THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY – SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY – SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

By

Maj Gen VK Singh, Veteran

INTRODUCTION

India’s independence from British rule in 1947 was achieved after a protracted and sustained struggle that lasted several decades. It has a unique place in World History since it was characterised by non-violence, a novel form of rebellion popularised by Mahatma Gandhi. It was the only instance when a colonial power not only relinquished authority voluntarily but also advanced the date of its departure. Though essentially non-violent, the movement had elements that involved the use of force, the most notable being the Indian National Army led by Subhas Chandra Bose, who attained iconic status after his death. Ironically, the INA was created with the help of Japan, a country with which India, then under British rule, was at war. During World War II, few Indians had heard of the INA, which did not have the backing of the National Congress, the party that was leading the struggle for freedom. However, after the war ended, fortuitous events such as the INA trials made the country aware of the INA. Overnight, members of the INA who had until then been regarded as turncoats by their colleagues in the Indian Army, became heroes.

 

The saga of the INA has been well documented by scores of Indian and foreign historians.  A large number chronicles has been written by members of the INA, extolling their role in the freedom struggle. Several Indian and foreign historians have written books on the subject, relying on personal story accounts of INA veterans and official records of the governments of India and Japan. There are scores of biographies of Bose, but except for a few, most are hagiographies. The lay reader will find enough to sustain his interest, but the meticulous researcher is often disappointed. The anomalies and disparities in the different narratives are too glaring to be overlooked, and one sometimes wonders whether he is reading fact or fiction. At the end of it, many important questions remain unanswered. Some of these will be discussed in this article, which has been divided into two parts. In Part I, a brief history of the INA will be narrated, with Part II raising the questions that need to be answered.

PART I - BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INA

Birth of the INA

            The INA was formally created in December 1941, by Captain Mohan Singh of 1/14 Punjab Regiment and Major Fujiwara Iwaichi of the Japanese Army. Mohan Singh claims that after his capture by the Japanese in Malaya on 11 December 1941 he was inspired by a sudden burst of patriotic feeling that had lain dormant until that time.  According to him, he was encouraged by Japanese propaganda that exhorted all Asian races to ‘kick out the white devils from the East’, and thought that if he approached the Japanese to help him in starting a movement for India’s independence, he would be able to attract a large number of soldiers. At that time, Mohan Singh felt that his force ‘would provide India with a new weapon, an organized and patriotic army to back up the non-violent struggle being carried from within by the Indian National Congress’. 1

           

            In fact, the creation of the INA was part of a well-planned strategy evolved by Japan even before the commencement of the war in the Pacific. Indian nationalist movements had taken root in Thailand, Malaya, Burma and Sumatra, under the leadership of Baba Amar Singh and Sardar Pritam Singh. In Japan, Rash Behari Bose, Raja Mahendra Pratap and AM Sahay formed the nucleus of the Indian nationalist movement. Even before Japan entered the war, the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo sent Major Fujiwara Iwaichi to Bangkok to enlist the support of the Indian nationalist elements in South East Asia and induce the defection of Indian soldiers of the British Army, should war break out. An agreement was signed between Amar Singh and Colonel Tamura of the Japanese Army, according to which the Indian Independence League (IIL) agreed to collaborate with the Japanese by inciting and undermining the loyalty of the soldiers of the Indian Army. Leaflets in English, Gurmukhi and Hindustani were kept ready to be thrown among them exhorting them to disobey the orders of their English commanders if asked to fight against the Japanese.2

 

            In 8 December 1941 the Japanese invaded Malaya. Captain Mohan Singh’s battalion, 1/14 Punjab, was part of 15 Indian Infantry Brigade, then deployed near Jitra. After a preparatory bombardment with mortars, Japanese tanks attacked the position on 11 December 1941. The battalion literally disintegrated, with most of the personnel being captured immediately or during the course of the next few days, while trying to escape southwards towards Singapore. Mohan Singh was part of a group that included his CO, Lieutenant Colonel LV Fitzpatrick, who was wounded.3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

On 15 December 1941 Mohan Singh’s group met Major Fujiwara and Giani Pritam Singh, who had been following the Japanese as they advanced through Malaya. Pritam Singh and Fujiwara explained to Mohan Singh their plans for raising an army to fight for Indian independence. Mohan Singh was highly impressed with Fujiwara, who was a genuine idealist and a great believer in the concept of the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. With arguments backed by phrases such as ‘Asia for Asiatics’ and India’s ‘shackles of slavery’, Fujiwara convinced Mohan Singh that India was not going to be free by non-violent methods being advocated by Mahatma Gandhi. If Indians wanted freedom, they would have to fight for it. He told Mohan Singh, ‘If you really want freedom for your country you must aspire to do something active. You must raise an Indian National Army’. 4

           

            After detailed discussions with Fujiwara, Mohan Singh agreed to raise the INA according to the model suggested by the Japanese. It soon became apparent that the role that the Japanese government was ready to allot to the INA was marginal. Instead of a fighting force, the Japanese intended to use the INA for propaganda purposes, particularly to foster anti-British feeling among Indian soldiers and the Indians in the region, for controlling prisoners of war and for maintaining law and order among the Indian population. Though Mohan Singh found Fujiwara to be a well-informed person, he felt that his knowledge of the strength and position of the Congress in India was poor. Whereas he had great regard for Mahatma Gandhi as a saint, he had not the slightest faith in his glorified weapon of non- violence. Mohan Singh tried to convince Fujiwara that under the prevailing conditions in India, the Congress method of fighting the British was the only practical one.’5

It took less than 15 days for Mohan Singh to change his opinion about Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress, and fall in line with the stance of the Japanese. After discussions in Taiping on 30-31 December 1941, during which the Japanese handed over a memorandum on the role of the INA, Mohan Singh wrote to Fujiwara on 1 January 1942, agreeing to accept the leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose and modifying his views with regard to the Congress: “The day Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose’s name comes before us, we promise that if it suits our purpose we will openly condemn the Indian National Congress”. 6

            After the battle of the Shin River on 7 January 1942, three Indian infantry brigades were dispersed. Many Indian prisoners of war, after being subjected to intensive propaganda by Mohan Singh and his men, agreed to transfer their allegiance to the Japanese side. Singapore fell on 15 February 1942, and a large number of Allied soldiers surrendered. Different figures have been given by historians about the total number of Allied prisoners, the number of Indian soldiers and the number that agreed to join the INA. According to Mohan Singh, 45,000 Indian soldiers were handed over by Lieutenant Colonel Hunt to Fujiwara at Farrer Park on 17 February 1942, who handed them over to Mohan Singh. However, Menezes gives the figure of Indian soldiers as 60,000, which is also the number mentioned by Cohen, relying on Winston Churchill’s History of the Second World War. After Mohan Singh spoke to the assembled Indian prisoners at Farrer Park, most of them cheered enthusiastically. They were then sent to the Bidadari Camp, but the officers were separated from the men and not allowed to talk to the latter. During the next few days, the prisoners were asked to volunteer for the INA, with implied threats by the Japanese that the non-volunteers would be ill treated, and the leaders in any non-cooperation would be shot.7

Estimates vary as to the actual numbers that joined the INA when it was formed. Mohan Singh writes that 42,000 men volunteered, while 13,000 remained non-volunteers.  According to him, approximately one third of the officers and one fifth of the VCOs did not join. Gerard Corr writes that out of the 55,000-60,000 Indian prisoners, probably about 20,000 enlisted immediately.8 This matches the figure given by Joyce Lebra, who writes that close to 25,000 of the 45,000 Indians taken prisoner at Singapore did not volunteer.9  

Mohan Singh promoted himself from captain to general, and became the GOC (General Officer Commanding) of the INA.  He set about organizing the newly formed Army, using novel techniques. All subedars and subedar majors were given the rank of captain, while jemadars were made lieutenants. To gain the confidence of these newly promoted officers, who were much older than the Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs), Mohan Singh decided to give them command of battalions and brigades, using the ICOs to fill staff appointments such as brigade major, staff captain, adjutant etc. The command of the brigade was given to Subedar Onkar Singh of 5/4 Punjab Regiment.

