CORRUPTION AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY
To know if government
officials handling the treasury are stealing public money or not is as
difficult to detect as whether a fish is drinking water or not?'
Chanakya in Arthashastra
Introduction
Corruption is today endemic in almost every organ of the
government. In fact, it has now permeated all walks of life and is widely
believed to be responsible for most of the ills that plague our country,
including poverty, ill health, lack of education and crime. Though the effect
of corruption on governance is well known, its impact on national security is rarely
talked about. In fact, it is of more serious concern than its other
repercussions. If this relationship is rarely talked about it is because of
lack of awareness and information, rather than lack of importance. The large number of scams in defence deals in
recent years are ample proof, if any is needed, of the magnitude of the problem
and its grave consequences to national security. There is a need to study this
phenomenon in greater detail, so that remedial measures can be taken to
alleviate the magnitude of the problem, if not overcome it.
What is Corruption?
Corruption has many
connotations, but the one most commonly known is the venal i.e. involving
bribery. It is important to appreciate the difference
between corruption and dishonesty. The World Bank has defined corruption
as the use of public office for private profit.
So, if a person occupying a public or government office uses his position to make
a private profit, it is corruption. Mere dishonesty or making a profit cannot
be termed as corruption. For instance, a trader who buys an item for ten rupees
and sells it for twelve, is making an honest profit. If the MRP of the product
is twelve rupees and he sells it at fifteen, he can be called dishonest, but
not corrupt. The money given to a waiter for better service in a restaurant is
called a tip, while that that given to a policeman to overlook a traffic
violation becomes a bribe. The waiter is not occupying a public office and
cannot be called corrupt. However, the policeman has made a private profit by
virtue of his official position and is corrupt. The same applies to money given
to the electric meter reader by a home owner to reduce his electricity bill, or
to the ticket examiner in a train by a passenger travelling without a
ticket.
What is National Security
To
understand the meaning of national security, let us
start with the example of a common peasant or a home owner. What is his concept
of security, for himself and his family? If he has some land which is fertile
it provides him financial security. To improve it still further and not be
dependant on the rains he digs his own well or a big pond, as they do in Assam and Bengal . He is still worried about attacks from wild
animals, or robbers, so he builds a fence around his farm or keeps some dogs,
which give him physical security. If he is still not satisfied he can keep a
shotgun or a rifle. Having catered for physical and financial security, he
turns to other needs, such as social and emotional security. He makes friends with his neighbours, so that
they can help him if he is in trouble and take him to the hospital when
he falls sick. He raises a family and as the children grow up he takes pains to
ensure that the stay together, so that they get emotional support from each
other.
On a higher plane, exactly the same thing is done by a
country to become secure. Physical security is provided by adequate military
strength, secure borders and a strong industrial base. For a small nation that
cannot afford to maintain large armed forces, the options are alliances with
friendly countries or joining a pact eg. NATO. Financial security is provided
by self reliance in food; energy resources such as oil, coal, hydroelectric or
nuclear power; communications in the form of good air, rail and road networks
and secure telecommunications. In fact, all these factors are important
ingredients, in varying degree, for all components of national security, which
themselves often overlap.
There
are many definitions of National Security. One of the simplest and easily
understood is given by Encarta 2007, which says: ‘National Security is the
protection of a nation from attack or other danger by maintaining adequate
armed forces and guarding state secrets’. A more comprehensive definition given
by Wikipedia is as given below:
National
security refers to the requirement to maintain the survival of
the nation-state
through the use of economic, military
and political power and the exercise of diplomacy.
Measures taken to ensure national security include:
·
using diplomacy to rally allies and
isolate threats
·
maintaining effective armed forces
·
implementing civil defense
and emergency preparedness measures (including
anti-terrorism legislation)
·
ensuring the resilience and redundancy
of critical infrastructure
·
using intelligence services to detect and defeat
or avoid threats and espionage, and to protect classified information
·
using counterintelligence services or secret police
to protect the nation from internal threats
According to the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for
the year 2001-02, In India’s national security objectives are served by :
·
Defending the country’s borders and protecting the lives and
property of its citizens against terrorism and insurgencies.
·
Maintaining a credible minimum deterrent against the use or the
threat of use of weapons of mass destruction against India .
·
Securing the country against restrictions on the transfer of
material, equipment and technologies that have a bearing on India ’s
security.
·
Promoting further co-operation and understanding with neighbouring
countries.
·
Working with countries of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) to
address key challenges before the international community
·
Pursuing security and strategic dialogue with major powers and key
partners; and
·
Following a consistent and principled policy on disarmament and
international security issues.
Another version of national security
that forms part of the Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security,
2001, is as under:
National
security is a function of a country’s external environment and the internal
situation, as well as their interplay with each other. The former is influenced
by the major features of the prevailing international order, the disposition of
its immediate and extended neighbours and the major powers. The internal
situation encompasses many aspects of national life, ranging from law and order
to economic fundamentals and from the quality of governance to national
cohesiveness.
