SIGNALS IN THE ADMIN BOX

SIGNALS IN THE ADMIN BOX

Maj Gen VK Singh (Retd)

After reading Brigadier PS Gills’s excellent article ‘Golden Arrow Signals –  A Firsthand Story’ in the October 2003 issue of the Signalman, readers would have got a fair idea of the role played by Signals in the Battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass, also known as the Battle of the Admin Box. The full story of the action has been described by many writers, including some who were present. Apart from Brigadier Gill, who was a subaltern in 89th Infantry Brigade Signal Section, accounts have been written by Brigadier PMP Hobson, who was then commanding 7th Indian Divisional Signals; Major KEC Gillon, who was then a subaltern in 15 Corps Signals; Brigadier Terence Barreto, then serving as a subaltern in 5th Indian Divisional Signals; and Anthony Brett-James, who was commanding 9th Infantry Brigade Signal Section. Exhaustive accounts of the battle are given in the war diaries of the units involved and the official history of World War ll, published by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence. The action has also been covered in several books on Military History, including Field Marshal Slim’s ‘Defeat Into Victory’; Frank Owen’s ‘Campaign in Burma’; and Brett-Jame’s ‘Ball of Fire’ and ‘Report My Signals’. Interesting accounts of the battle are given in the obituaries of Brigadier Pat Hobson published in the Daily Telegraph of 23rd August 1990 and the Times of 25th August 1990 in London.

The battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass during the Arakan operations was a turning point in the Burma Campaign in World War ll. Also known as the battle of the Admin Box, it was one of the few instances when Signals covered itself with glory not only for remaining ‘through’ but also for fighting the enemy in close combat. The casualties sustained by signallers bear testimony to their gallantry during the battle, which was recognized by several awards after the battle, including a DSO for Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson, the Commanding Officer of 7th Indian Divisional Signals. (This unit became 4th Indian Divisional Signals, after Partition). The story of the battle of the Admin Box has been told and retold many times. This article is based on the war diaries of the units involved, in addition to personal accounts of officers who were present during the operation.

7th Indian Divisional Signals had been raised at Rawalpindi on 14th August 1940 by Lieutenant Colonel NTH Minshall. The unit subsequently moved to Ranchi from where it moved to the Arakan in September 1943 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson. In early February 1944 the unit was located with the headquarters of 7th Indian Division at Laung Chaung, with the divisional administrative area being at Sinzweya, about three miles to the rear, east of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Headquarters 15 Corps was at Sabaigon, about thirty miles to the rear, while Headquarters 5th Indian Division was at Wabyin, west of Ngakyedauk Pass. A Corps Signal Centre had been established at Sinzweya, which had two trunk lines and one telegraph circuit each to Corps and the two divisional headquarters.

On the morning of 6th February at about 0530 hours the Japanese attacked the divisional headquarters. The first attack, which came in the Signals area that was nearest to the entrance of the divisional headquarters, was repulsed. The enemy made further attacks and succeeded in infiltrating through the thick jungle into the divisional headquarters and managed to establish a machine gun post on the hill behind it. By 1030 hours the Signals had withdrawn into the Royal Artillery lines and thereafter the whole of the divisional headquarters made independently for the combined 15 Corps Troops and , 7th Indian Division administrative base by splitting into small parties. The Divisional Commander along with his staff fought his way out and made for the Administrative Base at Sinzweya. A few of those constituting the party were ambushed but on the whole the casualties were not as severe as might have been expected; on the other hand, the divisional signals personnel were responsible for inflicting considerable damage against the attacking Japanese.

Lieutenant KEC Gillon of 15 Indian Corps Signals was one of the two Indian Signal Corps officers present in Admin Box during the siege. He had been sent to Sinzweya on 3rd February to establish an advance signal centre in view of the likely move of the Corps Headquarters to that location. Narrating his experiences during the battle, he writes :–

“On the morning of the 6 Feb 44 at about 0600 hours I was rung up by Signal Master RICHMOND (this was the code name for 7 Ind Div exchange) and was told that Div HQ was being attacked by Japs and hence the trunk lines between RICHMOND and our exchange, which was code-named PALNEY, should be kept through at all costs. I asked him whether the normal DRLS should be sent as per schedule at 0700 hours and his reply was, “we are not interested in any b _ _ _ _ _ _ mail at the moment. In any case we cannot do anything with it even if you send it." While he was speaking I could hear the clatter of LMG fire coming over the line from 7 Ind Div Area.

However, I informed Sigmn Roden, whose duty it was that day to take the mail to 7 Div, that Japs were attacking 7 Div HQ and hence there was no need for him to take the mail. He however, was quite prepared to go, and so after cautioning him to return if the situation was too hot, I permitted him to go and he left at 0700 hours. That was the last we saw of Sigmn Roden, for apparently he was shot just as he got off his motor cycle near 7 Div HQ, according to one of the BORs of 7 Div Signals. Eighteen days later Cpl Abbott found Sigmn Roden's body in a crouched position near his motor cycle, and, after removing his pay book and other things found on his body, Cpl Abbott buried the body and returned with the pay book, which I forwarded to OC 2 Coy.

