SIGNALS IN THE ADMIN BOX

SIGNALS IN THE ADMIN BOX

Maj Gen VK Singh (Retd)

After reading Brigadier PS Gills’s excellent article ‘Golden Arrow Signals –  A Firsthand Story’ in the October 2003 issue of the Signalman, readers would have got a fair idea of the role played by Signals in the Battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass, also known as the Battle of the Admin Box. The full story of the action has been described by many writers, including some who were present. Apart from Brigadier Gill, who was a subaltern in 89th Infantry Brigade Signal Section, accounts have been written by Brigadier PMP Hobson, who was then commanding 7th Indian Divisional Signals; Major KEC Gillon, who was then a subaltern in 15 Corps Signals; Brigadier Terence Barreto, then serving as a subaltern in 5th Indian Divisional Signals; and Anthony Brett-James, who was commanding 9th Infantry Brigade Signal Section. Exhaustive accounts of the battle are given in the war diaries of the units involved and the official history of World War ll, published by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence. The action has also been covered in several books on Military History, including Field Marshal Slim’s ‘Defeat Into Victory’; Frank Owen’s ‘Campaign in Burma’; and Brett-Jame’s ‘Ball of Fire’ and ‘Report My Signals’. Interesting accounts of the battle are given in the obituaries of Brigadier Pat Hobson published in the Daily Telegraph of 23rd August 1990 and the Times of 25th August 1990 in London.

The battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass during the Arakan operations was a turning point in the Burma Campaign in World War ll. Also known as the battle of the Admin Box, it was one of the few instances when Signals covered itself with glory not only for remaining ‘through’ but also for fighting the enemy in close combat. The casualties sustained by signallers bear testimony to their gallantry during the battle, which was recognized by several awards after the battle, including a DSO for Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson, the Commanding Officer of 7th Indian Divisional Signals. (This unit became 4th Indian Divisional Signals, after Partition). The story of the battle of the Admin Box has been told and retold many times. This article is based on the war diaries of the units involved, in addition to personal accounts of officers who were present during the operation.

7th Indian Divisional Signals had been raised at Rawalpindi on 14th August 1940 by Lieutenant Colonel NTH Minshall. The unit subsequently moved to Ranchi from where it moved to the Arakan in September 1943 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson. In early February 1944 the unit was located with the headquarters of 7th Indian Division at Laung Chaung, with the divisional administrative area being at Sinzweya, about three miles to the rear, east of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Headquarters 15 Corps was at Sabaigon, about thirty miles to the rear, while Headquarters 5th Indian Division was at Wabyin, west of Ngakyedauk Pass. A Corps Signal Centre had been established at Sinzweya, which had two trunk lines and one telegraph circuit each to Corps and the two divisional headquarters.

On the morning of 6th February at about 0530 hours the Japanese attacked the divisional headquarters. The first attack, which came in the Signals area that was nearest to the entrance of the divisional headquarters, was repulsed. The enemy made further attacks and succeeded in infiltrating through the thick jungle into the divisional headquarters and managed to establish a machine gun post on the hill behind it. By 1030 hours the Signals had withdrawn into the Royal Artillery lines and thereafter the whole of the divisional headquarters made independently for the combined 15 Corps Troops and , 7th Indian Division administrative base by splitting into small parties. The Divisional Commander along with his staff fought his way out and made for the Administrative Base at Sinzweya. A few of those constituting the party were ambushed but on the whole the casualties were not as severe as might have been expected; on the other hand, the divisional signals personnel were responsible for inflicting considerable damage against the attacking Japanese.

Lieutenant KEC Gillon of 15 Indian Corps Signals was one of the two Indian Signal Corps officers present in Admin Box during the siege. He had been sent to Sinzweya on 3rd February to establish an advance signal centre in view of the likely move of the Corps Headquarters to that location. Narrating his experiences during the battle, he writes :–

“On the morning of the 6 Feb 44 at about 0600 hours I was rung up by Signal Master RICHMOND (this was the code name for 7 Ind Div exchange) and was told that Div HQ was being attacked by Japs and hence the trunk lines between RICHMOND and our exchange, which was code-named PALNEY, should be kept through at all costs. I asked him whether the normal DRLS should be sent as per schedule at 0700 hours and his reply was, “we are not interested in any b _ _ _ _ _ _ mail at the moment. In any case we cannot do anything with it even if you send it." While he was speaking I could hear the clatter of LMG fire coming over the line from 7 Ind Div Area.

However, I informed Sigmn Roden, whose duty it was that day to take the mail to 7 Div, that Japs were attacking 7 Div HQ and hence there was no need for him to take the mail. He however, was quite prepared to go, and so after cautioning him to return if the situation was too hot, I permitted him to go and he left at 0700 hours. That was the last we saw of Sigmn Roden, for apparently he was shot just as he got off his motor cycle near 7 Div HQ, according to one of the BORs of 7 Div Signals. Eighteen days later Cpl Abbott found Sigmn Roden's body in a crouched position near his motor cycle, and, after removing his pay book and other things found on his body, Cpl Abbott buried the body and returned with the pay book, which I forwarded to OC 2 Coy.

Later during the morning of the 6 Feb, vehicles and men kept coming into the adm base from 7 Div HQ area, and it became apparent that 7 Div HQ was evacuating. Telephone communication to 7 Div HQ ceased about 1030 hours or so."

Brigadier Tery Barreto recalls his last conversation with Lieutenant Gillon :– “I was the Signal Master on duty in the Signal Office at HQ 5 Div at Maungdaw. I was speaking on the line to Ken Gillon, an Anglo-Indian from Nagpur (married to one of the Du Bois girls). He was describing to me the scene around him. He could actually see the Japs as they attacked. As we were talking, the line was cut. We were the last to use the line until it was restored ten days later.”