The Kargil Review Committee headed by K
Subramanyam made several important recommendations with regard to national
security. In April 2000 the Prime Minister constituted a Group of Ministers
(GOM) to review the
national security system in its entirety and based on the recommendations of
the Kargil Review Committee. The GOM was
headed by Shri L.K. Advani, Minister of Home Affairs. The other members were Shri
George Fernandes, Minister of Defence, Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External
Affairs and Shri Yashwant Sinha, Minister of Finance. Shri Brajesh Mishra,
National Security Adviser, was a Special Invitee who attended all meeting of
the GOM. The GOM was asked to submit its report within six months.
The traditional concept of national
security has undergone fundamental changes over the years. It is no longer
synonymous with sufficient military strength to defend the nation and its
interests. In today's world, military might alone does not guarantee either
sovereignty or security. The more realistic and comprehensive
approach to national security also includes economic strength,
internal cohesion and technological prowess. The fundamental security of the
individual citizen includes security of life and property, food security,
energy security, clean environment, education and health. A strong sense of
nationalism and good governance also form an integral part of national
security; as does the ability to retain political and economic sovereignty and
autonomy of decision making, in an era of globalisation and increasing economic
interdependence.
While acknowledging the wider connotation of
national security covering issues such as a nation’s economic and technological
capability, its food and energy security, etc., the GoM felt that addressing
all these issues together would diffuse the focus of its report. So it took a conscious
decision to exclude these issues so as to be able to address in detail the
management of national security as more traditionally conceived while taking
into account the need for flexibility in the context of the newly emerging
challenges. The GOM felt that significant step in this direction has already
been taken on Government’s direction by the National Security Advisory Board
(NSAB) which completed in 1999 a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review for the
first time in the country’s history. The NSAB was then in the process of
upgrading this study which was to be called the National Security Review. The
NSAB forms a part of the National Security Council as in reconstituted every
year. The present convenor of the NSAB is ex Foreign Secretary, M K Rasgotra.
The GOM set up four task forces, to
deal with four important subjects. These were as under:-
Intelligence Apparatus - Shri
GC Saxena ( ex RAW chief)
Internal Security - Shri
NN Vohra (ex Home/ Def Secy, PPS to PPM)
Border Management - Dr
Madhav Godbole (ex Home Secy)_
Management of Defence - Shri
Arun Singh (ex Minister of State for Defence)
This was the first time in
independent India ’s
history that a comprehensive review of the national security system in its
entirety was undertaken. The task forces completed their job by September 2000
and the GOM submitted its report in February 2001. This was truly commendable.
I do not recall any other committee or commission that has worked so fast. The
GOM held no less than 27 meetings, which again is a record, considering that
all the concerned ministers held important portfolios and were heavily
committed. Part of the credit must go to the task forces, comprising specialists
who had spent a life time in their respective fields.
The GOM made many far reaching
recommendations, most of which have been executed or are in the process of
being implemented. The portion of the report dealing with intelligence is
classified, but some of its recommendations such as enhancement of technical
capabilities of intelligence agencies and the setting up of new organisations
such as the NTRO and the DIA have already been executed. As regards internal
security, the major areas covered by the report are deployment of armed forces
for internal security duties, amendments in existing laws, money laundering, drug trafficking, narco-terrorism
and flow of foreign funds, functioning of the state police organisations, central
para military forces, revamping the criminal justice system to
make it more responsive, role of the MHA
and the state governments, inculcating patriotism
and a commitment to the national cause, civil defence and disaster relief management.
As regards
border management, the report distinguished border guarding forces (BSF, ITBP,
Assam Rifles) from central para military forces and central police forces, and
recommended that one such force should look after one border. Specific recommendations are given in respect
of each of our borders with Pakistan ,
China ,
Nepal ,
Bhutan ,
Bangla Desh and Myanmar .
Perhaps for the first time, maritime borders and coastal defence have been
considered, along with the role of the coast guard and the marine police. Other
areas covered by the report pertain to infiltration and smuggling of narcotics,
arms and weapons, illegal immigration, citizenship, passport and amendments to immigration
and refugee laws.
It may come as a surprise to many to learn that
until now we did not have a national security doctrine. Ideally, the
Government's national security objectives should lead to a formulation of
defence objectives, which, in turn, define defence policy and the directives of
the Defence Minister. These in turn lead to the preparation and subsequent
implementation of defence objectives and missions, for which the desired
military capability, required technologies, industrial capacities and fiscal
resources are identified. The report recommended restructuring of the higher defence
organisation, integrating the service headquarters with the MOD and the
appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff; the establishment of the Defence
Intelligence Agency. To streamline the
process of major acquisitions of military hardware, ships and aircraft, it
proposed the setting up the Defence
Procurement Board in the MOD. The GOM felt that private sector participation in
defence production and export should be encouraged, and the DRDO should concentrate
on core technologies that are not available from other sources.
