LIEUT
GENERAL K. UMRAO SINGH – THE FORGOTTEN HERO OF THE 1962 WAR
The recent publication of the Henderson Brooks
Report by Neville Maxwell has brought back memories of the traumatic events of
1962. The true story has not been told in its entirety, thanks to the lack of
vision of the political leadership and the bureaucracy, including those in
uniform. During a session titled
'Indian
Military History: The Missing Links' at the Jaipur
Literature Festival in 2012, when most of the speakers were talking about the
effect of the non availability of authentic war records on the training of young officers, a young
lady floored us by asking why we were all talking only of the impact of the non
disclosure of records for research and training etc. As a citizen, she wanted
to know how and why our soldiers fought and died in 1962. We had no answer.
There have been several books written by people in
and out of uniform about the 1962 debacle. The list of those who have been
blamed for the debacle comprises several political and military leaders, including
Prime Minister Nehru and Defence
Minister Krishna Menon. Other prominent personalities who have been held
culpable are the Director Intelligence Bureau (IB), B.N. Mullik; Army Chief
General P.N. Thapar; and GOC-in-C Eastern Command Lieut. General L.P. Sen. However,
very little has been written about Lieut. General Umrao Singh, GOC 33 Corps,
who refused to follow the orders to ‘throw out the Chinese’, and paid the price
by being sidelined. Had Nehru and Krishna Menon listened to Umrao, and he had
been backed by his military superiors, Thapar and Sen, the debacle and ignominy
that India suffered in 1962 could have been averted. Nine years later, when
Indira Gandhi asked the Army Chief, General Sam Manekshaw to go into East
Pakistan in April 1971, the latter refused. Sam later told Indira that if her
father had listened to his military advisers in 1962, he would not have been
humiliated as he was.
Umrao Singh was born on
5th December 2011 at Jaipur. He was the fifth out of ten sons of
Thakur Devi Singh of Chomu, one of twelve kotris
(principalities) of the princely state of Jaipur. He was of the Nathawat branch of the Kachwaha clan, which claims descent from
Kush, the second son of Lord Rama. The Kachwaha
dynasty established its rule in Dhoondar or Amber (later Jaipur) in early 13th
Century after defeating the Meenas.
Around 1600 AD, Prithviraj, who ruled Amber
during the reign of Sikander Lodi, gave each of his 12 surviving sons his own
fief (kotri) to rule. The third son,
Nathoo, was assigned Chomu, his descendants being known as Nathawats. The family has, since then, had a very illustrious
military tradition. Having proved his mettle in various battles, the ruler of
Chomu was appointed to command the vanguard of the Jaipur army and the first seat on
the right-hand side of the Maharaja was granted to him in Durbar – a privilege he
enjoyed till amalgamation of Jaipur into the Indian republic in 1947. According
to James Tod, the Political Agent to the Western Rajput States In early 19th
Century, Chomu was the largest of the 12 kotris,
contributing the maximum revenue and the largest personal quota of horsemen to
the ruler of Jaipur.
Umrao was educated at the Prince
of Wales Royal Military College (PWRIMC) at Dehradun, which was established to
train Indians for admission to the Royal Military College (RMC), Sandhurst. He
joined Sandhurst in July 1930 and was commissioned on 28th January
1932 into 5/6 Rajputana Riles (Napiers). He was 4th out of the 11 Indians
who passed out on that date, and 13th overall out of 41 cadets in his course.
Three years later, his younger brother, K. Bhagwati Singh (IC-1) passed out
with the first course commissioned from the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun.
Bhagwati’s son Madhvendra Singh joined the Indian Navy and retired as the Chief
of Naval Staff.
Umrao saw active service with his
battalion in Waziristan in 1932-35. During World War II, he served with his battalion
in Hongkong. During the Jammu and Kashmir Operations in 1947-48, he commanded 43
Lorried Brigade and later 5 Infantry Brigade, which took part in the relief of
Punch. From 1949 to 1953, he was the Brigadier General Staff at HQ Eastern
Command at Ranchi, where the Army Commander was Lieut. General Thakur Nathu Singh.
