VIGNETTES FROM 1947-48
By
Maj
Gen VK Singh
Introduction
The
years 1947-48 were perhaps the most turbulent in India’s history. There was
widespread jubilation when the country became free after 200 years of British
rule. The joy of liberty was blighted by Partition, which resulted in a mass
migration of hundreds of thousands of people across the newly created borders,
accompanied by terrible atrocities. Barely two months after Independence, the
nation’s armed forces were called upon to repel an invasion in the State of
Jammu and Kashmir, becoming embroiled in a war that lasted well over a year and
a conflict that continues even today. The history of those turbulent times has
been documented by many historians. However, many stories remain untold, hidden
in documents that are not seen by the general public. The vignettes recounted
in this article have been collated from various sources, some hitherto
unpublished.
The
Sacking of Mirpur
One
of the saddest events of the Jammu & Kashmir operations in 1947-48 concerns
Mirpur, which was sacked by the Pathans after being evacuated by
the State Force garrison on 26 November 1947. Mirpur could have been
saved – it was just a day’s march from Jhangar, which 50 Para Brigade had occupied
on 19 November. Brigadier YS Paranjape, Commander 50 Para Brigade wanted to do
exactly this, but was ordered to proceed to Kotli instead. Why did Major
General Kalwant Singh, GOC JAK Division, decide to forsake Mirpur, against the
advice of his subordinate as well as his superior? More important, why did the
Mirpur garrison, comprising 600 troops, pull out without a fight? A much
smaller force at Skardu withstood sustained attacks for six months. Punch was
besieged for a year before it was relieved. Was it poor leadership, or the
fighting quality of the troops that made the difference? Probably
both played a part. Colonel Puran Singh, the commander of the Mirpur garrison,
was not made of the same mettle as Brigadier Pritam Singh and Lieutenant
Colonel Sher Jung Thapa. Also, Mirpur was garrisoned entirely by State Force
troops, while Punch and Skardu both had a fair number of regular Indian Army
soldiers.
On
13 November 1947, elements of 50 Para Brigade consisting of 1 Patiala and a
troop of 7 Light Cavalry had reached Akhnur. On 16 November Major
General Kalwant Singh, GOC JAK Division, issued orders for the relief of
Naushera, Jhangar, Mirpur, Kotli and Punch. According to his plan,
50 Para Brigade was to relieve Naushera by 16th, Jhangar by 17th,
Kotli by 18th, and Mirpur by 20th November. Another
column from Uri, consisting of two battalions of 161 Infantry Brigade under
Brigadier LP Sen, was to move on the Uri-Punch axis on 16 November, reaching
Punch the same day.
The
plan was ambitious and had several flaws. The officiating C-in-C, Lieutenant
General FRR Bucher, felt that the advance of two columns was 'positively
dangerous', and the despatch of a column from Uri to Punch, with the enemy
still in position, was 'almost foolhardy'. Brigadier YS Paranjape, Commander 50
Para Brigade, had several objections. Apart from the dates being unrealistic,
he felt that after establishing a firm base at Jhangar, Mirpur should be
relieved first, so that the advance to Kotli was not interfered with by the
raiders. Both his battalions, 1 Punjab and 3 Rajput were below strength, with
350 to 400 men in each. However, he was over ruled by the GOC and the
operations commenced on 16 November 1947.1
Naushera
was occupied on 18 November, after a brief engagement. Paranjape had just three
companies with him, and wanted to wait till the rest of the column fetched up.
However, Kalwant ordered him to continue and capture Kotli. The advance was
resumed on 19 November and Jhangar occupied the same day. From Jhangar, two
roads forked out, one leading to Mirpur, and the other to Kotli. Paranjape was
in favour of relieving Mirpur before going for Kotli, so that his flank was
secure. However, Kalwant did not agree and ordered him to head for Kotli. The advance
from Jhangar was resumed on 20 November and Kotli was relieved only on 26
November, after negotiating 47 road blocks. By this time the fate of Mirpur had
been sealed - it was torched by the raiders the same day. About 400 soldiers
and 10,000 refugees managed to escape, and reached Jhangar. The Pathans killed
several hundred soldiers and civilians, capturing hundreds of women who were
taken away as war booty. Many of them were sold for 150 rupees after being
paraded naked through the streets of Jhelum by the exultant Pathan
tribesmen.
