VIGNETTES FROM 1947-48

VIGNETTES FROM 1947-48

By

Maj Gen VK Singh

Introduction  

            The years 1947-48 were perhaps the most turbulent in India’s history. There was widespread jubilation when the country became free after 200 years of British rule. The joy of liberty was blighted by Partition, which resulted in a mass migration of hundreds of thousands of people across the newly created borders, accompanied by terrible atrocities. Barely two months after Independence, the nation’s armed forces were called upon to repel an invasion in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, becoming embroiled in a war that lasted well over a year and a conflict that continues even today. The history of those turbulent times has been documented by many historians. However, many stories remain untold, hidden in documents that are not seen by the general public. The vignettes recounted in this article have been collated from various sources, some hitherto unpublished. 

The Sacking of Mirpur

            One of the saddest events of the Jammu & Kashmir operations in 1947-48 concerns Mirpur, which was sacked by the Pathans after being evacuated by the  State Force garrison on 26 November 1947. Mirpur could have been saved – it was just a day’s march from Jhangar, which 50 Para Brigade had occupied on 19 November. Brigadier YS Paranjape, Commander 50 Para Brigade wanted to do exactly this, but was ordered to proceed to Kotli instead. Why did Major General Kalwant Singh, GOC JAK Division, decide to forsake Mirpur, against the advice of his subordinate as well as his superior? More important, why did the Mirpur garrison, comprising 600 troops, pull out without a fight? A much smaller force at Skardu withstood sustained attacks for six months. Punch was besieged for a year before it was relieved. Was it poor leadership, or the fighting quality of the troops that made the difference?  Probably both played a part. Colonel Puran Singh, the commander of the Mirpur garrison, was not made of the same mettle as Brigadier Pritam Singh and Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa. Also, Mirpur was garrisoned entirely by State Force troops, while Punch and Skardu both had a fair number of regular Indian Army soldiers.

            On 13 November 1947, elements of 50 Para Brigade consisting of 1 Patiala and a troop of 7 Light Cavalry had reached Akhnur.  On 16 November Major General Kalwant Singh, GOC JAK Division, issued orders for the relief of Naushera, Jhangar, Mirpur, Kotli and Punch.  According to his plan, 50 Para Brigade was to relieve Naushera by 16^th, Jhangar by 17^th, Kotli by 18^th, and Mirpur by 20^th November. Another column from Uri, consisting of two battalions of 161 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier LP Sen, was to move on the Uri-Punch axis on 16 November, reaching Punch the same day.

               The plan was ambitious and had several flaws. The officiating C-in-C, Lieutenant General FRR Bucher, felt that the advance of two columns was 'positively dangerous', and the despatch of a column from Uri to Punch, with the enemy still in position, was 'almost foolhardy'. Brigadier YS Paranjape, Commander 50 Para Brigade, had several objections. Apart from the dates being unrealistic, he felt that after establishing a firm base at Jhangar, Mirpur should be relieved first, so that the advance to Kotli was not interfered with by the raiders. Both his battalions, 1 Punjab and 3 Rajput were below strength, with 350 to 400 men in each. However, he was over ruled by the GOC and the operations commenced on 16 November 1947.1

               Naushera was occupied on 18 November, after a brief engagement. Paranjape had just three companies with him, and wanted to wait till the rest of the column fetched up. However, Kalwant ordered him to continue and capture Kotli. The advance was resumed on 19 November and Jhangar occupied the same day. From Jhangar, two roads forked out, one leading to Mirpur, and the other to Kotli. Paranjape was in favour of relieving Mirpur before going for Kotli, so that his flank was secure. However, Kalwant did not agree and ordered him to head for Kotli. The advance from Jhangar was resumed on 20 November and Kotli was relieved only on 26 November, after negotiating 47 road blocks. By this time the fate of Mirpur had been sealed - it was torched by the raiders the same day. About 400 soldiers and 10,000 refugees managed to escape, and reached Jhangar. The Pathans killed several hundred soldiers and civilians, capturing hundreds of women who were taken away as war booty. Many of them were sold for 150 rupees after being paraded naked through the streets of Jhelum by the exultant Pathan tribesmen.                

               On 27 November, the day after it had been relieved, Kalwant ordered Paranjape to fall back on Jhangar. This was accomplished on 28 November. Soon after this, Brigadier Paranjape was hospitalised, and Brigadier Mohd. Usman took over command of 50 Para Brigade. If Kalwant's decision to rush to Kotli without securing his open flank by securing Mirpur was surprising, even stranger was his decision to fall back to Jhangar, immediately after its capture. In the event, Mirpur was lost. Why was Kalwant in such a tearing hurry to reach Kotli? It is said that the wife of one of Maharaja Hari Singh's ADCs, who was rumoured to be one of his many mistresses, lived in Kotli. Reportedly, a large treasure belonging to the Kashmir State was also kept in Kotli. Was Kalwant’s haste to relieve Kotli attributable to these two factors, rather than tactical reasons? The lady and the treasure were probably saved, but the lives of several thousand men and the honour of several hundred women were lost. 2

Why was Mirpur evacuated even before it was attacked? The report submitted by the garrison commander, Colonel Puran Singh, states:

‘The original Mirpur Grn consisted of 600 S.F tps approx 12,000 non-Muslims. On the night 25/26 Nov, the enemy with a force of approx 3 Bns attacked on all sides, sp by Mtn Arty. Own cas due to shelling were 50 to 100 killed. The cas among the refugees amounted to approx 100 to 1000. The refugees were pouring into the mil camp and it was decided to withdraw. The camp site with the tents and army vehs incl the dead were left, lest any suspicion should be raised. About 500 OR and the refugees withdrew Eastwards after last it on 26 Nov through the mountains and not by rd.  The party was attacked en route once during the night; own cas estimated were 30 IOR and 500 refugees. Eventually approx 400 IORs and 10,000 Civ got back to Jhangar safely. The rear gd of 100 IORs and 1000 refugees have not yet reached. (this rear gd with refugees is reported to be hiding in the jungles at Puna 15 miles South West of Jhangar)’.3

         The story of the sack of Mirpur is best told by one of the survivors. Given below are extracts from the statement of Mr. Inder Singh Bali, son of Sardar Tehil Singh, State Jagirdar  and Chief of the Punjab, aged 24 years, of Mirpur proper:-.

