THE 'psc' - GATEWAY TO THE GENERAL CADRE

The 'psc' - Gateway to the General Cadre

Maj Gen VK Singh

            What is the ‘General Cadre’? Is it the cadre of generals? Or is it some sort of exclusive club, whose membership is restricted to commanders? Can all officers join the General Cadre? If not, why? And if yes, how? These questions may appear silly and innocuous, but they are frequently asked, especially by the younger offic­ers, of ‘Other Arms’. In fact, the term ‘Other Arm’, though often used, does not officially exist - it is an indication of the caste system, which has come into being in the Indian Army, after Independence. Other manifestations of this virus are terms such as ‘Combat Arm’ and ‘Teeth Arm’. As if the others did not go into combat, or did not possess the means to masticate.

          In the British Indian Army, officers were granted ‘commissions’, and assigned to specific regiments, or corps. They remained on the strength of their parent regiments, upto and including the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. On promotion to the rank of Colonel, officers became part of the ‘General Cadre’, and were removed from the cadres of their regiments or corps. Except for lanyards, they were not permitted to wear regimental insignia or embellishments, such as black badges of rank, flash backings, crested buttons, and so on. Even in visiting cards and name boards, the abbrevia­tion IA, meaning Indian Army, replaced the names of their erst­while regiments. This was done with the specific purpose of ensuring that senior officers, in important command and staff appointments, could act impartially, and were not swayed by parochial considerations. The system applied to all officers, irrespective of their regiments and corps. However, an officer’s qualifications and experience was considered, while placing him in command and staff assignments, in the rank of Colonel and above.

          The above system remained in vogue in the Indian Army, after Independence. When the Regulations for the Army, based on the Queens Regulations, was revised in 1962, it mentioned five Arms, viz. Armoured Corps, Artillery, Engineers, Signals and Infantry, with all other Corps being classified as Services. This classifi­cation stands, even today, though some new Arms, such as Air Defence Artillery and Intelligence, have been added. Earlier, there were a number of differences between the service conditions of officers from the Arms and Services, the most important being the age of retirement. However, there was no distinction between officers of the Arms, in terms of service conditions, promotions, appointments, and retirement benefits.

          Though officers became a part of the General Cadre on attaining the rank of Colonel, their employment in specific appointments was decided by the Military Secretary, based on their qualifications and experience. The Armoured Corps, Artillery, Engineers and Signals had quite few ‘specified’ appointments, in the rank of Colonel, which could be filled by officers of these Arms. However, there were very few ‘specified’ appointments for the Infantry, in the rank of Colonel. As a result, almost all officers of Infantry, were promoted directly from Lieutenant Colonel to Brigadier, and given command of infantry Brigades. On promotion to the rank of Brigadier, most officers of Armoured Corps were given command of armoured brigades, those from Artillery com­manded artillery brigades, while the Engineers and Signals officers became chief engineers and chief signal officers. However, there was no bar to these officers commanding infantry brigades, and whenev­er one was considered suitable he was given command of a brigade, and later a division, corps, and even army. The decision to give command of a brigade to an officer from the Arms was taken by the Military Secretary, or the COAS, based on the recommendations of his superior officers, endorsed in his Annual Confidential Re­port. No separate promotion board was held for this purpose.

          There are many versions of the story about the decision to create a distinct entity, or cadre, of senior officers, and restrict the command of formations to them. Some people feel that this was done to improve the promotion prospects of Infantry officers, who felt that they had to compete with a very large number of their col­leagues from other Arms, who were eligible for command of brigades, while they themselves were debarred from specified vacancies of these Arms. Another story has it that the decision was taken when General PP Kumaramangalam was the COAS, reportedly at the behest of the polo playing fraternity, who found that their promotion prospects were not as good as those of the Infantry. There were very few armoured brigades, and this severely re­stricted the number of Armoured Corps officers who could rise to higher command. In order to bring them on equal footing, they argued that all officers of Infantry and Armoured Corps, once approved for promotion to the rank of Brigadier, should automatically be eligible for command of infantry as well as armoured brigades. Offic­ers of Arms ‘other’ than Infantry and Armoured Corps (here lies the genesis of ‘Other Arms’) could be given command of brigades, provided they were considered fit, by a selection board, and volunteered for the same, with the proviso that once they did, they would have to remain in the ‘General Cadre’, and would not be considered for promotion in specified appointments, of their respective Arms.

          At present, officers of the Artillery, Engineers and Signals, who have been recommended for the General Cadre, by their reporting officers, during their criteria command and staff tenures as Colonel, are screened by No 2 Selection Board, for promo­tion to Brigadier, along with officers of the Armoured Corps and Infantry. Some of the criteria staff appointments, applicable to other Arms, for induction into the General Cadre, are Colonel GS/Adm of a division, deputy  commander of a brigade, instructor at the Staff College or in the Senior Command Wing of the College of Combat, and so on. If found fit by the Selection Board, the officer is asked to indicate his willingness, to join the General Cadre. If he does, he is given command of a brigade, in his turn. If he declines, he is promoted to the rank of Brigadier, and posted to a ‘specified’ command or staff appointment, in his corps or regiment.

