A SLICE OF HISTORY
Maj Gen VK Singh
While going through the War
Diaries of 5 Indian Divisional Signals and 10 Infantry Brigade Signals Section
for the period 1940 to 1942, I came across some interesting documents and
notings, which give a rare insight into the problems faced by our predecessors,
and how they solved them. 10 Indian Infantry Brigade was then part of 5 Indian
Division, which took part in the operations in Eritrea, Egypt, Iraq and Cyprus.
Incidentally, the OC of the Brigade Signal Section, for Aug 40 to Mar 41 was
Capt (later Lt Gen) RN Batra.
RNB had joined the Brigade on 9 Aug 40
in Jhansi, and he was promoted from Lieutenant to Captain the same day. The
Brigade Commander was Brig (later Field Marshal) Slim. They left for East
Africa in September, and came under command 5 Indian Division, which had also
moved there from Trimulgherry, in the Deccan. Within a month, RNB was in the
thick of the fighting, and the capture of Gallabat fort by his Brigade in Nov
40, was a turning point in the campaign against the Italians.
For the Gallabat operation, RNB had to
provide communication to three infantry battalions, a field regiment, and the
RAF, for close air support. There was no PL ahead of the Brigade HQ, and there
was only one road on which vehicles could ply. The Signal section was holding
only ten miles of field cable, and this had to be laid by hand - mules were
available, but none could be spared for the cable detachments. The cable was
always badly damaged, and required heavy maintenance after it was reeled up,
and before it could be laid again. And this had to be done almost every day.
The state of wireless sets was not much
better. The Signal section had just five wireless sets, of which three had to
be given to the battalions (Strangely
enough, British battalions were authorised three radio sets, while the Indian
battalions had none). The two sets left in the Section were used for forward
and rearward links, with no reserves. Each set had just two 25 AHC batteries,
which lasted just a couple of hours. There was just one charging engine, which
was used to charge the batteries of the sets given to the battalions also. The
sets were carried in ‘yakdans’, if mules were available, which was seldom. The
battalions mostly had to manhandle the sets and batteries. The RAF ground
station which worked on R/T broke down, and had to communicate with the
aircraft on W/T, using a medium wave set. Since this interfered with the short
wave sets of the division and brigade, the latter had to be closed down.
(EMI/EMC is not a new phenomenon).
Not surprisingly, the most reliable
means of communication were dispatch riders and visual, followed by wireless.
Lines were rarely through, during the actual attack, and could be used only
when the operation was over, and positions consolidated. Though they were not
his immediate concern, RNB also had to worry about his rearward communications.
The Divisional HQ was at Gedaref, about 95 miles to the rear of Gallabat. There
was a single wire PL available for about 90 miles, and this was used in
conjunction with about eight miles of cable. A fuller phone circuit was also
superimposed on the line, for clearing message traffic.
In spite of all these limitations, the
communications functioned without a break throughout the operation. This could
have only been possible due to the hard work and dedication of the signallers,
who slogged day and night, without a break. As RNB himself later recalled, he
spent 72 hours without sleep, until Bill Slim ordered him to bed, saying “I
would rather have my communications fail, than my signal officer collapse.”
On 5 Mar 41, RNB handed over command of
10 Indian Infantry Brigade Signal Section to Lieut Jarvis, and joined the
Regiment. Shortly afterwards, he was promoted Temporary Major, and appointed OC
3 Company. The War Diary of 5 Indian Divisional Signals has some
interesting entries :-
5 Mar 41
A/Capt RN Batra posted from 10 Indian
Infantry Brigade Signal Section. Relieved by Lieut Jarvis.
15 Mar 41
Bombs dropped from unidentified plane
on Divisional HQ. One 5 Division Signals Signalman killed and one FS-6 set put
out of action.
16 Mar 41
Line continually cut by artillery fire.
17 Mar 41
1700 : Enemy artillery continues to
play havoc with lines. Shells land near mule team carrying FS-6 and other
signal equipment. Mules stampede and bolt.
2400 : No trace of mules or equipment.
Lines continue to be cut by artillery fire.
