TWO
RAJPUTS – CARIAPPA AND NATHU SINGH
By
Maj Gen VK Singh
This
is the story of two Indian soldiers, one famous and the other almost unknown,
even in the Army. One rose to the rank of General, becoming the first Indian
Commander-in-Chief, while the other retired as a Lieutenant General, after
declining the post that went to the other. Though there was a difference in
three years between their dates of commission, they were born in the same year
-1900. Both joined the same unit - 1st
Battalion the 7th Rajput Regiment (Queen Victoria's Own Light Infantry), known
in short as 1/7 Rajput (2 QVOLI). Though they had many similarities, their
personalities were totally different. One was a 'pucca' sahib, even more than
the British themselves, while the other was a nationalist who hated the
British.
Kodandera Madappa Cariappa was born on 28 January 1900 at Mercara in Coorg.
His father, Madappa, was an official in the revenue department. After finishing
his education at Presidency College, Madras, in June 1918 he joined the
Temporary School for Indian Cadets (TSIC), which was also called the Daly Cadet
College, at Indore. He passed out on 1 December 1919 with a temporary
commission and was placed seventh in overall order of merit, out of 39 cadets.
Subsequently, he was granted a permanent commission with effect from 17 July
1920. Incidentally, the first two
Indians to pass out from Sandhurst - Syed Iskander Ali Mirza and Iqbal Ali Beg -
were commissioned on 16 July 1920, and
were senior to Cariappa by one day. Beg did not join and Iskander Ali Mirza was
transferred to the political service.
Nathu Singh was born at Gumanpura, in the
princely state of Dungarpur, in Rajputana. He was the only child of Thakur
Hamir Singhji of Gumanpura, a noble man from the vassalage of Dungarpur. Unfortunately, he lost both his parents
before he was seven years old. Taking the orphaned boy under his wing, Maharawal
Vijay Singhji, the ruler of Dungarpur State, sent him to his own alma mater,
the Mayo College at Ajmer. In 1911, the Maharawal took Nathu along to the
Coronation Durbar at Delhi. Instead of being impressed by the pomp and
pageantry, the young Nathu was filled with shame and revulsion at the sight of Indian
rulers paying obeisance to the Crown. This made a deep impression on the young
boy, and he felt the first stirrings of nationalism. In 1915, he met Jawahar
Lal Nehru for the first time, and thereafter, his father, Moti Lal Nehru. The
Maharawal, himself a great patriot, implanted the seed of nationalism in Nathu
Singh's mind, which took root, and flowered, as he grew older.
Nathu Singh's background and
heritage - he was from the Mairtia clan, of Rathore Rajputs, renowned for their
valour - resulted in a natural inclination for the military profession. His
guardian, the Maharawal had also expressed a desire that he should follow the
martial tradition of his forbears, and join the Army. Unfortunately, the
Maharawal died in 1918, when Nathu Singh was still at school. Soon after he
returned from school in 1920, he had a row with the Political Officer in
Dungarpur, the first of his many brushes with the British. The Political
Officer later developed a liking for the young firebrand, and advised the
Rajmata to send him to Sandhurst, which had just been opened to Indians. Nathu
Singh wanted to become a soldier, but not under the British. However, he bowed
to his guardian’s wishes, and applied for the Royal Military College,
Sandhurst. After clearing the written examination and the interviews with the
C-in-C and the Viceroy, he sailed for England, in July 1921.
Nathu Singh spent a year and a half at
Sandhurst. His British instructors and colleagues were impressed by his
intellect, but somewhat surprised at his boldness and lack of servility, which
they had come to expect from all Indians. Nathu Singh disliked the British, and
made no effort to conceal this. During his stay at Sandhurst, General Jacob
of the Indian Army, addressing the cadets, told them that since the British
were likely to stay in India for a long time, the best among them should join
the Indian Army. Nathu Singh immediately sought an interview with the
Commandant, and told him that if the British had no intention of leaving, he
was not interested in getting his commission. During his stay in England, he
also met Subhas Chandra Bose, who was in the Indian Civil Service (ICS) at that
time. They had a common meeting ground, in their dislike of British rule, and
desire to be rid of it. However, they differed in their views regarding the
best method to achieve their goal.
After passing
out from the Daly Cadet College, Cariappa
served in 2/88 Carnatic Infantry, 2/125 Napier
Rifles
and 7th Dogras
before joining 1/7 Rajput, which was one of six units
of Infantry Indianised in 1923. The battalion was at in Waziristan, on the North West Frontier. Meanwhile, Nathu Singh, who had passed
out from Sandhurst on 1 February
1923
and assigned to 1/7 Rajput, was doing his
attachment with a British battalion, the 2nd Prince of Wales' Volunteers, located at Mhow. After spending
year with the Volunteers, he joined his parent unit in 1924, where Cariappa was
already serving, in Waziristan. Unlike most subalterns,
Nathu
did not follow the dictum of being seen, but not
heard. He had strong views, and he did not hesitate to articulate them. His
antipathy for the British, and their ways, could not be hidden, and this soon
brought him into conflict with his superiors.
Nathu Singh's first brush with
authority was over the matter of dining in the officers’ mess. He refused to dine in the mess with other
officers,
on the grounds that he was a high caste Hindu. This created an uproar.
Finally, he agreed to dine in the mess, but considered
it an act of condescension. According to the custom then in vogue, apart from
the CO, two other senior officers of the battalion were required to give their
recommendations regarding retention of an officer in service. In
his report dated 1 February 1925 , his CO, Lt. Col. A.H. Macleverty,
wrote:
"......I do not consider him well suited
for regimental life........he has strong religious convictions, which colour
every question......He finds mess irksome, and states that he cannot dine with
Europeans when at his home.....I do not think that his heart is in his profession,
as he has more than once stated that his ambition is service in his
state.....".
The opinion of
the CO was seconded by two other officers of the battalion, Major B.S.A.F.
Greville and Major E.M.C. Brander.
However, while recommending that Nathu Singh should not be retained in service,
all three praised his intelligence, professional knowledge and prowess at
games. Finally, General Claud W. Jacob, GOC-in-C, Northern
Command wrote:
"The sooner this officer is removed from the Army
the better." With this, it
appeared that Nathu’s fate was sealed. He was
called for a final interview with the Army Commander, where his CO was present.
After talking to Nathu
, the General was so impressed by his family and educational background, as well as his
obvious intelligence that he decided to give
him another chance. After advising him to
adjust himself to Army life, he sent Nathu out of his
office, the Army Commander then gave dressing down to the CO, for not
appreciating the background of the young Indian officer, and told him to handle
him properly. Nathu Singh was standing outside the door, and heard the whole
conversation, which he often related in later years.
Unlike other Indian officers had
been trained at Sandhurst, Cariappa had
not visited UK and other countries in
Europe. In 1925, he decided to go on
a Grand Tour
and applied to General HQ in Delhi, which not only accorded him permission, but arranged for his stay with British
units, wherever possible. Cariappa went around the World, and visited Europe,
USA, Japan, China and several other countries. The trip was a great education
for him, and he returned a much wiser and better man. The battalion had moved
to Fatehgarh in 1925, and It was here that
he got his nick name, 'Kipper'. It is said that a British officer's wife found
his name difficult to pronounce, and started calling him Kipper.
When
Nathu Singh’s first report
had been written, he had been in the battalion for just three weeks. After a
year, the perceptions of his CO and other officers had changed. Nathu Singh had
become moderate in his views as well as his behaviour, based on the advice of
the Army commander. On 1 April 1926, LT. Col. Greville, who was now commanding the battalion, wrote:
"A keen, hard working officer who
takes great interest in his work.....With regard to the adverse remarks in last
year's report he has shown much improvement in all respects and appears to be
much more broad minded in his views.....His manners in the mess are now
satisfactory and he finds no difficulties in the feeding
arrangements....conveys the idea that he is very pleased and happy with Army
life."