  “On 25^th Nov 1947 our town (Mirpur) was bombarded and what looked like canon and mortar fire was opened on the town resulting in the complete blowing up of the roofs of the houses and causing lots of casualties among the civilians. The state troops did not put tough fight and the raiders occupied the town at 2 pm and set the entire town on fire. There were about 350 men of the state troops in the town itself and had placed pqts around the town and about 200 men were in the Cantt. When the posn became hopeless the troops in the town decided to surrender and run away and placed themselves in touch with the Offr commanding in the Cantt, and with the concerted action of troops both in the town and the Cantt, the civilians from the town managed to reach the Cantt.

             

              Out of our party about 300 girls were forcibly taken away and when we reached Thatala camp we heard from the Hindus that had already reached there that their 500 girls had also been taken away. At Thatala we found that not less than 2,000 Pathans all with 303 rifles were present.

             

              The concentration at Thatala swelled up to about 5000. Here again the Pathans sorted out young girls and carried them away. Thatala is about 15 miles from Jhelum city. Among these Offrs there were one Lt Col, one Capt and a few JCOs and men in all numbering 50. These officers and men were not wearing Regtl Signs. All these offers and men were wearing black caps and from their uniform I would see that they belonged to the Punjab Regt. We spent two nights at this camp. Out of the raiders three men who belonged to my town and were very well-known to me took pity on me and managed to deliver me at Jhelum camp (at the house of Lt. Avtar Narain) after they had relieved me of all my belongings. I am the only survivor from Mirpur.”4

The Abduction and Sale of Captured Women

            The two major incentives for the tribesmen who invaded Jammu & Kashmir in 1947 were money and women. Instances of rape and looting occurred at almost all towns and villages that came in the way of the tribal lashkars, including Uri, Baramula, Rajauri and Mirpur. However, Mirpur seems to have come in for special attention, its fall being accompanied by the town being set on fire and the abduction of a large number of women who were sold like cattle in Jhelum and other towns. This engaged the attention of the highest in the land, including Prime Minister Nehru, who took up the matter with the authorities in Pakistan almost on a daily basis. In a telegram dated 1 December 1947, shortly after the fall of Mirpur, he wrote:

            For Prime Minister, Pakistan, from Prime Minister, India.

I have also been informed that 3,000 abducted Hindu women have been brought to Gujarat from the Bhimbar area and they are being sold like cattle at Rs. 150 each. I am asking an Offr on the staff of the Deputy High Commissioner at Lahore to go personally to make enquiries to Gujarat district and I hope you will ask West Punjab Govt to give him all facilities.5

The next day, on 2 December 1947, the Prime Minister sent another telegram:

For Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan from Jawaharlal Nehru.

I have recd info that Mirpur town has been completely destroyed and out of 13,000 (half of 26,000) non – Muslims only 2,000 (half of 4,000) have reached within 15 miles of Jhelum. The fate of these refugees as well as of about 3,000 (half of 6,000) from the rest of Mirpur area is not known, but there are reports that large numbers of abducted Hindu women have been brought into Jhelum district by Pathans. The Pathans are causing panic among non-Muslims refugee pockets in that district are firing indiscriminately and shot dead a Mahratta soldier the other day.

I am gravely concerned about the fate of the non-Muslims pockets in Jhelum district and of the Hindu refugees in particular the abducted women who have been brought from Jammu by the raiders. I shall be grateful if you will give all facilities to our MEO org to evacuate them to India.6

The very next day, i.e. 3 December 1947, Nehru sent yet another telegram to Pakistan:

            I have been drawing your attention to large concentrations of tribesmen and others in West Punjab near the border of Kashmir State and to the abduction of large numbers of women from Kashmir who are being offered for sale in West Punjab….7

            The report of the sale of abducted girls in Jhelum is corroborated from several other sources. An extract from a report forwarded by a civil intelligence officer of the Government of India in Pakistan says:

           In Jhelum no Hindu except our staff is left. The district liaison officer, who has to depend either on the information received from the high district officials or from some of his Muslim friends reports that in Jhelum girls abducted from Mirpur side are sold in Jhelum city at Rs 20/- each. The local police refuse to interfere on the ground that the girls were not removed from the Punjab and also they express their helplessness because of the attitude of the armed Pathans possessing these girls.8

The Capture of Zoji La

            The capture of Zoji La in November 1948 was a spectacular feat of Indian arms, paving the way for the relief of Leh. Though innovative use of armour and bold leadership were the decisive factors in the battle, the state of morale of the enemy also played a part. It was reported that in the Ladakh Valley the enemy morale was very low on account of shortage of rations, clothing and the fast approaching winter. About 400 body guards of the Mehtar of Chitral in Skardu refused to go to Leh, and the matter was reported to Burhan-ud-Din in Gilgit for necessary action by Mata-ul-Mulk.  Burhan-Ud-Din not only berated his nephew Mata-ul-Mulk, but told him that he would be reaching Skardu shortly to sort out the matter. (Burhan-ud-Din was the brother and Mata-ul-Mulk the son of the Mehtar of Chitral). 