On
27 November, the day after it had been relieved, Kalwant ordered Paranjape to
fall back on Jhangar. This was accomplished on 28 November. Soon after this,
Brigadier Paranjape was hospitalised, and Brigadier Mohd. Usman took over
command of 50 Para Brigade. If Kalwant's decision to rush to Kotli without
securing his open flank by securing Mirpur was surprising, even stranger was
his decision to fall back to Jhangar, immediately after its capture. In the
event, Mirpur was lost. Why was Kalwant in such a tearing hurry to reach Kotli?
It is said that the wife of one of Maharaja Hari Singh's ADCs, who was rumoured
to be one of his many mistresses, lived in Kotli. Reportedly, a large treasure
belonging to the Kashmir State was also kept in Kotli. Was Kalwant’s haste to
relieve Kotli attributable to these two factors, rather than tactical reasons?
The lady and the treasure were probably saved, but the lives of several
thousand men and the honour of several hundred women were lost. 2
Why was Mirpur evacuated even before it was attacked? The report
submitted by the garrison commander, Colonel Puran Singh, states:
‘The original Mirpur Grn consisted of 600 S.F tps approx 12,000
non-Muslims. On the night 25/26 Nov, the enemy with a force of approx 3 Bns
attacked on all sides, sp by Mtn Arty. Own cas due to shelling were 50 to 100
killed. The cas among the refugees amounted to approx 100 to 1000. The refugees
were pouring into the mil camp and it was decided to withdraw. The camp site
with the tents and army vehs incl the dead were left, lest any suspicion should
be raised. About 500 OR and the refugees withdrew Eastwards after last it on 26
Nov through the mountains and not by rd. The party was attacked en route
once during the night; own cas estimated were 30 IOR and 500 refugees.
Eventually approx 400 IORs and 10,000 Civ got back to Jhangar safely. The rear
gd of 100 IORs and 1000 refugees have not yet reached. (this rear gd with
refugees is reported to be hiding in the jungles at Puna 15 miles South West of
Jhangar)’.3
The story
of the sack of Mirpur is best told by one of the survivors. Given below
are extracts from the statement of Mr. Inder Singh Bali, son of Sardar
Tehil Singh, State Jagirdar and Chief of the Punjab, aged 24 years,
of Mirpur proper:-.
“On
25th Nov 1947 our town (Mirpur) was bombarded and what looked
like canon and mortar fire was opened on the town resulting in the complete
blowing up of the roofs of the houses and causing lots of casualties among the
civilians. The state troops did not put tough fight and the raiders occupied
the town at 2 pm and set the entire town on fire. There were about 350 men of
the state troops in the town itself and had placed pqts around the town and
about 200 men were in the Cantt. When the posn became hopeless the troops in
the town decided to surrender and run away and placed themselves in touch with
the Offr commanding in the Cantt, and with the concerted action of troops both
in the town and the Cantt, the civilians from the town managed to reach the
Cantt.
Out
of our party about 300 girls were forcibly taken away and when we reached
Thatala camp we heard from the Hindus that had already reached there that their
500 girls had also been taken away. At Thatala we found that not less than
2,000 Pathans all with 303 rifles were present.
The
concentration at Thatala swelled up to about 5000. Here again the Pathans
sorted out young girls and carried them away. Thatala is about 15 miles from
Jhelum city. Among these Offrs there were one Lt Col, one Capt and a few JCOs
and men in all numbering 50. These officers and men were not wearing Regtl
Signs. All these offers and men were wearing black caps and from their uniform
I would see that they belonged to the Punjab Regt. We spent two nights at this
camp. Out of the raiders three men who belonged to my town and were very
well-known to me took pity on me and managed to deliver me at Jhelum camp (at
the house of Lt. Avtar Narain) after they had relieved me of all my belongings.