          Till a few years ago, induction into the General Cadre was ef­fected only on promotion to the rank of Brigadier. Recently, it has been decided that promising officers from supporting Arms, who have completed 10 years service, will be offered a chance to opt for the General Cadre. After serving for two years in the Infantry or Armoured Corps, they will have the option to revert to their parent Arm, if they wish to. Since these officers will get a chance to command companies and squadrons, and later battalions and regiments, of Infantry and Armoured Corps, it is expected that they will perform better as infantry or armoured brigade commanders, than if they and joined the General Cadre only on promotion to Brigadier.

          In spite of the avenues open to signal officers, to join the General Cadre, there are not many takers, and sometimes, those found fit decline the offer. This was not the case, 15-20 years ago. In the late seventies and early eighties, Signals had more than half a dozen Corps and Divisional Commanders, one of whom rose to be an Army Commander (Lt Gen AN Mathur), and another became a Vice Chief of Army Staff (Lt Gen K Balaram). Today, we have only one officer in the General Cadre, who joined almost seven years ago. As a result, the Corps has suffered, and so have Signal officers. Without a voice in the highest councils of the Army, our interests are naturally not  kept in mind, when import­ant decisions are taken . Even the interests of Signal officers suffer, by default. Today, we do not have even one Military Attache, in a foreign country, whereas ten years ago, we had three (JP Singh in Australia, DN Sabharwal in Japan and PK Ghosh in Indonesia). It is several years since we sent an officer to Camberley, or to Latimer. The Royal College of Defence Studies in UK, or the War College in USA appear to be distant dreams. It is difficult to believe that the calibre of Signal officers has deteriorated, during the last fifteen or twenty years. If someth­ing has diminished, it is our representation in the General Cadre, and the General Staff. And this is a direct consequence of our officers shying away from the ‘psc’, which is in fact the gateway for entry into the General Cadre.

          In the fifties, Signals had just five vacancies at the Staff College, and these were progressively increased to 12, in the seventies. The number of Signal officers who qualified in the entrance examination was always much higher, with the result that some had to  appear two or three times, before they were nominat­ed. A few unfortunate ones appeared thrice, passed each time, but could not get in, since one was allowed only three chances. As a result, there was a persistent demand to abolish the quota system, and make the entry entirely merit based. When this was done, no one was happier than the supporting Arms, such as En­gineers and Signals, who felt that henceforth, their numbers would increase. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

          In the seventies, a large number of Signal officers began to be nominated for post graduate courses, such as the M Tech, in IITs and other institutions. With the induction of Plan AREN, and sophisticated EW systems, it was felt that every Signal officer must be a technical wizard, to be able to handle the complex equipment that was being inducted into service. We are a techni­cal Arm, it was argued, and it was essential that every Signal officer must be at least a graduate engineer. Qualification on the SODE course was made mandatory for promotion to the rank of Lt Col, and the number of officers being sent on M Tech was increased, with the brightest being sent to UK, to do their post graduation in British universities. We were so obsessed with the requirement of training our officers for technical jobs in Signal units and ‘hi-tech’ appointments that we lost sight of the need to train our officers for staff, and higher command. After all, the Army comprises not only units, but also formations, from brigade upwards. These are to be manned by staff officers, and need commanders. Like all other Arms and Services, Signals have to take their share of such ‘unspecified’ appointments, and are morally bound to make sure that their officers are trained for them.

          Unfortunately, we were so engrossed in looking at our own little tree that we could not see the wood. As a result, we not only lost out on our share of command appointments in the General Cadre, but also our legitimate share of unspecified vacancies. This was mainly because very few of our officers had done the psc, and thus did not meet the QR for most high grade staff appointments. In 1989, Signals was authorised 215 Colonels, which included 64 unspecified appointments. In 1990, we were given 64 additional vacancies of Colonels, which doubled our share of unspeci­fied vacancies from 64 to 128. However, we could never fill up the additional vacancies allotted to us, and remained deficient of 25 to 30 Colonels, from 1990 to 1995. These unspecified vacancies, surrendered by Signals, were utilised by other Arms and Services, who were able to accelerate their promotions, while we stagnated. Fortunately, the situation has been remedied, and today, the number of unfilled vacancies has come down to single digit fig­ures.