In 1926, Nathu Singh was posted to the 10/7
Rajput, the Regiment's training battalion at Fatehgarh. During this period, he continued his association with the Congress leaders, such as the
Nehrus, Jinnah, and Sarojini Naidu, whom he had met while giving evidence
before the Skeen Committee, which was examining the question of an Indian Sandhurst. Motilal Nehru and M.A. Jinnah were members, along with several others. The Committee examined
122 witnesses, which included KCIOs, their parents, and VCOs. Among the KCIOs
who gave evidence were Cariappa and Nathu Singh. During this period, Pandit
Motilal Nehru, who had resigned from the Committee in March 1926, heard about Nathu
Singh’s desire to leave the service, and dissuaded him from
it. He strongly advised Nathu Singh to stick to the Army and not join the
National movement or political department of the Government of India, or return
to Dungarpur State service, all options which he was considering.
During his stay in Fatehgarh, the
C-in-C, Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood, visited the battalion. All officers
were lined upto be introduced to him. Nathu Singh was wearing a 'safa'
(turban), instead of a regulation hat. He had been wearing the 'safa' since he
had been commissioned, and surprisingly, nobody had objected to it. When the
C-in-C came to Nathu, he took him to be a Viceroy's Commissioned Officer (VCO),
who normally wore such head gear. Shaking his hand, he asked, in Hindustani:
"Kaisa hai, Sahib" ("How are you?" VCOs were normally addressed as 'Sahib', as
JCOs in the Indian Army are even today). Without batting an eyelid, Nathu
replied, in Hindustani: "Bahut accha hai, Sahib". ("Very
well, Sir"). By now the CO had realised the confusion, and introduced him
to the C-in-C, as Mister Nathu Singh. The Chief quickly said: "How do you
do, Nathu Singh." In chaste English, Nathu replied; "Very well, Sir."
In 1929, Nathu
Singh returned to 1/7 Rajput, which was in Razmak, in Waziristan. The battalion
moved to Peshawar in 1930, and the next year, Nathu Singh was promoted Captain.
Cariappa was also in the battalion at that time. At that time, the Staff College at Camberley trained officers of the British Army,
whereas the one in Quetta had been established primarily for the Indian Army.
July 1931, Cariappa was posted to HQ
Peshawar District, as DAQMG. Based on the advice of his superiors and colleagues, he
decided to appear for the Staff College examination. In January 1932, he went to England for tuition by
the Royal United Services Institution (RUSI). He was also able to get a month's
attachment with a British battalion, and attended two short courses, at the Small Arms School and the Royal
Artillery School. As a result, Cariappa passed
the entrance examination, and became the first Indian officer to attend the
course at the Staff College, Quetta.
Cariappa found
that British officers treated those from the Colonies with
contempt and disdain. He tried to take
the sarcasm and discrimination in his stride, and rarely got into a
confrontation. However, on one occasion, he spoke up. In a large gathering,
towards the end of the course, student officers were invited to comment on the
course, and suggest improvements. Cariappa felt that the number of vacancies
for Indian officers at the Staff College was too small. This would deprive a
large number of deserving Indians from attending the course. In the ultimate
analysis, it would affect the quality of the Imperial Army, and may prove to be
their undoing in a major war. Everyone, including the Commandant, was stunned
by these remarks, and the audacity of the Indian officer. Subsequently,
the Commandant called Cariappa and advised him to broaden his views and
think in terms of the Army as a whole, rather than 'Indianisation,' which
showed a narrow vision.
After the
course, Cariappa asked for an appointment at the India House in London, or the
War Office, but this was not accepted. Instead of being
given a staff appointment, which he deserved, he posted back to his unit at Kohat in 1934, for a third tenure of regimental service on the North
West Frontier. It was two years before
he was posted as Staff Captain, in March 1936, to Deccan Area, in
Secunderabad. It was a non graded appointment, but Cariappa did not complain.
Finally, in 1938, he was promoted Major, and appointed DAA & QMG in the
same HQ. In 1939, when World War II started, he was posted as Brigade Major to
20 Indian Brigade, in Derajat.
While Cariappa was doing his staff
course, Nathu Singh was with the battalion in Peshawar. He again had a spat
with the British, over the issue of club membership. At that time, Indian officers were members of the officers mess, but
were not given membership of the club, which admitted only Europeans. This
created a peculiar situation, and a solution was found by making them honorary
members. In 1933, three Indian officers, who were honorary members of the
Peshawar Club, applied for permanent membership, and were black balled. When
Nathu Singh heard about it, he was furious. He had already resigned his
honorary membership earlier, and he now advised other Indian officers to do the
same. As a result, all Indians resigned en masse. When the Club President wrote to him, to reconsider his decision,
offering to renew his honorary membership, Nathu Singh declined. Soon afterwards, a dinner was held in the club, to celebrate the
satisfactory conclusion of the Mohmand operations, for which Nathu was later "Mentioned in Dispatches".
He decided to boycott the dinner, and other Indian officers did the same.
There was an uproar. His CO, Lt Col. V.R. Munton, who
was on leave in
England, wrote to Nathu Singh on 16 November 1933:
“…..But
I do feel it was a damned silly thing not to go to the dinner. A regiment is
rather a sacred thing, if you work it out & it is hallowed by a hundred odd
years of tradition & blood. To let it down merely to vent a private
grievance sounds very petty. You probably didn't mean it as such but it savours
of non-cooperation - & the latter in the Army is absolutely disaster. To
take up the attitude of a "die-hard" isn't going to do much good.
Quite apart from the fact that at the next show the Bn. will probably be left
behind, your own military career may be affected. A successful staff officer
has to show tact & sympathy, & be prepared to advance to a half-way
line."
On his return from England, Colonel
Munton went into the affair. He found that it was some British officers who had
done the mischief, and not Nathu Singh. Of course, he had declined to attend
the dinner, but this was in reaction to the black balling of the three Indian
officers. In fact, by standing up for his Indian colleagues, Nathu Singh gained
the respect of several British officers, who felt that the club rules were
unfair.
In 1934, 1/7 Rajputs moved to
Secunderabad. Like Cariappa, Nathu Singh also wished to apply for the Staff
College. More than ambition, he was spurred by burning desire to prove to the
British that he was better than they thought him to be. For three years, he was
denied the recommendation to compete for the examination, on the grounds that
he lacked experience. Naturally, he was livid with rage, especially as several
other officers, junior to him, were granted permission. However, there was
little he could do, but wait. Then, a new CO took over, and in 1935, Nathu
Singh was given the necessary recommendation. He appeared in the entrance
examination, and not only qualified, but secured a competitive vacancy. In
fact, he secured 915 marks out of 1000 in the Strategy paper, a record which was
never surpassed. The fact that he had done so, without any guidance or
coaching, was noticed, and commended by his CO.
At Quetta, one of his instructors was
B.L. Montgomery, who later achieved fame as the victor of El Alamien. 'Monty'
was greatly impressed by Nathu's sharp mind, and grasp of tactical problems,
and predicted that he would go far in the profession. He was known for his anti
Indian bias, and held a poor opinion of Indians, and their intellectual
capabilities. Once, he is said to have remarked "I do not like things Indian", drawing a prompt retort
from Nathu Singh, "then what are you
doing here, Sir?"
After successfully completing the
course at the Staff College, Quetta, in 1937, Nathu Singh was posted as Staff
Captain of the Naushera Brigade. After the outbreak of World War II, he was promoted Major, and
appointed Brigade Major of the same brigade. He was on excellent terms with his
first brigade commander, Brigadier Nye, who later became Vice Chief of Imperial
General Staff. However, he was at logger heads with Nye's successor, due to his
views supporting the stand of the Congress Party. In 1942, he was packed off to
Imphal, as GSO 2 (Chemical Warfare), of IV British Corps. He was mainly
concerned with the evacuation of refugees, who poured into India, as a result
of the Japanese invasion of Burma. He literally saved thousands of refugees
from certain death, and his contribution was acknowledged when he was
transferred to 2/7 Rajput, as the second-in-command.