            The first INA division was raised on 1 September 1942. Mohan Singh wanted to raise two divisions, but the Japanese agreed to only one. The division had three brigades, which were commanded by Lieutenant Colonels IJ Kiani (Gandhi Brigade), Aziz Ahmed Khan (Nehru Brigade) and Prakash Chand (Azad Brigade). Lieutenant Colonel JKT Bhonsle was given command of No. 1 Field Force Group, which had three infantry battalions and a heavy gun battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Burhan-ud-din commanded the Bahadur Group. The other functionaries were Major Jaswant Singh (Intelligence Group); Colonel MS Brar (Propaganda and Welfare Group), Lieutenant Colonel Kulwant Rai (Medical Group), Major SA Malik (Reinforcement Group), Lieutenant Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan (Officers Training School) and Major AB Mirza (HQ POWs).

            Gradually, Mohan Singh began to realize that the Japanese had no intention of building up the INA into a strong military force. They wanted to use the INA more as a political pawn than a military weapon. In fact, the role that they had envisaged for the INA was propaganda, fifth column duties and minor military operations. They hoped that when they marched into India with the INA ‘they would be acclaimed as liberators of India and Indians would automatically join them and the plum of victory will fall into their lap, ripened by the heat of their own activity. Thus they intended to use us as spies, euphemistically calling us patriots and freedom fighters’. 10

 

Disillusioned by the Japanese attitude and his differences with Rash Behari Bose, the President of the IIL, Mohan Singh decided to dissolve the INA. On 21 December 1942 he signed a Special Order of the Day formally dissolving the INA. The Japanese promptly arrested Mohan Singh, and placed the INA under the IIL, headed by Rash Behari Bose, an Indian revolutionary who had married a Japanese and lived in Tokyo. He was under the influence of the Japanese and Mohan Singh had earlier refused to accept his authority over the INA, leading to differences between them. Though Mohan Singh had taken a pledge from his officers that the INA would not be raised again, this was soon forgotten. JKT Bhonsle became the new Commander of the INA, with the title of Director, Military Bureau.

The Arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose

Subhas Chandra Bose was then in Germany, having reached there after his dramatic escape in January 1941 from Calcutta, where he had been placed under house arrest by the British authorities. With the support of the Germans, he had tried to raise the Indian Legion from the Indian prisoners of war in North Africa. However, he met with limited success, and only about three thousand prisoners agreed to join him. It was only after a year that Bose was able to have an audience with Hitler, and request him to recognize his movement or at least announce that India would be granted independence after the war. Hitler felt that such a declaration was premature, and asked Bose to wait until German forces had advanced far enough. After German losses at Alamein and Stalingrad, it became clear that this would not happen. Bose then requested the Germans to arrange his move to South East Asia, where he had already been invited to take over the IIL and the INA. On 8 February 1943 Bose left Kiel in a German submarine, accompanied by Abid Hasan. On 28 April 1943 he was transferred to a Japanese submarine near Madagascar, reaching Sabang in Northern Sumatra on 6 May and Tokyo on 16 May 1943. This was not the first, or indeed the last time that Bose left his followers to their fate, moving to greener pastures. In the words of Fay: “Bose left behind three thousand Indian men in Wehrmacht uniforms whose future would be halfhearted participation in the manning of the Atlantic Wall and then a British prisoner of war cage – three thousand men and a wife and child”. 11 

             One subject that remains somewhat of a mystery is Bose’s secret marriage to Emilie Schenkl, an Austrian girl he first met during his visit to Europe in the thirties. She worked as his secretary and helped him produce The Indian Struggle in 1934. During a subsequent visit in 1937, she accompanied Bose to the health resort of Bad Gastein, where he wrote his autobiography, The Indian Pilgrim, which was published ten years later.12 Emilie was his secretary again in 1941, when he went to Germany after his dramatic escape from Calcutta and established the Free India Centre. Toye writes: ‘In July 1942 it became necessary for Fraulein Schenkl, who had been Bose’ private secretary for more than a year, to leave the Free India Centre. The dismissal was not what it seemed. Bose had known Emilie Schenkl ever since 1934; she was now secretly his wife, and in September 1942 was to bear him a daughter’. 13 According to Fay, Emilie had begun living with Bose almost from the moment he reached Europe. Since Bose had taken a vow that he would not marry until India was free, he was naturally reluctant to formalize their relationship. However, Emilie wanted to get married, and he could not refuse her. But he agonized over the repercussions when the secret became known, as it was bound to some day. Many years later, soon after the debacle at Imphal, during a rare moment when he was alone with Laksmi Swaminathan, he asked her, “Do you think people in India will understand?” 14

            On his arrival in Tokyo, Bose found the Japanese more accommodating than the Germans. Prime Minister Tojo received him soon after his arrival, and was quite receptive to his project of forming a provisional government in exile. On 16 June 1943 Tojo made a declaration in the Diet that Japan was firmly resolved to extend all help to India to achieve full independence. This was music to the ears of Bose, who had tried for almost two years to get a similar commitment from Hitler, without success. He made a series of radio broadcasts, publicizing his presence in South Asia, calling Japan India’s greatest friend.  He received a tumultuous welcome when he reached Singapore on 2 July 1943, followed by week-long celebrations that were later commemorated annually as ‘Netaji Week.’ On 4 July he accepted the Presidency of the IIL and the allegiance of the INA, which he reviewed on the next day, giving it the battle cry ‘Chalo Dilli’ (To Delhi).  Two days later, another parade was held, at which Tojo himself took the salute. On 9 July, 60,000 people stood in pouring rain to hear Bose proclaim: ‘There is no nationalist leader in India who can claim to possess the many sided experience that I have been able to acquire.’ 15

            On 8 August 1943 Subhas Chandra Bose assumed personal command of the INA. Unlike Mohan Singh, who had taken the rank of general, Bose held no military rank – he was just the Supreme Commander. However, he wore a uniform that was neither Indian nor British, but was similar to what he had seen in Italy and Germany – breeches, tunic and jack boots. (The only other member of the INA to wear breeches was Captain Lakshmi Swaminathan, who commanded the Rani of Jhansi Regiment). The uniform was not the only thing Bose took from the Germans and Italians.  Hitler and Mussolini had titles – Fuehrer and Il Duce – and deciding that he too must have one, he settled on ‘Netaji’ (The Leader). On 21 October 1943 Bose announced the formation of the Arzi Hukumat-e-Hind, or the Provisional Government of Free India, which was recognized by Japan, Germany, Italy and some other countries that were under Axis domination. A few days later, the Provisional Government declared war on Great Britain and the United States. Bose made the declaration of war at a rally of fifty thousand Indians, who were asked to ratify it, by standing up and raising their hands if they were prepared to lay down their lives. The audience rose instantly, cheering, raising their rifles in the air, and shouting, “Netaji Ki Jai! Inqilab Zindabad! Chalo Delhi!” The declaration proved to be a windfall for the new government – during the next few days over thirteen million dollars were collected from Indians in Singapore and Malaya. The money was spent as soon as it poured in.16   