Later during the morning of the 6 Feb, vehicles and men kept coming into the adm base from 7 Div HQ area, and it became apparent that 7 Div HQ was evacuating. Telephone communication to 7 Div HQ ceased about 1030 hours or so."

Brigadier Tery Barreto recalls his last conversation with Lieutenant Gillon :– “I was the Signal Master on duty in the Signal Office at HQ 5 Div at Maungdaw. I was speaking on the line to Ken Gillon, an Anglo-Indian from Nagpur (married to one of the Du Bois girls). He was describing to me the scene around him. He could actually see the Japs as they attacked. As we were talking, the line was cut. We were the last to use the line until it was restored ten days later.”

The part played by Signals has been described by Frank Owen in his book ‘The Burma Campaign' :–

“The Signalmen, under Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson, DSO, held on to Divisional Headquarters to the last. Four times in as many hours their position was rushed, but though individual Japanese soldiers infiltrated into it they were all killed. The last wireless message reached the Box at 11.20 a.m. and then the listeners heard a voice say: “Put a pick through the set.” Mortared and soaked with rain, the Signallers hacked their way through the undergrowth to rejoin the garrison then forming in the Box. Hobson reported that his officers and men behaved with coolness and good marksmanship. “Of the 200 Japanese who attacked with mortars and machine guns, killed at least 40 and wounded many more." Throughout the siege of the Box, which was now about to begin, the Signalmen performed a magnificent service. Short of equipment, with all telephone lines cut and ciphers compromised, they kept communications going. By use of guarded language general orders were issued over open wireless. Information was securely transmitted by use of local jokes which the humourless Japanese could safely be trusted not to grasp. As an extra safeguard officers talked in French which a Brigadier admits “would have stumped the French, let alone the Japanese."

Another version of the battle is given by Anthony Brett-James, who was commanding                9th Infantry Brigade Signal Section, which had been placed under 7th Indian Division only a few days earlier. Describing the operation in his book ‘The Ball of Fire’, he writes :–

“The only troops defending Launggyaung were Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson’s Divisional Signals, and part of an Engineer Battalion. At six o’clock the air was rent by wild shouts from the Japanese. A few shots were almost smothered by a roar as of some vast football crowd, intermingled with catcalls and yells. All was uncertain in the half-light morning mist. The members of headquarters took up their prearranged battle stations. The Signal Office was attacked. Parties of the enemy infiltrated into the Signals area, and towards Messervy’s headquarters. Machine guns and mortars began firing into our positions from short range. Several attacks were beaten back, but all telephone lines were cut. Communications between the different parts of the headquarters were broken. Messervy with part of his staff was isolated on a steep hillock and pinned to the ground by fire. He decided that the place must be abandoned, but could get no message to this effect through to the rest of the staff and to Signals. Eventually, he and a few companions managed to slip away, waded down a stream, and made their way through the jungle and reached the administration area at Sinzweya.

Meanwhile Colonel Hobson, finding his men hard pressed, his casualties mounting, his wireless sets being overrun and destroyed, consulted Brigadier Hely, the C.R.A. It was decided to fight on, but soon the Japanese had established machine gun posts along a ridge that overlooked our strong points. Some tanks of the 25th Dragoons, which had just arrived here, were firing at these machine guns, but groups of our men found themselves caught between the two lines of fire.

The position was perilous. Resistance could no long be maintained. Hely gave the order to evacuate Launggyaung. A rendezvous was made: the eastern end of the Ngakyedauk Pass. But many new casualties were suffered in this withdrawal, and some confusion, for Japanese mortar fire broke up our parties and the main line of retreat was covered by the enemy. In all, Hobson’s Signals had seven officers, eight British and ninety Indian ranks killed or missing from that morning’s fighting."

Almost at the same time, the Japanese cut the road across the Ngakyedauk Pass. The Admin Base was now surrounded from all sides, and was under siege. Lieutenant Gillon gives a vivid account of the conditions in the Admin Box during the siege :–

“Our only means of communication with the out side world were two R/T links working to 15 Corps; supplies were dropped by Dakota aircraft. As the demand for telephone communication within the Admin Box increased, we were called upon to enlarge our existing 40 line F&F switchboard by adding on two 10  line U.C.  exchanges. But the telephone position was somewhat chronic – we had only 16 telephones ‘F’ and 7 Div Signals had a few D Vs, so, things did not look too bright for us. However, we managed as best as we could under the circumstances. The existing local telephone lines we had; were all built on poles which converged to one place – the Exchange; and the Japs were well aware of this fact. Realising that they could cause chaos in the Admin Box by putting our communication system out of commission, they set about to achieve this end. The Signal Office and Exchange dug-outs received several near misses from mortar bombs, and overhead lines were continuaIly being cut to ribbons by shrapnel and machine gun buIlets. On two occasions a mortar bomb landed within 5 yards of the Signal Office and Exchange, the shrapnel damaging the D.P. boxes outside on the terminal poles, and causing 10 lines to become ‘dis’, one which, on both occasions, happened to be the Div Commander’s line ! Our linemen, however, worked heroicaIly under extreme conditions, and put through all 10 lines in three minutes ! These two bombs, by the way, caused five casualties in my section, one which was somewhat serious."