By now, Nathu Singh had put in
almost twenty years service, and should have been promoted to Lieutenant
Colonel, and given command of a battalion. However, his promotion was delayed
by almost a year, and he remained the second-in-command. This was probably due
to his pro nationalist stance. During the Quit India movement in 1942, he was
asked to suppress an agitation. He placed a picket on the route of the rally,
but persuaded the Congress leaders, who were known to him, to take another
route. Next day, the CO again asked him to do the same. Nathu Singh objected,
saying that it was not fair to ask him to shoot at his own countrymen, who were
only asking for their freedom. He requested the CO to give the job to some
other officer, but this was refused, and he was told that if he disobeyed
orders he would be court martialled. Nathu Singh refused to carry out the
orders, and the matter was reported to the District Commander, Major General
Bruce Scott. When he was marched up to General Scott, Nathu Singh defended his
action, as a 'concientous objector', quoting the example of similar cases in
Ireland. To his good luck, Scott turned out to be an Irishman. He appreciated
the stand taken by Nathu Singh, and let him off.
In October 1943, Nathu Singh was
promoted and given command of 9/7 Rajput, at Chhindwara. When he took over the battalion, it had been
graded 'unfit for war', after having been mauled by the Japanese in Burma.
Nathu Singh set to work like a man possessed, and within a few months, had
turned it round. He was full of energy and determination, and his hard work
paid off. During the next inspection, the Brigade Commander could find little
fault, and the battalion was graded 'fit for war'. In fact, it was graded as
the best battalion in the division, and Major General 'Tiger' Curtis, GOC 14
Indian Division, congratulated them at a parade, in front of the entire
division.
Shortly afterwards, Nathu Singh was transferred
to 3 Maratha Light Infantry, in Italy. Command of a battalion in action would
entitle him to quick promotion, and he would probably get a chance to command a
brigade in field, and become the first Indian to do so. But Nathu Singh wanted
command of his own battalion, and nothing else. He appealed to the C-in-C,
General Auchinleck, under whom he had served in the NWFP, and who had become
his mentor. The Auk promptly had his transfer orders rescinded, and Nathu Singh
assumed command of 1/7 Rajput on in September 1944. When World War II ended, he
was commanding the battalion, in the Andamans, and accepted the formal
surrender of Japanese troops in the Andaman and Nicobar islands on behalf of
the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia. It was from Andamans that he wrote
the famous letter to Auchinleck protesting against the INA trials. Running into
eight pages, and couched in the strongest language, it brings out his anger,
and anguish, at the unfairness of the trials, and its repercussions. As an
example of courage, and candour, it has few equals.
In his letter, dated 17 December
1945, Nathu enclosed a Note, which bore the heading REPERCUSSIONS OF THE I.N.A.
TRIALS ON THE MINDS OF AN INDIAN IN THE ARMY. Listing the main reasons which led to the formation of the
INA, he felt that these factors, put together, led to grave doubts whether the
British were serious about Indianisation, or it was merely 'window dressing,'
to impress the public and the outside World. Though two and a half million
Indians had fought in two wars, they had not been able to produce a single
General. Important appointments dealing with operations were denied to them,
and just a handful were given command of units. Drawing a parallel with the
Soviet Union, which took shape at about the same time as Indianisation began in
India, the disparities were obvious. However, his most scathing comments were
reserved for the unfair treatment meted out to Indians, which he covers at
length. Nathu Singh wrote:
"..... The creation and
growth of the INA was a direct result of the continuous unjust treatment of
Indian officers in the Army. It is the natural heritage of years of
dissatisfaction, disappointment and disgust of various elements in the Indian
Army. The present members of the INA are to be blamed for their conduct, but
equally to blame is the Imperialist Anti-Indian British element in the army who
by their talk and action daily estranged the otherwise loyal mind of the
Indian, and last but not the least to blame are the British reverses in the Far
East, which left the Indian soldier to their fate.
Time is critical, and at this juncture, large issues are
at stake. Momentous decisions have to be made, and on them will depend the
future Indo-British relations. The previous services of those in the INA who
actually fought for the British till they were captured by the enemy deserve
lenient treatment. Wisdom and foresight suggest that the crimes of the members
of the INA be condoned."
One can only marvel at the brashness
of a Lieutenant Colonel, addressing the C-in-C, on such a sensitive political
issue. No less surprising is the Auk's response. Far from taking offence, he
realised that the feelings expressed by Nathu Singh stemmed from nationalistic
fervour, rather than a rebellious disposition. He not only chose to ignore the
fact that the writer had disobeyed orders, in addressing the C-in-C directly,
but replied, in his own hand. He could sense the anguish in the heart of Nathu
Singh, and could empathise with him. However, he felt disturbed and hurt at the
bitterness in Nathu Singh's letter, and admonished him, much as a school master
would his favourite pupil. Written in a human vein, the letter brings out the
Auk's deep attachment to the Indian Army, and his fondness for his Indian
subordinate.
Marked 'Personal and Private', the
Auk's hand written letter of 19 February 1946, reads:
"....I know that many of the views
expressed by you are based on fact. All the same, I do feel that you are wrong
to dwell so much on past mistakes and bitterness and I know that many of your
opinions are exaggerated and unfair. I say I know this and it grieves me to think that you, whom I regard as an old
friend, should deliberately rake up old errors and misunderstandings......You
are one of the people on whom I had hoped to rely....I was deeply disturbed and
I may say, disappointed by the general attitude of mind expressed in your note,
but I still hope that it does not represent your permanent frame of mind, as
this would cause me sorrow.....Needless to say you have my assurance that this
matter is private between us. Your note will not be seen by anyone else and it
will not have the slightest effect on your official standing, so far as I am
concerned, because I realise that you would not have written as you did had you
not had full trust in my good faith and friendship for you.....I do value your
having written to me as freely and openly as you did..."
As mentioned before, Cariappa was
Brigade Major of to 20 Indian Brigade, in Derajat when World War II started in
1939. In January 1941, he was posted as DAQMG of 10 Indian Division, which was
then in Iraq. The GOC was 'Bill' Slim, and he was overjoyed when Cariappa
joined his staff in Baghdad. Cariappa spent the next one year in Iraq, Iran,
Syria, and in North Africa. In March
1942, he was posted as second-in-command of 7 Rajput Machine Gun Battalion, a
new raising, at Fatehgarh. In April 1942, he was promoted Lieutenant Colonel
and appointed the Commanding Officer, becoming the first Indian to command a
battalion in the Indian Army.
Cariappa's battalion comprised
Muslims and Rajputs, in the ranks. Among officers, two thirds were British, and
one third Indian. The unit was equipped with Vickers machine guns, which
required considerable skill in handling. After three months, the unit was
redesignated as 52 Rajput, and moved to Lahore, as part of 43 Indian Armoured Division. It was converted
into an Armoured Corps unit, and its machine guns were replaced by tanks. But
within two months, they were reverted to Infantry, redesignated as 17/7 Rajput,
and moved to Secunderabad. With two conversions, and two moves within as many
months, the unit and the CO were not only confused, but tired, and breathed a
sigh of relief when they reached Secunderabad.
In April 1943, Cariappa was posted to
HQ Eastern Command as AQMG. He thus missed the opportunity to lead his
battalion in battle, and could not earn a decoration. He shared this misfortune with Nathu Singh, who also
did not get any award, having declined command of a battalion other than his
own. In August 1943, the South East Asia Command was formed, and the Fourteenth
Army was placed under its command. There were several changes, and Cariappa
volunteered to serve in an active formation. He was posted as AQMG, 26 Indian
Division, then located near Buthidaung, in Burma. It was a staff job, but at
least it was on the battle front. Cariappa did an excellent job, and was
awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE), for his services.
In November 1944, Cariappa was
promoted to the rank of Brigadier. However, instead of being given command of a
brigade, which he expected and deserved, he was posted as a member of the
Reorganisation Committee. Cariappa protested to the Military Secretary, but to
no avail. After about a year on the Reorganisation Committee, he was finally
given command the Bannu Frontier Brigade, in Waziristan in November 1945.
In February 1946, Cariappa was
appointed Presiding Officer of one of
the General Courts Martial constituted to try members of the INA. Before the
trial, he visited some of the detention camps, where the prisoners were lodged.