Subsequently he commanded 19 Infantry Division in Srinagar followed by a stint
as Chief of Staff under Lieut. General S.P.P. Thorat at Lucknow, where HQ
Eastern Command had moved from Ranchi. In 1961, he was promoted Lieut. General
and appointed GOC XXXIII Corps at Shillong, which was then responsible for the
defence of the whole of Eastern India including NEFA.
The infamous ‘forward policy’ was first enunciated
by Prime Minister Nehru during a meeting on 2 November 1961, in which he directed
that Indian forces should occupy the whole frontier from NEFA to Ladakh and
cover all gaps by setting up posts or by means of effective patrolling. However, he ordered that our troops should
not fire except in self-defence. On 5 December 1961, Army HQ instructed Western
Command to patrol as far forward as possible in Ladakh sector, with a view to
establishing additional posts to prevent the Chinese from advancing further and
also to dominate existing Chinese posts.
This order also specified that the ‘forward policy’ shall be carried out
without getting involved in a clash with the Chinese. Similar instructions were
issued for UP and other Northern areas, Eastern Command being told to go
forward and occupy the whole frontier, covering the gaps by patrolling or by
posts. As will be noticed, the orders from Army HQ went a step further than the
instructions issued by the Prime Minister. The ‘forward policy’ was the genesis
of the deterioration in the situation on the border, culminating in the Chinese
attack and the final debacle. It is generally believed that forward policy was
the brain child of Lieut. General B.M. Kaul, the Chief of General Staff (CGS) and
B.N. Mullik, the Director IB.
During the next few months, a number
of new posts were established near the McMahon Line and existing posts were
reinforced. Although those posts were
being manned by Assam Rifles, they were physically established under
supervision of the Army. Most of the
posts were of platoon strength and almost entirely dependent on air-dropped
supplies. By May 1962 the Chinese had also reinforced all their posts all along
the Indo-Tibetan border. By the end of September, 36 Indian posts had been
established in Ladakh against 47 posts set-up by the Chinese in the region.
Around Chushul the Indian and Chinese posts confronted each other at close
range and in the south around Rezangla and Demchok the Indian posts reached
almost up to the international border. In NEFA, by 20th July, 34
posts had been established. Among these posts was the one at Dhola, established
a little south of the Namkha Chu on 4 June.
The force level in NEFA at this time was two infantry brigades and 74
platoons of Assam Rifles.
The above military preparations were
followed by a spurt in provocative activities by Chinese troops and intrusions
in Indian Territory. In July and August
there were a number incidents in Ladakh in which Indian posts were surrounded
and patrols ambushed. Such incidents were reported from Galwan, Daulet Beg Oldi
and near the Karakoram Pass.
In the Eastern sector, during the
period June/July, the Chinese had intensified their border patrolling opposite
the Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions.
They had intruded about 140 meters inside Indian Territory at Lhola in
the western part of Siang Frontier Division.
All Chinese border posts had moved forward and had been considerably
reinforced. They had constructed defence works in all the forward posts and the
troops had been issued modern machine-guns in place of the old weapons. The biggest threat was posed by the Chinese
in the Eastern sector in August when they moved troops to the Thagla Ridge in
the Kameng Frontier Division and occupied it.
By the end of August 1962, they had concentrated about 400 troops in the
area.
At this time HQ 7 Infantry Brigade
under Brigadier J.P. Dalvi was located at Tawang, along with two battalions, 9
Punjab and 1 Sikh. On 8 September 1962, about 300-400 Chinese crossed the
Thagla Pass, demolished two bridges over the Namka Chu and surrounded the Assam
Rifles post at Dhola. By 4 pm the message had been passed on battalion wireless
net to the Battalion HQ which immediately conveyed it to Brigade HQ on
telephone.