7th Divisional Signals had destroyed or lost all its cipher documents during the attack on 6th February. However, communications were maintained with Headquarters 15 Corps and 5th Indian Division for the entire duration of the siege. A 19 set was taken from a tank of 25th Dragoons to establish emergency communications, until cable, radio batteries and cipher documents were airdropped. Trunk and local lines were frequently disrupted by enemy shelling, the linemen taking great risk to repair them and suffering several casualties. On 22nd February a line party under Lieutenant HF Newman accompanied an infantry battalion went up to the Ngakyedauk Pass to meet 123rd Brigade from 5th Indian Division that came up from the opposite side, carrying a line from 9th Brigade exchange. The same day Lieutenant R Gray of 33rd Indian Brigade ; Signal Section was killed by enemy shelling. The siege was finally broken on 24th February, Lieutenant Gourley bringing a line from 5th Indian Division and laying another line on his return journey to Corps. During the next few days the unit received much needed equipment and normal communications were restored. Parties were sent to the previous location to salvage stores left behind and bury the dead. The signal centre and cipher office had been completely destroyed by enemy shelling. However, equipment that had escaped shelling had not been damaged by the Japanese, who had taken only items that they could use, such as leather from ‘yakdans’ for use as boot leather.

The gallant action of the Signallers in the Battle of the Admin Box did not go unrecognised. Lieutenant Colonel Hobson was decorated with the Distinguished Service Order; Major JR Piddlington and Lieutenant D Crittal were awarded the Military Cross; while Sergeant CWL Ducker, Sergeant H Liptrot, Lance Corporal Mawer and Signalman Ram Autar got the Military Medal.

While 7th Indian Division was fighting desperately in the Admin Box, things were far from quiet in other sectors. On 6th February 1943, almost at the same time as the attack on the Admin Box, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on Briasco Bridge where several administrative units of 5th Indian Division were located, cutting the road Maungdaw – Bawli Bazaar. Though the road was cleared next day, the block had posed severe threat to the 5th Indian Division that had been effectively isolated like 7th Indian Division. Brigadier Tery Barreto recalls: “That night Div Sigs had to hold a part of the perimeter round Div HQ. I was given a little hillock with the Subedar Major and a handful of men. So tense was the situation that I had packed and taken with me my big pack with my sentimental belongings. We kept awake all night watching the tracers flying over Briasco Bridge. The firing was intense."

5th Indian Divisional Signals was located at Wabyin during this time. The unit, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel EIC Harrison, played an important role during the battle of the Admin Box. Communications with 7th Indian Division and 9th Infantry Brigade were maintained throughout the siege on the ‘Q’ link. It by means of, this vital link that air drops for the troops inside the Box were arranged. The wireless operator, Naik Balasundaram, worked throughout for forty-eight hours, to keep the link through. On 7th February when communications with Corps on line and wireless were down, the division had to enter the net of Fourteenth Army, where it was challenged but subsequently allowed to pass important messages. On 8th February a SCR 177B set was opened up on the forward net of 7th Indian Division and this was used to pass important messages to and from 7th Division, who were short of wireless sets having lost them when their previous position was overrun on the 6th. It was only on 10th February that a 'G’ staff officer from Corps arrived with a wireless set and took over the direct link to 7th Division. On 13th February 123rd Infantry Brigade moved up to a new position at the foot of the Ngakyedauk Pass. An attempt was made on the next day to lay a line to 7th Division. The line party laid the line to a point about a mile short of the destination but was not allowed to proceed further by Commander 123rd Infantry Brigade. A company of 4/8 Gurkhas took the line inside the Box at about 1800 hrs but could not put it through. Another attempt to lay the line was made on 17th February by a line detachment under Lieutenant Wolstencroft, the Lines Officer, accompanying a company of 4/8 Gurkhas. The line was put through at 1500 hours and the line detachment returned by the same route. However, the line was through just long enough for the two divisional commanders and some of their staff to talk to each other. Within three hours the enemy cut the line, which could not be repaired since the line detachment was not allowed to go out on the line under orders of ‘G’ staff. The commander of the line detachment, Naik HK Williams was later awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal for this feat. On 19th February line detachments were again laying three pairs of lines behind the infantry unit that was trying to clear the Pass. It was only on 23rd February when the Pass was reported clear of the enemy that all available line parties were pressed into service to get the line through. The line to 7th Indian Division was finally put through at 1345 hours on 24th February 1944. This brought to an end the saga of the Admin Box, and the Battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Shortly afterwards, both 5th and 7th Indian Divisions were moved to Imphal and 25th Indian Division took over the responsibility for the Arakan.

(The above account is based on material available with the Corps History Cell. It will form part of the Second Volume of the History of the Corps of Signals, covering the period 1939–47, that is presently being compiled – Author.)

(Published in the Signalman, Feb 2005)