The part played by Signals has been described by Frank Owen in his book ‘The Burma Campaign' :–

“The Signalmen, under Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson, DSO, held on to Divisional Headquarters to the last. Four times in as many hours their position was rushed, but though individual Japanese soldiers infiltrated into it they were all killed. The last wireless message reached the Box at 11.20 a.m. and then the listeners heard a voice say: “Put a pick through the set.” Mortared and soaked with rain, the Signallers hacked their way through the undergrowth to rejoin the garrison then forming in the Box. Hobson reported that his officers and men behaved with coolness and good marksmanship. “Of the 200 Japanese who attacked with mortars and machine guns, killed at least 40 and wounded many more." Throughout the siege of the Box, which was now about to begin, the Signalmen performed a magnificent service. Short of equipment, with all telephone lines cut and ciphers compromised, they kept communications going. By use of guarded language general orders were issued over open wireless. Information was securely transmitted by use of local jokes which the humourless Japanese could safely be trusted not to grasp. As an extra safeguard officers talked in French which a Brigadier admits “would have stumped the French, let alone the Japanese."

Another version of the battle is given by Anthony Brett-James, who was commanding                9th Infantry Brigade Signal Section, which had been placed under 7th Indian Division only a few days earlier. Describing the operation in his book ‘The Ball of Fire’, he writes :–

“The only troops defending Launggyaung were Lieutenant Colonel PMP Hobson’s Divisional Signals, and part of an Engineer Battalion. At six o’clock the air was rent by wild shouts from the Japanese. A few shots were almost smothered by a roar as of some vast football crowd, intermingled with catcalls and yells. All was uncertain in the half-light morning mist. The members of headquarters took up their prearranged battle stations. The Signal Office was attacked. Parties of the enemy infiltrated into the Signals area, and towards Messervy’s headquarters. Machine guns and mortars began firing into our positions from short range. Several attacks were beaten back, but all telephone lines were cut. Communications between the different parts of the headquarters were broken. Messervy with part of his staff was isolated on a steep hillock and pinned to the ground by fire. He decided that the place must be abandoned, but could get no message to this effect through to the rest of the staff and to Signals. Eventually, he and a few companions managed to slip away, waded down a stream, and made their way through the jungle and reached the administration area at Sinzweya.

Meanwhile Colonel Hobson, finding his men hard pressed, his casualties mounting, his wireless sets being overrun and destroyed, consulted Brigadier Hely, the C.R.A. It was decided to fight on, but soon the Japanese had established machine gun posts along a ridge that overlooked our strong points. Some tanks of the 25th Dragoons, which had just arrived here, were firing at these machine guns, but groups of our men found themselves caught between the two lines of fire.

The position was perilous. Resistance could no long be maintained. Hely gave the order to evacuate Launggyaung. A rendezvous was made: the eastern end of the Ngakyedauk Pass. But many new casualties were suffered in this withdrawal, and some confusion, for Japanese mortar fire broke up our parties and the main line of retreat was covered by the enemy. In all, Hobson’s Signals had seven officers, eight British and ninety Indian ranks killed or missing from that morning’s fighting."

Almost at the same time, the Japanese cut the road across the Ngakyedauk Pass. The Admin Base was now surrounded from all sides, and was under siege. Lieutenant Gillon gives a vivid account of the conditions in the Admin Box during the siege :–

“Our only means of communication with the out side world were two R/T links working to 15 Corps; supplies were dropped by Dakota aircraft. As the demand for telephone communication within the Admin Box increased, we were called upon to enlarge our existing 40 line F&F switchboard by adding on two 10  line U.C.  exchanges. But the telephone position was somewhat chronic – we had only 16 telephones ‘F’ and 7 Div Signals had a few D Vs, so, things did not look too bright for us. However, we managed as best as we could under the circumstances. The existing local telephone lines we had; were all built on poles which converged to one place – the Exchange; and the Japs were well aware of this fact. Realising that they could cause chaos in the Admin Box by putting our communication system out of commission, they set about to achieve this end. The Signal Office and Exchange dug-outs received several near misses from mortar bombs, and overhead lines were continuaIly being cut to ribbons by shrapnel and machine gun buIlets. On two occasions a mortar bomb landed within 5 yards of the Signal Office and Exchange, the shrapnel damaging the D.P. boxes outside on the terminal poles, and causing 10 lines to become ‘dis’, one which, on both occasions, happened to be the Div Commander’s line ! Our linemen, however, worked heroicaIly under extreme conditions, and put through all 10 lines in three minutes ! These two bombs, by the way, caused five casualties in my section, one which was somewhat serious."

7th Divisional Signals had destroyed or lost all its cipher documents during the attack on 6th February. However, communications were maintained with Headquarters 15 Corps and 5th Indian Division for the entire duration of the siege. A 19 set was taken from a tank of 25th Dragoons to establish emergency communications, until cable, radio batteries and cipher documents were airdropped. Trunk and local lines were frequently disrupted by enemy shelling, the linemen taking great risk to repair them and suffering several casualties. On 22nd February a line party under Lieutenant HF Newman accompanied an infantry battalion went up to the Ngakyedauk Pass to meet 123rd Brigade from 5th Indian Division that came up from the opposite side, carrying a line from 9th Brigade exchange. The same day Lieutenant R Gray of 33rd Indian Brigade ; Signal Section was killed by enemy shelling. The siege was finally broken on 24th February, Lieutenant Gourley bringing a line from 5th Indian Division and laying another line on his return journey to Corps. During the next few days the unit received much needed equipment and normal communications were restored. Parties were sent to the previous location to salvage stores left behind and bury the dead. The signal centre and cipher office had been completely destroyed by enemy shelling. However, equipment that had escaped shelling had not been damaged by the Japanese, who had taken only items that they could use, such as leather from ‘yakdans’ for use as boot leather.

The gallant action of the Signallers in the Battle of the Admin Box did not go unrecognised. Lieutenant Colonel Hobson was decorated with the Distinguished Service Order; Major JR Piddlington and Lieutenant D Crittal were awarded the Military Cross; while Sergeant CWL Ducker, Sergeant H Liptrot, Lance Corporal Mawer and Signalman Ram Autar got the Military Medal.