He found them full of rancour and
hatred against the British, for treating them badly, and holding them without
trial. Cariappa was pained by their plight, and wrote to the Adjutant General,
requesting him to expedite the trials. He also recommended that some of them,
such as Shah Nawaz Khan, G.S. Dhillon, and P.K. Sehgal, should be pardoned. It
would be fair to assume that the British decision to let off most of the prisoners
was prompted as much by the impassioned pleas of soldiers, such as Cariappa and
Nathu Singh, as it was by the strong reaction from the general public and the
political leaders.
Soon
after his famous letter to Auchinleck written from the Andamans, Nathu Singh
was promoted Colonel and posted as
Deputy Director, Personnel Services, in the Adjutant General's Branch in Army
HQ, which was then at Meerut. Very soon, he had differences with the Director,
Brigadier Duke, which necessitated the transfer of one of them. Under normal circumstances, Nathu Singh
should have been moved out, but the Auk decided to post out Brigadier Duke
instead, and Nathu Singh was promoted Brigadier and appointed Director in his
place. Nathu Singh pleaded with the C-in-C to transfer him, instead of
Brigadier Duke, but he did not agree. When the Auk came to know about his
differences with Brigadier Duke, he called Nathu Singh to Delhi, and made him
stay in his own house. He even took him to England, to enable him to study the
selection procedure for officers in the British Army. When the time came for
Nathu Singh to return to Meerut, he asked the ADC for the bill, for the drinks
he had, while staying in the C-in-C's house (This was later renamed as Teen
Murti, and became the Prime Minister's House, in Nehru's time). The ADC told
him to talk to the C-in-C himself, which he did. The Auk said: "Don't
be silly, Nathu. You are my guest." To this Nathu Singh
replied: "Sir, I wish I had known this earlier. I would have had a few more
drinks."
Soon after becoming the Director,
Nathu Singh submitted a paper on the reorganisation of the Army, and its
officer cadre, which was approved by Auchinleck. A training school was
immediately started at Yol, for emergency commissioned officers (ECOs), so that
they could be granted permanent regular commission (PRC). This helped about 4,000
ECOs to get absorbed in the regular Army, as ICOs. It was at this time that he was offered the
post of the C-in-C, after Independence. Sardar Baldev Singh was then the
Defence Minister of the Interim Government. At a tea party held at his house,
Baldev Singh conveyed this to Nathu Singh, in the presence of several other
leaders, including the premiers of Punjab and the North West Frontier Province.
He followed it up with a letter, on 22 November, 1946, addressed to Nathu
Singh:
Your letter of 21st November
has reached me. You have been selected and earmarked to be the First C-in-C of
India, with Command over the three Defence Services. This decision has been
arrived at, after the Muslim League joined the 'Interim Government', and with
the consent of all the Political Parties comprising the Government. It is on
the recommendation of the present C-in-C, and with the approval of the Governor
General, the Viceroy, and may be the HMG. The approval of the officers senior
to you does not arise.
The letter goes on to address several other issues raised by Nathu Singh,
such as acceleration of nationalisation, integration of the three Defence
Services, 'Dominion Status' for the country, and the appointment of an Indian
as the next Governor General, after Lord Wavell. Baldev Singh also made it
clear that after the 'Transfer of Power', the
C-in-C would be working under the Ministry of Defence. Nathu Singh is said
to have declined the offer, since he felt that Cariappa was senior, and the
appointment should rightfully go to him. However, the next letter from Nathu
Singh contains no reference to this offer of promotion. Instead, it deals with
a very important subject - the partition of India. Dated 24 November 1946, it
reads:.
".....In our case,
unless we remain within the Commonwealth maybe for a short period of a year or
two, it is clear to me that by the Cabinet Mission's latest suggestion of
groupings into zones, they may have may have made sure of cutting the country
into three pieces and controlling India, the subcontinent, as they have no
doubt they will play havoc with us. To put them in their place, I know Pandit
Nehru, and through him, the Congress are trying to do so. But please beware
lest India is broken up by bolstering the Muslim League and other communal
forces - Sikhs demand for Khalistan, the Princes bid for Federation and
encouraging Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir becoming independent by joining
hands with other reactionaries...."
The Defence Minister replied, on 27 November
1946:
"Your
letter of 24th has reached me, its contents are much appreciated by Pt Jawahar
Lalji, Sardar Patel, and my other colleagues of the Executive Council, including
the members of the Muslim League....I know you are keeping yourself well out of
the present constantly changing political developments, much influenced by the
British Imperialists in combination with Mr. Jinnah and other leaders, and I
expect of you to keep a special eye on the various communities that are being
tapped and influenced by them.....I understand you are preparing a paper on
acceleration of Nationalisation.....I would much like to discuss this very
vital matter with you before you finalise your proposals for the consideration
of the Gopalaswamy Nationalisation Committee."
Nathu Singh and Sarojini Naidu had given evidence before the Skeen
Committee on the same day, and they had become quite close to each other.
Sarojini Naidu insisted that Nathu Singh should call her 'Mah' (Mother), and
that is the way she signed her letters to him. The two often corresponded, and
at this juncture, he wrote to her, about the problems facing the Country, and
nationalisation of the Army. Sarojini Naidu responded, on 9 January 1947, and
wrote:
"Dear Nathoo Singh,
Many Thanks for sending me
your very illuminating 'Shot in the dark'. It gives a correct picture of the
situation from every angle.
.....As the security of the
country depends entirely upon the Army, the army should not be based on what
the country can afford to have for its defence. It will be fatal to rely on a
small armed force, however efficient and modernly equipped it may be; because
our country is vulnerable, bristling with traitors and the fifth columnists, in
millions in every part of India. We all know the character and honesty of our
potential enemies and so called friends.
Our leaders should get
advice from us Indians in the army and other branches..... and not repeat not
from hirelings, who have their own axes to grind;....
One thing more, probably you
have noticed but have not mentioned; is how the army is at a disadvantage
because of that 'steel frame', who wants to have the last word in everything
pertaining to the Army. That steel frame must go.
Once again, many thanks for
sending me the most illuminating 'Shot in the Dark.'
Yours
Mah
In February 1947, Nathu Singh was
called to give evidence before the Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee. The
Committee was set up in November 1946, and consisted of Sir Gopalaswamy
Ayyangar (Chairman), Pandit Hriday Nath Kunzru, Muhammad Ismail Khan, Sardar
Sampuran Singh, Major General D.A.L. Wade, Brigadier K.S. Thimayya, Wing
Commander Mehr Singh and Commander H.M.S. Choudri as members, with Lieut
Colonel B.M. Kaul as Secretary. Auchinleck had indicated that out of 22,000
officers in the Indian Army, only 8,500 were Indians, with most of them being
ECOs, with very little service or experience. If the Indian Army were to be
nationalised immediately, officers with less than nine years service would be
commanding battalions. While this could be acceptable in war, it would do
incalculable harm if resorted to in peace, where officers needed to have
judgement, wisdom, patience and a knowledge of human nature, which could only
be acquired by experience. He warned against the dangers of entrusting the
command of the Army to officers who lacked experience, especially in the
prevailing circumstances, when disruptive forces were swaying public opinion.
Nathu Singh was in Meerut, when he
received a questionnaire, which covered several aspects of the problem. He
wrote a personal letter to Thimayya, who was member of the Committee, on 8
February 1947, in which he suggested that each issue should first be discussed
'in house' by the Army, before Indian officers give evidence. Unless this was
done, the Committee may arrive at wrong conclusions, since most officers lacked
knowledge and experience, and did not have at their disposal the necessary data
to arrive at valid conclusions. He felt that "Each problem should be
thrashed out by experienced Indian officers selected by the Nationalisation
Committee, prior to the matter coming up before them. It is in this manner that
the Committee will be able to get well considered opinions for their final
recommendations."