             The low state of morale of the enemy is obvious from intercepted messages that were exchanged between enemy commanders. One such message from the enemy commander at Dras – Zoji La to the Supreme Commander at Gilgit is given below:

“FROM JAMIL (XOB) TO GEORGE (QLC) RPT JAL (.) A 174 (.) SECRET (.) REF YOUR D 255 (.) MY MEN ARE UNDER FED AND UNDER CLOTHED (.) FOR DAYS THEY GO WITHOUT FOOD (.) BELIEVE ME THEY WILL NOT SIT IF AFTER FORTNIGHT ON THE HIGHEST PEAKS OF ZOJILA IF NOTHING WILL BE DONE FOR THEIR RATIONS AND CLOTHING SINCE NOW (.) RATIONS AND CLOTHING SO FAR RECEIVED FROM AS TO REAR USUAL TO NOTHING FOR A C D WINGS (.) TPS HAVE FRANKLY TOLD US THAT THEY WILL NOT WORK IF THEY WILL NOT BE PROPERLY FED AND CLOTHED (.) PLEASE REALISE THE COMING WINTER HIGHEST PEAKS OF ZOJILA AND SEND RATIONS AND CLOTHING OTHERWISE IT WILL BE TOO DIFFICULT FOR US TO MAKE OUR MEN TO FIGHT (.)”9

            An intercepted message from Burhan-ud-Din to Mata-ul-Mulk not only brings out the deteriorating relations between them but gives an indication of the extent of involvement of the Government of Pakistan in the operations. (Shortly after this, Burhan-ud-Din himself took over from Mata-ul-Mulk).

“FROM QLC TO XOD (.) S – 89 (.) SECRET (.) FOLLOWING FROM NASIM IN REPLY TO YOUR ….. TO END VERY DISAPOINT AFTER ALL THAT I HAVE DONE FOR YOU AND YOUR MEN (.) IS ONLY FOR ME THAT YOU HAVE NOT BEEN SENT UNDER ESCORT TO CHITRAL IN SPITE OF GOVERNOR NWFPS INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT (.) WHAT EVER MEN DO WILL REFLECT ON YOU (.) WARN YOU NOT TO GET YOUR SELF IN TROUBLE AND RUIN THE MEN ALSO (.) ISLAM IS IN DANGER (.) YOUR RECALLING OF YOUR MEN FROM NUBRA HIGHLY ENRAGED ALL PAK OFFICIALS (.) DEFENCE SECRETARY ESPECIALLY COMING FOR PURPOSE OF LOOKING INTO YOUR CONDUCT (.) SEND SOME ONE AND HAVE IMMEDIATELY THEM RECALLED (.) THEY SHOULD GET BACK BY FORCED MARCHES (.) I WILL REACH (.)” 10

Nehru and Zoji La

            The first prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a Kashmiri. His attachment to the land of his forbears is well known. What is not known is his extensive knowledge of the terrain in Kashmir and the interest he took in operational matters. By inclination, he was adventurous and fond of the outdoors. He had trekked extensively in the hills of Kashmir, Himachal, Garhwal and Kumaon and is said to have spent his honeymoon in a travellers’ hut at Baltal. It was no surprise that he took a special interest in the plans being made by Thimayya and Cariappa to capture Zoji La. This is brought out by the two letters reproduced below, one from SS Khera, the Commissioner at Meerut, addressed to Nehru and the other from Nehru to Major General Kalwant Singh, who had recently moved to Delhi as the CGS. Significantly, Nehru wrote to the CGS and not the C-in-C, who was then a British officer. 11

_________________________________________________________________

DO No 200/L&OG

                                                                                    Commissioner’s OFFICE, MEERUT

                                                                                    July 8, 1948

Dear JAWAHAR Lal Ji

1.           I take the liberty of sending this bit of information in case it is of any use.

2.           In the MAHCHHOI area beyond the ZOJILA there are certain rather obscure routes which have been traversed either by me or to my knowledge within the last three or four years.  I have marked them on the attached Map.  The routes in each case are difficult and not possible for animals, but men with loads can traverse them.  The one from the telegraph hut just beyond the high point of the ZOJILA pass is fairly easy and gives access to the head of the AMARNATH valley and so down towards BALTAL and also through PANCH-TARNI towards SHESHNAG.   The snag about this route is that unless care is taken to keep right under the shoulder of the AMARNATH peak, the party will find itself on the edge of impracticable precipices.  There is another route which goes up the long nala between MAHCHHOI and MATAYAN.  It is a long nala about ten miles to the head, with many bends and apparently leads nowhere; but there is a way over the top down into the PANCH-TARNI plain.

3.           Both these routes provide access between PAHALGAM and the MAHCHHOI-MATAYAN area.

4.           There are other routes over the ridge of the main HIMALAYAN Range between ZOJILA and NUN-KUN, but these are fairly obvious and well known.

5.           Incidentally, as I have trekked a fair deal over the area between the ROHTANG pass at the head of KULU valley and the SASERLA which is about 60 miles NORTH OF LEH, and also in the ZASKAR valley from its head down through DRAS to the ZOJILA, I would be happy to answer any questions, although of course probably our Army know all the answers themselves by now.

            Kind regards,

                                                                                                Yours sincerely,

                                                                                                Sd/-x-x-x (SS KHERA)

_____________________________________________________________

PRIME MINISTER

INDIA                                                                                                            NEW DELHI

                                                                                                            JULY 10, 1948

My dear KALWANT SINGH,

I am sending you a letter I have received from the Commissioner of MEERUT Division, also a map which he has sent me.

I might mention that in 1916 I crossed the ZOJILA, went to MATAYAN, and then tried to go to AMARNATH cave from MATAYAN across the high mountains.  We climbed some glaciers, reached the top of a huge ice field and were only about 3 or 4 miles from AMARNATH cave.  It started snowing then which made it very difficult to cross the crevasses.  Indeed I slipped into one and had to be pulled out by the rope which was tied around me.  So I did not succeed in reaching AMARNATH and had to come back to MATAYAN.

I rather doubt if we can take much advantage of these difficult mountain routes which KHERA has pointed out.  But if you wish to enquire further into this matter, please write to KHERA or even ask him to come up here for a day.

                                                                                                            Yours sincerely

                                                                                    Sd/-x-x-x-x (JAWAHARLAL NEHRU)

Major General KALWANT SINGH

Chief of the General Staff

Army Headquarters,

New Delhi

______________________________________________________________

            The two letters along with the map were sent the very next day to HQ Western Command with copies endorsed to the Director of Military Intelligence. It not known whether the maps were found useful or the services of SS Khera were utilised in the plan for the capture of Zoji La.  However, they bring out the personal interest that our first Prime Minister took in matters military. Soon after Zoji la was captured, Nehru visited Kashmir to personally congratulate the troops who had taken part in the operation. Exactly a year earlier, he had visited Kashmir immediately after the recapture of Baramula accompanied by Indira Gandhi.