While 7th Indian Division was fighting desperately in the Admin Box, things were far from quiet in other sectors. On 6th February 1943, almost at the same time as the attack on the Admin Box, the Japanese launched a surprise attack on Briasco Bridge where several administrative units of 5th Indian Division were located, cutting the road Maungdaw – Bawli Bazaar. Though the road was cleared next day, the block had posed severe threat to the 5th Indian Division that had been effectively isolated like 7th Indian Division. Brigadier Tery Barreto recalls: “That night Div Sigs had to hold a part of the perimeter round Div HQ. I was given a little hillock with the Subedar Major and a handful of men. So tense was the situation that I had packed and taken with me my big pack with my sentimental belongings. We kept awake all night watching the tracers flying over Briasco Bridge. The firing was intense."

5th Indian Divisional Signals was located at Wabyin during this time. The unit, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel EIC Harrison, played an important role during the battle of the Admin Box. Communications with 7th Indian Division and 9th Infantry Brigade were maintained throughout the siege on the ‘Q’ link. It by means of, this vital link that air drops for the troops inside the Box were arranged. The wireless operator, Naik Balasundaram, worked throughout for forty-eight hours, to keep the link through. On 7th February when communications with Corps on line and wireless were down, the division had to enter the net of Fourteenth Army, where it was challenged but subsequently allowed to pass important messages. On 8th February a SCR 177B set was opened up on the forward net of 7th Indian Division and this was used to pass important messages to and from 7th Division, who were short of wireless sets having lost them when their previous position was overrun on the 6th. It was only on 10th February that a 'G’ staff officer from Corps arrived with a wireless set and took over the direct link to 7th Division. On 13th February 123rd Infantry Brigade moved up to a new position at the foot of the Ngakyedauk Pass. An attempt was made on the next day to lay a line to 7th Division. The line party laid the line to a point about a mile short of the destination but was not allowed to proceed further by Commander 123rd Infantry Brigade. A company of 4/8 Gurkhas took the line inside the Box at about 1800 hrs but could not put it through. Another attempt to lay the line was made on 17th February by a line detachment under Lieutenant Wolstencroft, the Lines Officer, accompanying a company of 4/8 Gurkhas. The line was put through at 1500 hours and the line detachment returned by the same route. However, the line was through just long enough for the two divisional commanders and some of their staff to talk to each other. Within three hours the enemy cut the line, which could not be repaired since the line detachment was not allowed to go out on the line under orders of ‘G’ staff. The commander of the line detachment, Naik HK Williams was later awarded the Indian Distinguished Service Medal for this feat. On 19th February line detachments were again laying three pairs of lines behind the infantry unit that was trying to clear the Pass. It was only on 23rd February when the Pass was reported clear of the enemy that all available line parties were pressed into service to get the line through. The line to 7th Indian Division was finally put through at 1345 hours on 24th February 1944. This brought to an end the saga of the Admin Box, and the Battle of the Ngakyedauk Pass. Shortly afterwards, both 5th and 7th Indian Divisions were moved to Imphal and 25th Indian Division took over the responsibility for the Arakan.

(The above account is based on material available with the Corps History Cell. It will form part of the Second Volume of the History of the Corps of Signals, covering the period 1939–47, that is presently being compiled – Author.)

(Published in the Signalman, Feb 2005)

HE JABALPUR MUTINY—A NEW PERSPECTIVE

THE JABALPUR MUTINY—A NEW PERSPECTIVE

Maj Gen VK Singh (Retd)

Very few Signallers of the present generation have heard of the mutiny, as it was then called, that occurred in the Signal Training Centre at Jabalpur in 1946. In the period before Independence, there was an understandable tendency to play down such incidents, which did little credit to British authority over the Dominion of India. Surprisingly, this attitude continued in the Indian Army even after Independence. As a result, the contribution of soldiers who took part in these uprisings was never recognised. It is only in recent years that we have begun to high-light the sacrifices made by these brave men who lost not only their livelihood but also suffered imprisonment for raising their voices against British authority. Ironically, the soldiers who joined the Indian National Army led by Subhas Chandra Bose were treated as heroes, even though they not only joined the enemy but also fought against their compatriots who were wearing the uniforms of the Indian Army. At the same time the soldiers who rebelled against British authority were treated as mutineers. This conundrum has baffled many Indians, especially those in the Armed Forces.

Though the part played by the INA has been adequately high-lighted, none of the historians of that period have made more than a passing reference to other revolts and uprisings by personnel of the Armed Forces against British rule. These uprisings mostly occurred after the War, and the concerned personnel only rebelled against British authority – they neither joined hands with the enemy nor took up arms against their compatriots. Due to lack of publicity and support from political leaders, these incidents remained virtually unknown and were soon forgotten by the public. As a result the contribution of soldiers to the freedom movement has never been acknowledged or high-lighted, even though there is a wealth of documentary evidence to support this hypothesis.

Major KC Praval’s  'Indian Army After Independence' was published in 1986 soon after his death. In the Foreword of the book, on p. (ix), Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd) wrote, “…..There had also been the Naval mutiny at Bombay and the Army (Signals) mutiny at Jubbulpore. It was now clear as daylight to the British that                they could no longer use the Indian Army to perpetuate their imperial rule over India…”

Maj Gen Shahid Hamid’s book  'Disastrous Twilight' was published in 1986. Hamid was Private Secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck,                   the Commander-in-Chief in India in               1946-47. Referring to an entry in his               diary dated 30th March 1946 on p.47, he writes:  

"Today the 'Hindustan Times' commented editorially on the Auk’s appeal to the Indian Army." There is no doubt whatever that if the transfer of power is not quickly brought about, the foreign rulers of India cannot count upon the loyalty of the Indian Army…”

In his book 'History of the Freedom Movement in India, Volume IV', the well-known historian Dr. Tara Chand has dwelt at length on the reasons for advancing the date of Independence on pp.558-560. “The most controversial measure of the Viceroy was the decision to advance the date of transfer of power from June 1948 to August 15, 1947. On this issue Mountbatten recorded his reasons in his conclusions appended to the Report on the Last Viceroyalty submitted to His Majesty’s Government in September 1948. His defence for expediting the transference of power to the Indians was on these lines… Secondly, the ultimate sanction of law and order, namely, the Army, presented difficulties for use as an instrument of government for maintenance of peace….”