I am the only survivor from Mirpur.”4
The
Abduction and Sale of Captured Women
The
two major incentives for the tribesmen who invaded Jammu & Kashmir in 1947
were money and women. Instances of rape and looting occurred at almost all
towns and villages that came in the way of the tribal lashkars,
including Uri, Baramula, Rajauri and Mirpur. However, Mirpur seems to have come
in for special attention, its fall being accompanied by the town being set on
fire and the abduction of a large number of women who were sold like cattle in
Jhelum and other towns. This engaged the attention of the highest in the land,
including Prime Minister Nehru, who took up the matter with the authorities in
Pakistan almost on a daily basis. In a telegram dated 1 December 1947, shortly
after the fall of Mirpur, he wrote:
For
Prime Minister, Pakistan, from Prime Minister, India.
I have also been informed that 3,000 abducted Hindu women have
been brought to Gujarat from the Bhimbar area and they are being sold like
cattle at Rs. 150 each. I am asking an Offr on the staff of the Deputy High
Commissioner at Lahore to go personally to make enquiries to Gujarat district
and I hope you will ask West Punjab Govt to give him all facilities.5
The next
day, on 2 December 1947, the Prime Minister sent another telegram:
For Mr.
Liaquat Ali Khan from Jawaharlal Nehru.
I have
recd info that Mirpur town has been completely destroyed and out of 13,000 (half
of 26,000) non – Muslims only 2,000 (half of 4,000) have reached within 15
miles of Jhelum. The fate of these refugees as well as of about 3,000 (half of
6,000) from the rest of Mirpur area is not known, but there are reports that
large numbers of abducted Hindu women have been brought into Jhelum district by
Pathans. The Pathans are causing panic among non-Muslims refugee pockets in
that district are firing indiscriminately and shot dead a Mahratta soldier the
other day.
I am
gravely concerned about the fate of the non-Muslims pockets in Jhelum district
and of the Hindu refugees in particular the abducted women who have been
brought from Jammu by the raiders. I shall be grateful if you will give all
facilities to our MEO org to evacuate them to India.6
The very
next day, i.e. 3 December 1947, Nehru sent yet another telegram to Pakistan:
I
have been drawing your attention to large concentrations of tribesmen and
others in West Punjab near the border of Kashmir State and to the abduction of large
numbers of women from Kashmir who are being offered for sale in West Punjab….7
The
report of the sale of abducted girls in Jhelum is corroborated from several
other sources. An extract from a report forwarded by a civil intelligence officer
of the Government of India in Pakistan says:
In
Jhelum no Hindu except our staff is left. The district liaison officer, who has
to depend either on the information received from the high district officials
or from some of his Muslim friends reports that in Jhelum girls abducted from
Mirpur side are sold in Jhelum city at Rs 20/- each. The local police refuse to
interfere on the ground that the girls were not removed from the Punjab and
also they express their helplessness because of the attitude of the armed
Pathans possessing these girls.8
The Capture of Zoji La
The
capture of Zoji La in November 1948 was a spectacular feat of Indian arms,
paving the way for the relief of Leh. Though innovative use of armour and bold
leadership were the decisive factors in the battle, the state of morale of the
enemy also played a part. It was reported that in the Ladakh Valley the enemy
morale was very low on account of shortage of rations, clothing and the fast
approaching winter. About 400 body guards of the Mehtar of Chitral in Skardu
refused to go to Leh, and the matter was reported to Burhan-ud-Din in Gilgit
for necessary action by Mata-ul-Mulk. Burhan-Ud-Din not only berated
his nephew Mata-ul-Mulk, but told him that he would be reaching Skardu shortly
to sort out the matter. (Burhan-ud-Din was the brother and Mata-ul-Mulk the son
of the Mehtar of Chitral).