Areas
of Concern in National Security
The
important areas of concern in national security are us under:-
·
Defence
(external threat)
·
Security
of vital installations & national monuments (nuclear facilities, airfields,
railways, shipyards, oil refineries, dams, power plants etc.)
·
Security
of international border and coastline (terrorist, illegal immigration,
smuggling)
·
Internal
Security (protection of lives and property of citizens from terrorism,
insurgency, organized crime)
·
Intelligence
(security of sources, codes and ciphers, counter intelligence)
·
Protection
of economy, industry (fake currency, money laundering, hawala)
·
Transfer
of vital material, equipment and technology (nuclear fissile material, missile
technology)
Defence
The area in which
corruption has the most damaging effect is defence. Since the earliest times,
spies have been used to obtain information about the enemy’s military strength.
This is valid even today. The best method of getting such information is to
bribe someone from the opposite camp. In other words find a corrupt official.
The enemy tries to do the same thing to us. Corrupt persons in authority, who
have access to the country’s defence plans and capability, pose the greatest
danger to national security. After the 1965
operations, the Director of Military Operations in the Pakistani Army revealed
that he was ready to pay up to one crore rupees for information on where India
planned to launch her armoured division. Such vital information can change the
course of battle and the future of the country. That is the reason why a
country’s war plans are so zealously guarded. After independence, there have
been dozens of cases of penetration by foreign intelligence agencies, by
creating moles. Most of these penetrations were by the CIA, the targets being RAW
or IB. There was one case of a mole in the PM’s office, who worked for French
intelligence. Fortunately, none of these cases involved defence related
information.
Corruption in Defence Deals
Corruption
in defence deals is a world wide phenomenon. There is corruption in other areas
of defence, such as procurement of rations, clothing, works etc, but these do
not really impinge on national security. Of course, one can argue that giving
inferior rations or clothing to troops degrades their fighting capability, and
thus affects security. Technically, this is true. I once had an officer in my
company, who was stickler. If he saw an officer’s orderly walking his dog or
playing with his children, he said that the officer was corrupt. According to
him, if one used an official pen to write a private letter, or used his
official telephone to call his wife, he was corrupt. There is no such thing as
absolute honesty. In the Indian armed forces, the military engineering service, the
ordnance corps, the supply corps and to an extent the electrical and mechanical
engineers (and its equivalents in the navy and the air force), who have to deal
with procurements and money, have been known to indulge in malpractices. The
only saving grace has been that once they are caught, the culprits were
punished severely.
The maximum scope
for corruption is in defence deals because the sums involved are very large,
and the sources of supply limited. The margins of profit are also very high. It
is therefore natural that the manufacturer or vendor uses all means to secure
the order. The decisions for purchase of defence equipment are often made at
the highest level. This happens all over the World. Some years ago, there was a
major scandal in the USA .
General Dynamics, the company that made the Trident nuclear submarines bought
an ordinary China
tea set from Admiral Rickover as an 'antique'. In the 60s the Lockheed scandal resulted
in the resignation of the PMs of Japan and Italy . In India , there have been several
scams involving purchase of defence equipment. Some of them are discussed in
the succeeding paragraphs.
The Bofors Case
In 1986 the Rajiv Gandhi
Government had signed a deal with a Swedish company, AB Bofors for the supply
of 400 Howitzer field guns to the Indian Army. The total cost of the guns was Rs
1437 crore. There was a condition that no middlemen would be engaged by the
parties. It was later found that Bofors
had paid a commission to three people - Ottavio Quattrocchi, Win Chadha and the
Hinduja brothers. The kickbacks amounted
to about 64 crores. The case was handed over to CBI and has been in the courts
for the last 20 years, with no end in sight. The CBI ahs already spent 250
crores on the case.
It was alleged that Rajiv
Gandhi and members of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) indulged in a massive
cover-up after the story broke. SK Bhatnagar, the defence secretary, was also
involved. The Ambassador in Stockholm
during the period 1984-88 was BM Oza. He wrote a book after he retired in 1994.
He says that he has no doubt that former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had
received bribes in the gun deal through Ottavio Quattrochi. So corruption did occur. But did it affect national
security? The Army has not found any fault with the gun, which proved
its worth during the Kargil operations. But since rules were violated and
bribes were given and taken, the guilty persons need to be punished.
The HDW Submarine case
Another controversial deal that was signed during Rajiv
Gandhi’s time was for the HDW submarines in 1987 fro 420 crores. Here again,
commissions were paid to middlemen and foreign companies. VP Singh was then a defence minister in the
Rajiv Gandhi. He came to know about the commissions from a telegram from the
Indian ambassador in Germany .