From the above, it is clear that one of the major contributing factors to the British Government’s decision to leave India was the realization that it could no longer depend on the Indian Army. And this realization stemmed from the uprisings that took place in the Army, Navy and Air Force in the period before Independence. There is little doubt that these rebellions were instrumental not only in the decision of the British Government to grant Independence to India, but also in Mountbatten’s decision to advance the date from June 1948 to August 1947. The two major uprisings in this category were by personnel of the Royal Indian Navy at Bombay in February 1946 and the Indian Signal Corps at Jabalpur in February–March 1946.

In the beginning of 1946, there were two major establishments of the Indian Signal Corps at Jubbulpore (as Jabalpur was then called). The first was the Signal Training Centre (STC) comprising No. 1 Signal Training Battalion (Military), and 2 and 3 Signal Battalions (Technical). The second was the Indian Signal Depot and Records, which comprised the Indian Signals Depot; the Indian Signals Demobilisation Centre; and the Indian Signals Records. The Commandant of the STC was Colonel LC Boyd, Royal Signals, while Col RTH Gelston, Royal Signals, commanded the Depot and Records.           Both these establishments came under the Jubbulpore Area, commanded by Brigadier Hutchins, which in turn came under the GOC Nagpur District,                  Maj Gen Skinner, with his HQ at Nagpur. HQ Central Command was then located at Agra.

The mutiny started at 0920 hours on 27 February 1946. (The personnel involved referred to their action as a strike). About 200 men, mainly workshop trainees from G Company of 2 Signal Training Battalion formed up in the lines of the unit, just before the second works parade was due to fall in.  Shouting slogans, they marched through the unit to the lines of 3 Signal Training Battalion, brushing past the Company Commander and Subedar Major who tried to stop them near the Quarter Guard. Marching through the Depot, they proceeded towards the city shouting ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’, and waving flags of the Congress Party and the Muslim League. The CO of the Depot Battalion, Lt Col Anderson and a party of 15 armed NCOs tried to stop them near the Nerbudda Club and even threatened to shoot, but this did not deter them from continuing their march. Having reached Tilak Bhumi, Taliaya in the city, they stopped and held a meeting. There were speeches by some of the men, accompanied by slogans and waving of flags.

The news of the incident spread quickly. There was considerable tension in the city and shopkeepers closed their shops. However, the meeting was peaceful and there was no violence or unruly behaviour by the men. At about                     1615 hours they started back for the unit. By this time the military authorities had mobilised two companies of 27/9 Jats to assist the STC in containing the uprising. Having reached the unit, the protesters  sat down in the Battalion Arena. The Commandant, Colonel LC Boyd arrived, and the names of all the men were taken down. Soon afterwards, the Area Commander arrived and addressed the men. He told them that they were all under arrest, but assured them that he would forward their grievances to higher authorities. They fell in and were marched to the STC Cage where the Commandant noted down their grievances. These were discrimination in pay between Indian and British Other Ranks; poor quality of rations; slow speed of demobilisation; protest against the firing in Bombay, Karachi and Calcutta; protest against the expenditure on Victory celebrations in view of the food crisis; and the release of all INA prisoners including Captain Burhanuddin and Abdul Rashid.  They indicated that they were ready to go back to work if their demands were met. After taking down their grievances the Commandant spoke to the men and left. The men remained in the Cage during             the night, and were given food and bedding.

By early next morning, a British battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry had arrived in Jubbulpore. A party of about 80 men from 2 Signal Battalion assembled in the unit at 0700 hours and began moving along the same route that had been taken by their colleagues on the previous day. They were intercepted by a platoon of the British battalion and brought back to the unit. About 200 clerks of the Records also collected at one place. They were joined by about a 100 men from 3 Signal Training Battalion, who sat down and refused to go to work, demanding the release of their colleagues who were still inside the cage. The District Commander, Maj Gen Skinner arrived on the scene, and it was decided to arrest the ringleaders only. The second-in-command of the 27/9 Jats and Lt Col Poonose entered the cage and tried to induce the ringleaders to give themselves up. However, the rest of the men did not allow this and became restless. Finally it was decided to carry out the arrests by force.

About 80 soldiers of the Somerset Light Infantry entered the cage, with bayonets fixed on their rifles. A few of the men were physically removed, amidst a lot of shouting. Faced with the bayonets of the British troops, the crowd retreated to one corner of the cage, which gave way under the weight of sheer numbers.                     A large number managed to escape through the gap, while the remainder were involved in a scuffle with the British troops. Many were injured by bayonets and some were trampled in the stampede. Of the ones who had escaped, most were caught and brought back, to be kept in custody in the Jat lines.

The news of the bayonet charge spread like wild-fire in the STC and at many places the men came out and demonstrated against this, resulting in some more arrests. In the early hours of 1st March, about 150 OR from 3 Signal Training Battalion left their lines and marched through Sadar Bazar, shouting slogans and waving flags, but returned to the unit within an hour. The previous day’s incidents had been reported in several newspapers and there was considerable resentment at the bayonet charge on the Indian OR. According to the newspapers, three men had been killed, while 70 were injured in the bayonet charge. The District Magistrate declared Jubbulpore Cantonment a restricted area, and the entry of civilians was banned. During the next two days, the situation improved, but was still far from normal. The men in the cage refused to come out until their leaders were released. On 3rd March, troops of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade placed a cordon around the Signal Training Centre lines. The Area Commander and Commandant spoke to the men and asked them to return to work. Most of them agreed, and normal parades were held in the units. During the next two days several men returned and joined duty.  By                      7th March the situation had become           normal and there were no untoward incidents.