Endnotes

1.               SN Prasad SN and Dharam Pal, History of the Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48), History Division, Ministry of Defence, New  Delhi, 1987. pp.52-55

2.               Maj. Gen. V.K. Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 160-62.

3.                  Appendix to J& K Division Intelligence Summary (ISUM) of 5 December 1947, Document No. 601/14172/H/I, History Division, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi. 

4.                  White Paper on Kashmir, Government of India, 26 Feb 1948, New Delhi. History Division, MOD, File No 601/14189/H,  p.47

5.                  White Paper on Kashmir, p. 67

6.                  White Paper on Kashmir, p. 55

7.                  White Paper on Kashmir, p. 115

8.                  Appendix ‘A’ to J& K Division Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No.2 of 20 January 1948, Document No. 601/14172/H/I, History Division, MOD, New Delhi. 

9.                  Appendix ‘A’ to HQ Western Command Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No. 43 for the period 29 Aug to 08 Sep 1948, Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi. 

10.              Appendix ‘B’ to HQ Western Command Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No. 43 for the period 29 Aug to 08 Sep 1948, Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.

11.              HQ Western Command Intelligence Summary (ISUM) for the period Jun to Sep 1948, Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.

(Published in the USI Journal)

SIGNALS IN THE ADMIN BOX

SIGNALS IN THE ADMIN BOX

Maj Gen VK Singh (Retd)

After reading Brigadier PS Gills’s excellent article ‘Golden Arrow Signals –  A Firsthand Story’ in the October 2003 issue of the Signalman, readers would have got a fair idea of the role played by Signals in the Battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass, also known as the Battle of the Admin Box. The full story of the action has been described by many writers, including some who were present. Apart from Brigadier Gill, who was a subaltern in 89th Infantry Brigade Signal Section, accounts have been written by Brigadier PMP Hobson, who was then commanding 7th Indian Divisional Signals; Major KEC Gillon, who was then a subaltern in 15 Corps Signals; Brigadier Terence Barreto, then serving as a subaltern in 5th Indian Divisional Signals; and Anthony Brett-James, who was commanding 9th Infantry Brigade Signal Section. Exhaustive accounts of the battle are given in the war diaries of the units involved and the official history of World War ll, published by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence. The action has also been covered in several books on Military History, including Field Marshal Slim’s ‘Defeat Into Victory’; Frank Owen’s ‘Campaign in Burma’; and Brett-Jame’s ‘Ball of Fire’ and ‘Report My Signals’. Interesting accounts of the battle are given in the obituaries of Brigadier Pat Hobson published in the Daily Telegraph of 23rd August 1990 and the Times of 25th August 1990 in London.

The battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass during the Arakan operations was a turning point in the Burma Campaign in World War ll. Also known as the battle of the Admin Box, it was one of the few instances when Signals covered itself with glory not only for remaining ‘through’ but also for fighting the enemy in close combat. The casualties sustained by signallers bear testimony to their gallantry during the battle, which was recognized by several awards after the battle, including a DSO for Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson, the Commanding Officer of 7th Indian Divisional Signals. (This unit became 4th Indian Divisional Signals, after Partition). The story of the battle of the Admin Box has been told and retold many times. This article is based on the war diaries of the units involved, in addition to personal accounts of officers who were present during the operation.

7th Indian Divisional Signals had been raised at Rawalpindi on 14th August 1940 by Lieutenant Colonel NTH Minshall. The unit subsequently moved to Ranchi from where it moved to the Arakan in September 1943 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson. In early February 1944 the unit was located with the headquarters of 7th Indian Division at Laung Chaung, with the divisional administrative area being at Sinzweya, about three miles to the rear, east of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Headquarters 15 Corps was at Sabaigon, about thirty miles to the rear, while Headquarters 5th Indian Division was at Wabyin, west of Ngakyedauk Pass. A Corps Signal Centre had been established at Sinzweya, which had two trunk lines and one telegraph circuit each to Corps and the two divisional headquarters.

On the morning of 6th February at about 0530 hours the Japanese attacked the divisional headquarters. The first attack, which came in the Signals area that was nearest to the entrance of the divisional headquarters, was repulsed. The enemy made further attacks and succeeded in infiltrating through the thick jungle into the divisional headquarters and managed to establish a machine gun post on the hill behind it. By 1030 hours the Signals had withdrawn into the Royal Artillery lines and thereafter the whole of the divisional headquarters made independently for the combined 15 Corps Troops and , 7th Indian Division administrative base by splitting into small parties. The Divisional Commander along with his staff fought his way out and made for the Administrative Base at Sinzweya. A few of those constituting the party were ambushed but on the whole the casualties were not as severe as might have been expected; on the other hand, the divisional signals personnel were responsible for inflicting considerable damage against the attacking Japanese.

Lieutenant KEC Gillon of 15 Indian Corps Signals was one of the two Indian Signal Corps officers present in Admin Box during the siege. He had been sent to Sinzweya on 3rd February to establish an advance signal centre in view of the likely move of the Corps Headquarters to that location. Narrating his experiences during the battle, he writes :–

“On the morning of the 6 Feb 44 at about 0600 hours I was rung up by Signal Master RICHMOND (this was the code name for 7 Ind Div exchange) and was told that Div HQ was being attacked by Japs and hence the trunk lines between RICHMOND and our exchange, which was code-named PALNEY, should be kept through at all costs. I asked him whether the normal DRLS should be sent as per schedule at 0700 hours and his reply was, “we are not interested in any b _ _ _ _ _ _ mail at the moment. In any case we cannot do anything with it even if you send it." While he was speaking I could hear the clatter of LMG fire coming over the line from 7 Ind Div Area.