He ordered an investigation and resigned when Rajiv Gandhi did not agree with
him. When he became Prime Minister in 1990, he ordered a case to be registered
by the CBI against former defence secretary S K Bhatnagar, former additional
secretary (defence) S S Sidhu, former additional financial advisor (defence
ministry) B S Ramaswamy, former vice chief of Naval staff Vice-admiral Schunker
and former Indian Navy captain M Kondath. The others named as accused were Gopi Chand
Hinduja, a new Delhi-based firm Roger Enterprises Pvt Ltd and some German companies.
Here
again, corruption did occur. However, the Navy
has not complained about the submarine itself. In fact, they wanted some more. So, one cannot really
say that national security has been compromised, except in the sense
that the rule of law has been flouted. Talking about rules, it is interesting
to note that the government itself sometimes breaks the very rules that it
makes. In a recent book The Kaoboys of
RAW, B Raman has revealed that the Government of India paid a bribe or
commission of $ 6 million to an Iranian middleman to get a soft loan of $ 250
million from the Shah of Iran. If this is indeed true, can the Government with
a straight face treat the commissions paid to middlemen in defence deals such
as the Bofors and the HDW submarine as crimes?
The Motorola Case
This is not really
related to defence, but is equally important, since it concerns the security of
the Prime Minister. This case has been described in detail in my book India ’s External Intelligence – Secrets of the
Research & Analysis Wing (RAW). With a view to upgrade their existing Motorola
communication system that had been procured in 1989, in August 2001 the SPG
sent out a global tender enquiry for the procurement of a new digital trunking system.
Out of 13 alleged that the specifications had been framed in a biased manner, to
favour Motorola. A Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC), which
had members from the SPG, Civil
Aviation, Communication, Defence, IB, Police Wireless and RAW was constituted
to examine the technical bids. For various reasons, all the companies except
Motorola were dropped, though they met the minimum technical requirements.
One of the
important requirements of the system was security, with end-to-end encryption.
Surprisingly, the strength of the encryption was not specified and there was no
stipulation regarding approval from Systems Analysis Group (SAG), a unit of the
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which is responsible to
grade all encryption systems that are used by government agencies. The SAG
tests the system and then allots a ‘crack resistivity’, which roughly indicates
the time that would be required to crack the system. This may be in days,
weeks, months or even years. When the representative from RAW raised the point
about SAG approval for the crypto system, the other members felt that this was
not necessary, since SPG did not come under the Ministry of Defence. It was when he resed to sign the TEC report
that the others agreed to add a sentence at the end: “The firm should submit an
appropriate SAG evaluation certificate.”
I was nominated to
represent RAW in the Tender Acceptance cum Price Negotiation Committee that was
constituted to consider the financial bid of Motorola for the communication
system. Apart from the fact that the
price being paid to Motorola being too high, they were asking for 90% advance
payment within 10 days of the contract being signed. It also came to light that
a case had been filed by Iridium India against Motorola for fraud
and inducement to invest through false claims and suppression of material
facts. The Mumbai High Court had issued an interim order restraining Motorola
from remitting or transferring any money out of India , until the case was finally
decided. When I raised the point about SAG approval fro the crypto system, I
was informed that the previous Secretary (Security) had waived the requirement
of SAG evaluation, on file. When Motorola officials were asked about the security
grading of their crypto system, they said that it was very secure, and better
than anything that we had. When asked to spell out its crack resistivity, they
gave the same answer. When asked if the algorithm for the crypto system had
been specially designed or customized for us, or was it the same as the one
being used by others, they confirmed that it was a common user algorithm.
I was literally
shocked at this disclosure. As a rule, security and intelligence agencies
always used indigenous crypto systems, with foreign companies only providing
the radio system and accessories. Even in the case of indigenous crypto
systems, including those developed by public sector companies, the algorithms are
customized for the particular agency, and not used by others. In this
particular case, the entire set up, including the crypto system, was developed
by Motorola, which was an American company. The security of the system was
definitely doubtful. Since it was being procured from a foreign firm, it was
quite likely that foreign intelligence agencies would have access to the
algorithm and would be able to eavesdrop
on the network and know the exact details of the movements of the Prime
Minister and the measures being taken to protect him.
After discussed
the matter with my superiors, I put my reservations in writing. However, having
doubts about the efficacy of my report through official channels, I also wrote
a demi official (DO) letter to a joint secretary in the Prime Ministers Office,
apprising him of the lacunae in the crypto system that was being procured for
use by the SPG, and the serious implications it might have on the Prime
Minister’s security. As expected, it was only the DO letter that yielded
results. The order was cancelled and a fresh technical committee was
constituted to firm up the specifications for the new communication system for
the SPG. The SPG subsequently purchased
the Motorola system, without SAG approval. RAW was not consulted, for obvious
reasons. In this case, there is no doubt that Motorola has obtained the
contract by paying bribes. Corruption has clearly occurred. Has it affected
national security? I think it has. Today, the security of the Prime Minister,
and that of all others who are protected by the SPG, is doubtful.