Seth Govind Das of the Congress Party raised the matter in the Central Assembly in Delhi. In his reply on 15th March 1946, the War Secretary, Mr. P. Mason gave the official version of the case. According to him, 1,716 persons were involved in the mutiny. He accepted that thirty-five persons had been wounded of whom eight had bayonet wounds. However, he denied that there was any firing or bayonet charge. According to him, some persons had sustained bayonet wounds when they attempted to overpower the troops that had been called in to arrest the ringleaders. Only two persons were seriously injured and there were no deaths. Mr. Ahmad Jaffar of the Muslim League suggested that a couple of members of the Defence Consultative Committee should be associated with the inquiry, but this was rejected by the War Secretary, who contended that this was a service matter and it would be quite illegal to associate non-officials.

The revolt had shocked the military establishment, especially the British officers who had always believed that the Indian soldiers would never let them down. The reasons for the disaffection were quickly analysed and remedial measures taken immediately. The District Commander issued instructions to all concerned to improve the standard of food and accommodation. A Board of Officers presided over by Lt Col Cassani brought to light the pathetic conditions under which the Indian troops lived. Officers, VCOs and NCOs who had been posted at the STC for more than two years were immediately posted out, after it was found that some of them had been there for 8–10 years. The SO-in-C, Maj Gen CHH Vulliamy directed that more Indian officers should be posted to the Centre, so that they could understand the problems of Indian troops. By April 1946, Lt Col TK Mukerjee and Maj Bhattcharjee were posted in as CO and 2IC of 2 Signal Training Battalion, with Capt KK Tewari taking over as Adjutant.

Disciplinary action taken against those who participated in the mutiny was severe and swift. 18 men were tried by Summary General Court Martial and sentenced to dismissal and imprisonment ranging from one to three years. In addition, 20 were dismissed after trial, and 41 discharged without any enquiry or investigation. Many more were sent home merely on suspicion and the statements of Junior and Non-Commissioned Officers who were considered loyal by British officers. Most of them had put in long years of service and fought in World              War II. They did not get any pension or gratuity and many lived and died in penury and their pleas for redress fell on deaf ears. There are several letters that bring out the pathetic state of these unfortunate soldiers, who remained true to their salt and helped the British win the Second World War. Having implicit faith in the British sense of fair play and justice, they were surprised and disappointed at the treatment they received at the hands of the Government of the day.

On the occasion of the                            25th Anniversary of Independence in 1972, the Government of India decided to honour those who had taken part in the freedom struggle and suffered hardships. The Prime Minister presented 'Tamra-Patras' to freedom fighters on this occasion. A scheme known as the 'Samman' pension scheme was introduced, under which a monthly pension is paid to the freedom fighter and after his death to his spouse. The Central and the State governments pay separate pensions, and the amount is periodically revised. In addition to the pension, the freedom fighter and his spouse are entitled to benefits such as free rail travel, medical treatment, old age homes, quotas for allotment of plots and houses, subsidised telephone connections etc. A list of mutinies and movements that qualify for the grant of the freedom fighters pension is given in the Citizen Charter for Freedom Fighters issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs. There are approximately 50 movements in the list, which contains only four from the Armed Forces. These are :–

* Suez Canal Army Revolt in 1943.

* Ambala Cantt. Army Revolt in 1943.

* Jhansi Regiment Case in Army (1940).

* Royal Indian Navy Mutiny, 1946.

The only one missing is the STC revolt of 1946. In fact, this was the last uprising by soldiers, and can be equated to the proverbial ‘last straw’ that broke the camel’s back. The Navy mutiny at Bombay had resulted in bad publicity for the Government, since it had to be suppressed by the use of force. The STC mutiny at Jabalpur occurred just two weeks later, and once again force had to be used to quell it. The Indian Navy then was a miniscule force, and the Army could easily handle disaffection in its ranks. But what if the Army itself was alienated? The prospect was too fearsome to even imagine and caused consternation and panic in Delhi and London.

There is another twist to the tale. About 200 men from signals who were captured by the Japanese had joined the INA. Like other INA personnel, they were dismissed from service after the War. After Independence, 12 of them were re-enrolled in the Army. After completing their colour service, they retired with full pensionary benefits. Being INA veterans, they were given the status of freedom fighters and became entitled to the ‘samman pension’. Thus, personnel of the Indian Signal Corps who joined the INA are presently getting two pensions, while those who took part in the STC mutiny are not getting even one.

          For some reason, the Corps of Signals chose to ignore the STC mutiny, even after Independence. Almost all the other revolts and uprisings were added to the list of freedom movements that qualify for the award of freedom fighters samman pension, benefiting the men who lost their freedom and their jobs. The Indian Navy has constructed a memorial at Bombay to commemorate the mutiny that took place in 1946 and annual functions are held to honour those who took part in it. The men who took part in the Jabalpur mutiny in 1946 deserve the status of freedom fighters to a much greater extent than many others who are in the list. This is the least that the Nation can do for them. Most of them are dead and many are too old to benefit from the privilege. If nothing else, they will be satisfied that an injustice has been undone, even if it was long overdue.

(Published in the Signalman, Oct 2003)

THE HIMALAYAN RALLY - A CHALLENGE

THE  HIMALAYAN  RALLY - A  CHALLENGE

Maj Gen VK Singh

          I was bitten by the rallying bug in October 1980, when the First Himalayan Rally took place.  The rally started from Bombay, and ended at Delhi, after covering about 4,000 km.  There was a regrouping halt at Jhansi, where I was then posted.  The Army had been requested to provide some assistance, in the form of radio communications, and that is how I became involved.  The rally was won by Shekhar Mehta and Lofty Drews, from Kenya, in an Opel Ascona.  An all women’s team from West Germany, comprising M Hoepfner and O Anderson, driving a Toyota Celica, came in second.  In third place was another German team, of W Siller and H Schuller, in a Datsun 160 J.