However, I informed Sigmn Roden, whose duty it was that day to take the mail to 7 Div, that Japs were attacking 7 Div HQ and hence there was no need for him to take the mail. He however, was quite prepared to go, and so after cautioning him to return if the situation was too hot, I permitted him to go and he left at 0700 hours. That was the last we saw of Sigmn Roden, for apparently he was shot just as he got off his motor cycle near 7 Div HQ, according to one of the BORs of 7 Div Signals. Eighteen days later Cpl Abbott found Sigmn Roden's body in a crouched position near his motor cycle, and, after removing his pay book and other things found on his body, Cpl Abbott buried the body and returned with the pay book, which I forwarded to OC 2 Coy.

Later during the morning of the 6 Feb, vehicles and men kept coming into the adm base from 7 Div HQ area, and it became apparent that 7 Div HQ was evacuating. Telephone communication to 7 Div HQ ceased about 1030 hours or so."

Brigadier Tery Barreto recalls his last conversation with Lieutenant Gillon :– “I was the Signal Master on duty in the Signal Office at HQ 5 Div at Maungdaw. I was speaking on the line to Ken Gillon, an Anglo-Indian from Nagpur (married to one of the Du Bois girls). He was describing to me the scene around him. He could actually see the Japs as they attacked. As we were talking, the line was cut. We were the last to use the line until it was restored ten days later.”

The part played by Signals has been described by Frank Owen in his book ‘The Burma Campaign' :–

“The Signalmen, under Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson, DSO, held on to Divisional Headquarters to the last. Four times in as many hours their position was rushed, but though individual Japanese soldiers infiltrated into it they were all killed. The last wireless message reached the Box at 11.20 a.m. and then the listeners heard a voice say: “Put a pick through the set.” Mortared and soaked with rain, the Signallers hacked their way through the undergrowth to rejoin the garrison then forming in the Box. Hobson reported that his officers and men behaved with coolness and good marksmanship. “Of the 200 Japanese who attacked with mortars and machine guns, killed at least 40 and wounded many more." Throughout the siege of the Box, which was now about to begin, the Signalmen performed a magnificent service. Short of equipment, with all telephone lines cut and ciphers compromised, they kept communications going. By use of guarded language general orders were issued over open wireless. Information was securely transmitted by use of local jokes which the humourless Japanese could safely be trusted not to grasp. As an extra safeguard officers talked in French which a Brigadier admits “would have stumped the French, let alone the Japanese."

Another version of the battle is given by Anthony Brett-James, who was commanding                9th Infantry Brigade Signal Section, which had been placed under 7th Indian Division only a few days earlier. Describing the operation in his book ‘The Ball of Fire’, he writes :–

“The only troops defending Launggyaung were Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson’s Divisional Signals, and part of an Engineer Battalion. At six o’clock the air was rent by wild shouts from the Japanese. A few shots were almost smothered by a roar as of some vast football crowd, intermingled with catcalls and yells. All was uncertain in the half-light morning mist. The members of headquarters took up their prearranged battle stations. The Signal Office was attacked. Parties of the enemy infiltrated into the Signals area, and towards Messervy’s headquarters. Machine guns and mortars began firing into our positions from short range. Several attacks were beaten back, but all telephone lines were cut. Communications between the different parts of the headquarters were broken. Messervy with part of his staff was isolated on a steep hillock and pinned to the ground by fire. He decided that the place must be abandoned, but could get no message to this effect through to the rest of the staff and to Signals. Eventually, he and a few companions managed to slip away, waded down a stream, and made their way through the jungle and reached the administration area at Sinzweya.

Meanwhile Colonel Hobson, finding his men hard pressed, his casualties mounting, his wireless sets being overrun and destroyed, consulted Brigadier Hely, the C.R.A. It was decided to fight on, but soon the Japanese had established machine gun posts along a ridge that overlooked our strong points. Some tanks of the 25th Dragoons, which had just arrived here, were firing at these machine guns, but groups of our men found themselves caught between the two lines of fire.

The position was perilous. Resistance could no long be maintained. Hely gave the order to evacuate Launggyaung. A rendezvous was made: the eastern end of the Ngakyedauk Pass. But many new casualties were suffered in this withdrawal, and some confusion, for Japanese mortar fire broke up our parties and the main line of retreat was covered by the enemy. In all, Hobson’s Signals had seven officers, eight British and ninety Indian ranks killed or missing from that morning’s fighting."

Almost at the same time, the Japanese cut the road across the Ngakyedauk Pass. The Admin Base was now surrounded from all sides, and was under siege. Lieutenant Gillon gives a vivid account of the conditions in the Admin Box during the siege :–

“Our only means of communication with the out side world were two R/T links working to 15 Corps; supplies were dropped by Dakota aircraft. As the demand for telephone communication within the Admin Box increased, we were called upon to enlarge our existing 40 line F&F switchboard by adding on two 10  line U.C.  exchanges. But the telephone position was somewhat chronic – we had only 16 telephones ‘F’ and 7 Div Signals had a few D Vs, so, things did not look too bright for us. However, we managed as best as we could under the circumstances. The existing local telephone lines we had; were all built on poles which converged to one place – the Exchange; and the Japs were well aware of this fact. Realising that they could cause chaos in the Admin Box by putting our communication system out of commission, they set about to achieve this end. The Signal Office and Exchange dug-outs received several near misses from mortar bombs, and overhead lines were continuaIly being cut to ribbons by shrapnel and machine gun buIlets. On two occasions a mortar bomb landed within 5 yards of the Signal Office and Exchange, the shrapnel damaging the D.P. boxes outside on the terminal poles, and causing 10 lines to become ‘dis’, one which, on both occasions, happened to be the Div Commander’s line ! Our linemen, however, worked heroicaIly under extreme conditions, and put through all 10 lines in three minutes ! These two bombs, by the way, caused five casualties in my section, one which was somewhat serious."

