THE
JABALPUR MUTINY—A NEW PERSPECTIVE
Maj Gen VK Singh (Retd)
Very few Signallers of the
present generation have heard of the mutiny, as it was then called, that
occurred in the Signal Training Centre at Jabalpur in 1946. In the period
before Independence, there was an understandable tendency to play down such
incidents, which did little credit to British authority over the Dominion of
India. Surprisingly, this attitude continued in the Indian Army even after
Independence. As a result, the contribution of soldiers who took part in these
uprisings was never recognised. It is only in recent years that we have begun
to high-light the sacrifices made by these brave men who lost not only their
livelihood but also suffered imprisonment for raising their voices against
British authority. Ironically, the soldiers who joined the Indian National Army
led by Subhas Chandra Bose were treated as heroes, even though they not only
joined the enemy but also fought against their compatriots who were wearing the
uniforms of the Indian Army. At the same time the soldiers who rebelled against British authority were treated as
mutineers. This conundrum has baffled many Indians, especially those in the
Armed Forces.
Though the part played by the INA has
been adequately high-lighted, none of the historians of that period have made
more than a passing reference to other revolts and uprisings by personnel of
the Armed Forces against British rule. These uprisings mostly occurred after
the War, and the concerned personnel only rebelled against British authority –
they neither joined hands with the enemy nor took up arms against their
compatriots. Due to lack of publicity and support from political leaders, these
incidents remained virtually unknown and were soon forgotten by the public. As
a result the contribution of soldiers to the freedom movement has never been
acknowledged or high-lighted, even though there is a wealth of documentary
evidence to support this hypothesis.
Major KC Praval’s 'Indian Army After Independence' was
published in 1986 soon after his death. In the Foreword of the book, on p.
(ix), Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd) wrote, “…..There had also been the Naval mutiny at
Bombay and the Army (Signals) mutiny at Jubbulpore. It was now clear as
daylight to the British that
they could no longer use the Indian Army to perpetuate their imperial
rule over India…”
Maj Gen Shahid Hamid’s book 'Disastrous Twilight' was published in 1986.
Hamid was Private Secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in
India in 1946-47. Referring
to an entry in his diary
dated 30th March 1946 on p.47, he writes:
"Today the 'Hindustan Times'
commented editorially on the Auk’s appeal to the Indian Army." There is no
doubt whatever that if the transfer of power is not quickly brought about, the
foreign rulers of India cannot count upon the loyalty of the Indian Army…”
In his book 'History of the Freedom
Movement in India, Volume IV', the well-known historian Dr. Tara Chand has
dwelt at length on the reasons for advancing the date of Independence on
pp.558-560. “The most controversial measure of the Viceroy was the decision to
advance the date of transfer of power from June 1948 to August 15, 1947. On
this issue Mountbatten recorded his reasons in his conclusions appended to the
Report on the Last Viceroyalty submitted to His Majesty’s Government in
September 1948. His defence for expediting the transference of power to the
Indians was on these lines… Secondly, the ultimate sanction of law and order,
namely, the Army, presented difficulties for use as an instrument of government
for maintenance of peace….”
From the above, it is clear that one of
the major contributing factors to the British Government’s decision to leave
India was the realization that it could no longer depend on the Indian Army.
And this realization stemmed from the uprisings that took place in the Army,
Navy and Air Force in the period before Independence. There is little doubt
that these rebellions were instrumental not only in the decision of the British
Government to grant Independence to India, but also in Mountbatten’s decision
to advance the date from June 1948 to August 1947. The two major uprisings in
this category were by personnel of the Royal Indian Navy at Bombay in February
1946 and the Indian Signal Corps at Jabalpur in February–March 1946.
In the beginning of 1946, there were
two major establishments of the Indian Signal Corps at Jubbulpore (as Jabalpur
was then called). The first was the Signal Training Centre (STC) comprising No.
1 Signal Training Battalion (Military), and 2 and 3 Signal Battalions
(Technical). The second was the Indian Signal Depot and Records, which
comprised the Indian Signals Depot; the Indian Signals Demobilisation Centre;
and the Indian Signals Records. The Commandant of the STC was Colonel LC Boyd,
Royal Signals, while Col RTH Gelston, Royal Signals, commanded the Depot and
Records. Both these
establishments came under the Jubbulpore Area, commanded by Brigadier Hutchins,
which in turn came under the GOC Nagpur District, Maj Gen Skinner, with his HQ
at Nagpur. HQ Central Command was then located at Agra.
The mutiny started at 0920 hours on 27
February 1946. (The personnel involved referred to their action as a strike).