          During the first rally, there were some instances of stone throwing in Maharastra and Madhya Pradesh, instigated by a political party which felt that the event should not be held, because of the large expenditure of fuel.  Also, though it was called a Himalayan Rally, most of the driving was in the plains, and only the last leg saw some hill driving.  So in 1981, when the Second Himalayan Rally was held, it started and ended at Delhi, after covering some 3,800 km. Major halts were at Nainital, Mussourie, and Simla, with regrouping halts at Dehradun, Ranikhet and Rai.  Put off by the stone throwing in the first Rally, many foreign competitors, including Mehta, stayed away.  This Rally was won by Ramesh Khoda and Aslam Khan of Kenya, in a Datsun 160 J  Major Ravi Kapoor, of Engineers, with Lt GJ Singh as his co-driver, in a Jonga, came second, followed by Minoo Nanavaty, Darayus Bhathena and Gavin Hurtis in a Mahindra Jeep.

          Encouraged by the performance of Army teams, - only one had taken part in 1980, and three in 1981 (Engineers, EME and ASC) - the Army Adventure Foundation decided to field eight teams in 1982.  Based on Jongas, the teams were from the Armoured Corps, Mechanised Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Kumaon Regiment, ASC and EME.  Ravi Kapoor had been sponsored by Suzuki to drive one of their cars - the forerunner of the Maruti 800- but he met with an unfortunate accident near Karnal, during a test run, and could not take part.  The Mechanised Infantry team included a driver who had lost both his legs- Lt Col (later Lt Gen) Pankaj Joshi.  The Signals team comprised of Maj VK Singh, Maj SK Jain and Nk Ram Karan.

          This being our first rally, we were literally clueless.  Fortunately, those who had taken part earlier were able to guide us, but only to a limited extent.  The first thing to be done was to get a new vehicle released from the CVD.  Once this was done, work began on the modifications, which were carried out in various workshops and garages.  Some modifications, such as fitting the roll bar, the metal shield on the underside, circuit breakers, three point seat belts and of course the closed body, were mandatory.  Others, such as additional fuel tanks, lights, horns, leaf springs, shock absorbers, protective grills, tool boxes, intercom sets, navigator lights,  Halda Meter, etc were optional but necessary.  The Halda Meter had to be imported from UK, through a relative who had gone there on a holiday.  It was also essential to carry out a route recce, which took about two weeks, because most of the jungle and mountain tracks were in disrepair, after the monsoon.  We were assured that these would be repaired before the rally, but we were very skeptical.  Then, the vehicle which we took for the recce had to be changed thrice, and suffered numerous break downs.  Thanks to the ubiquitous line dets of Signals, we always found food and shelter, and able to get help in terms of repair and recovery, whenever this happened - which was often.

          Before proceeding further, it would be well to explain how a car rally is run.  Contrary to popular perception, it is not always the first driver to finish who is the winner.  The rally is a test not only of speed, but endurance, and the skill of the driver and the navigator.  The entire route is divided into legs, each terminating at a major halt, where a minimum halt of five hours is allowed.  Within a leg, there may be one or more regrouping halts.  This is done to ‘regroup’ the cars.  Due to the large difference in the speeds of foreign and Indian cars, the gap between them keeps gradually increasing, and time controls have to remain open for a long time.  For this reason, regrouping halts are made, where all cars halt, and are restarted after the last car has arrived, within the maximum permitted lateness.  No additional time is allowed for refuelling, repairs etc, which have to be done in the competitors time.  During halts, the vehicles are in parc ferme, and competitors cannot carry out any repairs or maintenance, except for cleaning the windscreen and replacing a flat tyre. Even during the rally, repairs have to be done by the team members themselves, or their designated service teams, which can be prepositioned, or follow. Outside help results in disqualification.

          Each leg has a number of sectors, which can be competitive or transport. Each sector starts and ends at a Time Control (TC), which is manned by a marshal, a timekeeper and a recorder. The organisers lay down an ideal time for each sector, which the competitor has to maintain. Penalties are awarded, for early as well as late arrival at a TC. One penalty point is awarded for each minute of lateness, and ten points for each minute of early arrival. In competitive sectors, which are run over jungle tracks or mountain roads, with little traffic, ideal timings are almost impossible to achieve, and everyone earns some penalties. Transport sectors are run on highways and roads with heavy traffic. To avoid accidents, ideal timings are very liberal, and are easy to achieve. To discourage overspeeding, penalties for early arrival are ten times higher than for late arrival.  As a result, nobody earns a penalty in the transport sector, unless there is a breakdown, or  miscalculation.

          In the Third Himalayan Rally, the first leg was almost 1300 km, ending at Nainital. It was divided into two sections, of 700 and 600 km respectively, separated by a regrouping halt, at Dehradun. In this leg, most of the driving was on jungle tracks. By the end of the first leg, almost half the competitors had dropped out, due to mechanical failures, accidents, or not being able to arrive within the maximum permitted lateness, which was seven hours for the first section, and ten hours for the second.  According to Nazir Hoosein, the Chairman of the Himalayan Rally Association, the first leg was deliberately kept longer, tougher, and mostly in the plains, in order to separate the men from the boys.  By the time the rally reached the treacherous mountain roads, only experienced and mature drivers were left in the race.  If one did not get lost, or have a breakdown, the fastest drivers, driving the high performance foreign cars, could finish the leg with as little as 10 points, while the Indian cars could rarely finish with less than 200.  At regrouping halts, where the minimum halt was 30 minutes, the foreign drivers could take a nap, since they had a lead of two to three hours.

