VIGNETTES FROM 1947-48
By
Maj Gen VK Singh
Introduction
The years 1947-48 were perhaps the
most turbulent in India’s history. There was widespread jubilation when the
country became free after 200 years of British rule. The joy of liberty was
blighted by Partition, which resulted in a mass migration of hundreds of
thousands of people across the newly created borders, accompanied by terrible
atrocities. Barely two months after Independence, the nation’s armed forces
were called upon to repel an invasion in the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
becoming embroiled in a war that lasted well over a year and a conflict that
continues even today. The history of those turbulent times has been documented
by many historians. However, many stories remain untold, hidden in documents
that are not seen by the general public. The vignettes recounted in this
article have been collated from various sources, some hitherto
unpublished.
The Sacking of Mirpur
One of the saddest events of the
Jammu & Kashmir operations in 1947-48 concerns Mirpur, which was sacked by
the Pathans after being evacuated by the
State Force garrison on 26 November 1947. Mirpur could have been saved –
it was just a day’s march from Jhangar, which 50 Para Brigade had occupied on
19 November. Brigadier YS Paranjape, Commander 50 Para Brigade wanted to do
exactly this, but was ordered to proceed to Kotli instead. Why did Major
General Kalwant Singh, GOC JAK Division, decide to forsake Mirpur, against the
advice of his subordinate as well as his superior? More important, why did the
Mirpur garrison, comprising 600 troops, pull out without a fight? A much
smaller force at Skardu withstood sustained attacks for six months. Punch was
besieged for a year before it was relieved. Was it poor leadership, or the fighting
quality of the troops that made the difference?
Probably both played a part. Colonel Puran Singh, the commander of the
Mirpur garrison, was not made of the same mettle as Brigadier Pritam Singh and
Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa. Also, Mirpur was garrisoned entirely by
State Force troops, while Punch and Skardu both had a fair number of regular
Indian Army soldiers.
On 13 November 1947, elements of 50
Para Brigade consisting of 1 Patiala and a troop of 7 Light Cavalry had reached
Akhnur. On 16 November Major General
Kalwant Singh, GOC JAK Division, issued orders for the relief of Naushera,
Jhangar, Mirpur, Kotli and Punch.
According to his plan, 50 Para Brigade was to relieve Naushera by 16th,
Jhangar by 17th, Kotli by 18th, and Mirpur by 20th
November. Another column from Uri, consisting of two battalions of 161 Infantry
Brigade under Brigadier LP Sen, was to move on the Uri-Punch axis on 16
November, reaching Punch the same day.
The plan was ambitious and had several flaws. The
officiating C-in-C, Lieutenant General FRR Bucher, felt that the advance of two
columns was 'positively dangerous', and the despatch of a column from Uri to
Punch, with the enemy still in position, was 'almost foolhardy'. Brigadier YS
Paranjape, Commander 50 Para Brigade, had several objections. Apart from the
dates being unrealistic, he felt that after establishing a firm base at
Jhangar, Mirpur should be relieved first, so that the advance to Kotli was not
interfered with by the raiders. Both his battalions, 1 Punjab and 3 Rajput were
below strength, with 350 to 400 men in each. However, he was over ruled by the
GOC and the operations commenced on 16 November 1947.1
Naushera was occupied on 18 November, after a brief
engagement. Paranjape had just three companies with him, and wanted to wait
till the rest of the column fetched up. However, Kalwant ordered him to
continue and capture Kotli. The advance was resumed on 19 November and Jhangar
occupied the same day. From Jhangar, two roads forked out, one leading to Mirpur,
and the other to Kotli. Paranjape was in favour of relieving Mirpur before
going for Kotli, so that his flank was secure. However, Kalwant did not agree
and ordered him to head for Kotli. The advance from Jhangar was resumed on 20
November and Kotli was relieved only on 26 November, after negotiating 47 road
blocks. By this time the fate of Mirpur had been sealed - it was torched by the
raiders the same day. About 400 soldiers and 10,000 refugees managed to escape,
and reached Jhangar. The Pathans killed several hundred soldiers and civilians,
capturing hundreds of women who were taken away as war booty. Many of them were
sold for 150 rupees after being paraded naked through the streets of Jhelum by
the exultant Pathan tribesmen.