7th Divisional Signals had destroyed or lost all its cipher documents during the attack on 6th February. However, communications were maintained with Headquarters 15 Corps and 5th Indian Division for the entire duration of the siege. A 19 set was taken from a tank of 25th Dragoons to establish emergency communications, until cable, radio batteries and cipher documents were airdropped. Trunk and local lines were frequently disrupted by enemy shelling, the linemen taking great risk to repair them and suffering several casualties. On 22nd February a line party under Lieutenant HF Newman accompanied an infantry battalion went up to the Ngakyedauk Pass to meet 123rd Brigade from 5th Indian Division that came up from the opposite side, carrying a line from 9th Brigade exchange. The same day Lieutenant R Gray of 33rd Indian Brigade ; Signal Section was killed by enemy shelling. The siege was finally broken on 24th February, Lieutenant Gourley bringing a line from 5th Indian Division and laying another line on his return journey to Corps. During the next few days the unit received much needed equipment and normal communications were restored. Parties were sent to the previous location to salvage stores left behind and bury the dead. The signal centre and cipher office had been completely destroyed by enemy shelling. However, equipment that had escaped shelling had not been damaged by the Japanese, who had taken only items that they could use, such as leather from ‘yakdans’ for use as boot leather.

The gallant action of the Signallers in the Battle of the Admin Box did not go unrecognised. Lieutenant Colonel Hobson was decorated with the Distinguished Service Order; Major JR Piddlington and Lieutenant D Crittal were awarded the Military Cross; while Sergeant CWL Ducker, Sergeant H Liptrot, Lance Corporal Mawer and Signalman Ram Autar got the Military Medal.

While 7th Indian Division was fighting desperately in the Admin Box, things were far from quiet in other sectors. On 6th February 1943, almost at the same time as the attack on the Admin Box, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on Briasco Bridge where several administrative units of 5th Indian Division were located, cutting the road Maungdaw – Bawli Bazaar. Though the road was cleared next day, the block had posed severe threat to the 5th Indian Division that had been effectively isolated like 7th Indian Division. Brigadier Tery Barreto recalls: “That night Div Sigs had to hold a part of the perimeter round Div HQ. I was given a little hillock with the Subedar Major and a handful of men. So tense was the situation that I had packed and taken with me my big pack with my sentimental belongings. We kept awake all night watching the tracers flying over Briasco Bridge. The firing was intense."

5th Indian Divisional Signals was located at Wabyin during this time. The unit, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel EIC Harrison, played an important role during the battle of the Admin Box. Communications with 7th Indian Division and 9th Infantry Brigade were maintained throughout the siege on the ‘Q’ link. It by means of, this vital link that air drops for the troops inside the Box were arranged. The wireless operator, Naik Balasundaram, worked throughout for forty-eight hours, to keep the link through. On 7th February when communications with Corps on line and wireless were down, the division had to enter the net of Fourteenth Army, where it was challenged but subsequently allowed to pass important messages. On 8th February a SCR 177B set was opened up on the forward net of 7th Indian Division and this was used to pass important messages to and from 7th Division, who were short of wireless sets having lost them when their previous position was overrun on the 6th. It was only on 10th February that a 'G’ staff officer from Corps arrived with a wireless set and took over the direct link to 7th Division. On 13th February 123rd Infantry Brigade moved up to a new position at the foot of the Ngakyedauk Pass. An attempt was made on the next day to lay a line to 7th Division. The line party laid the line to a point about a mile short of the destination but was not allowed to proceed further by Commander 123rd Infantry Brigade. A company of 4/8 Gurkhas took the line inside the Box at about 1800 hrs but could not put it through. Another attempt to lay the line was made on 17th February by a line detachment under Lieutenant Wolstencroft, the Lines Officer, accompanying a company of 4/8 Gurkhas. The line was put through at 1500 hours and the line detachment returned by the same route. However, the line was through just long enough for the two divisional commanders and some of their staff to talk to each other. Within three hours the enemy cut the line, which could not be repaired since the line detachment was not allowed to go out on the line under orders of ‘G’ staff. The commander of the line detachment, Naik HK Williams was later awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal for this feat. On 19th February line detachments were again laying three pairs of lines behind the infantry unit that was trying to clear the Pass. It was only on 23rd February when the Pass was reported clear of the enemy that all available line parties were pressed into service to get the line through. The line to 7th Indian Division was finally put through at 1345 hours on 24th February 1944. This brought to an end the saga of the Admin Box, and the Battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Shortly afterwards, both 5th and 7th Indian Divisions were moved to Imphal and 25th Indian Division took over the responsibility for the Arakan.

(The above account is based on material available with the Corps History Cell. It will form part of the Second Volume of the History of the Corps of Signals, covering the period 1939–47, that is presently being compiled – Author.)

(Published in the Signalman, Feb 2005)

HE JABALPUR MUTINY—A NEW PERSPECTIVE

THE JABALPUR MUTINY—A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Maj Gen VK Singh (Retd)

Very few Signallers of the present generation have heard of the mutiny, as it was then called, that occurred in the Signal Training Centre at Jabalpur in 1946. In the period before Independence, there was an understandable tendency to play down such incidents, which did little credit to British authority over the Dominion of India. Surprisingly, this attitude continued in the Indian Army even after Independence. As a result, the contribution of soldiers who took part in these uprisings was never recognised. It is only in recent years that we have begun to high-light the sacrifices made by these brave men who lost not only their livelihood but also suffered imprisonment for raising their voices against British authority. Ironically, the soldiers who joined the Indian National Army led by Subhas Chandra Bose were treated as heroes, even though they not only joined the enemy but also fought against their compatriots who were wearing the uniforms of the Indian Army. At the same time the soldiers who rebelled against British authority were treated as mutineers. This conundrum has baffled many Indians, especially those in the Armed Forces.

Though the part played by the INA has been adequately high-lighted, none of the historians of that period have made more than a passing reference to other revolts and uprisings by personnel of the Armed Forces against British rule. These uprisings mostly occurred after the War, and the concerned personnel only rebelled against British authority – they neither joined hands with the enemy nor took up arms against their compatriots. Due to lack of publicity and support from political leaders, these incidents remained virtually unknown and were soon forgotten by the public. As a result the contribution of soldiers to the freedom movement has never been acknowledged or high-lighted, even though there is a wealth of documentary evidence to support this hypothesis.

