www.expressbuzz.com
4.
Group
Captain SM Hali,. 'RAW at War-Genesis of Secret Agencies in Ancient
India', Pakistan Defence Journal, March 1999.
5.
"GROUP OF MINISTERS' REPORT ON "REFORMING THE NATIONAL
SECURITY SYSTEM", PIB release, May 23, 2001
6.
Editorial 'Security
Counsel', Times of India, 24 May 2001.
7.
Swati Chaturvedi, IB and RAW roles defined, Hindustan Times, 26 August
2001.
8.
B. Raman, The Kaoboys of RAW – down memory lane, New Delhi, 2007, p.119.
9. B.
Raman, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future, p. 364-377
11. The Indian
Express, New Delhi, 21 January 2007
12. Sunil
Sainis, Intelligence Reforms, BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR - Volume 3(4) January-February 2001
10 Oct 2009
No comments:
Post a Comment