When Nathu Singh appeared before the
Committee, the date for transfer of power had been announced as June 1948, by
the British Prime Minister. He suggested that by that date, Indians should be in
full control of the Army, and if this was to be achieved, they must begin to
hold responsible positions straight away. He strongly refuted the Committee's
suggestion of a Military Mission, to continue after transfer of power, and
recommended advisers, who would be responsible to the Indian Government instead
of the War Office, as would happen in case of a Military Mission. He also
objected to the concept of keeping Indian officers as apprentices or under
studies, for important appointments, and felt that they should be deputies
instead, so that they had authority as well as responsibility. When asked about
the partition of the Army, in case power was transferred to more than one
State, Nathu Singh stated that he would hate to do that. In fact, he said that
it is not possible to split up the army. He closed by saying, "I suggest
that Indians should be consulted in all future planning at A.F.H.Q. This has
not been done in the past. We are going to be holding the baby soon. We must be
taken into confidence."
The Armed Forces Nationalisation
Committee submitted its report on 12 May 1947. However, by this time the date
of transfer of power had been advanced to 15 August 1947, and the Committee's
recommendations became redundant. Nathu
Singh again wrote to the Defence
Minister on 31 May 1947, after reading his broadcast, about Partition. By this
time, he had been transferred to Derajat Force, in Dera Ismail Khan. He wrote
to Sardar Baldev Singh:
"...I was amazed and shocked to read
your broadcast in the paper at the possibility of a division of the defence
services. As an Indian I hate it. My conception is that to partition India
would be equivalent of committing rape of our Motherland and to partition the
defence services means nothing short of civil war within a few years
time......You will play an important part in the final shape of things to come.
What about your collecting a selected number of senior officers from all
classes and communities from the services and forcing down the throat of
uncompromising political leaders, the wisdom of a united India staying within
the Empire...."
The Defence Minister replied, on 12
June 1947:
" .....I entirely agree with you that
the division of India would be equivalent to committing rape of our Motherland
and the division of the Defence Forces will have a serious effect on the
Military. If in case there is no other solution to our political problem except
the division of the country, then division of the Army is inevitable, and this
is what I have stated in my statement...I have noted your suggestion about certain officers. We
have at present a number of problems facing us and we will need the help of
senior Indian officers, but the final decision will have to be taken after the
Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab have given their verdict about partition of
the Provinces."
Nathu Singh's correspondence with
Sardar Baldev clearly brings out his concern for the unity and integrity of
India. He was of the opinion that the British deliberately partitioned India,
to make it weak, even hoping that it would be 'ungovernable', and force the
warring factions to ask them to extend their stay in the Colony. He felt that
the Armed Forces, being unaffected by the virus of religion and communalism,
were capable of holding the country together, and partition could have been
avoided. He never forgave Nehru and the other leaders for their failure to
consult the Armed Forces, or take them
into confidence, before taking the decision to accept partition. At this time,
Nathu Singh was posted on the North West Frontier, from where he could do
little but write letters. Also, he was only a Brigadier, and though the most
voluble of the KCIOs, he was not the senior among them. Had this been the case,
perhaps he could have influenced matters, and events may have taken a different
turn. It is pertinent to note that in January 1947, Cariappa had been sent to
the Imperial Defence College, in UK, from where he was recalled only in July,
and was thus absent at a very crucial juncture, when the fate of the Indian
Army was being decided.
Cariappa was sent to UK, to attend
the Imperial Defence College, along with J.N. Chaudhuri, who was only a
Colonel. This was the first time Indian officers had been sent on this
prestigious course, and was the result of the foresight of Auchinleck, who knew
that the British would be leaving India soon, and appreciated the necessity of
training Indian officers to fill senior appointments in the Government and the
Army. Cariappa's old commander, and mentor, Bill Slim, was the Commandant of
the Imperial Defence College. He saw Cariappa as the future C-in-C of the
Indian Army, and often invited him for discussions on the situation then
unfolding in the sub continent. During this time, there was a lot of talk of
India, and the Indian Army, being divided.
Cariappa, realising the dangers of dividing the Army, and the lack of
experience of officers at senior levels, made a statement that it would take at
least five years before the Indian Army could stand on its feet, without the
help of British officers. This was picked up by the press, and caused a furore in India. Liaquat Ali Khan, of the Muslim League, felt that Cariappa's
intentions, in keeping an undivided Army, were suspect, and took up the issue
with Mountbatten. Cariappa was summoned to India House, in London, where Lord
Ismay, Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, was present. Cariappa clarified that he
had made the suggestion only because he felt that an undivided Army could help
the two newly independent nations in getting over their teething problems. He
was admonished, told to knock the idea out of his mind, and not to mention it
again. In a telegram to Mountbatten, on 4 May 1947, Ismay wrote: "It
is hard to know whether Cariappa in putting forward his idea was ingenious and
ignorant or disingenuous and dangerous, or both."
Cariappa took the advice, and did
not talk about it again. However, he was not the only one who felt this way.
Nathu Singh had already taken up this matter with the Defence Minister, Sardar
Baldev Singh, several months earlier. Cariappa could not complete the course,
as he was recalled in July, to supervise the reorganisation of the Army, before
Partition. Immediately on his return, he wrote to Nehru, making another fervent
appeal to prevent the division of the Army. Nehru's reply was non committal. On
one occasion, he collared Jinnah at a social function, and told him
categorically that if the Army was split, both India and Pakistan would be
vulnerable to outside attack. Jinnah laughed it off, saying that if this
happened, both countries would get together and face the enemy.
On 15 August 1947, the day India became
independent, Cariappa was promoted Major General, and appointed Deputy Chief of
General Staff, at Army HQ. The Indian Army was partitioned also, and there was
considerable wrangling and heart burning over the division of regiments,
military establishments, and weaponry. In November 1947, he took over as
GOC-in-C Eastern Command, relieving Lt. Gen. Sir Francis Tuker. He remained at Ranchi
for just over a month. As the Kashmir situation worsened, he was moved to
replace Lt. Gen. Dudley Russel, who resigned as GOC-in-C, Delhi and East Punjab
(DEP) Command, which was then located at Delhi. Cariappa renamed it as Western
Command and moved his own HQ to Jammu.
Cariappa had some of his finest hours
during the Kashmir operations. Operation KIPPER, for the capture of Naushera
and Jhangar, was planned by him, and succeeded. This was followed by Operation
EASY, for the link up with Punch, and Operation
BISON, for the capture of Zojila, Dras and Kargil. If he had been given
additional troops, and the necessary permission, he would have succeeded in
pushing the Pakistanis out of Kashmir, for which plans had been made.
Unfortunately, this did not come about, due to the intervention of the United
Nations, after an appeal by India. Characteristically, Nehru took the decision
to appeal to the UN Security Council without consulting the Armed Forces.
The UN Security Council adopted a
resolution on 21 April 1948, calling for a cease fire, a plebiscite, and the
appointment of a commission. Both India and Pakistan rejected the resolution,
but agreed to receive the commission. The United Nations Commission for India
and Pakistan (UNCIP) was then formed. The UNCIP adopted a resolution, asking
both countries to agree to a cease fire, and conclude a truce agreement, for
further consultations for a plebiscite. India accepted this resolution, while
Pakistan refused.
On 6 July 1948, Army HQ issued instructions
that no major operations were to be undertaken without their sanction. Cariappa
was told to concentrate on stabilising the existing positions, and not to
expect any additional troops, as none could be spared, keeping in mind the
Hyderabad operations, and overall
situation in the country. Cariappa protested that such a defensive
policy would be harmful, since the enemy was on the offensive in Tithwal,
Punch, and Hajipir pass. There was a threat to Leh, and if this fell, Kargil
could be reinforced, posing a serious threat to the Kashmir valley. He pleaded
for continuing the offensive operations, for the capture of Kargil, Domel
and Mirpur, and asked for two additional
brigades. With great reluctance, he was given permission only for the advance
to Kargil, and allotted a brigade for the task. To make matters worse, the
Indian Air Force was forbidden to attack installations near the border, to
avoid reports from the UNCIP.
Considering the restrictions placed
on him by his own Government, and the lack of support in terms of troops, it is
indeed commendable that Cariappa succeeded in achieving what he did. Due to
political considerations, a defensive policy was imposed on the Army. As a
result, India lost several key objectives, in Uri and Tithwal sectors. Since
the road to Ladakh could not be opened till Zojila, Dras and Kargil were
captured, Cariappa decided to do so, on his own. In disobeying orders, which
forbade all offensive operations, he took a grave risk. But had he not done so,
Ladakh may not have been part of India today. As it happened, these key
objectives were captured, after a brilliant manoeuvre, including the use of tanks, for the first time, at such altitudes. The
country owes an eternal debt to Cariappa for the risks he took. If he had failed,
it would have ended his career.