Border Security
Protection
of our international border and coastline from external aggression is the
responsibility of the defence forces. In addition, the borders have to be
protected to prevent the entry of undesirable elements, which are a threat to
national security. In this category would fall terrorists,
illegal immigrants, smugglers etc. Corruption in the forces or
government officials who are responsible to prevent the entry of these elements
becomes a threat to national security. A classic case is the landing of RDX and
weapons on the western coast which were used in the terrorist attacks in Bombay in 1993. The
officials of the Customs and Police department who facilitated the landings
have been punished.
Another
serious problem is illegal immigration. Today, we have about 2 crore Bangladeshis,
25 lakh Nepalese, 70,000 Sri Lankan Tamils and about one lakh Tibetan migrants living in India. Demographic
changes have taken place in the border belts of West
Bengal , several districts in Bihar ,
Assam , Tripura
and Meghalaya as a result of large-scale illegal migration. Even States like Delhi , Maharashtra
and Rajasthan have been affected. Such large-scale migration has obvious
social, economic, political and security implications. These people could not
have entered without the connivance of corrupt officials who man the borders.
It is well known that most illegal immigrants from Bangla Desh enter by bribing
the BSF which is manning the borders. One can say that once they are detected,
we can deport them. This is easier said than done. Here again corruption comes
into play, with political parties taking positions to suit the interest of
their vote banks.
Smuggling is another activity that flourishes on our
borders and coastline. The items smuggled can be anything, such as consumer
goods, gold, drugs and narcotics etc. It is a well organized business, carried
out by communities of professional couriers who have come up in the villages
and towns close to our land borders and maritime coasts. The Pak ISI is also
reportedly involved in encouraging these activities. Drug couriers are allowed
passage on condition of collecting and reporting trans-border intelligence.
Smugglers are given assistance and facilities, in exchange of services for
organising infiltration of terrorists and saboteurs and landing of explosives,
arms and ammunition. Smuggling cannot be carried out without the connivance of
corrupt border officials. This is one of the most potent threats to national
security.
Organised Crime
The existence of organized
crime syndicates is a fact of life. It is a price every nation has to
pay for liberty and democratic rights. In fact, it is in the most developed
nations such as USA
where the mafia is most active. Organised crime was unknown in Russia during
the Soviet era. Today, the mafia controls everything in Russia . In India , Bombay was the city most
prone to organized crime, and dons such as Haji Mastan and Dawood Ibrahim have
had films made about them. The mafia conducts illegal activities such as
extortion, smuggling of drugs, prostitution, gambling etc. In the Bombay blasts of 1993,
they carried out terrorist acts also. The mafia cannot exist without the active
support of the police and corrupt politicians. Corruption is inherent in the survival of
organised crime, which flouts the rule of law. It results in breakdown of law
and order, bad governance and loss of faith of the common people in the
executive and judiciary.
Intelligence (Security of Codes and
Ciphers)
Security
of codes and ciphers is vital to national security. I don’t know how many of you
have read FW
Winterbotham’s Ultra Secret or Peter Calvocoressi’s Top Secret
Ultra, both published in 1974. During World War II, the Germans had devised
a machine called Enigma, which was used to
automatically code and decode messages. In India , we began using a similar machine
called ECL (Equipment Cipher Line) only in the late sixties. The machine was
being manufactured in a factory in Norway , where a number of local
workers were employed. One of the workers escaped to England and from memory, drew up
the circuit diagram of the machine. British scientists were able to duplicate
the machine, which could decode German transmissions coded on Enigma. This was
considered so secret that the security classification given to it was Ultra Secret, which was higher than Top Secret.
The Germans used Enigma
throughout the war, yielding a rich harvest to British intelligence. In several
instances, British lives were lost, since saving them would have revealed to
the Germans the source of the intelligence, resulting in its drying up. In one
instance, an intercept revealed that the Luftwaffe was going to bomb Coventry the next
morning. The town could have been evacuated, and the lives of its residents
saved. Churchill took the agonising decision not do so, since it would have
resulted in the discontinuance of the use of Enigma by the Germans. I am giving
this example to illustrate how important it is to protect codes and ciphers,
and the grave danger to national security if they are compromised.
Unfortunately, this has occurred in the recent past.
In October 2003, around 20
computers were stolen from DRDO's Scientific Analysis Group (SAG) and Institute for Systems Studies and Analyses (ISSA) in Metcalfe House in Delhi . The SAG evaluates communication
equipment, encryption codes and algorithms for the defence ministry, home
ministry, armed forces and some paramilitary forces. The ISSA, in turn,
develops strategic and tactical wargames, threat analyses and
weapon-performance evaluation. The initial enquiry found that the security at
Metcalfe House was extremely lax. Many people had free access to the important
SAG lab. The SAG was supposed to keep all the codes under strict lock and key
but this was not done. Since I have myself visited the lab, I can confirm this.
There were about 17 officials and scientists who had free access to the lab.