In November 1943 Bose was invited to Tokyo for the Greater East Asia Conference, which he attended as an observer. During his visit, he met Prime Minister Tojo and requested that Japan formally hand over to the Provisional Government of Free India the Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal, which the Japanese had occupied in early 1942. This would give his government a measure of legitimacy, he reasoned. Tojo demurred, since the islands were strategically important, and the Japanese Navy was bound to object strongly. Finally, a compromise was reached. Tojo announced that Japan was ready to hand over the islands shortly, as the initial evidence of her readiness to help in India’s struggle for independence.  This was a declaration of intent, not a de facto transfer. The distinction was significant, for the next step – the actual transfer of administration – was never taken by the Japanese Government.17

Military Operations Conducted by the INA          

           

From the day of its inception, Mohan Singh had been pressing for the INA to be sent to the front to take part in actual operations and wanted to raise two divisions. However, the Japanese agreed to only one. Mohan Singh soon realised that the Japanese were not serious about making the INA a strong force that could conduct regular military operations. After the ‘dissolution’ of the first INA in December 1942, its strength had dropped to 12,000. After the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose, about 10,000 prisoners agreed to join and it was decided to raise two more divisions. The first operational exposure of the INA was in a minor role in the Arakan, where it was employed in small detachments.  This was followed by two operations in Imphal and on the Irrawaddy, for which Bose was able to convince the Japanese to allot specific sectors to the INA, instead of using it in penny packets. Bose repeatedly stressed that advance into India must be led by the INA, and ‘the first drop of blood to be shed on Indian soil should be that of a member of the INA.’

           

In the Arakan offensive in February 1944, INA special groups comprising espionage and propaganda elements totaling about 250 men were part of the Japanese offensive against the 5^th and 7^th Indian Divisions. These men were organised in small parties that had mainly nuisance value, shouting propaganda or confusing orders in encounters with British-Indian troops, leading them sometimes into Japanese ambushes and spying out their defensive positions. One of these parties led by Major LS Misra managed to subvert an Indian outpost held by a platoon of Gwalior Lancers. This was touted as major success by the INA, Bose calling it an ‘active and important’ part in a great Japanese victory, which alas never materialized, the Arakan battle ending in a shattering defeat for the Japanese.18

The next operation in which the INA took part was the Japanese offensive against Imphal in March 1944. A group of about 150 irregulars of the INA Special Forces was attached to each of the three divisions that the Japanese employed in Imphal. The only regular INA division available was the 1^st INA Division, under Colonel MZ Kiani – the 2^nd Division was in Malaya - which comprised the 1^st (Subhas) Regiment with a strength of 3,000 men, and the 2^nd and 3^rd Regiments, each two thousand strong. (The regiments were akin to brigades, and were sometimes referred to as such). The first to be mobilized was the Subhas Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan, which was sent to the front with great fanfare, after a farewell speech by Bose himself on 3 February 1944. No. 1 Battalion, under Major PS Raturi was despatched to the Kaladan Valley, while No. 2 and 3 Battalions (Majors Ran Singh and Padam Singh) were to proceed to Haka and Falam area in the Chin Hills

No. 1 Battalion reached the Kaladan Valley on 24 March, as the 81^st West African Division was withdrawing.  It had several skirmishes with the rear guards, suffering a few casualties. It remained there intact, without further encounter, until September, posting a company at Mowdok in the Sangu Valley, on Indian soil, during the monsoon. The crossing of the border was accompanied by great jubilation. According to the Japanese plan, Imphal was to be captured by 10^th April 1944. The 2^nd and 3^rd Guerilla Regiments reached Rangoon only in March, when the offensive was well underway and there was little chance of them playing a role in the battle. However, Bose had persuaded General Kawabe to let them at least enter Imphal on the heels of the Japanese.  In any case, nobody expected   that these men would have to fight. They were to line the route at Bose’s entry into Imphal and assist in the formation of the new divisions there.19 

The 2^nd Guerilla Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel IJ Kiani) together with the headquarters of the 1^st INA Division commenced their move from Rangoon on 25 March. On his arrival at Maymyo on 28 March the Divisional Commander, Colonel MZ Kiani, was told that if he wished to be present at the fall of Imphal, he should immediately rush his force to Tamu and join the Yamamoto Force, which was part of the Japanese 33^rd Division. 2^nd Regiment moved post-haste, leaving behind all its heavy baggage, mortars and machine guns at Kalewa, with the men carrying only a blanket, a rifle and fifty rounds of ammunition. The Regiment reached the village of Khanjol towards the end of April, and was informed that it would take part in the attack on Palel airfield, in conjunction with the Japanese thrust, which was planned for 1 May. With great difficulty the Regiment was able to muster 300 ex-Indian Army soldiers, who were grouped in a task force under the command of Major Pritam Singh, a staff officer at divisional headquarters who volunteered to lead the assault. The force left Khanjol on the night of 30 April, but took almost two days to travel the twelve miles to the assembly area, reaching there on 2 May. The Japanese attack had gone in a day earlier from the East, but Pritam Singh decided to attack from the South on his own.

The attack was launched on the night of 2 May. At about 2230 hours the leading company, moving in extended order, ran into a platoon of 4/10 Gurkha Rifles, about five miles short of the objective. The INA soldiers had been assured that neither British nor Indian troops would fire on them, and were talking and smoking as they walked, with no semblance of discipline.  The Gurkhas, forewarned of their approach, waited for them to reach a suitable position and then opened fire. The INA soldiers panicked and scattered, but Pritam Singh rallied some of them and approached again, this time more cautiously. He tried to parley with the Gurkhas, asking them not to fire. When this failed, the INA column attacked the platoon, but was beaten back. Pritam Singh launched seven attacks, before deciding to call it off. He ordered a withdrawal, sending a patrol to carry out reconnaissance for a new attack and calling his regimental commander for help. Two INA officers and many soldiers were killed; about thirty-five more surrendered or were captured. The Gurkhas lost two killed. Shortly afterwards the regimental headquarters was attacked by a company of the Frontier Force Rifles, followed by an air strike, in which fifty INA soldiers were killed and about the same number wounded. An artillery concentration severely shook the morale of the rest, and Kiani ordered the 2^nd Regiment to withdraw to Khanjol. The reconnaissance patrol sent by Pritam Singh had also surrendered.20

The failure at Palel and the casualties were a severe jolt to the morale of the INA, which had come to believe the assurance given by Bose that propaganda and not firepower would decide the result when they would face Indian troops. Even for the Japanese, the battle was not going according to plan. By the first week of May the offensive of the Yamamoto Force had lost steam. The INA continued to hold Khanjol and Mittong Khunue in spite of frequent attacks and temporary withdrawals.  Rains throughout May and June restricted activity on both sides to patrolling and the 2^nd Guerilla Regiment did not fight any more battles. But the effects of climate, hunger and malaria took a heavy toll and by the beginning of July, the strength of the Regiment was down to 750 men. On 3 July an Indian battalion, the 4^th Mahratta Light Infantry, attacked and cleared Khanjol, which was held by just 50 men, and occupied Mittong Khunue. The Indian battalion did not advance further, and continued to hold the end of the Mombi track until it finally withdrew in the third week of July.

The 3^rd Guerilla Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Gulzara Singh, did not play any significant part in the Imphal battle. The Regiment reached Tamu on 26 May after the monsoon had broken and was ordered to occupy a defensive position around Narum. One battalion was used for transport duties with the other two occupying the villages of Lamyang, Keipham and Khosat. The Regiment was already depleted by sickness when it arrived in the battle area. The rains and irregular supplies added to their woes, reducing the strength of the battalions to almost half. Both the 2^nd and 3^rd Guerilla Regiments and the remnants of the 1^st Regiment began to withdraw on 18 July 1944.

