THE SOLDIER’S CONTRIBUTION TO INDIA’S INDEPENDENCE
By
Maj Gen VK Singh
The role of the Indian
Armed Forces in the struggle for freedom from British rule has never been
documented, acknowledged or appreciated by the public. The Sepoy Mutiny of
1857, now known as the First War of Independence, was quelled, but the spirit
of nationalism that it kindled could not be extinguished. A number of smaller
mutinies and revolts took place during the next 90 years, many of which
politically motivated and inspired by a spirit of nationalism. By the time
World War II ended, the Indian soldier had become a true nationalist. The
nationalistic feeling that had entered the heart of the Indian soldier caused
alarm among the British rulers. Apart
from loss of prestige, the British were reluctant to leave India for strategic
reasons. However, once they realised that they could no longer count on the
Indian Army to maintain control over India, they had no alternative except to
quit. Had the Indian Armed Forces remained staunch, there is little doubt that
British rule would have continued for at least another 10 to 15 years.
While
the Indian Mutiny in 1857 was to an extent inspired by the desire to be free of
British rule, the concept of nationalism among took root only after the birth
of the Congress at the turn of the century and flowered only after the Civil
Disobedience movement in 1930 and the Quit India movement in 1942. During World
II and even earlier, many Indian soldiers with nationalistic feelings had
misgivings about military service under British rule. Nonetheless, they continued to serve for many
reasons. The primary role of the Indian Army was to defend India, and service
in the Army could not be termed as anti-national. Secondly, the political
leaders who were then heading the freedom struggle decided to support Britain
during the War, after being assured that India would be given dominion status
once it was over.
After
the end of World War II, the Labour party came to power in England. Churchill,
who always opposed any move to grant independence or even autonomy to India,
was no longer Prime Minister and the new government approved the suggestions of
the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, to hold elections for the central and provincial
assemblies, lift the ban on Congress organisations and release political
prisoners. In early 1946 there were cases of disaffection in the RIAF (Royal
Indian Air Force), the RIN (Royal Indian Navy) and the Signal Corps of the
Indian Army at Jubbulpore. In March the
Cabinet Mission led by Sir Stafford Cripps arrived in Delhi, to confer with the
principal political parties on the method of framing a constitution for a
self-governing, independent India. The
Viceroy was involved in the deliberations of the Cabinet Mission, but the
problem of the disaffection in the armed services caused him considerable
anxiety. In a dispatch addressed to King George VI on 22 March 1946, he wrote:
……The
most disturbing feature of all is that unrest is beginning to appear in some
units of the Indian Army; so far almost entirely in the technical arms.
Auchinleck thinks that the great mass of the Indian Army is still sound, and I
believe that this is so. It may not take long, however, to shake their
steadiness if the Congress and Muslim League determine to use the whole power
of propaganda at their command to do so. 1
On 27 March 1946 Sir J.A. Thorne,
the Home Member of the Viceroy’s Council, was asked to prepare a brief appreciation of what would happen if the
Cabinet Mission does not achieve a settlement. According to Thorne’s appreciation, the loyalty of the Services could no
longer be taken for granted. In the 1942 disturbances the Services were
nearly 100 percent staunch, but this would not be so on a future occasion. If
faced with the prospect of firing on mobs, not all units could be relied upon.
As regards the behaviour that could be expected of troops generally under these
circumstances, there would be a lot of disaffection, and downright mutiny,
especially in the RIAF, RIN and Signals units.
Thorne suggested that an appreciation on these aspects be prepared by
the War Department.2
The
C-in-C directed the DMI (Director of Military Intelligence), Brigadier B.P.T.
O’Brien, to assess the present state morale and degree of reliability of the
three Indian fighting services, with special reference to the I.C.O.s (Indian
Commissioned Officers), under three conditions – in aid of civil power in
widespread communal or ant-present-Government disturbances; in operations on
the Frontier; and as garrisons overseas. Extracts from the DMI’s Note submitted the
C-in-C on 25 April, are given below:- 3
….Our
views on the reliability of the Indian Services in widespread Congress inspired
trouble are
(a) The Indian Armoured
Corps, Gunners, Sappers and Infantry can in the main be depended on provided that their I.C.Os, particularly the senior
ones, remain loyal and any waverers among them are dealt with firmly and
immediately…
(b) The Indian Signal Corps
cannot at present be considered reliable….