The thieves knew exactly
what they were looking for. They did not touch the other expensive equipment
lying outside. They just took away the storage devices like CDs and computer
hard discs, which stored the sensitive codes. An enquiry was ordered by the
Government, which included officials from IB and RAW. However, ultimately, no
one was found guilty. The SAG came out with a statement that none of the
computers had any sensitive data. Of course, this was just not true. The theft
was committed by insiders, who knew exactly what they wanted. They would not
waste their time if the computers did not have anything worthwhile. After this
incident, security was tightened and 30 guards were employed. But the extent of
loss has not been made public. Most of the organisations whose codes had been
cleared by SAG in recent years promptly took remedial action, changing the
algorithms or the equipment itself. In my view, the theft of data from SAG was
the biggest intelligence disaster since independence. At one go, all codes and ciphers
being used by the defence services, police, para military organisations and
intelligence agencies were compromised. No one has been caught, but obviously
some people within the organisation were bought by an enemy country. The people
who carried out the inquiry also cannot be absolved from blame. This is an example of how corruption directly affects
national security.
Counter Intelligence
One of the oldest methods of
obtaining information about the enemy is by penetrating sensitive government
departments dealing with defence, research and development, atomic energy,
etc. An official who has access to
sensitive information is compromised by inducements of money, alcohol, drugs,
or sex. Often blackmail or threats to the life of the person or his family is
also used. The person so compromised is called a mole. Sometimes, moles work
for both sides, being called double agents. Doctored information is fed by each
side to the other and the mole collects money from both. The history of
espionage is full of stories of spies and moles, who worked for the enemy for
several years without getting caught. During the cold war, there were many cases
of penetration in the CIA and the KGB. The means employed to prevent such
penetration is called counter intelligence. Moles can be created in any
department or organ of the enemy, but the intelligence agencies are the
favourite target. Some well known cases in the recent past have been given
below.
In 1987, KV Unnikrishnan, the RAW
Commissioner in Madras
was convicted for espionage. During his tenure in Colombo in 1981, he had become friendly with
an American diplomat, and together with him, engaged in several extra marital
affairs with unidentified women. After his return to India , he was briefly stationed at Delhi before moving to Madras . Sometime in 1985,
a woman describing herself as a stewardess with Pan American Airways telephoned
him from Bombay .
She said that his American diplomat friend had told her to contact him in case
she felt lonely. Unnikrishnan caught the next flight to Mumbai and spent some
time with her in her hotel room. A liaison soon developed between the two, and
in 1985-86, she gave him complimentary air tickets to accompany her on holidays
to Singapore .
During these jaunts in Singapore ,
the duo was photographed. The IB office
in Madras
alerted RAW about Unnikrishnan’s activities, and a joint surveillance and
investigation team was set up. It was learned that he was working for the CIA,
and passing copies of sensitive documents about RAW operations in Sri Lanka . In
1986, Unnikrishnan was arrested and spent a year in Tihar jail before being
dismissed from service. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi decided not to prosecute
him, since he had already spent a year behind bars.
In 1996, Rattan
Sehgal was a contender for the top job in the IB. He had served for some
time in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), where he was responsible for internal
security and counter-intelligence. After his return to the IB from MEA, he was
made the head of the counter-intelligence division. During his stint in the
MEA, Sehgal had established contacts with several foreign intelligence
operatives. He continued to maintain these links, without the knowledge of the
DIB. The IB’s counter-intelligence division was keeping a tab on a woman CIA
staffer in the US Embassy, who used a mobile phone to contact various people in
the government. The IB’s counter-intelligence team got a shock when they
discovered that the mobile phone was registered in the name of their boss,
Rattan Sehgal. This was brought to the notice of the DIB, Arun Bhagat, who set
up a joint team of RAW and IB to keep him under surveillance. The team was able
to make a video recording of his meetings with the woman CIA officer, including
footage of the time he had spent with her at a resort on the New Delhi-Jaipur
highway. When confronted with this evidence, Sehgal admitted his contacts with
her, and having given her a mobile phone to facilitate her operational work,
which involved liaison with RAW on counter terrorism and other matters.
However, Sehgal denied having passed on any sensitive information. He was
permitted to proceed on pre-mature retirement.
The third penetration by CIA was
discovered in 2004. Rabinder Singh, then a
joint secretary in RAW, defected with the help of the Americans and possible
connivance of some officers within the organisation. He joined the Army as a
commissioned officer, and served in the Gurkhas. While in the Army, he took
part in Operation Blue Star, the counter-terrorist assault on the Golden Temple
in 1984. Shortly afterwards, he joined RAW on deputation, along with several
other officers. On completion of his deputation, he opted for permanent
absorption in RAW. Initially, he was stationed in Amritsar where his principal task was the
collection of trans-border HUMINT (human intelligence) about the Pakistani Army
and the training of Sikh terrorists by Pakistan 's Inter-Services
Intelligence in Pakistani territory. Subsequently, he was posted to West Asia , where his task involved monitoring the
activities of terrorist groups there. He also did a stint in West
Europe , where he focused on the activities of Sikh terrorist elements
operating in that region.