Though the campaign ended in July, by the end of April 1944 it had become clear that the offensive against Imphal was not going well. However, INA headquarters in Maymyo, without any means of communications with the forward troops, was unaware of this development, and in mid-May, Bose sent three senior ministers of his cabinet - Chatterji, Alagappan and AM Sahay – to Tamu, partly in order that they might be at hand when Imphal was entered, and to buy up supplies, relieve the INA difficulties and bring back an accurate report. Their report reached Bose towards the end of June, but he was still unaware of the actual state of affairs. Even on 10 July, when the Japanese officially informed Bose that the Imphal campaign was being abandoned, he appeared to have no inkling of the magnitude of the disaster. (No one has been able to explain the reason for lack of communications between Bose and his field commanders. There must have been hundreds of wireless sets in the equipment captured from the British at Singapore. Bose also had a secret radio link to Germany, on which he sometimes spoke to Nambiar, and also his wife). Netaji Week was celebrated in Rangoon with customary gusto, including parades, speeches and cultural events. Bose issued a statement on the year’s progress, and finalised the government organisation that would be needed once Imphal was captured. He broadcast messages to the people of India, including those who worked for the government, and to soldiers of the Indian Army, assuring them that they would be taken into the INA after victory, and their service would count towards their INA pensions!

The decision to suspend the Imphal campaign was made public on 26 July, the day the Japanese Prime Minister Tojo resigned. It was only in August when survivors from the front began arriving in Rangoon with tales of horrible deaths due to disease and starvation that Bose was enlightened of the magnitude of the tragedy that had befallen his soldiers. On 19 August there was a desperate appeal from Colonel Kiani to intervene with the Japanese to save hundreds of sick men stranded by floods on the withdrawal route. Bose was helpless, for the Japanese were themselves in dire straits and could do little to help the INA. Bose blamed the Japanese for the debacle, by denying essential supplies to the INA, and recommended the dissolution of the Hikari Kikan that had been responsible for this task. In future, the INA would look after all their administration themselves, he declared. He was enraged when he came to know of the large number of desertions in the INA and publicly berated the officers for their lack of leadership, which resulted in low morale of the troops. Of 6000 men that had been sent the front, at least 1500 had deserted or been captured.

In October 1943, Bose received an invitation to visit Tokyo from the new Japanese Prime Minister, General Koiso. Bose found the Japanese still receptive to his demands, which included the appointment of an ambassador to his government, increase in the size of the INA by at least 50,000, a loan agreement, better weapons including tanks, planes and guns to supplement captured British stores, distribution of propaganda literature written by himself and transfer of all Indian POWs to the INA. At this time, American bombers were already paying frequent visits to the Japanese capital, and many of these demands appeared to be meaningless, which is probably the reason for the Japanese conceding them. However, in return for sending a diplomat to his government, the Japanese asked for a quid pro quo – Bose agreed to put the INA under Japanese command during the defence of Malaya and Burma.21

Though the writing was on the wall, Bose continued to exhibit his confidence that the Japanese would win the war. In an article in the Azad Hind on 6 November 1944, after the retreat from Imphal, he reiterated his firm conviction that the final victory would belong to Japan and Germany. ‘A new phase of war was approaching’, he wrote, ‘in which the initiative would again lie in the hands of the Japanese’. Not surprisingly, Professor Joyce Lebra was constrained to write: “Bose’s constant repetition of this faith throughout and even after the Imphal campaign raises the question of the soundness of his military judgement”. 22

After spending a month in Japan, Bose returned to Singapore in December 1944. He spent over a month in Malaya, reviewing the functioning of the training camps at Seletar and Kuala Lumpur, and going over the finances. On both counts he found the outlook dismal. The number of new recruits barely matched those who were shedding their uniforms and slipping away. The income of the Indian Independence League was drying up, and when persuasion failed, draconian measures were adopted to increase collections.

At a press conference in Rangoon the day after his arrival, Bose asserted that the war had now entered the third phase, which would be decisive, and Indians must play their rightful part. “Had the rains not intervened,” he said, “we should by now have occupied the Manipur basin”. During a rally in October, he had given a new war cry – khun (blood). In the days that followed, he repeated it at every opportunity. He no longer talked of the march to Delhi, but blood. It was Indian blood that he wanted, and he asked for it because the old slogan did not sound convincing now. The war was not over, but Bose knew that his men were not going anywhere near Delhi. Yet, the fight must go on. Freedom, he observed, carries a price – blood. And since blood was all that his young recruits had to offer, it became his constant refrain in the months that followed. “Tum mujhe khun do, main tumhen azadi dunga (give me blood, and I will give you freedom)”, he said. As 1945 opened, this was all Bose had to offer. 23

After their defeat at Imphal, Japanese forces had withdrawn to the Irrawaddy River, where the next major battle was to take place. Two INA divisions, the 1^st and the 2^nd, were to take part in the battle. In the event, only one regiment of the 2^nd Division, the 4^th Guerilla Regiment under Major GS Dhillon could take part, the rest still waiting in Rangoon for their stores and equipment to arrive from Malaya. Mutiny and desertion had become a serious problem in the INA, and troops were screened before being sent to the front. About 150 men from Dhillon’s regiment were sent back as suspect, leaving him with 1,200 men to defend twelve miles of the river. Bose ordered several measures to raise the morale of the troops. They were protected from contact with Imphal survivors and encouraged by glowing accounts of INA heroism in battle. Gallantry awards were presented and there were accelerated promotions, including four major generals, one of them being Shah Nawaz Khan, the newly appointed commander of the 2^nd INA Division.  

The 7^th Indian Division began to cross the Irrawaddy on 14 February 1945 at Nyangu and Pagan, where the 4^th INA Regiment was deployed. The attacking troops suffered some casualties from medium machine guns in the INA defences, but managed to cross the river. About a hundred men of the 7^th INA Battalion under Lieutenant Hari Ram surrendered at Nyangu and one hundred and forty of the 9^th INA Battalion under Lieutenant Chandra Bhan showed a white flag and laid down their arms at Pagan. Shah Nawaz has chosen to gloss over these surrenders, mentioning only the gallantry of the INA troops and the casualties they inflicted on the enemy. ‘Our men having used up all their ammunition resorted to bayonet charges, but eventually most of the men of the 7^th Battalion were overpowered and had to surrender’.24   However, Bose was deeply pained when he heard of the surrenders, and wrote to Dhillon: ‘I have heard with grief, pain and shame of the treachery shown by Lieutenant Hari Ram and others. I hope that the men of the 4^th Regiment will wash away the blot on the INA with their blood.’ Worried by the desertions, Bose wrote another letter to an officer of the INA Police at Mandalay, ‘According to my information the men who recently deserted form Mandalay … are still in the Mandalay area. These men must be arrested and sent down to Rangoon under escort. If you cannot arrest them, they must be shot at sight.’ 25

On 17 March 1945 there was another action at Taungzin where Dhillon’s troops are said to have redeemed their reputation, according to INA accounts. A British motorized column attacked an INA company under the command of Second Lieutenant Gian Singh Bisht, in which the company lost about forty men, including the company commander.  Shah Nawaz has described the action thus: ‘In the name of India and Indian independence they charged the enemy trucks. The enemy immediately debussed and hand to hand fighting ensued which lasted for full two hours, but our heroes would not give in. Forty of them sacrificed their lives after inflicting heavier losses on the enemy. The enemy was so impressed by their determination that they beat a hurried retreat’.26 A more down-to-earth version of the action has been given by Fay, who writes: ‘Near Taungzin one day a company of his let itself be trapped in the open by light tanks, armored cars and infantry in trucks, tried vainly to break out with the bayonet and lost several score men dead or captured. ……But Dhillon was also prone to heroics. When the publicity people at Rangoon heard about the Taungzin disaster, they transformed it into a sort of latter-day Charge of the Light Brigade, and Dhillon was pleased’. 27

The next action occurred at Mount Popa on whose western slopes the 2^nd INA Regiment under PK Sahgal was occupying defences.  Headquarters 2^nd INA Division was also at Popa, under its newly appointed commander, Major General Shah Nawaz Khan. In February Bose decided to visit Mount Popa himself, to get a first hand account of the conditions there. His first visit to the front line had to be cut short because the enemy got there first. He was in Meiktila on 25 February when news came that British tanks had reached Mahling, just twenty miles away. When Shah Nawaz advised that they should turn back, Bose refused, saying “England has not produced the bomb that can kill Subhas Chandra Bose.” However, reason finally prevailed over bravado, and he fled from Meiktila, accompanied by a very anxious Shah Nawaz in the only staff car that they had. Everyone was armed to the teeth and ready for the worst, Bose sitting with a loaded tommy gun across his lap with Shah Nawaz beside him, his personal physician next to the driver and the liaison officer on the running board. The scene is now a key element of the Bose legend. 