          It would be interesting to reflect on the reasons for the reluc­tance of our officers to do the psc. In '89-'90, a study was con­ducted on the poor performance of Signal officers on the JC course, and its results were presented during the CSOs/Command­ants Conference, held at Mhow in Feb 1990. As part of the study, about 150 Signal officers who had done the JC course were asked to indicate their preference, between the psc, ptsc, M Tech and SOPGE. Almost 60% of the officers who responded preferred  to do the M Tech, while 20% opted for the psc, the rest being undecid­ed, or indicating multiple choices. To the next question, as to the reasons for preferring the M Tech to the psc, the answers covered mainly four reasons. First, better postings; second, better re-employment prospects; third, technical pay; and fourth, better promotion prospects.

          On the face of it, all the above reasons appeared to be valid. However, on detailed analysis, none of them was found to be true. Let us consider them one by one. The first reason, of better postings, was valid, upto a point, since M Tech officers were normally posted only to ‘hi tech’ appointments, or to the MCTE, and rarely got a chance to serve in field areas. This is no longer true, because we now have a very large number of M Tech qualified officers, and every Signal unit, in peace and field, is posted with at least one. Also, MS-13 has now computerised its operations, and posting proposals show not only the units where an officer has served earlier, but also his field peace profile index, and the ideal for officers of his seniority. All stations, in peace as well as field, have now been graded, from 1 to 9, and the hardness or softness of a station is taken into account while planning postings of officers. As a result, anomalies in field or peace tenures which existed earlier have now been minimised, and M Tech officers can hope to get their share of field postings, on par with those who have done the psc. In fact, with the increas­ing number of UN assignments now available, almost 50% of psc officers can hope to get a tenure abroad. The number of M Tech officers who are selected for UN assignments is negligible.

          The second reason, of better re-employment prospects, was also found to be without basis. Data obtained from Signals Adm, re­garding Signal officers who have obtained jobs after retirement or release reveals that these bear no relation to the qualifica­tions of the officers. In fact, some of the best jobs are held by officers with no qualifications whatsoever. The reason for this is not difficult to comprehend. Officers normally retire at the age of fifty plus. Even those who proceed on pre-mature retire­ment are well over forty. Today, candidates with M Tech degrees are available to the Industry at the age of 25-30. Why should anyone want to employ a fifty year old engineer, if he can get one half his age, at half the cost? Invariably, retired officers are employed in middle or senior management positions, on the basis of their experience, spoken reputation, and contacts. Qualifications and degrees do not count at these levels of later­al induction, as they would for vertical induction where the person is starting at the bottom of the ladder. Hence, the second reason, of better re-employment pros­pects, is also not valid, unless an officer leaves the service at the age of 30-35, as a Major or a Captain.

          The third reason, concerning technical pay is valid, but the amount involved is too small to merit consideration. Also, the UN assignments which come the way of psc officers more than compen­sate any losses they suffer on this account. The fourth reason, about better promotion prospects, needs to be analysed carefully. Based on actual selection rates, over the last ten years or so, it has been found that upto the rank of Colonel, the promotion pros­pects of M Tech and psc officers are almost on par. However, above this rank, there is a marked difference, and selection rates of psc officers are much higher, in the rank of Brigadier, as well as Major General. A glance at the Corps List will prove the point.. All the four Lieutenant Generals in the Corps have done the psc, out of 15 Major Generals, 13 are psc and of the 62 Brigadiers, 33 are psc, with 25 having done M Tech. Out of 261 Colonels, 41 are psc; 62 are ptsc; 81 are M Tech; and 31 are SOPGE.

          What is the reason for the higher selection rates of psc offic­ers, in higher ranks? It is not the psc per se, which gives them an edge, but the better reports which they earn, on staff appoint­ments. It has been seen that Signal officers perform exceedingly well on staff, and since psc officers get three or four such appointments, their OAP shoots up, and they have little trouble in clearing the promotion boards. Signal officers, by the nature of their jobs, and upbringing in the Corps, tend to be more sincere and meticulous than those from other Arms, and make good staff officers. Formation commanders thus find their performance well above par, and reward them accordingly. In fact, it is not uncommon for a Signal officer to get an ‘outstanding’ report, in a staff appointment.

          It should now be amply clear that most of the so called advantag­es of the M Tech are a myth, and the psc scores over it on almost every count. However, it is neither possible nor desirable for every Signal officer to do the psc. We need a large number of M Tech qualified officers, to man hi-tech appointments. But we also need an equal number to man staff appointments. It is for the officer to make a choice, depending on his aptitude, and inclination. The decision has to be left to the officer himself - the organisation cannot force him, one way  or the other. However, it is the duty of his superiors to  give  advice  and  guidance,  and explain the advantages and disadvantages of both options. Fortu­nately, the attitude has already begun to change, and more offic­ers are now opting for the psc, than five or ten years ago. (In 1988 there were only two Signal officers doing the course at Welling­ton, and in 1991, just three). Hopefully, the trend will contin­ue, and in a few years time, Signals will regain the lost ground, and return to a position of pre eminence, in the General Cadre, as well as the General Staff.

(Published in the Signalman)