On 27 November, the day after it had been relieved,
Kalwant ordered Paranjape to fall back on Jhangar. This was accomplished on 28
November. Soon after this, Brigadier Paranjape was hospitalised, and Brigadier
Mohd. Usman took over command of 50 Para Brigade. If Kalwant's decision to rush
to Kotli without securing his open flank by securing Mirpur was surprising,
even stranger was his decision to fall back to Jhangar, immediately after its
capture. In the event, Mirpur was lost. Why was Kalwant in such a tearing hurry
to reach Kotli? It is said that the wife of one of Maharaja Hari Singh's ADCs,
who was rumoured to be one of his many mistresses, lived in Kotli. Reportedly,
a large treasure belonging to the Kashmir State was also kept in Kotli. Was
Kalwant’s haste to relieve Kotli attributable to these two factors, rather than
tactical reasons? The lady and the treasure were probably saved, but the lives
of several thousand men and the honour of several hundred women were lost. 2
Why was Mirpur evacuated even before
it was attacked? The report submitted by the garrison commander, Colonel Puran
Singh, states:
‘The original Mirpur Grn consisted of 600 S.F tps approx
12,000 non-Muslims. On the night 25/26 Nov, the enemy with a force of approx 3
Bns attacked on all sides, sp by Mtn Arty. Own cas due to shelling were 50 to
100 killed. The cas among the refugees amounted to approx 100 to 1000. The
refugees were pouring into the mil camp and it was decided to withdraw. The
camp site with the tents and army vehs incl the dead were left, lest any
suspicion should be raised. About 500 OR and the refugees withdrew Eastwards
after last it on 26 Nov through the mountains and not by rd. The party was attacked en route once during
the night; own cas estimated were 30 IOR and 500 refugees. Eventually approx
400 IORs and 10,000 Civ got back to Jhangar safely. The rear gd of 100 IORs and
1000 refugees have not yet reached. (this rear gd with refugees is reported to
be hiding in the jungles at Puna 15 miles South West of Jhangar)’.3
The
story of the sack of Mirpur is best told by one of the survivors. Given below
are extracts from the statement of Mr.
Inder Singh Bali, son of Sardar Tehil Singh, State Jagirdar and Chief of the Punjab, aged 24 years, of
Mirpur proper:-.
“On 25th Nov 1947 our town (Mirpur)
was bombarded and what looked like canon and mortar fire was opened on the town
resulting in the complete blowing up of the roofs of the houses and causing
lots of casualties among the civilians. The state troops did not put tough
fight and the raiders occupied the town at 2 pm and set the entire town on
fire. There were about 350 men of the state troops in the town itself and had
placed pqts around the town and about 200 men were in the Cantt. When the posn
became hopeless the troops in the town decided to surrender and run away and
placed themselves in touch with the Offr commanding in the Cantt, and with the
concerted action of troops both in the town and the Cantt, the civilians from
the town managed to reach the Cantt.
Out of our party about 300 girls
were forcibly taken away and when we reached Thatala camp we heard from the
Hindus that had already reached there that their 500 girls had also been taken
away. At Thatala we found that not less than 2,000 Pathans all with 303 rifles
were present.
The concentration at Thatala
swelled up to about 5000. Here again the Pathans sorted out young girls and
carried them away. Thatala is about 15 miles from Jhelum city. Among these
Offrs there were one Lt Col, one Capt and a few JCOs and men in all numbering
50. These officers and men were not wearing Regtl Signs. All these offers and
men were wearing black caps and from their uniform I would see that they
belonged to the Punjab Regt. We spent two nights at this camp. Out of the
raiders three men who belonged to my town and were very well-known to me took
pity on me and managed to deliver me at Jhelum camp (at the house of Lt. Avtar
Narain) after they had relieved me of all my belongings. I am the only survivor
from Mirpur.”4
The Abduction and Sale
of Captured Women
The
two major incentives for the tribesmen who invaded Jammu & Kashmir in 1947
were money and women. Instances of rape and looting occurred at almost all
towns and villages that came in the way of the tribal lashkars, including Uri, Baramula, Rajauri and Mirpur. However,
Mirpur seems to have come in for special attention, its fall being accompanied
by the town being set on fire and the abduction of a large number of women who
were sold like cattle in Jhelum and other towns. This engaged the attention of
the highest in the land, including Prime Minister Nehru, who took up the matter
with the authorities in Pakistan almost on a daily basis. In a telegram dated 1
December 1947, shortly after the fall of Mirpur, he wrote:
For Prime Minister,
Pakistan, from Prime Minister, India.