          The Third Himalayan Rally was flagged off from the National Stadium, on 30 October 1982.  The cars were started at two minute intervals, to ensure a reasonable gap between them.  Two days before the start, I had broken my right middle finger, when our Jonga had overturned, during a trial run, so Jain was at the wheel.  We reached Dehradun without mishap, after about 15 hours of driving, most of it during the night.  After a short halt, we started on the second section, which was to end at Nainital.  We were coming down from Pauri towards Kotdwar, when there was strange sound from the differential, and when we stopped to investigate, we found that the oil had leaked out.  We had some with us, and topped it up, but it did not prove of much use, as some of the teeth seemed to be broken.  The answer was to change the whole rear axle, but obviously, this was not readily available.  Our service team fetched up only after two hours, and it took another four hours to interchange the axles of the  two Jongas.  Since there were only two jacks, these had to be switched repeatedly, before the task was accomplished.  We started off, after a delay of six hours.  We did reach Nainital, but being beyond the maximum permitted lateness, we were ‘timed out’, and had to retire.  We returned to Delhi, very dejected.  The rally was won by Jayant Shah and Aslam Khan, of Kenya, in a Datsun Violet ; in second place were Rudi Stohl and R Kaufman from Austria, in a Lada, while Ramesh Khoda came third.  The best performance from the Army was of the Armoured Corps team, led by Lt Col (later Lt Gen) SS Mehta, who was 8th overall, but third among Indian entries.

          When the next Rally was held, in October 1983, I was commanding the Mech Div Sig Regt.  Jain could not be spared, and Lt Col RK Nair was nominated to replace his as my co-driver.  Having learnt from our earlier mistakes, this time our preparations were thorough.  All parts which normally failed, such as half shafts and tie rods, were sent to CVRDE, Ahmednagar, for radiological and electronic tests.  Surprisingly, almost two thirds were found to be faulty.  To improve stability on turns, the centre of gravity of the vehicle was lowered, and the size of the crew reduced from three to two.  An anti puncture solution was injected into the tubes, so that there were no punctures.  At that time, this was not available in India, so all the Army teams shared the cost, and a private firm imported a barrel for us.  Instead of one there were four service teams, each under an officer or a JCO, with sufficient spares, and a vehicle mechanic.  These teams were prepositioned at selected locations along the route, and took turns following us, before handing over to the next one.  They would then use a short cut and reach their next location, on the rally route.  This ensured that the service team was never more than 30 minutes behind the rally vehicle.  As soon as the gap became larger, another prepositioned service   vehicle would take over, and the gap reduced to zero.

          When the Fourth Himalayan Rally was flagged off, we were in  high spirits.  The first sector of 257 km, ending at Ramnagar, was transport, with an ideal time of 275 minutes, so everyone took it easy.  After that, the fun started.  The next sector of 40 km, ending at Kehripur, had an ideal time of 33 minutes, which worked out to an average speed of 73 kmph.  In other words, one had to drive at over 80, on a narrow jungle track, full of sharp curves, wooden bridges, causeways, and riverbeds.  We arrived 15 minutes late, and earned                 15 penalty points.  We were quite disappointed, till we learned from others that we had not done too badly.  When we reached Dehradun at about six in the morning, we had accumulated 111 penalty points, which was the least among the Indian entries.  On the way, a stone thrown by a boy had smashed our windscreen, but otherwise we were in good shape, even after 15 hours of driving, without a break.

          After a short halt of three hours, we were flagged off at 0900 hours.  The 35 km sector to Mussourie was transport, with an ideal time of 50 minutes, to cater for refuelling etc.  We made the mistake of going to the EME repair det, to get our windscreen changed.  We thought it would take a few minutes - it was almost two hours before we drove off, with the screen still not fitted, but held in place by metal clamps welded at the four corners.  When we passed the point where our differential had packed up in 1982 we heaved a sigh of relief, which turned out to be premature.  We had crossed Kotdwar, and were heading for Kehripur, when there was a cracker like sound.  We stopped, and found that the water pump had burst.  Two service teams were right behind us, so we were not unduly worried.  It took about 30 minutes to change the pump.  We started again, but within      10 minutes, there was another explosion.  Ultimately , we had to change the water pump four times, and each time it burst.  When our stock was exhausted, we decided to have one more try, and borrowed one from another Army team.  We drove at 30 kmph for the rest of the distance, and had 961 penalty points when we checked in at Nainital.  This was way beyond the maximum permitted lateness of ten hours, and we knew that our fate was sealed.  Next morning, we were given a provisional start, and continued in the rally.  It was only after we reached Mussourie, the end of the second leg, that we were informed that we had been ‘timed out’, and had to retire.  Jayant Shah and Aslam Khan retained their first place, in Nissan 240 RS, followed by G Colsul and A Lopes of Belgium, in an Opel Ascona 400.  Ramesh Khoda had once gain to be content with third place.  The best performance among the Army teams was by the Armoured Corps team, led by Maj PPS Dhillon, who was overall 5th, and third among Indians.

          In 1984, the Signals team again had the 1982 combination of VK Singh and Jain.  Once again, we were plagued with mechanical problems, but fortunately, they were minor, and could be rectified.  But we did lose precious time, including some in the transport sectors, trying to carry out repairs.  When we reached the Savoy Hotel at Mussourie at 0839 hours on 30 October, we were doing reasonable well.  The restart was in the evening, so after a quick bath and a hearty breakfast, we retired for a nap.  After lunch, we were suddenly told that Indira Gandhi had been assassinated, and the restart might be delayed.  In the evening, it was announced that the rally was terminated.  Due to large scale riots in Dehradun and Delhi, competitors were advised to stay on at Mussourie.  However, the Army teams decided to move back, and forming a convoy, left for Delhi next day.  The scenes we saw en route, and on entering Delhi on the night of 31 October, were horrendous.  As for the Rally, it was won by Jayant Shah, for the third time in a row, with Lofty Drews as his navigator.  In second place was Rajiv Khanna and DJ Ferrao of Kenya, in an Opel Manta 400.  For the third year running, Ramesh Khoda was third, in a Subaru.  The Army teams did exceptionally well, with the Sikh Regiment team, led by Major Dalvinder Singh coming overall 5th, but winning the National Award for being the first among Indian entries.