(c) The Ancillary Services of the Army as a
whole should not be relied on to act
against rioters…
(d) The
Royal Indian Navy cannot at present be regarded as reliable….
(e) The
Royal Indian Air Force must be regarded as doubtful…
….the key to the reliability of
the Services, particularly the Army, is the attitude of the I.C.O. …the morale
of the I.C.O. can be greatly improved by the example and attitude of British
officers…
Auchinleck forwarded Brigadier O’Brien’s Note to the Viceroy and the
Cabinet Mission, giving copies to Army Commanders as well as the Chiefs of the R.I.N.
and the R.I.A.F. As can be imagined, it caused considerable dismay and
alarm in all quarters. Meanwhile, the Cabinet Mission requested the Viceroy for
an appreciation of the situation that was likely to arise if their proposals
fail and for a general policy on India in that event. In a Top Secret
Memorandum dated 30 May 1946, Wavell warned that if the Congress and Muslim
League failed to come to terms, serious communal riots may break out, with very
little warning, especially in the Punjab, UP and Bihar. Prompt action would be
required to deal with the trouble, with very little time for consultations with
London. He suggested that their actions should be based on certain definite
principles, the first being to give India self-government as quickly as
possible without disorder and chaos breaking out. Britain should avoid a
situation in which she had to withdraw from India under circumstance of
ignominy after wide spread riots and attacks on Europeans, or adopt a course
that could be treated as a policy of ‘scuttle’ or gave the appearance of
weakness. While deciding the short term
policy, the long-term strategic interests of Britain should be safeguarded. In the event of serious trouble, there was a
military plan, which provided for holding on to the principal ports – Calcutta,
Madras, Bombay, Karachi – and to Delhi. Subsequently, British troops would be
transferred from Southern India to the North. Stressing the need to avoid being
embroiled with both Hindus and Muslims, he suggested a ‘worst case’ solution –
to hand over the Hindu Provinces to the Congress and withdraw to the Muslim
Provinces in the North-West and North-East. 4
Three days later, the Cabinet
Mission and the Viceroy sent a ‘Most Immediate’ telegram to the Prime Minister,
stressing the urgent need for the British Government to announce a clear policy
in the event of the negotiations between the Cabinet Mission and the political
parties breaking down, which could happen any time between 5 and 15 June, and
the line of action that the Viceroy was to adopt. The first point to be decided
was whether they should attempt to repress a mass movement sponsored by the
Congress and maintain the existing form of government. This was possible only if
the Indian Army remained loyal, which was doubtful. It would also cause much
bloodshed and achieve nothing, unless it was intended to stay on in India for
another 10 to 20 years. At the other extreme was the decision to withdraw from
the whole of India as soon as the Congress gave a call for a mass uprising.
This would have an adverse impact on British prestige throughout Commonwealth.
After considering several options, the Cabinet Mission opined that if
negotiations did in fact break down and they were faced with serious internal
disorders, the situation would have to be met by adopting one of five courses.
These were (1) complete withdrawal from India as soon as possible; (2)
withdrawal by a certain date; (3) an appeal to the United Nations Organisation; (4) maintaining overall control throughout
India; and (5) giving independence to Southern and Central India, and
maintaining the existing position in North-West and North-East India. 5
The appreciations of the
Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission reached London while the latter were still
carrying out their negotiations in Delhi and Simla. They were considered by the
Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which asked the Chiefs of Staff to examine
the military implications of the five courses of action listed by the Cabinet
Mission, keeping in mind the short-term policy and the long-term strategic
interests listed by the Viceroy. The Report of the Chiefs of Staff, entitled
‘India – Military Implications of Proposed Courses of Action’, spelt out the
strategic requirements of Britain in India in any future war, emphasizing that
Britain should have recourse to India’s industrial and manpower potential, and
should be able to use her territory for operational and administrative bases,
and air staging posts. It was therefore important that India should be secure
from external aggression and internal disorder, and remain a single unit. These
were surprising assertions, considering that even at that moment, the Cabinet
Mission was in Delhi, discussing with Indian leaders the form of self
governance that was to be introduced!