When India achieved Independence,
Nathu Singh was in command of the Derajat Force, at Dera Ismail Khan. Thanks to
his penchant for disagreeing with his British superiors, he was transferred, in
quick succession, to Kamptee Sub Area and then to the refugee camp at
Kurukshetra. After a visit to the camp Edwina Mountbatten was so impressed that
she told Nathu Singh: "You must be a genius." Shortly afterwards,
when Mahatma Gandhi visited the camp, they had a discussion about non violence.
Nathu Singh asked the Mahatma how he expected his principles of non violence to
work, in the existing circumstances. He also asked: "In 1921, you had said
that we would achieve independence in one year. What happened? You had said,
division of the country over my dead body. And the country has been
divided." Gandhiji had no answer.
Very soon, Nathu Singh was promoted Major
General, and appointed GOC Deccan Area, where he was involved in the planning
of the Hyderabad operations, which took place later. While he was there, he was
called to Delhi, to attend a briefing, so that he could take over command of
the operations in Jammu and Kashmir, which had already commenced. Due to some
reason, he could not reach Delhi in time, and Brigadier Kalwant Singh, who was
then Director of Operations at Army HQ and familiar with the situation, was
promoted and appointed GOC JAK Force. When Nathu Singh reached Delhi, he went
to the Operations Room, and came to know of this development. After studying
the situation, he went to meet the Prime Minister, which was then a normal
practice, for senior Army officers.
When he reached the Prime Minister's
house, he found him sitting on the lawn, talking to some ministers, and
civilian officials. Presently, Nehru got up and went inside. The others present
there asked Nathu Singh for his views, on the best way to deal with the crisis,
in Kashmir. Nathu Singh replied that if he had his way, he would use the
minimum troops, to hold the passes, and with maximum force, attack and capture
Lahore. This would force Pakistan to withdraw, and vacate all occupied
territory in Jammu and Kashmir. The civilians were impressed by the logic of
this argument, and when Nehru returned, they told him that the General had a
plan to throw out the invaders. When Nehru asked him to repeat what he had
said, Nathu Singh demurred, saying that he would rather not, since he knew it
would not find favour. But Nehru insisted, and Nathu repeated what he had told
the others. Nehru became angry, and said that a responsible senior officer like
him should not have thought of such a foolhardy scheme, which could cause an
international crisis. It is interesting to recall that in 1965, a similar plan
was approved by Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was then the Prime Minister, and it
was the threat to Lahore which saved Kashmir, from Pakistani aggression.
In December 1947, Nathu Singh was
posted to Lucknow, as GOC UP Area. Sarojini Naidu, who had been appointed
Governor of the United Provinces after Independence, was also in Lucknow. Apart
from being a well known patriot and freedom fighter, she was a renowned
poetess, and known as "The Nightingale of India." She was very close
to Mahatma Gandhi and other Congress leaders, and had played a prominent part
in the struggle for freedom. Nathu Singh discussed with her the problems of
India's security, and the Armed Forces. He had put down his views in a paper
called 'Notes on National Security', and he gave her a copy. She forwarded them
to Nehru, who was the Prime Minister, and prevailed on him to through them.
Nehru's comments on the Note make interesting reading. In a hand written note,
dated 1 January 1948, he wrote:
".....It is axiomatic
that India must be strong militarily etc or otherwise she will not only not
progress but might break up. How best to build up strength in various sectors
is a question of balancing resources....
..... Strength, and even purely military strength, depends today far
more than before, on our industrial growth & scientific research. It
depends also on internal cohesion and peace in industry etc. This latter is a
political & economic problem of exceeding complexity and cannot be dealt
with simply by military or police methods.
.....The whole question of defence is intimately tied up with
international questions as well as economic questions. The Notes (of General
Nathu Singh) though they refer to international matters do not show an intimate
knowledge of the international set-up or economic questions which are of vital
importance today both internally and externally.
......No British officer
will be in operational command in the Indian Army after 31.3.1948.
.....Some of the lines of approach in these notes are arguable.
They may land us in difficulties. But generally Major General Nathu Singh's
notes are helpful and it is desirable that urgent thought should be given to
these matters by our senior officers and those in control of the political
destinies of the nation.
(Signed)
J. Nehru 1//1/48"
The divergence of views between
Nehru and Nathu Singh are obvious. The ideals, so dear to Nehru's heart, and
his consciousness of the international role which he saw for India, are also
evident. However, one cannot but help remark that he also appears to
pontificate, much as a school master would on a student's essay, submitted for
evaluation. His remarks about Nathu Singh's ignorance of international matters
are ungracious, when one recalls that having been in office for just five
months, he himself had little experience, as Nathu Singh was to subsequently
remind him. He was also out, by almost a year, in his assertion about British
officers not being in command after 31 March 1948.
Nathu Singh's tenure in Lucknow was
short, but eventful. He had to put down two mutinies, at Allahabad and Jhansi,
which were nipped in the bud, and did not affect the rest of the Army. During
this time, he also had an unfortunate misunderstanding with Nehru, concerning
his absence at a parade held at Lucknow. Though he had known Nehru for several
years, their relations soured, and were never cordial after this. In January
1948, soon after taking charge, he had written an Appreciation on the Defence
of India, and forwarded it to Army HQ. He was greatly perturbed by a directive
issued from the office of the C-in-C, which sought to reduce the size of the
Regular Army to 150,000 - during World War II, it had risen to 2.5 million
- with an annual budget allocation of 45
crore rupees (a crore is ten million), for the next three years.
In the preamble, he wrote:
"We as soldiers must approach our leaders and submit
our minimum requirements and make it clear that if funds are not provided for
such a force, the responsibility will be upon them. A soldier is but a servant
of the State. He must however, point out any weaknesses in the defensive
structure of the country with all the emphasis at his command. In order to
arrive at a correct appreciation, we must consider both military and allied
factors and not be swayed by any notions of idealism or allow political
considerations to affect our judgement.....
A NEWLY CREATED NATION WHICH
HAS ONLY JUST THROWN OFF HER BONDAGE OF FOREIGN RULE OF 200 YEARS AND MORE
CANNOT RISK A REVERSE ALMOST AT HER REBIRTH.
.....We must NOT decide on
the size of our Defence Service on what we can financially afford but on what
we need in the form of a Modern Defence based on the following considerations
:-
(a) What is the strength and armament of present and potential
enemies of India?
(b) What is the force required by India to meet this threat
(c) What will be the cost of maintaining such a force?
(d) What is the maximum amount the country can afford to pay for
its Defence Forces?
(e) To arrive at a compromise between (b), (c) and (d0 above,
consistent with the safety of our land.
Keeping the above in view,
the Land Forces which India should maintain are given in the enclosed
appreciation. They are only my first thoughts."
Nathu Singh proceeded to list out
the frame work of the Indian Army, for the future. By present standards, he was
extremely conservative - he asked for one corps headquarters, one armoured
division, two infantry divisions, one parachute brigade, one armoured brigade,
and the associated complement of Artillery, Engineers and Signals. The number
of infantry battalions was only 28. However, he advocated a large complement of
territorial army, which would provide the second line of defence, and boost the
resources of the regular army, during war.
In April 1948, he was promoted Lieut General,
and appointed GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, at Ranchi. Like many other Indian
officers, he had risen from the rank of Lieut Colonel to Lieut General, in less
than three years. He continued his efforts to convince the political and
military leadership of the necessity of maintaining a strong Army. When asked
for a run down of the Army, by Army HQ, he replied, on 24 October 1950 :-
"....The situation facing the country
from the military point of view is today virtually the same if not worse
because, although Pakistan outwardly appears to be fraternising with our
country, recent speeches of their leaders leave no room for doubt that they are
preparing for a show-down with our country over the KASHMIR issue.