Major KC Praval’s  'Indian Army After Independence' was published in 1986 soon after his death. In the Foreword of the book, on p. (ix), Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd) wrote, “…..There had also been the Naval mutiny at Bombay and the Army (Signals) mutiny at Jubbulpore. It was now clear as daylight to the British that                they could no longer use the Indian Army to perpetuate their imperial rule over India…”

Maj Gen Shahid Hamid’s book  'Disastrous Twilight' was published in 1986. Hamid was Private Secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck,                   the Commander-in-Chief in India in               1946-47. Referring to an entry in his               diary dated 30th March 1946 on p.47, he writes:  

"Today the 'Hindustan Times' commented editorially on the Auk’s appeal to the Indian Army." There is no doubt whatever that if the transfer of power is not quickly brought about, the foreign rulers of India cannot count upon the loyalty of the Indian Army…”

In his book 'History of the Freedom Movement in India, Volume IV', the well-known historian Dr. Tara Chand has dwelt at length on the reasons for advancing the date of Independence on pp.558-560. “The most controversial measure of the Viceroy was the decision to advance the date of transfer of power from June 1948 to August 15, 1947. On this issue Mountbatten recorded his reasons in his conclusions appended to the Report on the Last Viceroyalty submitted to His Majesty’s Government in September 1948. His defence for expediting the transference of power to the Indians was on these lines… Secondly, the ultimate sanction of law and order, namely, the Army, presented difficulties for use as an instrument of government for maintenance of peace….”

From the above, it is clear that one of the major contributing factors to the British Government’s decision to leave India was the realization that it could no longer depend on the Indian Army. And this realization stemmed from the uprisings that took place in the Army, Navy and Air Force in the period before Independence. There is little doubt that these rebellions were instrumental not only in the decision of the British Government to grant Independence to India, but also in Mountbatten’s decision to advance the date from June 1948 to August 1947. The two major uprisings in this category were by personnel of the Royal Indian Navy at Bombay in February 1946 and the Indian Signal Corps at Jabalpur in February–March 1946.

In the beginning of 1946, there were two major establishments of the Indian Signal Corps at Jubbulpore (as Jabalpur was then called). The first was the Signal Training Centre (STC) comprising No. 1 Signal Training Battalion (Military), and 2 and 3 Signal Battalions (Technical). The second was the Indian Signal Depot and Records, which comprised the Indian Signals Depot; the Indian Signals Demobilisation Centre; and the Indian Signals Records. The Commandant of the STC was Colonel LC Boyd, Royal Signals, while Col RTH Gelston, Royal Signals, commanded the Depot and Records.           Both these establishments came under the Jubbulpore Area, commanded by Brigadier Hutchins, which in turn came under the GOC Nagpur District,                  Maj Gen Skinner, with his HQ at Nagpur. HQ Central Command was then located at Agra.

The mutiny started at 0920 hours on 27 February 1946. (The personnel involved referred to their action as a strike). About 200 men, mainly workshop trainees from G Company of 2 Signal Training Battalion formed up in the lines of the unit, just before the second works parade was due to fall in.  Shouting slogans, they marched through the unit to the lines of 3 Signal Training Battalion, brushing past the Company Commander and Subedar Major who tried to stop them near the Quarter Guard. Marching through the Depot, they proceeded towards the city shouting ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’, and waving flags of the Congress Party and the Muslim League. The CO of the Depot Battalion, Lt Col Anderson and a party of 15 armed NCOs tried to stop them near the Nerbudda Club and even threatened to shoot, but this did not deter them from continuing their march. Having reached Tilak Bhumi, Taliaya in the city, they stopped and held a meeting. There were speeches by some of the men, accompanied by slogans and waving of flags.

The news of the incident spread quickly. There was considerable tension in the city and shopkeepers closed their shops. However, the meeting was peaceful and there was no violence or unruly behaviour by the men. At about                     1615 hours they started back for the unit. By this time the military authorities had mobilised two companies of 27/9 Jats to assist the STC in containing the uprising. Having reached the unit, the protesters  sat down in the Battalion Arena. The Commandant, Colonel LC Boyd arrived, and the names of all the men were taken down. Soon afterwards, the Area Commander arrived and addressed the men. He told them that they were all under arrest, but assured them that he would forward their grievances to higher authorities. They fell in and were marched to the STC Cage where the Commandant noted down their grievances. These were discrimination in pay between Indian and British Other Ranks; poor quality of rations; slow speed of demobilisation; protest against the firing in Bombay, Karachi and Calcutta; protest against the expenditure on Victory celebrations in view of the food crisis; and the release of all INA prisoners including Captain Burhanuddin and Abdul Rashid.  They indicated that they were ready to go back to work if their demands were met. After taking down their grievances the Commandant spoke to the men and left. The men remained in the Cage during             the night, and were given food and bedding.

By early next morning, a British battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry had arrived in Jubbulpore. A party of about 80 men from 2 Signal Battalion assembled in the unit at 0700 hours and began moving along the same route that had been taken by their colleagues on the previous day. They were intercepted by a platoon of the British battalion and brought back to the unit. About 200 clerks of the Records also collected at one place. They were joined by about a 100 men from 3 Signal Training Battalion, who sat down and refused to go to work, demanding the release of their colleagues who were still inside the cage. The District Commander, Maj Gen Skinner arrived on the scene, and it was decided to arrest the ringleaders only. The second-in-command of the 27/9 Jats and Lt Col Poonose entered the cage and tried to induce the ringleaders to give themselves up. However, the rest of the men did not allow this and became restless. Finally it was decided to carry out the arrests by force.

About 80 soldiers of the Somerset Light Infantry entered the cage, with bayonets fixed on their rifles. A few of the men were physically removed, amidst a lot of shouting. Faced with the bayonets of the British troops, the crowd retreated to one corner of the cage, which gave way under the weight of sheer numbers.                     A large number managed to escape through the gap, while the remainder were involved in a scuffle with the British troops. Many were injured by bayonets and some were trampled in the stampede. Of the ones who had escaped, most were caught and brought back, to be kept in custody in the Jat lines.