Even during war, training was not
forgotten. Since regular courses could not be conducted, short capsules were
run for officers at ad hoc schools established in each theatre. An entry dated
19 Oct 41 in the War Diary informs that “CO and Maj Batra left for Combined
Training Centre at Kabrit.” They returned on 26 Oct 41. On 31 Oct 41, orders
were received for move of the entire Division, including 9, 10 and 29 Brigades,
to an unknown destination. This seemed
to be the form, and troops rarely knew where they were headed for. On 1 Nov 41,
the CO, Lt Col CL Morgan, also left for an unknown destination. By the time he
returned the unit was on the move, and had entrained at Giza, for Alexandria.
It was only after they had embarked on 2 Nov 41, for an unknown destination,
that it was revealed that 5 Indian Division was going to Cyprus, while Lt Col
Morgan was to take over as CSO 25 Corps, in Nicosia.
After disembarking at Famagusta, they
moved by road to Larnaca, and GOC 5 Indian Division took over command of Cyprus
Island. The Divisional HQ was located at Larnaca; 9 Brigade at Limassol; 10
brigade at Kondea, and 161 Brigade at Kokkini Timithia. Cyprus had a well
developed civil communication network, which was run by “The Cable and Wireless
Company”. The Army decided to have its own visual communication network, and
RNB was assigned the task of carrying out the survey. On 21 Dec 41, as recorded
in the War Diary, the Recce Report, Appreciation and Plan for Visual
Communication on the Island, written by Maj RN Batra was published. It gives out
the locations of all high features, inter visibility, bearings, distances, and
type of visual communications - helio, lamp day with telescope, and lamp night
with telescope. It also gives the road approaches to each site, weather,
billeting arrangements and so on. The appreciation examines the courses open,
the alternatives, and the requirements of equipment and personnel.
Those days, calls on telephone lines
were always given a precedence. The highest precedence was CLEAR THE LINE
(EMERGENCY AIR) authorised only to the Commander RAF Cyprus; this was followed
by CLEAR THE LINE (EMERGENCY OPS) authorised to the Governor, the Corps
Commander, and the SASO. Then came the URGENT call, which was similar to the OP
IMMEDIATE call of today. Appointment
codes were used, on wireless as well as visual signalling. For the latter,
numerals were used to indicate appointments. For instance the Commander was 5;
G staff officer was 6; Q staff officer was 7; CRA (Commander Royal Artillery)
was 1; CRE (Commander Royal Engineers) was 3; Commander Royal Signals was 2 and
so on.
The most striking feature of the War
Diaries and other documents is the obvious attention to detail, and the care
with which they were prepared. One must remember that there was a war on, and
the HQ moved almost every day, especially during the campaign in Eritrea. There
was usually only one officer in the Brigade Signal Section, and he must have
had his hands full. Yet he found time to make entries in the War Diary, prepare
the strength returns, the parade states, the casualty returns, and several
other documents. Another interesting feature is
the Report on Signal Communications and Incidents of Training Value.
This was prepared by the CO, covering the events during the preceding month,
the problems faced, and the lessons learnt. There are several such reports,
signed by Lt Col Leslie Morgan, during the period 1941-42, which would have
proved to be of immense value to his successors.
Raj Batra was one of the founding
fathers of the Corps of Signals, in India. After going through the records of
the units in which he had served, one can see that he had a flawless
professional upbringing. The monthly reports written by Lt Col Morgan are
cogent, brief, and lucid. They are masterly examples of military writing, which
could be used as lesson plans even today. A few years later, RNB was given
command of Force 401 Signal Regiment, where his second-in-command was Maj
(later Brig) Apar Singh. The Quarterly Historical Reports of Force 401, written
by its GOC, Maj Gen FJ Loftus Tottenham are extremely eloquent, coherent, and
forceful. RNB learned his soldiering at the hands of experts such as Slim and
Tottenham, and his signalling from the likes of Leslie Morgan. Is it any wonder
that he did wonders himself, when he had the chance?
Now
that OP VIJAY is over, I think we should emulate the example of Raj Batra, and
those who taught him. Signal officers, especially those in Northern Command who
were in the thick of the action, have gained valuable experience, which needs to
be documented, and preserved. Even those who were not actively involved, but
were in various stages of preparation, would have learned several new lessons.
This is perhaps the first time after Brass Tacks that the Army was deployed on
such a massive scale, and many voids in communication must have come to light.
It is essential that these be put down in writing, when our memory is still
fresh, so that they can act as a guide to those who are called upon to plan and
execute communications during operations, in future.
(Published in the Signalman, Sep 1999)
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