Before examining the military
implications of the courses proposed by the Cabinet Mission, the Chiefs of
Staff eliminated the first three viz. withdrawal from India as soon as
possible; withdrawal by a certain date; and appeal to the UNO. That left only
two courses viz. maintaining control throughout India and a withdrawal in
phases, which they proceeded to examine.
The most important factor in retaining hold over the whole country was
the ability to maintain law and order, which depended largely on the loyalty of
the Indian armed forces. The conclusions on this crucial aspect were in line
with those of GHQ India.
‘....we consider that the reliability of the Indian Army as a whole,
including those in garrisons outside India is open to serious doubt. This
applies even to Gurkha units….The Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air
Force cannot be regarded as reliable’.
….A
policy of remaining in India and firmly accepting responsibility for law and
order would result, if the Indian Army remained loyal, in an acceptable military commitment and
would safeguard our long term strategic interests….If however, the Indian Armed
Forces did not remain loyal… we would be faced with the necessity of providing five British divisions for India, with the
consequent abandonment of commitments in other areas hitherto regarded as
inescapable, serious effects on our import and export programmes and world-wide
repercussions on the release scheme. The only alternative to this would be
ignominious withdrawal from the hole of India. 6
The Report by the Chiefs of Staff
clearly brings out the fact that the British Government was seriously
considering the option of creating Pakistan in June 1946, not because of the
lack of agreement with the political parties – this was still being negotiated
by the Cabinet Mission – but due to the threat of disaffection in the Indian
armed forces. This option was ruled out only because it did not serve British
strategic interests. Had the Indian armed forces remained loyal or there had
been enough British divisions to keep them in check, the British would never
had left India.
The crucial role of the Indian Armed
Forces, especially the Indian Army, in the British decision to quit India has
been commented on by several writers and historians. Captain Shahid Hamid, Private Secretary to General
Auchinleck, made the following entry in his diary on 30 March 1946: ‘Today the Hindustan Times commented editorially on the Auk’s appeal to
the Indian Army. “There is no doubt whatever that if the transfer of power is
not quickly brought about, the foreign rulers of India cannot count upon the
loyalty of the Indian Army…”7
The well known historian, Dr. Tara
Chand, has written: ‘The most
controversial measure of the Viceroy was the decision to advance the date of
transfer of power from June 1948 to August 15, 1947. On this issue Mountbatten
recorded his reasons in his conclusions appended to the Report on the Last
Viceroyalty submitted to His Majesty’s Government in September 1948. His
defence for expediting the transference of power to the Indians was on these
lines… “Secondly, the ultimate sanction
of law and order, namely, the Army, presented difficulties for use as an
instrument of government for maintenance of peace….’.8
It is interesting to reflect on the
course of history if the Indian soldier had not been affected by nationalistic
feelings and continued to serve loyally as he had during and before World War
II. Though the freedom movement had developed considerable momentum by the time
the war ended, the assumption that it would have achieved independence on its
own would be erroneous. With the vast resources at their disposal, it would not
have been difficult for the British authorities in India to muzzle the
movement, as they had done in 1930 and 1942. The only after deterrent after 1945
was the uncertain dependability of the Army. Had the Indian soldier remained
staunch, or adequate British forces been available, it is most unlikely that
freedom would have come in 1947. If nothing else, it would have been delayed by
10-15 years. If this had happened, perhaps India would not have been
partitioned, the Kashmir problem would not have existed, and the Indo-Pak wars
of 1948, 1965 and 1972 would not have been fought. With its large size,
population and a long spell of peace unfettered by the threat of war, India might
even have become a World power, equalling or even surpassing China by the turn
of the century.
Endnotes
1. Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, (ed.) The Transfer of Power 1942-47(12 vols, London) vi, pp. 1233-37.
2. Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of
Power, vii, p.150.
3. Mansergh
and Moon, The Transfer of Power,
vii, pp. 406-7.
4. Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of
Power, vii, pp. 731-7.
5. Mansergh and Moon, The Transfer of
Power, vii, pp. 787-95.
6. Mansergh and Moon , The
Transfer of Power, vii, pp.
889-900.
7. Major General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, (London, 1986),
p.47
8. Dr Tara Chand, History of the
Freedom Movement in India,
21
July 2010
(Published in
Salute)
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