I have also been informed that 3,000 abducted
Hindu women have been brought to Gujarat from the Bhimbar area and they are
being sold like cattle at Rs. 150 each. I am asking an Offr on the staff of the
Deputy High Commissioner at Lahore to go personally to make enquiries to
Gujarat district and I hope you will ask West Punjab Govt to give him all
facilities.5
The next day, on 2 December 1947,
the Prime Minister sent another telegram:
For Mr. Liaquat Ali
Khan from Jawaharlal Nehru.
I have recd info that
Mirpur town has been completely destroyed and out of 13,000 (half of 26,000)
non – Muslims only 2,000 (half of 4,000) have reached within 15 miles of
Jhelum. The fate of these refugees as well as of about 3,000 (half of 6,000)
from the rest of Mirpur area is not known, but there are reports that large
numbers of abducted Hindu women have been brought into Jhelum district by
Pathans. The Pathans are causing panic among non-Muslims refugee pockets in
that district are firing indiscriminately and shot dead a Mahratta soldier the
other day.
I am gravely
concerned about the fate of the non-Muslims pockets in Jhelum district and of
the Hindu refugees in particular the abducted women who have been brought from
Jammu by the raiders. I shall be grateful if you will give all facilities to
our MEO org to evacuate them to India.6
The very next day, i.e. 3 December 1947, Nehru sent
yet another telegram to Pakistan:
I
have been drawing your attention to large concentrations of tribesmen and
others in West Punjab near the border of Kashmir State and to the abduction of
large numbers of women from Kashmir who are being offered for sale in West
Punjab….7
The
report of the sale of abducted girls in Jhelum is corroborated from several
other sources. An extract from a report forwarded by a civil intelligence
officer of the Government of India in Pakistan says:
In
Jhelum no Hindu except our staff is left. The district liaison officer, who has
to depend either on the information received from the high district officials
or from some of his Muslim friends reports that in Jhelum girls abducted from
Mirpur side are sold in Jhelum city at Rs 20/- each. The local police refuse to
interfere on the ground that the girls were not removed from the Punjab and
also they express their helplessness because of the attitude of the armed
Pathans possessing these girls.8
The Capture of Zoji La
The capture of Zoji La in November
1948 was a spectacular feat of Indian arms, paving the way for the relief of
Leh. Though innovative use of armour and bold leadership were the decisive
factors in the battle, the state of morale of the enemy also played a part. It
was reported that in the Ladakh Valley the enemy morale was very low on account
of shortage of rations, clothing and the fast approaching winter. About 400
body guards of the Mehtar of Chitral in Skardu refused to go to Leh, and the
matter was reported to Burhan-ud-Din in Gilgit for necessary action by
Mata-ul-Mulk. Burhan-Ud-Din not only
berated his nephew Mata-ul-Mulk, but told him that he would be reaching Skardu
shortly to sort out the matter. (Burhan-ud-Din was the brother and Mata-ul-Mulk
the son of the Mehtar of Chitral).
The low state of morale of the enemy is
obvious from intercepted messages that were exchanged between enemy commanders.
One such message from the enemy commander at Dras – Zoji La to the Supreme
Commander at Gilgit is given below:
“FROM JAMIL
(XOB) TO GEORGE (QLC) RPT JAL (.) A 174 (.) SECRET (.) REF YOUR D 255 (.) MY
MEN ARE UNDER FED AND UNDER CLOTHED (.) FOR DAYS THEY GO WITHOUT FOOD (.)