The post had been surrounded by the
Chinese at 8 am but the information reached the Brigade HQ eight hours later at
4 pm. The information was conveyed to Divisional HQ and to Commander 7 Infantry
Brigade, who had proceeded on leave, but was still at Tezpur. Orders were
issued to the post commander at Dhola to hold out at all costs and
reinforcements were on their way. Next morning the Brigade Commander arrived at
Tawang by helicopter and conferred with COs of 9 Punjab and 1 Sikh. By the
evening of 9 September the Chinese strength around Dhola was reported to be
about 600.
Along with the rapidly changing situation
in the forward areas, considerable activity was taking place at higher echelons
of the Army as well as the political leadership. On 9 September 1962, a high
level meeting was held in Delhi, chaired by Defence Minister V.K. Krishna
Menon. It was attended by COAS, General P.N. Thapar; GOC-in-C Eastern Command,
Lieut. General L.P. Sen; the Cabinet Secretary, S.S. Khera; the Director IB, B.N.
Mullik; and a few others. At the meeting it was decided that the Chinese must
be evicted from south of the Thagla Ridge immediately. The Army Chief accepted
the decision, and orders were passed to Eastern Command accordingly. To carry
out this task, orders were issued for the immediate move of 9 Punjab to Namka
Chu, with the rest of 7 Brigade to be ready to follow within 48 hours. The
eviction operation was code-named ‘Leghorn’.
Two days later at another meeting held
in Defence Minister’s office, General Sen reported that there were some 600
Chinese in Dhola and he had ordered 7 Brigade to deal with them. Based on the
advice of Sen, Krishna Menon approved the decision to mount an attack on the
Thagla ridge. On 12 September 1962, Sen conveyed the decision of the government
to expel the Chinese from Thagla to the corps and divisional commanders during
a conference at Tezpur. General Umrao Singh, who had already consulted General
Prasad and Brigadier Dalvi on the issue, clearly told the Army Commander that
the task was beyond the capability of the troops available to him. He also
questioned the wisdom of moving the only brigade available for the defence of
Tawang, the vital ground, to Thagla. However, Sen was not convinced,
reiterating that the decision had been taken by the government, and they had to
follow it. Immediately afterwards, Umrao sent a formal letter to HQ Eastern
Command, giving a realistic appraisal of the military situation, based on an
appreciation carried out earlier.
On 18 September, a Government
spokesman announced at a press conference that the Army had been instructed to
drive the Chinese out of the Dhola area.
On 20 September, Eastern Command issued instructions that all patrols
and posts were to engage Chinese patrols that came within range of their
weapons. At this time, Brigadier Dalvi accompanied by Colonel Misra was
carrying out reconnaissance of the area occupied by 9 Punjab. At 10.30 pm while
they were at Bridge II discussing the points to be included in his appreciation
that had been asked for by Divisional HQ, the Chinese sentry threw a grenade
into the Indian sentry post. Firing started from both sides of the Namka Chu
and resulted in two Chinese being killed and two wounded. Indian casualties
were five wounded.
The outbreak of firing on the Namka
Chu and the build-up by the Chinese made their intentions clear. At a meeting
in Defence Ministry on 22 September 1962, General Thapar asked the government
to reconsider the decision to evict the Chinese from Thagla. Since Nehru and
Krishna Menon were out of the country, the meeting was chaired by K.
Raghuramaiah, the Deputy Defence Minister. The Foreign Secretary then explained
the Prime Minister’s instructions that no infringement of the border in NEFA
was to be accepted. It was decided that the Army would have to carry out the
instructions of the government and evict the Chinese from the Dhola area.
Thapar requested for a written order of the government on the subject. Soon
afterwards, he received a note signed by H.C. Sarin, Joint Secretary, Ministry
of Defence, which stated: “The decision
throughout has been as discussed at previous meetings, that the Army should
prepare and throw the Chinese out as soon as possible. The COAS was accordingly
directed to take action for the eviction of the Chinese in the KAMENG Frontier
Division of NEFA as soon as he is ready.”