About 200 men, mainly workshop trainees from G Company of 2 Signal Training
Battalion formed up in the lines of the unit, just before the second works
parade was due to fall in. Shouting
slogans, they marched through the unit to the lines of 3 Signal Training
Battalion, brushing past the Company Commander and Subedar Major who tried to
stop them near the Quarter Guard. Marching through the Depot, they proceeded
towards the city shouting ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’, and waving flags
of the Congress Party and the Muslim League. The CO of the Depot Battalion, Lt
Col Anderson and a party of 15 armed NCOs tried to stop them near the Nerbudda
Club and even threatened to shoot, but this did not deter them from continuing
their march. Having reached Tilak Bhumi, Taliaya in the city, they stopped and
held a meeting. There were speeches by some of the men, accompanied by slogans
and waving of flags.
The news of the incident spread
quickly. There was considerable tension in the city and shopkeepers closed
their shops. However, the meeting was peaceful and there was no violence or
unruly behaviour by the men. At about 1615 hours they started
back for the unit. By this time the military authorities had mobilised two
companies of 27/9 Jats to assist the STC in containing the uprising. Having
reached the unit, the protesters sat
down in the Battalion Arena. The Commandant, Colonel LC Boyd arrived, and the
names of all the men were taken down. Soon afterwards, the Area Commander
arrived and addressed the men. He told them that they were all under arrest,
but assured them that he would forward their grievances to higher authorities.
They fell in and were marched to the STC Cage where the Commandant noted down
their grievances. These were discrimination in pay between Indian and British
Other Ranks; poor quality of rations; slow speed of demobilisation; protest
against the firing in Bombay, Karachi and Calcutta; protest against the
expenditure on Victory celebrations in view of the food crisis; and the release
of all INA prisoners including Captain Burhanuddin and Abdul Rashid. They indicated that they were ready to go
back to work if their demands were met. After taking down their grievances the
Commandant spoke to the men and left. The men remained in the Cage during the night, and were given food and
bedding.
By early next morning, a British
battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry had arrived in Jubbulpore. A party of
about 80 men from 2 Signal Battalion assembled in the unit at 0700 hours and
began moving along the same route that had been taken by their colleagues on
the previous day. They were intercepted by a platoon of the British battalion
and brought back to the unit. About 200 clerks of the Records also collected at
one place. They were joined by about a 100 men from 3 Signal Training
Battalion, who sat down and refused to go to work, demanding the release of
their colleagues who were still inside the cage. The District Commander, Maj
Gen Skinner arrived on the scene, and it was decided to arrest the ringleaders
only. The second-in-command of the 27/9 Jats and Lt Col Poonose entered the
cage and tried to induce the ringleaders to give themselves up. However, the
rest of the men did not allow this and became restless. Finally it was decided
to carry out the arrests by force.
About 80 soldiers of the Somerset Light
Infantry entered the cage, with bayonets fixed on their rifles. A few of the
men were physically removed, amidst a lot of shouting. Faced with the bayonets
of the British troops, the crowd retreated to one corner of the cage, which
gave way under the weight of sheer numbers. A large number managed to
escape through the gap, while the remainder were involved in a scuffle with the
British troops. Many were injured by bayonets and some were trampled in the
stampede. Of the ones who had escaped, most were caught and brought back, to be
kept in custody in the Jat lines.
The news of the bayonet charge spread
like wild-fire in the STC and at many places the men came out and demonstrated
against this, resulting in some more arrests. In the early hours of 1st March, about 150 OR from 3 Signal Training
Battalion left their lines and marched through Sadar Bazar, shouting slogans
and waving flags, but returned to the unit within an hour. The previous day’s
incidents had been reported in several newspapers and there was considerable
resentment at the bayonet charge on the Indian OR. According to the newspapers,
three men had been killed, while 70 were injured in the bayonet charge. The
District Magistrate declared Jubbulpore Cantonment a restricted area, and the
entry of civilians was banned. During the next two days, the situation
improved, but was still far from normal. The men in the cage refused to come
out until their leaders were released. On 3rd March, troops of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade
placed a cordon around the Signal Training Centre lines. The Area Commander and
Commandant spoke to the men and asked them to return to work. Most of them
agreed, and normal parades were held in the units. During the next two days
several men returned and joined duty.
By 7th March the
situation had become normal and
there were no untoward incidents.
Seth Govind Das of the Congress Party
raised the matter in the Central Assembly in Delhi. In his reply on 15th March 1946, the War Secretary, Mr. P. Mason
gave the official version of the case. According to him, 1,716 persons were
involved in the mutiny. He accepted that thirty-five persons had been wounded
of whom eight had bayonet wounds. However, he denied that there was any firing
or bayonet charge. According to him, some persons had sustained bayonet wounds
when they attempted to overpower the troops that had been called in to arrest
the ringleaders. Only two persons were seriously injured and there were no
deaths. Mr. Ahmad Jaffar of the Muslim League suggested that a couple of
members of the Defence Consultative Committee should be associated with the
inquiry, but this was rejected by the War Secretary, who contended that this
was a service matter and it would be quite illegal to associate non-officials.