The news of the bayonet charge spread like wild-fire in the STC and at many places the men came out and demonstrated against this, resulting in some more arrests. In the early hours of 1st March, about 150 OR from 3 Signal Training Battalion left their lines and marched through Sadar Bazar, shouting slogans and waving flags, but returned to the unit within an hour. The previous day’s incidents had been reported in several newspapers and there was considerable resentment at the bayonet charge on the Indian OR. According to the newspapers, three men had been killed, while 70 were injured in the bayonet charge. The District Magistrate declared Jubbulpore Cantonment a restricted area, and the entry of civilians was banned. During the next two days, the situation improved, but was still far from normal. The men in the cage refused to come out until their leaders were released. On 3rd March, troops of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade placed a cordon around the Signal Training Centre lines. The Area Commander and Commandant spoke to the men and asked them to return to work. Most of them agreed, and normal parades were held in the units. During the next two days several men returned and joined duty.  By                      7th March the situation had become           normal and there were no untoward incidents.

Seth Govind Das of the Congress Party raised the matter in the Central Assembly in Delhi. In his reply on 15th March 1946, the War Secretary, Mr. P. Mason gave the official version of the case. According to him, 1,716 persons were involved in the mutiny. He accepted that thirty-five persons had been wounded of whom eight had bayonet wounds. However, he denied that there was any firing or bayonet charge. According to him, some persons had sustained bayonet wounds when they attempted to overpower the troops that had been called in to arrest the ringleaders. Only two persons were seriously injured and there were no deaths. Mr. Ahmad Jaffar of the Muslim League suggested that a couple of members of the Defence Consultative Committee should be associated with the inquiry, but this was rejected by the War Secretary, who contended that this was a service matter and it would be quite illegal to associate non-officials.

The revolt had shocked the military establishment, especially the British officers who had always believed that the Indian soldiers would never let them down. The reasons for the disaffection were quickly analysed and remedial measures taken immediately. The District Commander issued instructions to all concerned to improve the standard of food and accommodation. A Board of Officers presided over by Lt Col Cassani brought to light the pathetic conditions under which the Indian troops lived. Officers, VCOs and NCOs who had been posted at the STC for more than two years were immediately posted out, after it was found that some of them had been there for 8–10 years. The SO-in-C, Maj Gen CHH Vulliamy directed that more Indian officers should be posted to the Centre, so that they could understand the problems of Indian troops. By April 1946, Lt Col TK Mukerjee and Maj Bhattcharjee were posted in as CO and 2IC of 2 Signal Training Battalion, with Capt KK Tewari taking over as Adjutant.

Disciplinary action taken against those who participated in the mutiny was severe and swift. 18 men were tried by Summary General Court Martial and sentenced to dismissal and imprisonment ranging from one to three years. In addition, 20 were dismissed after trial, and 41 discharged without any enquiry or investigation. Many more were sent home merely on suspicion and the statements of Junior and Non-Commissioned Officers who were considered loyal by British officers. Most of them had put in long years of service and fought in World              War II. They did not get any pension or gratuity and many lived and died in penury and their pleas for redress fell on deaf ears. There are several letters that bring out the pathetic state of these unfortunate soldiers, who remained true to their salt and helped the British win the Second World War. Having implicit faith in the British sense of fair play and justice, they were surprised and disappointed at the treatment they received at the hands of the Government of the day.

On the occasion of the                            25th Anniversary of Independence in 1972, the Government of India decided to honour those who had taken part in the freedom struggle and suffered hardships. The Prime Minister presented 'Tamra-Patras' to freedom fighters on this occasion. A scheme known as the 'Samman' pension scheme was introduced, under which a monthly pension is paid to the freedom fighter and after his death to his spouse. The Central and the State governments pay separate pensions, and the amount is periodically revised. In addition to the pension, the freedom fighter and his spouse are entitled to benefits such as free rail travel, medical treatment, old age homes, quotas for allotment of plots and houses, subsidised telephone connections etc. A list of mutinies and movements that qualify for the grant of the freedom fighters pension is given in the Citizen Charter for Freedom Fighters issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs. There are approximately 50 movements in the list, which contains only four from the Armed Forces. These are :–

* Suez Canal Army Revolt in 1943.

* Ambala Cantt. Army Revolt in 1943.

* Jhansi Regiment Case in Army (1940).

* Royal Indian Navy Mutiny, 1946.

The only one missing is the STC revolt of 1946. In fact, this was the last uprising by soldiers, and can be equated to the proverbial ‘last straw’ that broke the camel’s back. The Navy mutiny at Bombay had resulted in bad publicity for the Government, since it had to be suppressed by the use of force. The STC mutiny at Jabalpur occurred just two weeks later, and once again force had to be used to quell it. The Indian Navy then was a miniscule force, and the Army could easily handle disaffection in its ranks. But what if the Army itself was alienated? The prospect was too fearsome to even imagine and caused consternation and panic in Delhi and London.

There is another twist to the tale. About 200 men from signals who were captured by the Japanese had joined the INA. Like other INA personnel, they were dismissed from service after the War. After Independence, 12 of them were re-enrolled in the Army. After completing their colour service, they retired with full pensionary benefits. Being INA veterans, they were given the status of freedom fighters and became entitled to the ‘samman pension’. Thus, personnel of the Indian Signal Corps who joined the INA are presently getting two pensions, while those who took part in the STC mutiny are not getting even one.

          For some reason, the Corps of Signals chose to ignore the STC mutiny, even after Independence. Almost all the other revolts and uprisings were added to the list of freedom movements that qualify for the award of freedom fighters samman pension, benefiting the men who lost their freedom and their jobs. The Indian Navy has constructed a memorial at Bombay to commemorate the mutiny that took place in 1946 and annual functions are held to honour those who took part in it. The men who took part in the Jabalpur mutiny in 1946 deserve the status of freedom fighters to a much greater extent than many others who are in the list. This is the least that the Nation can do for them. Most of them are dead and many are too old to benefit from the privilege. If nothing else, they will be satisfied that an injustice has been undone, even if it was long overdue.

(Published in the Signalman, Oct 2003)