Rabinder came
under suspicion when his name was dropped accidentally by a diplomat in the US
Embassy in Delhi
sometime in the middle of April 2004. He was put under surveillance and was
photographed making copies of documents on the photocopier kept in his office. One
day there was a surprise check of briefcases at closing time, when everyone was
leaving for home. But nothing incriminating was found in Rabinder’s briefcase.
After this he continued to attend office. Then, on 14 May 2004 , he just vanished. It was
only after he disappeared that it was announced that Rabinder was an American
mole. He went Kathmandu , from where he went to
the USA
on an American passport.
Rabinder’s escape
left many questions unanswered. If he was indeed a mole, why was he allowed to
get away? Why did RAW not arrest him the day they came to know of his
activities? Was he ‘allowed’ to get away, by people in RAW itself, who feared
that they would be exposed if he was arrested and interrogated? Was Rabinder
part of a larger network, which facilitated his escape? In the world of
intelligence, spies are shown little mercy. If caught, their principals almost
never acknowledge their existence. In normal circumstances, the Americans
should have done the same thing, and denied that they had anything to do with
Rabinder. The fact that they chose to whisk him out of India can only
mean one thing – they did not want him to spill the beans about others like
him, who were part of the network.
The fourth case of penetration occurred in 2006. Like the
first and second incidents
involving Unnikrishnan and Sehgal, the ‘honey-trap’,
was again employed. This is one of the oldest techniques used by intelligence
agencies to recruit moles. It is the favourite trick employed by the CIA, at
least for Indians. In this case, a woman officer in the US Embassy, Rosanna Minchew, who was actually a CIA officer, was
involved. Commander Mukesh Saini of NSCS (National
Security Council Secretariat) was the coordinator of the Indo-US Cyber Security
Forum, of which Minchew was a member. They became quite close and several trips
together, to Bombay
and Calcutta .
Saini later resigned and joined an American company. Before he left, he had
introduced Minchew to SS Paul, a computer analyst
working under him at the NSCS. The Police already knew of Minchew’s activities
and were monitoring her mobile phone. They found a large number of SMSs from a
particular number, which turned out to belong to Paul. Apparently, Paul passed
on sensitive data on USB drives copied from the computers at the NSCS to
Minchew, for which he was to be paid $ 50,000.
It was reported that he had received a part of the payment.
Along
with Saini and Paul, a senior RAW officer also came under a cloud. Brigadier Ujjal Dasgupta, the Director (Computers) in
RAW, was also a member of the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum and came to know
Minchew. On 16 June 2006 , his office was searched
and sealed by a team of officials from both IB and RAW. Dasgupta was asked not to come to the office,
and to stay at home until his case is decided. Subsequently, on 19 July 2006 , he was arrested. During his police
custody, he revealed that he had thrown some pen drives in a well in Nehru Park ,
very close to the place where he lived. The pen drives were recovered, though
apparently nothing incriminating has been found in them. He
is presently in Tihar jail, and his trial is yet to begin.
Charges against Dasgupta have been framed under the Official Secrets Act, a draconian law enacted by the British in
1923. According to the Act, if an Indian has any sort of communication with a
foreign national, he is presumed to have passed information useful to an enemy.
To prove communication, it is enough for the name or address of a foreigner is
found in his possession. So, if a foreigner’s telephone number is found in the
diary or sim-card memory of the mobile phone of an Indian, he can be branded a
spy. Since Minchew and Dasgupta were members of the same committee, it is quite
likely that they exchanged telephone numbers and communicated with each other.
It is pertinent that all the
penetrations have been done by the CIA, and not Pakistan or China . In fact,
we are collaborating with the USA on several
matters, such as anti-terrorism and cyber security.
Still, they continue to spy on us. The other point is that the penetrations
occurred in intelligence agencies, and not the departments where the really
valuable secrets are kept. Just grading
a document secret or top secret does not make it valuable from the intelligence
point of view. For example, in RAW even the circulars for tea parties are
graded secret. Is it of any use to a foreign intelligence agency? Here one must
appreciate what is really sensitive information and what is not. If its knowledge
by the enemy is likely to cause serious injury to our national interest, it is
sensitive. National interest is not the same as the interest of the party in
power, or the reputation of a politician or a bureaucrat.
Intelligence agencies such as RAW and IB consider themselves super
secret organisations. It is important to remember that intelligence agencies do
not hold any information about our own country. The information held by them
pertains to foreign countries, which is already known to them. Obviously, it cannot be treated on par with
information of our own country held by the defence forces, nuclear facilities,
space related establishments, etc. In all the
cases cited above, corruption played a part. In the case of Paul of and Rabinder Singh, it was
money. In other cases, it was probably sex. These are examples where corruption
has directly affected national security.