General Thapar repeated the Government’s
orders to Sen. He also warned Lieut. General
Daulet Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command of the possibility of Chinese reaction
in Ladakh and advised that Indian posts there should be strengthened. On 24 September Umrao personally conveyed
these orders to Major General Niranjan Prasad, GOC 4 Infantry Division.
By this time, serious differences
between commanders at various levels in the military hierarchy had surfaced. On
14 September, Sen had ordered Umrao to carry out an appreciation and formulate an
outline plan for the operation. After passing through the corps and divisional
commanders, the order reached Dalvi in 7 Infantry Brigade. Other than the Army
Commander, all three – Umrao, Prasad and Dalvi – were convinced that the
capture of Thagla was not feasible with the resources then available. However,
Dalvi agreed to produce an appreciation highlighting the maintenance and
administrative problems, hoping that this would convince the higher authorities
of the unsoundness of the plan. His appreciation resulted in a plan with the
modest aim of capturing Tseng-jong, a small feature on Thagla slopes, and then
rolling down west to east to the Chinese positions on the Namka Chu. It was to
be attempted with an out-flanking move from Bridge V near Tsangle. While
working out the logistics for the plan, Dalvi made it clear that unless the
proper administrative base was ready within a fortnight there would be no scope
for operations during that winter.
Prasad approved the plan after some
alterations and then submitted it to Umrao who had reached Lumpu on 26
September. Umrao also suggested some modifications in the appreciation and
advised on a more modest tactical aim. The draft plan was revised accordingly
and Umrao personally took it to Lucknow on 29 September. However, Sen refused
to accept the requirements stipulated for the operation; it would have been
impossible to meet them before the winter set in. Being unable to convince the
Army Commander, Umrao submitted his views and assessment of the situation in
writing on 30 September. There were
other differences between Sen and Umrao, which came out in the open during a
meeting on 2 October 1962, presided over by the Defence Minister. Umrao
protested at the interference in his command and orders sent to him by Sen to
send a company patrol to Tsangle to establish a post there. He felt that
Tsangle had no tactical significance and would give away Indian intentions to
the Chinese.
The Defence Minister returned from New
York on 30 September. Two days later, Prime Minister Nehru returned from
Nigeria. Sen had been insisting on the removal of Umrao and the appointment of
a more pliable corps commander to carry out the orders of the government. The
problem was solved by divesting Umrao of the responsibility for NEFA. It was
taken away from XXXIII Corps and handed over to a newly raised IV Corps. Lieut.
General B.M. Kaul, the CGS, was given command of the new Corps, with the
specific task of evicting the Chinese from the Dhola-Thagla area.
The
rest of the story is well known and is not being repeated. The fact that the
brigade, divisional and corps commanders – Dalvi, Prasad and Umrao – were
convinced that the operation was not militarily viable should have alerted the
top military hierarchy – Sen and Thapar - about the impending disaster. Yet,
they meekly succumbed to political pressure and went along. By putting the
lives of their soldiers at risk and conducting an operation that had no chance
of success, they displayed a singular lack of moral courage and professional
integrity. As for the political leadership – Nehru and Krishna Menon – little
needs to be said. They can be forgiven for not being familiar with military
strategy and higher direction of war, but there is no justification for riding
roughshod over professional military advice. The lesson was learnt, as
subsequent events were to prove. Both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi
benefitted from this lesson, deciding to go by the advice their Army chiefs
during the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan.
In the 1962 war, Umrao Singh stands
out as the only senior military commander, apart from his subordinates, Prasad
and Dalvi, who took a stand and refused to carry out orders that were
militarily impractical and undoable. He placed the interest of the nation and
the well being of his soldiers above his own, in the highest traditions of the military
profession and of his ancestors.
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