BELIEVE ME THEY WILL NOT SIT IF AFTER FORTNIGHT ON THE HIGHEST PEAKS OF ZOJILA
IF NOTHING WILL BE DONE FOR THEIR RATIONS AND CLOTHING SINCE NOW (.) RATIONS
AND CLOTHING SO FAR RECEIVED FROM AS TO REAR USUAL TO NOTHING FOR A C D WINGS
(.) TPS HAVE FRANKLY TOLD US THAT THEY WILL NOT WORK IF THEY WILL NOT BE
PROPERLY FED AND CLOTHED (.) PLEASE REALISE THE COMING WINTER HIGHEST PEAKS OF
ZOJILA AND SEND RATIONS AND CLOTHING OTHERWISE IT WILL BE TOO DIFFICULT FOR US
TO MAKE OUR MEN TO FIGHT (.)”9
An intercepted message from
Burhan-ud-Din to Mata-ul-Mulk not only brings out the deteriorating relations
between them but gives an indication of the extent of involvement of the
Government of Pakistan in the operations. (Shortly after this, Burhan-ud-Din
himself took over from Mata-ul-Mulk).
“FROM QLC TO XOD
(.) S – 89 (.) SECRET (.) FOLLOWING FROM NASIM IN REPLY TO YOUR ….. TO END VERY
DISAPOINT AFTER ALL THAT I HAVE DONE FOR YOU AND YOUR MEN (.) IS ONLY FOR ME
THAT YOU HAVE NOT BEEN SENT UNDER ESCORT TO CHITRAL IN SPITE OF GOVERNOR NWFPS
INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT (.) WHAT EVER MEN DO WILL REFLECT ON YOU (.) WARN
YOU NOT TO GET YOUR SELF IN TROUBLE AND RUIN THE MEN ALSO (.) ISLAM IS IN
DANGER (.) YOUR RECALLING OF YOUR MEN FROM NUBRA HIGHLY ENRAGED ALL PAK
OFFICIALS (.) DEFENCE SECRETARY ESPECIALLY COMING FOR PURPOSE OF LOOKING INTO
YOUR CONDUCT (.) SEND SOME ONE AND HAVE IMMEDIATELY THEM RECALLED (.) THEY
SHOULD GET BACK BY FORCED MARCHES (.) I WILL REACH (.)” 10
Nehru and Zoji
La
The first prime Minister of India,
Jawaharlal Nehru, was a Kashmiri. His attachment to the land of his forbears is
well known. What is not known is his extensive knowledge of the terrain in
Kashmir and the interest he took in operational matters. By inclination, he was
adventurous and fond of the outdoors. He had trekked extensively in the hills
of Kashmir, Himachal, Garhwal and Kumaon and is said to have spent his
honeymoon in a travellers’ hut at Baltal. It was no surprise that he took a
special interest in the plans being made by Thimayya and Cariappa to capture
Zoji La. This is brought out by the two letters reproduced below, one from SS
Khera, the Commissioner at Meerut, addressed to Nehru and the other from Nehru
to Major General Kalwant Singh, who had recently moved to Delhi as the CGS. Significantly,
Nehru wrote to the CGS and not the C-in-C, who was then a British officer. 11
_________________________________________________________________
DO No 200/L&OG
Commissioner’s
OFFICE, MEERUT
July
8, 1948
Dear JAWAHAR Lal Ji
1. I take the
liberty of sending this bit of information in case it is of any use.
2. In the
MAHCHHOI area beyond the ZOJILA there are certain rather obscure routes which
have been traversed either by me or to my knowledge within the last three or
four years. I have marked them on the
attached Map. The routes in each case
are difficult and not possible for animals, but men with loads can traverse
them. The one from the telegraph hut
just beyond the high point of the ZOJILA pass is fairly easy and gives access
to the head of the AMARNATH valley and so down towards BALTAL and also through
PANCH-TARNI towards SHESHNAG. The snag
about this route is that unless care is taken to keep right under the shoulder
of the AMARNATH peak, the party will find itself on the edge of impracticable
precipices. There is another route which
goes up the long nala between MAHCHHOI and MATAYAN. It is a long nala about ten miles to the
head, with many bends and apparently leads nowhere; but there is a way over the
top down into the PANCH-TARNI plain.