Soon after his return to Rangoon Bose received the shocking news that five staff officers of 2^nd INA Division – four majors and one lieutenant - had walked across to the British lines. Soon afterwards, British aircraft dropped leaflets signed by one of them, advising others in the INA to surrender. The shameful desertions soon became a topic of conversation in every Rangoon household and the subject of laughter in every Japanese mess.  Bose was rattled by the treachery, and said that he would take his own life if such a thing happened again. He announced the observance of a ‘Traitors’ Day’ in each INA unit, when deserters would be publicly dishonoured. He issued two special orders, outlining a number of measures to deal with the problem. One of these specified that ‘every member of the INA - officer, NCO or sepoy - will in future be entitled to arrest any other member of the INA, no matter what his rank may be, if he behaves in cowardly manner, or to shoot him if he acts in a treacherous manner.’ 28.

Unfortunately, the desertions did not stop. Late in March, one of Dhillon’s battalion commanders deserted. On the night of 2 April, just before a full-scale attack on he 2^nd INA Regiment at Legyi, three staff officers and some NCOs deserted. The attack came at mid-day and the INA defences soon collapsed, even the administrative area being overrun. Sahgal ordered a counter attack but the two platoons concerned deserted. A second counter attack after nightfall succeeded, but Sahgal then came to know that the whole of his 1^st Battalion – the CO, company commander and about three hundred men - had deserted. The remainder could not face another attack and Sahgal withdrew them on his own initiative during the night. What followed was a rout. Except for an odd occasion when they decided to stand and fight, the 2^nd INA Division disintegrated and virtually ceased to exist. By the end of April, only fugitives remained at large. On 13 May 1945, Shah Nawaz, Dhillon and about fifty men surrendered at Pegu.

The End of the INA

Rangoon fell to British forces on 4 May 1946. A day earlier, the senior British officer who was a prisoner in the Rangoon jail had ordered the disarming and concentration of the INA, which was now under the command of Major General Loganadhan, the Supreme Commander having left about ten days earlier along with a few senior officers, about fifty League workers and the last contingent of women of the Rani of Jhansi regiment. In his last message before leaving Bose declared ‘I do not leave Burma of my own free will. I would have preferred to stay on here with you and share with you the sorrow of temporary defeat.’ But his advisers had overruled him, he had other responsibilities in Siam and Malaya that nobody else could fulfill, and for Indians this defeat was only an incident in their struggle. ‘Go down as heroes’, he said, ‘go down upholding the highest code of honour and discipline’.29

Bose’s last words to his men were to ‘uphold the highest code of honour’, which he was even then violating, perhaps unknowingly.  Not being a professional soldier, he can be forgiven for not being aware of the time honoured code that a captain always goes down with his ship and a commander with his troops, be it death or captivity. (Percival surrendered with 85,000 of his men when Singapore fell in 1942 and Niazi with 93,000 troops in 1971 in East Pakistan. Captain Mulla went down with the INS Khukri in 1971). However, most of the senior INA officers had spent long years in uniform, and it appears strange that they advised him to escape, leaving more than ten thousand of his men to their fate.

It has been suggested that Bose wanted to go to Russia and carry on the struggle from there, but there appears no concrete proof of this. Another reason put forward is that the British authorities would have executed him if he had been captured, but this appears unlikely. Bose was never a member of the Indian Army and could not have been tried for treason under the Indian Army Act, like Shah Nawaz, Sahgal and Dhillon. His stature and prestige in India would have deterred the British from even contemplating such a step. In fact, the wave of sympathy that swept the country after the INA trials would have multiplied manifold and united the Indian people against the British. Who knows, with Bose being present at the final parleys, India may not been partitioned.

PART II - THE UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Were Indian soldiers in the pre-Independence Indian Army patriots or mercenaries?

            Almost all officers who joined the INA claim that they did so for patriotic reasons. Of course, none of them has been able to explain why his sense of patriotism surfaced only after being captured. If they felt so strongly about serving under the British, they should have resigned. In the Preface to Toye book, Philip Mason wrote, “One must respect such a man as Subhas Chandra Bose, who resigned from the Indian Civil Service because he sincerely believed it his duty to India; that respect can hardly be extended to all who changed sides in adversity and who a second time chose the more comfortable path”30.

Mohan Singh feels differently, writing: In whatever dignified colours we may paint the pre-Independence Indian Army, we cannot hide one hard fact that, besides its responsibility for the defence and security of our country, it had to play its purely mercenary role.31

Of course, there is an inherent contradiction in Mohan Singh’s statement – responsibility for defence of one’s country does not blend with a mercenary role. The primary task of the Indian Army, even under British rule, was defence and internal security of the country. In 1933 the War Office had spelt out the role of the Indian Army in the following words: “The duties of the army in India include the preservation of internal security in India, the covering of the lines of internal communication, and the protection of India against external attack. Though the scale of forces is not calculated to meet external attack by a great Power, their duties might well comprise the initial resistance to such an attack pending the arrival of imperial reinforcements.32

The supplementary role implied the provision of an Imperial Reserve, for which the British Government agreed to grant an annual subsidy of 1.5 million pounds to the Government of India. This role was modified by the ‘1938 Plan’ (Document No. B-43746), which stipulated six tasks for the Indian defence forces, viz. defence of the Western Frontier against external aggression; defence of land frontiers other than the Western Frontier; maintenance of law and order and the suppression of disorder and rebellion; safeguarding strategic lines of communication within India; provision of a general reserve with mobile components; and provision of forces for possible employment overseas at the request of the Government of UK. In view of the enhancement in the responsibilities assigned to India, the Chatfield Committee was constituted in 1938 to recommend measures to modernize and increase the size of the Indian armed forces. The Committee’s recommended that a new contract be negotiated with the Government of India, to enable it to fulfill its task. The recommendations of the Committee were approved by the British Cabinet on 28 June 1939, but before they could be implemented, World War II broke out.

As will be obvious, the primary responsibility of the Indian Army – defence of India – never changed. The employment of Indian troops overseas was covered by a formal contract between the governments of UK and India.  By definition, a mercenary soldier fights for money or reward for a country other than his own. Strictly speaking, the term would be more appropriate for the INA soldiers who fought for a foreign power – Japan. It is relevant to point out that the salaries of all ex-Indian Army soldiers in the INA were paid by Japan, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind paying only for the civilian recruits.

Who were the mercenaries – Indian soldiers in the Indian Army or the Indian National Army?

Were the aims of the INA practical and achievable?