.....Communist China's complete success over the KUOMINTANG and the
establishment of the Peoples' Government, their recent activities, their
declared policy towards liberation of Tibet, and the recent Mission from the
latter country clearly indicate the writing on the wall. The Communist menace is gradually spreading towards the very borders
of India.
.....To ensure the security of our borders and our State, the
Defence service ratio between INDIA
and PAKISTAN should be two to one
. If this is reduced, we will be laying our country open to an ever present
danger of a major war."
Nathu Singh's remarks, especially
with reference to Pakistan and China, display an insight of international
affairs which very few Indians had, at that time. Even Nehru, who orchestrated
India's foreign policy for almost two decades following Independence, failed to
grasp the nuances which Nathu Singh had perceived. As a result, the Defence
Forces were neglected, with disastrous results in 1962. Nathu Singh cried
himself hoarse, trying to convince the political and military leadership of the
need of maintaining a strong Army. An intimate knowledge of military affairs is
important for those who decide the fate of peoples, and nations. Among his
contemporaries, such as Churchill, Stalin, Chiang Kai Shek, Roosevelt, Eisenhower,
Tito, and Nasser, Nehru was one of the few who had never worn an uniform.
Soon after Independence, the Prime
Minister held a conference of senior Army officers, to elicit their views
regarding keeping British officers for some more time, as advisors. Nehru felt
that Indian officers lacked the experience to take over the responsibility for
such a large Army, and wanted to retain British officers for a longer period,
as Pakistan had done. Almost everyone agreed with Nehru, except for Nathu
Singh. He said: " Officers sitting here have more than 25 years service, and are
capable of holding senior appointments in the Armed Forces. As for experience,
if I may ask you Sir, what experience do you have to hold the post of Prime
Minister?" There was a stunned silence, and Nehru did
not reply. Finally, it was decided to keep the British advisors for some more
time, as proposed by Nehru.
2030,
17 sep 2010
On
15 January 1949, Cariappa succeeded General Roy Bucher, as Chief of Army Staff
and Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army. In fact, Cariappa was the third choice for
the job, and got it only after the other two Army Commanders, Nathu Singh
and Rajendra Sinhji, declined the offer,
in deference to Cariappa, who was senior to both of them. When Cariappa became
Chief, he was 13 days short of his 49th birthday. After almost 200 years of
British rule, an Indian had finally assumed command of the Indian Army, and to
mark this historic occasion, 15 January became the official Army Day, in India.
Cariappa served as
Commander-in-Chief for four years, retiring on 14 January 1953. His greatest
achievement was keeping the Indian Army apolitical, and establishing healthy
traditions. Unlike Pakistan and Burma, which achieved independence from British
rule at about the same time, the Indian Army has stayed out of politics, even
during times of crisis. Most of the credit for this must go to Cariappa. In
fact, he refused to take back INA personnel, primarily for this reason, since
he was convinced that they would bring politics into the Army. There was a lot
of pressure on him for this, and Nehru relented only after Cariappa threatened
to resign on this issue. However, he adopted the slogan 'Jai Hind', used by the
INA, and ended all his talks with this. 'Jai Hind' soon became the Indian
Army's slogan as well as form of greeting, between men and officers.
Though he was a staunch 'Rajput', he
never did anything to favour his own regiment. In fact, just before he retired,
Major (later Colonel) Mustasad Ahmed, the Centre Adjutant, went to Delhi to get
the new regimental headgear approved. Cariappa called him over for lunch, and
while they were talking, Mustasad blurted out; "Sir, now that you are
laying down the office, we feel that you have not done anything special for the
regiment." Cariappa smiled, and remarked, "So that is what you
all think". Fifteen years later, in 1968, they met again in Delhi.
Mustasad mentioned that with the Chief being a gunner, the Artillery was now
getting the best foreign assignments. Cariappa immediately retorted; "You
remember, you once told me that I have not done anything special for the
regiment. If I had, people would be saying the same about me."
In 1951, he visited the Rajput Regimental
Centre to present the Cariappa Banner, which was awarded to the best training
company of the year. There was a doubt whether the banner should be escorted,
on parade, like the Colours. The Centre Commandant, Colonel Guman Singh, did
not believe in polite gestures, and after consulting the orders on the subject,
decided that the banner was not entitled to an escort. When Cariappa arrived on parade, and saw that the banner named
after him was not being properly escorted, he went crimson with rage. The
initial blast was borne by Lieut General Nathu Singh, who was GOC-in-C Eastern
Command. He in turn gave a dressing down to the Adjutant, Major Mustasad Ahmed,
who could do little else than look at the Centre Commandant, who happened to be
the Army Commander's son-in-law. Without batting an eye lid, Guman Singh told
the Chief that he had read the rules carefully, and the banner was not entitled
to an escort. Cariappa immediately cooled down, and became his charming
self.
Like Nathu Singh, Cariappa also had his
brushes with Nehru. He had foreseen the Chinese threat, and wanted to defend
the border more effectively. In May 1951, he presented an outline plan for the
defence of the North East Frontier Agency. Nehru dismissed his plans, adding
that it was not the business of the C-in-C to tell the Prime Minister how to
defend the country. He advised Cariappa to only worry about Pakistan and
Kashmir; as far as NEFA was concerned, the Chinese themselves would defend our
frontiers! Cariappa was terribly hurt, but like a good soldier, accepted the
rebuke from the Prime Minister. In later years, he realised his mistake. If he
had persisted, and corrected Nehru's fantasies with more forceful arguments and
facts, perhaps the debacle of 1962 would not have taken place.
Cariappa was a meticulous host, as
well as a guest. Even after his retirement, when he lived alone, he entered his
own drawing room fully dressed. Once when he was the Chief, Lieut General
Thakur Nathu Singh, then Army Commander of Eastern Command, was a house guest.
Nathu Singh wanted to pull Cariappa's leg. So he put on a 'kurta' and 'pyjama',
and sat in the drawing room. When Cariappa entered the room some time later, he
immediately ticked off Nathu Singh, who replied that what he was wearing was
the national dress, and Cariappa had better get used to it.
One quality that Nathu Singh and Cariappa
shared was uprightness. There can be no better illustration of Cariappa's
sterling character, than that concerning his son, Nanda Cariappa, a fighter
pilot who was shot down in Pakistan, during the 1965 War (Nanda rose to be an
Air Marshal, and retired as AOC-in-C, South Western Air Command). Field Marshal
Ayub Khan sent a message to Cariappa that his son was safe and would be well
looked after. He also offered to release him, if Cariappa desired. Cariappa
replied, "I will ask no favour for my son, which I cannot secure for
every soldier of the Indian Army. Look after all of them. They are all my
sons."
Cariappa's love and affection for the Indian 'Jawan' was well known. He
often said," Our Jawans are absolute gems." After his
retirement, when he moved to Roshanara, his house in Mercara, he had a statue
of a Jawan kept on his mantlepiece, next to a photograph of his father.
Cariappa started his day by paying obeisance to both. He never accepted any
criticism of the Indian Army, or the Jawan, and was quick to rise to their
defence. He once filed defamation charges against a newspaper which carried
derogatory remarks about the Indian Army. When the Editor apologised, and retracted
the remarks, Cariappa withdrew the suit.
Though Cariappa was a strict
disciplinarian, he also had a great sense of humour, and could be extremely
charming and full of fun. One such incident was described by Harjit Malik, in a 'middle', entitled THE
GENERAL DANCED, in the Times of India, of 3 June 1993. When Cariappa was the
Chief, he went on a visit to France, where the ambassador, H.S. Malik, asked
him to stay at the embassy. When he heard that the French celebrate the
Quatorze Juillet by dancing on the streets, he expressed a desire to join the
celebrations. There was great consternation, in the embassy as well as his
staff, but Cariappa was firm.
Accompanied by the Maliks and their daughter, Harjit, the General proceeded to the Latin Quarter,
and the party luckily found an empty table at one of the pavement cafes.
Cariappa sat for a while, erect as a ramrod, looking at the thousands of
Parisiennes, dancing with gay abandon, or locked in embrace, oblivious of the
World around. Then the music, and the atmosphere, became too much, and he got
up, and asked Harjit for a dance. And soon, people saw a sedate old gentleman,
impeccably dressed, with a young girl on his arm, dancing the foxtrot, in a
crowd of long haired and scantily dressed bohemians.