3. Both these
routes provide access between PAHALGAM and the MAHCHHOI-MATAYAN area.
4. There are
other routes over the ridge of the main HIMALAYAN Range between ZOJILA and
NUN-KUN, but these are fairly obvious and well known.
5. Incidentally,
as I have trekked a fair deal over the area between the ROHTANG pass at the
head of KULU valley and the SASERLA which is about 60 miles NORTH OF LEH, and
also in the ZASKAR valley from its head down through DRAS to the ZOJILA, I
would be happy to answer any questions, although of course probably our Army
know all the answers themselves by now.
Kind
regards,
Yours
sincerely,
Sd/-x-x-x
(SS KHERA)
_____________________________________________________________
PRIME MINISTER
INDIA NEW
DELHI
JULY
10, 1948
My dear KALWANT SINGH,
I am sending you a letter I have received from the
Commissioner of MEERUT Division, also a map which he has sent me.
I might mention that in 1916 I crossed the ZOJILA, went to
MATAYAN, and then tried to go to AMARNATH cave from MATAYAN across the high
mountains. We climbed some glaciers,
reached the top of a huge ice field and were only about 3 or 4 miles from
AMARNATH cave. It started snowing then
which made it very difficult to cross the crevasses. Indeed I slipped into one and had to be
pulled out by the rope which was tied around me. So I did not succeed in reaching AMARNATH and
had to come back to MATAYAN.
I rather doubt if we can take much advantage of these
difficult mountain routes which KHERA has pointed out. But if you wish to enquire further into this
matter, please write to KHERA or even ask him to come up here for a day.
Yours
sincerely
Sd/-x-x-x-x
(JAWAHARLAL NEHRU)
Major General KALWANT SINGH
Chief of the General Staff
Army Headquarters,
New Delhi
______________________________________________________________
The two letters along with the map
were sent the very next day to HQ Western Command with copies endorsed to the
Director of Military Intelligence. It not known whether the maps were found
useful or the services of SS Khera were utilised in the plan for the capture of
Zoji La. However, they bring out the
personal interest that our first Prime Minister took in matters military. Soon
after Zoji la was captured, Nehru visited Kashmir to personally congratulate
the troops who had taken part in the operation. Exactly a year earlier, he had
visited Kashmir immediately after the recapture of Baramula accompanied by
Indira Gandhi.
Endnotes
1.
SN Prasad SN and Dharam Pal, History of the Operations in Jammu &
Kashmir (1947-48), History Division, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi, 1987. pp.52-55
2.
Maj.
Gen. V.K. Singh, Leadership in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve
Soldiers, Sage Publications, New
Delhi, 2005, pp. 160-62.
3.
Appendix
to J& K Division Intelligence Summary (ISUM) of 5 December 1947, Document
No. 601/14172/H/I, History Division, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi.
4.
White
Paper on Kashmir, Government of India, 26 Feb 1948, New
Delhi. History Division, MOD, File No 601/14189/H, p.47
5.
White
Paper on Kashmir, p. 67
6.
White
Paper on Kashmir, p. 55
7.
White
Paper on Kashmir, p. 115
8.
Appendix
‘A’ to J& K Division Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No.2 of 20 January 1948,
Document No. 601/14172/H/I, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.
9.
Appendix ‘A’ to HQ Western Command
Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No. 43 for the period 29 Aug to 08 Sep 1948,
Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.
10.
Appendix ‘B’ to HQ Western Command
Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No. 43 for the period 29 Aug to 08 Sep 1948,
Document No. 601/14181/H, History Division, MOD, New Delhi.
11.
HQ Western Command Intelligence Summary
(ISUM) for the period Jun to Sep 1948, Document No. 601/14181/H, History
Division, MOD, New Delhi.
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