In mid January 1942 Mohan Singh said that the eventual object of the INA was to drive the British out of India. During the Bangkok Conference held in June 1942, the Indian Independence League resolved that the INA would be used for operations against British forces; to secure and safeguard Indian National Independence and for any other purpose that may assist the Independence of India. Soon after his arrival in South East Asia, Bose declared: ‘Indians outside India, particularly Indians in East Asia, are going to organise a fighting force which will be powerful enough to attack the British Army in India. When we do so, a revolution will break out, not only among the civil population at home, but also among the Indian Army, which is now standing under the British flag.’ 33

The aim of the INA, as envisaged by Mohan Singh, the IIL and also by Bose was two fold – to militarily defeat the British and to subvert the loyalty of the Indian Army. Were these aims achievable? Bose was confident that as soon as he entered India, Indian soldiers would lay down their arms. However, it was the height of military naiveté to believe that the ill-trained and ill-equipped INA would be able to defeat the British Army. Mohan Singh, Shah Nawaz as well as several others have written that the Japanese did not support them with weapons, ammunition and supplies. If this was true, why did they agree to send their men into battle, where they were bound to suffer heavy casualties?

Though Bose was not a professional soldier, even he must have known that the military objectives of the INA were not achievable. According to Corr, Bose made two fatal errors of judgement during his career. The first was his decision to challenge Gandhi, which set him on the road out of India. The second error was to believe that he could return through military means. ‘Bose was aware that the tide of war had turned against Japan and the Imphal offensive was a gigantic gamble. Yet he spoke to his men in a way that suggested the road to Delhi lay open. …. Becoming a victim of his own propaganda, Bose urged on his regiments to destruction. In the end he lost touch with reality.’34

After the defeat at Imphal, when General Kawabe told him that the order to retreat had been given, Bose declared that the INA would continue the operations. “Increase in casualties, cessation of supplies, and famine are not reason enough to stop marching. Even if the whole army becomes only spirit we will not stop advancing towards our homeland. This is the spirit of our revolutionary army,” he said. Though Corr writes that Kawabe was much moved, he must also have been amused at Bose’s innocence. ‘Prodigal with emotional language, Bose did not seem to feel he had been sufficiently prodigal with the lives of his soldiers. He talked – to the amazement of even the Japanese – of sending the Rani of Jhansi Regiment up to the battle front.’35

Having known that the INA did not have the military strength to defeat the British Army, why did its leaders send it into battle, to face death and destruction?

How did the INA perform in battle?

Almost all ex-INA officers eulogize the gallantry of its members during operations. Some even suggest that the INA planned and executed the attack on Imphal, with the Japanese playing a subsidiary role. Shah Nawaz writes: “While the INA was on the offensive there was not a single occasion on which our forces were defeated on the battle-field, and there was never an occasion when the enemy despite their overwhelming superiority in men and material were able to capture a post held by the INA. On the other hand there were very few cases where INA attacked British post and failed to capture them.”36

            According to Dr. RM Kasliwal, who was the personal physician to Bose in 1945, “In the fighting in the Imphal sector our troops played a very prominent part. They pushed the enemy back everywhere ….. Our armies, along with those of our allies chased the British forces deep into Manipur sector. Some of our troops reached Kohima and occupied that town, and some penetrated up to Dimapur.”37  

            The war diaries of the Indian Army formations and units that fought in Imphal not only contradict the INA claims but also contain unflattering accounts of their performance, which are endorsed by the Japanese who were fighting alongside. The low casualty figures and the large numbers of INA personnel who surrendered and deserted are also indicative of the pedestrian performance of the INA. Several foreign writers have commented on the performance of the INA in battle. Cohen writes:“…the INA was starved of equipment, logistic support and information, and although it did occupy Indian soil briefly, it’s battle history was dismal.” 38. John Connell writes: “In every recorded clash between British and Indian forces and the INA in Burma, the INA was worsted. Their leadership was far from inspiring: three officers in all were killed in battle, one was killed by a Japanese sentry and one died in an air crash.”39

            One of the reasons for the INA’s poor performance was the quality of its leaders. Commenting on this aspect, Toye writes: “…few of the platoon and company commanders in the 1^st INA Division had been trained as officers at all: most of them had been promoted direct from the ranks by Mohan Singh… What quality of leadership could be expected of officers such as these in the war of 1944?”40

The military leadership of Bose himself, who had no military training or experience, is also relevant. Fujiwara, who knew the INA and its leaders more than any other Japanese officer, writes: “As leader of the Army, Bose became the foundation of spiritual strength and was the pivot of the INA organisation. However, the standard of his operational tactics was, it must be said with great regret, low. He was inclined to be idealistic and not realistic. To this Toye adds: “The fact that he was neither a good soldier, nor the infallible political genius his disciples believed, makes only the more remarkable his power of fascination.”41

In military terms, are the claims of INA victories genuine?

How many INA soldiers were killed in battle?

            Apart from their performance in battle, INA veterans make tall claims about the number of soldiers who died in battle. Captain SS Yadav, an ex-INA officer has complied a book (Forgotten Warriors), listing the names of all members of the INA. The list contains about 13,000 names, with several names appearing more than once, and many addresses missing or incomplete. It has a list 131 persons who died in action and a Roll of Honour listing the names of 1602 persons who died from all causes, including wounds, sickness, accidents etc. Yet, he writes: “The valiant troops of the INA had to withdraw to Burma from the battlefronts of Kohima and Imphal. About twenty six thousand heroes of the Indian National Army laid down their lives”.42 Shah Nawaz is more conservative, stating that 4,000 INA soldiers were killed in the fighting in April and May 1944.

            The INA figures appear to be grossly inflated. Quoting official figures given by GHQ India, Toye writes: “The INA Division had started out for Imphal six thousand strong: only two thousand six hundred returned, and of these about two thousand had to be sent at once to hospital. During the campaign 715 men deserted, about four hundred were killed in battle, about eight hundred surrendered, and about fifteen hundred died of disease and starvation.43

            In subsequent operations, the number of desertions increased, while fewer were killed in action. Menezes writes: “Of some 15,500 INA personnel in Burma in 1945, 150 were killed in action; 1,500 died of starvation or disease; 5,000 surrendered or deserted; 7,000 were captured; 2,000 escaped towards Bangkok. 44

Why did some Indian soldiers join the INA while others did not?

            In the Foreword to Toye’s book, Philip Mason, who was the Joint Secretary in the War Department in 1945-46, gives four motives for joining the INA. A few did so with the intention of rejoining British forces when they saw a chance; some were puzzled, misinformed, misled, and on the whole believed the course they took was the most honourable open to them; others were frankly opportunist and some really were fervent nationalists.

            Stephen Cohen has given a similar analysis. ‘At least three factors influenced the decision to join the INA: personal comfort, nationalist political beliefs, and the charismatic appeal of Subhas Bose.  A few of the defecting officers anticipated personal rewards for themselves when they transferred allegiance to the Japanese, and to this extent the British label of “treasonous rabble’ was accurate. No INA officer has ever admitted such a motive, but interviews with former INA leaders and British officers indicate that money and security were important considerations for a few Indians.’ 45  

Major (later Major General) Shahid Hamid was the Private Secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India in 1946-47. According to him, ‘Most of the men who joined the INA were cowards and were not prepared to face the hardships of the prisoner of war camps. It was an escape from ill treatment and starvation. Very few joined for patriotic reasons.’ 46

Some of the reasons given by ex INA officers for joining the INA are interesting, even amusing. A number of officers such as Shah Nawaz, JKT Bhonsle, Gian Chand etc. did not join the INA initially, but later changed their minds. Shah Nawaz writes: ‘We decided that the best course was (a) for the senior officers to join the INA, gain control of it and prevent the ill treatment of prisoners of war, and also their exploitation by the Japanese. If we were unable to do this, then we would try and wreck the INA from within, if and when we had an opportunity to do so. (b) For the rank and file to remain out of the INA and if need be to undergo hardships and ill treatment, but the senior officers in the INA would do their best to help them. This at that time concerned mainly the Muslims’. 47