The revolt had shocked the military
establishment, especially the British officers who had always believed that the
Indian soldiers would never let them down. The reasons for the disaffection
were quickly analysed and remedial measures taken immediately. The District
Commander issued instructions to all concerned to improve the standard of food
and accommodation. A Board of Officers presided over by Lt Col Cassani brought
to light the pathetic conditions under which the Indian troops lived. Officers,
VCOs and NCOs who had been posted at the STC for more than two years were
immediately posted out, after it was found that some of them had been there for
8–10 years. The SO-in-C, Maj Gen CHH Vulliamy directed that more Indian
officers should be posted to the Centre, so that they could understand the
problems of Indian troops. By April 1946, Lt Col TK Mukerjee and Maj Bhattcharjee
were posted in as CO and 2IC of 2 Signal Training Battalion, with Capt KK
Tewari taking over as Adjutant.
Disciplinary action taken against those
who participated in the mutiny was severe and swift. 18 men were tried by
Summary General Court Martial and sentenced to dismissal and imprisonment
ranging from one to three years. In addition, 20 were dismissed after trial,
and 41 discharged without any enquiry or investigation. Many more were sent
home merely on suspicion and the statements of Junior and Non-Commissioned
Officers who were considered loyal by British officers. Most of them had put in
long years of service and fought in World War II. They did not get any
pension or gratuity and many lived and died in penury and their pleas for
redress fell on deaf ears. There are several letters that bring out the
pathetic state of these unfortunate soldiers, who remained true to their salt
and helped the British win the Second World War. Having implicit faith in the
British sense of fair play and justice, they were surprised and disappointed at
the treatment they received at the hands of the Government of the day.
On the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of Independence in 1972, the
Government of India decided to honour those who had taken part in the freedom
struggle and suffered hardships. The Prime Minister presented 'Tamra-Patras' to
freedom fighters on this occasion. A scheme known as the 'Samman' pension
scheme was introduced, under which a monthly pension is paid to the freedom
fighter and after his death to his spouse. The Central and the State
governments pay separate pensions, and the amount is periodically revised. In
addition to the pension, the freedom fighter and his spouse are entitled to
benefits such as free rail travel, medical treatment, old age homes, quotas for
allotment of plots and houses, subsidised telephone connections etc. A list of
mutinies and movements that qualify for the grant of the freedom fighters
pension is given in the Citizen Charter for Freedom Fighters issued by the
Ministry of Home Affairs. There are approximately 50 movements in the list,
which contains only four from the Armed Forces. These are :–
* Suez Canal Army Revolt in 1943.
* Ambala Cantt. Army Revolt in 1943.
* Jhansi Regiment Case in Army (1940).
* Royal Indian Navy Mutiny, 1946.
The only one missing is the STC revolt
of 1946. In fact, this was the last uprising by soldiers, and can be equated to
the proverbial ‘last straw’ that broke the camel’s back. The Navy mutiny at
Bombay had resulted in bad publicity for the Government, since it had to be
suppressed by the use of force. The STC mutiny at Jabalpur occurred just two
weeks later, and once again force had to be used to quell it. The Indian Navy
then was a miniscule force, and the Army could easily handle disaffection in
its ranks. But what if the Army itself was alienated? The prospect was too
fearsome to even imagine and caused consternation and panic in Delhi and
London.
There is another twist to the tale.
About 200 men from signals who were captured by the Japanese had joined the
INA. Like other INA personnel, they were dismissed from service after the War.
After Independence, 12 of them were re-enrolled in the Army. After completing
their colour service, they retired with full pensionary benefits. Being INA
veterans, they were given the status of freedom fighters and became entitled to
the ‘samman pension’. Thus, personnel of the Indian Signal Corps who joined the
INA are presently getting two pensions, while those who took part in the STC
mutiny are not getting even one.
For
some reason, the Corps of Signals chose to ignore the STC mutiny, even after
Independence. Almost all the other revolts and uprisings were added to the list
of freedom movements that qualify for the award of freedom fighters samman
pension, benefiting the men who lost their freedom and their jobs. The Indian
Navy has constructed a memorial at Bombay to commemorate the mutiny that took
place in 1946 and annual functions are held to honour those who took part in
it. The men who took part in the Jabalpur mutiny in 1946 deserve the status of
freedom fighters to a much greater extent than many others who are in the list.
This is the least that the Nation can do for them. Most of them are dead and
many are too old to benefit from the privilege. If nothing else, they will be
satisfied that an injustice has been undone, even if it was long overdue.
(Published in the Signalman, Oct 2003)
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