Soon after his retirement, Cariappa
was offered the job of Indian High Commissioner in Australia, by the Prime
Minister, Pandit Nehru. After some deliberation, he accepted, and sailed for
Sydney in July 1953. His niece, Sagari, volunteered to go with him, and keep
house. When Cariappa arrived at Canberra, the Governor General, Field Marshal
Slim, broke protocol, and called on Cariappa at his residence, even before he
had presented his credentials.
His stay in Australia was eventful, and
soon everyone was talking of the Indian High Commissioner. During one of his trips, he saw a war memorial,
which was not being looked after, and surrounded by bushes. Cariappa stopped
his car, walked up to the memorial, and began clearing the growth with his own
hands. Soon, a crowd had collected. The incident was widely reported in the
Press, and the Australians felt ashamed that a foreigner had to show them how
to respect their martyrs.
On another occasion, when Cariappa was
going to attend a function organised by ex servicemen, his car broke down.
Cariappa took a lift in a truck. During the journey, the truck driver asked him
who he was. When Cariappa replied that he was the Indian High Commissioner, the
driver laughed and said, "In that case I am the King of Nepal."
When they reached their destination, Cariappa thanked the driver, saying,"
Thank you, Your Majesty." The driver, seeing his hosts, realised that
he had indeed been travelling with the Indian High Commissioner, and apologised.
Cariappa's tenure in Australia was
not without controversy. Once, he made certain remarks about Australia's white
migrants policy, which favoured immigration of white races only. This created a
furore in the Press, and there were demands for his recall, for interfering in
the domestic affairs of another country. But Cariappa remained unfazed. He knew
that he was right, and his views had many supporters. Ultimately, the
Australian Government was forced to review its immigration policy, and make it
more liberal.
Cariappa returned to India in 1956, and
retired to his house, Roshanara, in Mercara, in Coorg. But he continued to take
a keen interest in all matters concerning the Army. When the Chinese attacked
India in 1962, he went to the local recruiting office, and offered to enlist,
as a soldier. In 1965, after the cease fire, he expressed a desire to visit the
troops, on the front. During his visit to 17 Rajput, the battalion he had
raised in 1942, the troops raised their war cry, after he had spoken to them.
The Pakistani battalion commander on the other side was agitated, and asked his
men to man the trenches. He then registered a strong protest. When he was told
the reason for the war cry, he immediately came across, saluted Cariappa, and
requested him to come over, so that his men could also have a glimpse of the
legendary General.
Though Cariappa had been C-in-C of
the Indian Army for four years, he was only 53 years old when he retired.
Today, the Chief retires at 60. Not only Cariappa, but several other senior
officers had very short tenures. Nathu Singh retired at the age of 51, and
Thimayya and Thorat at 55. This was one of the biggest blunders of the Nehru
Government, which insisted on keeping British officers after Independence, on
the grounds that Indian officers lacked experience. At the same time, it
allowed its most experienced officers, such as Cariappa, Nathu Singh, Thimayya
and Thorat to retire, at a very young age. In the event, the Nation was deprived
of their services when it needed them most. When the Chinese attacked India in
1962, both Thimayya and Thorat had spent just a year out of uniform. Who knows,
if they had been still serving, the Nation would have been spared the
humiliation it suffered.
The welfare of ex servicemen always
remained Cariappa's prime concern. In 1964, he founded the Indian Ex
Servicemens League (IESL), by amalgamating the Federation and the Association,
which were rival organisations, often working at cross purposes. He was also
responsible for creation of the Directorate of Resettlement. In 1957, he took
up cudgels on behalf of Major General
Tara Singh Bal, who had been unjustly retired by the Government, and had him
reinstated. Keeping the IESL free from politics was one of his major
achievements.
Cariappa also had made a brief foray
into politics, in early 1971. Convinced that the country could not be governed
by the present system of elections, he recommended that the general elections
scheduled in 1971 be cancelled, and President's rule be imposed for a few
years, keeping the Constitution in suspended animation. Political parties were
to be abolished, and Martial Law imposed in disturbed States. Once the
situation had stabilised, elections could be held, with just two or three
parties, as in UK or USA. As was expected, there was a violent reaction from
all political parties, and Y.B. Chavan, the Home Minister, denounced in
Parliament the call for 'Army Rule by an ex C-in-C'. Cariappa wrote an angry
letter to Chavan, berating him for misleading the House, and demanded an
apology, which never came.
A number of his friends and admirers
had been trying to persuade him to join politics and stand for elections, so
that he could contribute to the Nation's development. After deep reflection, he
agreed, and decided to contest foe the Lok Sabha seat from the North East
Bombay. Lieut General S.P.P. Thorat, and several other retired officers came
forward to assist him in his campaign, in addition to several well known
industrialists and the erstwhile Maharaja of Mysore. Cariappa declined to join
any political party, and stood as an independent candidate. Unfortunately, two
of his opponents were V.K. Krishna Menon and Acharya J.B. Kripalani, both
veterans and political heavy weights. Cariappa, though widely respected, was a
novice in the rough and tumble world of politics. He refused to use money or
muscle, to get votes, and in his campaign speeches, talked of honour, integrity
and probity, which seemed unintelligible to his audiences. Most of them came to
his meetings with a sense of amusement, and laughed at his 'fauji Hindustani',
which few in Bombay could comprehend. Not surprisingly, he lost, and came a
poor third, behind his two seasoned opponents, who had several decades of
experience, backed by the resources of their respective political parties.
Apart from lack of experience, he went wrong in the choice of his constituency.
If he had stood from his native Coorg, perhaps he would have won.
In 1986, the Government decided to
appoint him a Field Marshal. Technically, a Field Marshal never retires, and
therefore, retired officers cannot be given this rank. However, the decision
stemmed from the deep sense of respect and esteem in which Cariappa was held,
by all sections of Indian society. Cariappa graciously accepted the honour. On
28 April 1986, at a Special Investiture Ceremony held at Rashtrapati Bhawan, he
was presented the Field Marshal's baton by President Zail Singh. In deference
to his age - he was 86 - he was offered a chair, while the citation was being
read out. True to his character, Cariappa declined the offer, and stood ramrod
straight, throughout the ceremony.
After 1991, Cariappa's health
deteriorated. He was suffering from arthritis, and a weak heart, and needed constant medical
attention. He was shifted to a cottage, in the Command Hospital, at Bangalore.
The end came on 15 May 1994. Cariappa died in his sleep, peacefully. Two days
later, his mortal remains were cremated at his ancestral home at Madikeri, in
Coorg. The cremation had all the ceremony and pomp which befitted a Field
Marshal, and the three Service Chiefs, along with Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw,
were in attendance, when his son Nanda Cariappa lit the funeral pyre, and the
buglers sounded the Last Post, with the Honour Guard reversing arms. Many of
the mourners, including some soldiers in uniform, had tears in their eyes, as
they bade farewell to the man who had always treated them like his sons, and
whom they called the 'Father of the Indian Army'.
Kipper is no more. But if the adage
about old soldiers never dying, but fading away, was ever true, it was in his
case. He had become a living legend, even before he rose to the highest
military rank. Every man has faults, and perhaps Cariappa too had some. But
they are hard to find. Even those who did not openly adore him respected him,
grudgingly. He had the strongest character and sense of values, qualities that
are hard to come by today. Although a strict disciplinarian, he was always just
and fair, and even those who felt the rough end of his stick vouch for this.
The Indian nation owes him an eternal debt, for his contributions, which are
too numerous to recount. Of course, if Cariappa had been alive, and told this,
he would have said that he only did what he felt was his duty. Though
anglicised in habits and behaviour, he was a patriot and kept the interest of
his country always uppermost, followed by that of the soldier. Every Indian
Army officer is reminded of the immortal words of Field Marshal Lord Chetwode,
as he takes the Final Step, and passes out, from the Indian Military Academy.
" The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and
every time; the honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next;
your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time." One of the few who followed it, in letter and
spirit, was K.M. Cariappa.
25 Oct 2010