The
low state of morale of the enemy is obvious from intercepted messages that were
exchanged between enemy commanders. One such message from the enemy commander
at Dras – Zoji La to the Supreme Commander at Gilgit is given below:
“FROM JAMIL (XOB) TO GEORGE (QLC) RPT JAL (.) A 174 (.) SECRET
(.) REF YOUR D 255 (.) MY MEN ARE UNDER FED AND UNDER CLOTHED (.) FOR DAYS THEY
GO WITHOUT FOOD (.) BELIEVE ME THEY WILL NOT SIT IF AFTER FORTNIGHT ON THE
HIGHEST PEAKS OF ZOJILA IF NOTHING WILL BE DONE FOR THEIR RATIONS AND CLOTHING
SINCE NOW (.) RATIONS AND CLOTHING SO FAR RECEIVED FROM AS TO REAR USUAL TO
NOTHING FOR A C D WINGS (.) TPS HAVE FRANKLY TOLD US THAT THEY WILL NOT WORK IF
THEY WILL NOT BE PROPERLY FED AND CLOTHED (.) PLEASE REALISE THE COMING WINTER
HIGHEST PEAKS OF ZOJILA AND SEND RATIONS AND CLOTHING OTHERWISE IT WILL BE TOO
DIFFICULT FOR US TO MAKE OUR MEN TO FIGHT (.)”9
An
intercepted message from Burhan-ud-Din to Mata-ul-Mulk not only brings out the
deteriorating relations between them but gives an indication of the extent of
involvement of the Government of Pakistan in the operations. (Shortly after
this, Burhan-ud-Din himself took over from Mata-ul-Mulk).
“FROM QLC TO XOD (.) S – 89 (.) SECRET (.) FOLLOWING FROM NASIM
IN REPLY TO YOUR ….. TO END VERY DISAPOINT AFTER ALL THAT I HAVE DONE FOR YOU
AND YOUR MEN (.) IS ONLY FOR ME THAT YOU HAVE NOT BEEN SENT UNDER ESCORT TO
CHITRAL IN SPITE OF GOVERNOR NWFPS INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT (.) WHAT EVER
MEN DO WILL REFLECT ON YOU (.) WARN YOU NOT TO GET YOUR SELF IN TROUBLE AND
RUIN THE MEN ALSO (.) ISLAM IS IN DANGER (.) YOUR RECALLING OF YOUR MEN FROM
NUBRA HIGHLY ENRAGED ALL PAK OFFICIALS (.) DEFENCE SECRETARY ESPECIALLY COMING
FOR PURPOSE OF LOOKING INTO YOUR CONDUCT (.) SEND SOME ONE AND HAVE IMMEDIATELY
THEM RECALLED (.) THEY SHOULD GET BACK BY FORCED MARCHES (.) I WILL REACH
(.)” 10
Nehru and Zoji La
The
first prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a Kashmiri. His attachment
to the land of his forbears is well known. What is not known is his extensive
knowledge of the terrain in Kashmir and the interest he took in operational
matters. By inclination, he was adventurous and fond of the outdoors. He had
trekked extensively in the hills of Kashmir, Himachal, Garhwal and Kumaon and
is said to have spent his honeymoon in a travellers’ hut at Baltal. It was no
surprise that he took a special interest in the plans being made by Thimayya
and Cariappa to capture Zoji La. This is brought out by the two letters
reproduced below, one from SS Khera, the Commissioner at Meerut, addressed to
Nehru and the other from Nehru to Major General Kalwant Singh, who had recently
moved to Delhi as the CGS. Significantly, Nehru wrote to the CGS and not the
C-in-C, who was then a British officer. 11
_________________________________________________________________
DO No
200/L&OG
Commissioner’s
OFFICE, MEERUT
July
8, 1948
Dear JAWAHAR Lal Ji
1. I
take the liberty of sending this bit of information in case it is of any use.