Indirect Effects of Corruption
Corruption has a profound
negative impact on the social, economic, and political fabric of Indian
society. It violates human rights, undermines the rule of law, distorts the
development process, and dis-empowers the Indian state. This leads to the state
losing its capacity to govern. Corruption violates the legal and regulatory
framework in India .
Corruption violates human rights as it hinders the process of fulfilling civil,
political, economic, and social rights. The unequal application of law leading
to selective enforcement due to corruption creates an environment of scant
regard for law and legal institutions.
Rule of law means a
society is governed on the basis of laws enforced equally. Corruption in India creates
an environment whereby some people are given privileges due to their ability to
pay bribes. A rule-of-law society is based upon the trust and faith of the
people that they are governed on the basis of laws enforced in a fair, just,
and reasonable manner. Corruption undermines this basic trust. This especially
weakens sovereignty in democratic polities, where legitimacy and popular will
are essential requisites for an authority to call itself `sovereign.'
In India ,
corruption is treated as a law enforcement issue. The laws against bribery are
part of the criminal law enforcement mechanisms. Even the institutional
mechanisms available are largely based on the law enforcement machinery
investigating allegations of corruption and the prosecution of the wrongdoers.
But this approach puts corruption along with other offences criminal law
attempts to punish. Corruption, if understood from the standpoint of its
consequences for the rule of law, human rights, and development has a negative
impact on state sovereignty. Transparency in governance is crucial to ensure
the state exercises its powers in a responsible manner. Corruption of the state
and its institutions means the state is not functioning to capacity and the law
enforcement machinery is weak.
How does this affect
national security? A person who is deprived of his rights or his share is bound
to rebel. This is the root cause of insurgencies in various parts of the
country. For many years after Independence ,
the north east was neglected by the rest of the country. Development funds did
not reach the common people, who nursed a genuine grievance against the Indian
state. The agitations for a separate state by the Mizo, Nagas, Gorkhas, Bodos
and many others are the result of this neglect, leading to internal security
problems for several decades.
A sovereign state must ensure
that laws are enforced in a non-discriminatory manner. Corruption does not
allow this. Hence, criminalisation of politics and politicisation of crimes
have become common in Indian society. The sovereign state becomes too weak to
enforce the law and all institutions of governance suffer from a crisis of
legitimacy as well as of autonomy and independence, which are required to
enforce the law including that against corruption. If the rule of law cannot be
enforced, security is weakened.
Another aspect of
governance is development. A sovereign state should ensure that there is social
and economic development. Corruption does not allow the state to fulfill this
functions Often, the resources allocated for development are diverted, in the
form of corrupt transfer of wealth to a few persons who are governing the
country. The alleged acts of corruption in the MPLADS is an example of how
corruption in India
undermines the development process. Development aid becomes a source of huge
internal conflict and improper use of resources, thereby undermining the
sovereignty of the state, which in turn leads to internal security problems.
Remedial Measures
Having seen the relationship between
corruption and security, let us discuss the remedial measures. One remedy to reduce corruption is to
have more stringent laws. This does not always work. We already have laws, but
corruption still exists. This is because laws have to be enforced by people. If
the enforcers become corrupt, no law can be enforced. The legal systems in India are time
consuming and have many loopholes. As a result, corrupt official are rarely
punished, even if they are caught. Many of our law-makers have cases of
corruption registered against them. There is thus a lack of will to enforce
laws dealing with corruption.
We have seen that defence deals are a major source of corruption. One
suggestion is to replace executive or political control by parliamentary
control over the entire procurement process. We have seen that our honourable
parliamentarians are no angels. In fact, parliamentary control is already
there, in the form of statutory audit. In fact, today the only accountability
comes from the CAG report, that comes after the event (many times after years)
and no action is taken on it, though Parliament can ask for independent
witnesses and even hear the rival views.
The only way to prevent corruption is to increase transparency,
especially in defence deals. There is nothing secret in the purchase of weapons
and guns. Transparency will automatically bring to a halt or reduce the
involvement of politicians and middlemen, who are the major source of
corruption. One person who has played an important role in reducing corruption
is Mr N Vittal, who was the Central
Vigilance Commissioner for many years. He issued guidelines to make the process
more transparent, which definitely improved matters. For instance the order issued by the
CVC banning post tender negotiations ensured that there is no scope for
exercise of discretion which may amount to favouritism.
Conclusion
Corruption
has pervaded every aspect of life in India . However, it no longer just a
legal issue. Today, corruption in not just a crime that is to be investigated
and punished under the existing laws. It has very wide ramifications that
affect national security. Unless corruption is controlled, it is likely to
further aggravate the internal security situation in the country, in addition
to the external threats.
24 Oct 2017
(Written as script for
lecture to be delivered at the CBI Academy in Ghaziabad)
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