The concern of Shah Nawaz for Muslims was one of the reasons that prompted his decision to join the INA. This has been confirmed by Harbaksh, who writes that Shah Nawaz joined the INA ‘because of some dispute over accommodation for a Muslim JQ.’ As for Bhonsle, Harbaksh does not mince words. “Bhonsle, I knew, had done it to save his skin. He had admitted as much to me.”48

Prominent among those who did not join were Captain (later Lieutenant General) Harbaksh Singh, 5/11 Sikhs; Captain (later Major General) HC Badhwar; Captain (later Lieutenant General) KP Dhargalkar, both of the 3^rd Cavalry and Captain (later Lieutenant General) AC Iyappa, Signals. The reasons for these officers deciding against joining the INA were mainly two – distrust of the Japanese and lack of faith in the INA leadership. According to Harbaksh, ‘unless Mahatma Gandhi or Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru made an appeal over the air for every young man outside India to join the INA to liberate India with the help of the Japanese, we would not join, as we had no faith in its leadership’.49

            Cohen cites another reason for the professional soldier being less than sympathetic to the INA – his oath of loyalty. Many did not regard lightly the breaking of their oath, and preferred to spend the war in a prison camp undergoing hard labour, even torture, at the hands of the Japanese or the INA. In India, the concept of loyalty is closely linked to ‘salt’. An employee is expected to be loyal to his employer, whose salt he has eaten. For many Indian soldiers joining the INA meant being untrue to their salt, and facing the stigma of faithlessness and disloyalty in their regiments and villages when they returned home.

There is no doubt that those who refused to join face hardships, hard labour, and even torture, sometimes by their own men. Some of the officers who refused to join were subjected to third degree methods to bring them in line. Badhwar and Dhargalkar were locked in underground cages, which were about five feet long by five feet wide and seven feet high, and sometimes held five or six prisoners. They were kept inside these cages for 88 days, during which time they saw nothing of the outside world. 50

The fate of those who refused to join the INA was uncertain. The fortunate ones remained in POW camps or were sent as working parties to depots and airfields. Many were sent to labour camps in Borneo, the Celebes and Thailand, where thousands died of disease and starvation. Those who joined the INA not only had a more comfortable life but also a better survival rate. According to Menezes, of the 40,000 prisoners of war who did not join the INA, 11,000 died in captivity, of disease, starvation or were murdered, some even cannibalized by the Japanese. Strangely enough, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, which claimed the allegiance of all Indians and guaranteed equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, did nothing to alleviate the sufferings of these unfortunate soldiers.  Corr writes: ‘As for Gill, suffering in solitary confinement, he (Bose) did nothing. Neither did he do anything for the thousands of Indians in Thailand who were being worked to death on the Infamous Death Railway. He left them to their appalling fate’. 51

            What is the truth? Did majority of prisoners join the INA for patriotic reasons, or for pecuniary gains, better living conditions and to escape torture and harsh treatment at the hands of their Japanese captors?

What is the truth about atrocities committed by the INA?

There were several reported instances of the INA soldiers committing atrocities on Indian soldiers who were captured and held in their custody, as well as on those who refused to join the INA. After the end of the war, some of them were tried by court martial and convicted, not only for waging war against the Crown but also murder, and causing grievous hurt. Of the three officers (Shah Nawaz Khan, P.K. Sahgal and G.S. Dhillon), who were tried in the Red Fort in 1945, Dhillon was charged with the murder of Duli Chand, Hari Singh, Daryao Singh and Dharam Singh, whereas the other two were charged with abetment to murder, in addition to waging war against the King. Later, Captain Burhanuddin was also tried for murder but found guilty only of causing grievous hurt. Apparently, “Teja Singh was stood on a table, his wrists tied to a rope eight feet from the ground, the table removed, and Teja Singh beaten by 120 men in succession under Burhanuddin’s orders until he lost consciousness, with the result that he subsequently died.” 52

           

Commenting on the atrocities omitted by the INA, Shahid Hamid writes: ‘Most officers later realized that the INA was a trap, but once in they could not get out. They had no love for the Japanese and maintained that they were let down by them. The atrocities committed by the Kempatai (Japanese Special Military Police) did not help towards better relations. Taking their clue (sic) from the Kempatai the INA committed atrocious crimes in the name of patriotism against their own comrades. These are considered among the most degrading crimes in the history of soldiering’.53

However, there is a contrary view, which holds that stories of INA atrocities were sometimes concocted or deliberately exaggerated by British Intelligence, in order to protect Indian soldiers from falling prey to INA propaganda. According to Peter Ward Fay, in 1943 the British authorities adopted a programme that was intended to blacken the name of the INA, which was christened the JIFC (Japanese Indian or Inspired Fifth Column), which came to be known as Jiffs. Each unit was asked to form a  ‘josh group’, which officers were detailed to educate and train in countering INA propaganda and possible seduction by contact parties of the INA as had occurred in the Arakan. Interrogation files were combed for instances of barbarous behaviour by the Japanese towards prisoners, and these were circulated among troops deployed on the Burma Front. “There is a purpose here. It is to instill hatred of the Japanese, contempt for traitors, and in general a desire to be ‘up and at them’ into the men”. 54

The INA executed some of its own members, who were accused of desertion. This was done after trials conducted by the INA under its own Act, whose legality was suspect. However, Bose had himself decreed that traitors would be executed, even though he had earlier announced that anyone who wished to leave the INA could do so at any stage. There was the well known case of Captain Durrani, who not only instructed several intelligence agents sent to India to surrender, but gave them intelligence to pass on to authorities in India. At a secret midnight arraignment in the Bidadri Concentration Camp, Bose personally interrogated Durrani, who was weak and dazed after ten days of Japanese third degree. Bose would take no denial.  “You should be grateful to me”, he said, “that I have saved you from the Japanese firing squad, and that you will be shot by Indians”. 55.

Did the INA resort to coercion to collect funds?

            Maintaining a large military force like the INA needed considerable amount of funds. The Japanese agreed to pay the salaries of the prisoners of war, and to supply the weapons, equipment and rations. Most of the weapons and equipment were captured from the British Army after the fall of Singapore, and as it retreated from Burma. However, the civilian recruits had to be paid by the IIL, which had to rely on contributions from the Indian community in South East Asia. In the initial period these contributions were voluntary, and sufficed to meet the needs of the INA. However, after the arrival of Bose, the IIL was expanded, with a secretariat and eight departments to handle its multifarious activities. By October 1943 the monthly expenses amounted to about a million local dollars or 116,700 pounds sterling.

The arrival of Bose infused new life into the movement, and Indians made generous contributions. A merchant named Habeeb donated his entire estate to the IIL. Even poor Indians did not lag behind and gave whatever they could afford. However, the contribution soon dried up and persuasion was replaced by threats.  On 25 October 1943 he addressed the merchants of Malaya with severity: Legally speaking there is no private property when a country is in a state of war. If you think that your wealth and possessions are your own, you are living in delusion.  Your lives and property do not belong to you; they now belong to India and India alone. 56

When Bose heard that some of the rich Indians of Malaya were murmuring that he was harassing them, and wanted to change their nationalities or avoid payment by some other means, he told them; ‘I stand here today representing the Provisional Government of Azad Hind which has absolute rights over your lives and properties…If you do not choose to come forward voluntarily, then we are not going to remain slaves on that account… Everyone who refuses to help our cause is…..    our enemy. 57

Bose soon recognized that cash donations would not be enough to meet his needs and decided that he must make a systematic levy on Indian property. From the beginning of 1944 Indians had to declare their assets. Levies of from ten to twenty five percent were imposed and collected with progressive vigour. After a state reception in Manila, Bose visited Saigon on 24 November 1943, where the Indian community was assembled to greet him.  He assessed its contribution to his funds at twelve million piastres and, when the leaders demurred, exclaimed, much as he had done in Malaya: ‘All your wealth would not buy back one life lost in battle. I have full jurisdiction over you and can order you to the front.58