2. In
the MAHCHHOI area beyond the ZOJILA there are certain rather obscure routes
which have been traversed either by me or to my knowledge within the last three
or four years. I have marked them on the attached Map. The
routes in each case are difficult and not possible for animals, but men with
loads can traverse them. The one from the telegraph hut just beyond
the high point of the ZOJILA pass is fairly easy and gives access to the head
of the AMARNATH valley and so down towards BALTAL and also through PANCH-TARNI
towards SHESHNAG. The snag about this route is that unless
care is taken to keep right under the shoulder of the AMARNATH peak, the party
will find itself on the edge of impracticable precipices. There is
another route which goes up the long nala between MAHCHHOI and
MATAYAN. It is a long nala about ten miles to the head, with many
bends and apparently leads nowhere; but there is a way over the top down into
the PANCH-TARNI plain.
3. Both
these routes provide access between PAHALGAM and the MAHCHHOI-MATAYAN area.
4. There
are other routes over the ridge of the main HIMALAYAN Range between ZOJILA and
NUN-KUN, but these are fairly obvious and well known.
5. Incidentally,
as I have trekked a fair deal over the area between the ROHTANG pass at the
head of KULU valley and the SASERLA which is about 60 miles NORTH OF LEH, and
also in the ZASKAR valley from its head down through DRAS to the ZOJILA, I
would be happy to answer any questions, although of course probably our Army
know all the answers themselves by now.
Kind
regards,
Yours
sincerely,
Sd/-x-x-x
(SS KHERA)
_____________________________________________________________
PRIME
MINISTER
INDIA NEW
DELHI
JULY
10, 1948
My dear
KALWANT SINGH,
I am
sending you a letter I have received from the Commissioner of MEERUT Division,
also a map which he has sent me.
I might
mention that in 1916 I crossed the ZOJILA, went to MATAYAN, and then tried to
go to AMARNATH cave from MATAYAN across the high mountains. We
climbed some glaciers, reached the top of a huge ice field and were only about
3 or 4 miles from AMARNATH cave. It started snowing then which made
it very difficult to cross the crevasses. Indeed I slipped into one
and had to be pulled out by the rope which was tied around me. So I
did not succeed in reaching AMARNATH and had to come back to MATAYAN.
I rather
doubt if we can take much advantage of these difficult mountain routes which
KHERA has pointed out. But if you wish to enquire further into this
matter, please write to KHERA or even ask him to come up here for a day.
Yours
sincerely
Sd/-x-x-x-x
(JAWAHARLAL NEHRU)
Major General
KALWANT SINGH
Chief of
the General Staff
Army
Headquarters,
New Delhi
______________________________________________________________
The
two letters along with the map were sent the very next day to HQ Western
Command with copies endorsed to the Director of Military Intelligence. It not
known whether the maps were found useful or the services of SS Khera were
utilised in the plan for the capture of Zoji La. However, they bring
out the personal interest that our first Prime Minister took in matters
military. Soon after Zoji la was captured, Nehru visited Kashmir to personally
congratulate the troops who had taken part in the operation. Exactly a year
earlier, he had visited Kashmir immediately after the recapture of Baramula
accompanied by Indira Gandhi.
Endnotes
1. SN
Prasad SN and Dharam Pal, History of the Operations in Jammu &
Kashmir (1947-48), History Division, Ministry of Defence,
New Delhi, 1987. pp.52-55
2. Maj.
Gen. V.K. Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve
Soldiers, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 160-62.
3. Appendix
to J& K Division Intelligence Summary (ISUM) of 5 December 1947, Document
No. 601/14172/H/I, History Division, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi.
4. White
Paper on Kashmir, Government of India, 26 Feb 1948, New Delhi. History
Division, MOD, File No 601/14189/H, p.47
5. White
Paper on Kashmir, p. 67
6. White
Paper on Kashmir, p. 55
7. White
Paper on Kashmir, p. 115
8. Appendix
‘A’ to J& K Division Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No.2 of 20 January 1948,
Document No. 601/14172/H/I, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.
9. Appendix
‘A’ to HQ Western Command Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No. 43 for the period 29
Aug to 08 Sep 1948, Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New
Delhi.
10. Appendix
‘B’ to HQ Western Command Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No. 43 for the period 29
Aug to 08 Sep 1948, Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.
11. HQ
Western Command Intelligence Summary (ISUM) for the period Jun to Sep 1948,
Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.
(Published
in the USI Journal)
No comments:
Post a Comment