The shortage of funds was aggravated once it became clear that Japan was losing the war. In November 1944 the collection in Malaya fell from $ 2,000,000 to $ 617,000, in six months. It became difficult to enforce assessments - now that people knew that time was on their side, they delayed payments and concealed assets. In December 1944 Bose toured the region, to collect funds. In Penang he ordered the arrest of a defaulter, which hade a salutary effect on the others. On his return to Singapore, he threatened ten people with arrest. Letters were sent out to each defaulter, with a warning that if they did not pay up within three days, they would face arrest and imprisonment. On his way back to Rangoon in January 1945 Bose addressed a public meeting.   His speech was direct and bitter: those who opposed him should say so openly, they could then be put into concentration camps with the British and their property could be confiscated: if they wished to remain free they must pay their assessments. Bose left with the Japanese Security Police a list of ten persons for immediate arrest, and eighty others for varying degrees of surveillance and pressure: in the following two weeks the ten were arrested. 59

In July 1945 ‘Netaji Week’ was celebrated in Singapore. The rich Indians were called for a meeting to hear new demands for money. On the orders of Bose, five of the defaulters warned in January were arrested by the Japanese Security Police. Several demand notes went out from the IIL.  A man who had promised ten thousand dollars but sent only half received a terse note: ‘I regret that our instructions are not to accept part payments. Netaji made it very clear that promises must be fulfilled in a day or two. It is incumbent on you to pay your promised amount at once.’ Kuala Lumpur was similarly visited, where five defaulters were arrested. 60

Were these coercive methods to extort funds from Indians living in foreign countries lawful?

Did the INA play a part in India’s independence? 

           

Most INA veterans assert that they played a stellar role in India’s independence form British rule. In support of this view, they cite various documents that show that one of the reasons that prompted the British decision to grant independence to India was the realisation that they could no longer rely on the Indian Army.  In note written in early 1946 Lord Wavell wrote: “It would not be wise to try the Indian Army too highly in suppression of it’s own people.”61 In the Foreword to KC Praval's book on the Indian Army, Lieutenant General SK Sinha wrote, ‘There had also been the Naval mutiny at Bombay and the Army (Signals) mutiny at Jubbulpore. It was now clear as daylight to the British that they could no longer use the Indian Army to perpetuate their imperial rule over India…”62

Menezes writes: ‘Now in early 1946, serious cases of mutiny suddenly occurred in the Royal Indian Navy (RIN), less serious in the Royal Air Force (RAF) (wanting early repatriation) and in the Royal Indian Air Force, and a lesser protest in the Indian Army, at Jubbulpore in the Signal Training Centre.63 Though Menezes calls the Jubbulpore mutiny ‘a lesser protest’, in fact it was taken most seriously by the British authorities. The RIN and RIAF at that time were miniscule forces, with hardly any role in governance. The major instrument of British power was the Indian Army, and disaffection in its ranks was a cause for concern, however small. On 28 March 1946, less than a month after the suppression of the mutiny at Jubbulpore, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India, broadcast his famous appeal to all officers of the Indian Army. On 30 March 1946, the Hindustan Times commented editorially on the Auk’s appeal. “There is no doubt whatever that if the transfer of power is not quickly brought about, the foreign rulers of India cannot count upon the loyalty of the Indian Army…”64.

            While there is no doubt that nationalist feelings had taken root in the Indian Army, there is no proof that the INA was the catalyst. There were three prominent mutinies in 1946 – the RIN mutiny at Bombay, Karachi and other places; the Army mutiny at Jabalpur and the RIAF mutiny at several places. The root causes of all three were deficiencies in pay, food, accommodation etc; delay in demobilization and discrimination against Indian servicemen. Later, nationalist demands were added, and the movements were given a political twist. While it is true that after the INA trials - not before - there was a feeling of sympathy for the INA prisoners in certain quarters in the Armed Forces, there is nothing on record to show any direct correlation between these movements and the INA. In fact, after the fall of Rangoon so strong was the feeling against the INA prisoners amongst Indian soldiers that Auchinleck had to issue instructions for their safety. The assertion that these mutinies were inspired by the INA appears to be fallacious.

             Did the INA make any significant contribution to India’s independence from British rule?

CONCLUSION

The story of the INA will be complete only when answers are found to the questions given above. There is a need to carry out an objective assessment of the role of the INA and its contribution to India’s independence. This is all the more important since all persons who were members of the INA even for a day are today classified as freedom fighters, getting pensions that are four to five times what is paid to soldiers who retire after 15 to 20 years service. There is no doubt that those who fought for the country’s freedom deserve the nation’s gratitude. But the contributions of those who remained true to their salt and fought to defend the nation’s borders should not be forgotten.

END NOTES

1.         Gen. Mohan Singh, Soldiers’ Contribution to Indian Independence, p.67

2.         TR Sareen, Japan and the Indian National Army, pp. 51-52

3.         Joyce C. Lebra, Jungle Alliance – Japan and the Indian National Army, pp.16-18. (Lebra erroneously writes that Mohan Singh was the second-in-command of the battalion. In fact, there were several officers senior to him, including Major VDW Anderson, the 2ic).

4.         Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger, p.3.

5.         Mohan Singh, p.78

           

6.         Ibid, p.86

7.         Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour – The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, p.382

8.         Gerard H. Corr, The War of the Springing Tigers, p. 116

9.         Lebra, p.83.

10.       Mohan Singh, p.201.

11.       Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army, p.200

12.       Ibid, p.195.

13.       Toye, p.75.

14        Fay, p.312.

15.       Toye, p. 82

16        Lebra, p.130. M. Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, p.158

17.       Ibid, p.133

18.       Toye, p. 105.

19.       Ibid, p. 106

20.       Ibid, p. 226.

21.       Lebra, p.143. Sivaram, p.230

22.       Ibid, p.191

23        Fay, p.315.

24.       Maj Gen Shah Nawaz Khan, My Memories of INA and its Netaji p. 190

25.       Toye, p. 139

26.       Shah Nawaz, p. 195

27.       Fay, pp. 342-343.

28.       Toye, p. 142. Special Order of the Day, 13^th March 1945

29.       Ibid, p. 146

30.       Ibid, p. VIII

31.       Mohan Singh, p. 65

32.       Bisheshwar Prasad, ed. Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-45 – India and the War, p.35

33.       Shah Nawaz p. 89

34.       Corr, p.165

35.       Ibid, p.166

36.       Shah Nawaz, p. 159

37.       RM Kasliwal, The Impact of Netaji and INA on India’s Independence, p.20

38.       Stephen Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, p.152

39.       John Connell, Auchinleck, p.97,

40.       Toye, p.120

41.       Ibid, p. 178

42.       Captain SS Yadav, Forgotten Warriors, p.50

43.       Toye, pp.125-126

44.       Menezes, p. 397

45.       Cohen, p.152

46.       Major General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, p.17      

47.       Shah Nawaz, p. 47-

48.       Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, In the Line of Duty – A Soldier Remembers, p.134

49.       Harbaksh Singh, pp.111-112

50        Cohen, p.149 

51.       Corr, p.149

52.       Connell, p.817 

53.       Hamid, p.17

54.       Fay, p.424

55.       Toye, p.112. (Durrani survived and was later decorated with the George Cross for his fortitude. Lebra erroneously calls it the VC)

56.       Ibid, p.94

57.       Ibid, p.95

58.       Ibid, p.98

59        Ibid, p.133

60.       Ibid, p.162

61.       Wavell, The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 197

62.       Major KC Praval, Indian Army After Independence, p. IX.

63.       Menezes, p. 404

64.       Hamid, p.47