          In 1985, I was posted to an inter-service establishment, and though Signals Directorate had detailed me for the event, my boss, who was a Naval officer, piqued at not having been asked for his concurrence, refused to spare me.  The Signals team that year comprised of  Lt Col SK Jain and Maj OP Beniwal, who was from my Regiment, and had been in charge of the Services team earlier. Very sensibly, they discarded the Jonga, and took a Maruti Gypsy, like almost everyone else.  The team did quite well, and finished in the first ten among Indian entries.  In fact, the Army teams did exceedingly well, with Capt KS Chauhan of Artillery winning the National Award, and four places out of the first five among Indian entries going to Army teams.  This was the last rally in which Signals fielded a team.  Capt Chauhan of Artillery went on to win the National Award, a record four times, and became the best rallyist in India.  He was sent to UK for training by the Himalayan Rally Association, but due to lack of a good car, and a sponsor, could not make his mark in the international arena.

          Participating in the Himalayan Rally was an unique experience.  Driving for 14-15 hours a day for five days, on treacherous roads, was a test of human endurance, and will power.  Several international drivers called it the toughest rally in the World.  Sir Philip Young, who had won the London-Sydney Marathon in 1969-70, took part each year, but could  never finish. It was also dangerous; in 1983, one of the Rally’s veteran drivers, Carl  Forsmark, lost his life, in addition to a member of the Mech Inf service team.  In 1984, Lt Col PS Gill and Lt Srivastava of the ASC died when their Jonga went off the road.  For the last ten years, the Himalayan Rally has not been held, due to lack of sponsors.  There are a large number of rallies being conducted in India, most of them in the South.  Most of them are two day events, with distances varying from 500 to 1000 km.  None of them are in the same league as the Himalayan Rally, which had become a popular event on the international circuit.  It is indeed a pity that almost ten years of hard work, in bringing up the rally to international standards, has ultimately come to a nought.

(Published in the Signalman, May 1998)

A VETERAN SIGNALLER DOES US PROUD

A VETERAN SIGNALLER DOES US PROUD

Maj Gen VK Singh

Almost every senior officer of the Armed Forces, serving and retired, is acquainted with Colonel VK Singh VSM, (Retd). Most signallers of the present generation would have heard of him, but may not know of his achievements. Vijay is presently the Deputy Director (Adm) of the United Services Institution of India, more popularly known as the USI. Commissioned in June 1963, from the First Emergency Commissioned Course (EC-1), he has had an illustrious career. As a young captain, he was a divisional officer in the NDA. Later, he commanded 19 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment, before serving in the Signals Directorate as Director (Sigs1). Age was against him, or else he would certainly have risen to the highest ranks in the Corps, given his undoubted merit and sterling qualities. 

On his retirement from active service in November 1991, he joined the USI, which was then in Kashmir House, behind the E-in-C’s office. Having spent 17 years with the USI, he is today the longest serving officer on its rolls. He played a key role in the move of the USI to its present location on Rao Tula Ram Marg, opposite the Signals Enclave in 1996. A large part of the credit for present standing of the USI in terms of facilities, ambience and academic excellence is due to him.

Though he modestly admits that he is neither a scholar nor a historian, this is not entirely true. The USI was established in 1870 and is one of the oldest academic institutions in the country. In fact, the USI Journal, published quarterly, is India’s oldest journal on defence affairs, a detail mentioned on its cover. It is read all over the World and frequently used as reference material by scholars. Noticing that the wealth of material available between its pages has never been indexed, Vijay decided to do it on his own. After painstaking work spread over several months, he compiled an index of USI journals from 1870 to 1970, covering one hundred years. This has now been put on the web site of the USI and is a boon for research scholars as well as general readers.

            Vijay’s most spectacular contribution is the compilation of History of the USI, which has recently been printed. Spending many hours after office and on Saturdays, pouring over old issues of the Journal and Minutes of Council/Executive Committee meetings, he has put together a detailed volume that covers not only the history of the USI but provides an insight into the functioning of the armed services during the British Raj and after Independence. As admitted by the Director, Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, who wrote the Foreword, the document was produced by Vijay “at entirely his own initiative as a ‘labour of love’ in every sense of the term.” Recognising the debt that the USI owes him for his contributions, General Nambiar adds: “what he has put together will serve the Institution and its members well in the years to come as reference book.”

Published in the Signalman, Jun 2009

The History Of The Corps - A Troubled Journey

The History Of The Corps - A Troubled Journey

Maj Gen VK Singh

It may come as surprise to most Signallers that a comprehensive regimental history of the Corps of Signals has still not been written.  Of course, there is a book that covers the history of the Indian Signal Corps, which existed till 14th August 1947, but it covers only the period up to the outbreak of World War II in 1939.  The history of the Indian Signal Corps from 1939 to 1947, and of its successor, the Corps of Signals, is yet to be written.  During the last fifty or sixty years, there have been several attempts to write the history of the Corps, but very few bore fruit.  The troubled journey of the history of the Corps is a story in itself, known to few among us.

Maj Gen RFH Nalder, who was the SO-in-C in India shortly before Independence, wrote a book entitled 'The Royal Corps of Signals – A History of Its Antecedents and Development (CIRCA 1800-1955).' Published in 1958, the book covers the activities of the Indian Signal Corps very briefly.  In India, a book entitled 'History of The Corps of Signals –Volume I–Early Times to Outbreak of Second World War (1939)' was published by the Corps of Signals Committee in 1975.  Based on the draft written by Brigadier Tery Barreto, this was the first time a comprehensive history of the Corps was published. Another ten years were to elapse before another ‘abridged’ history of Corps, written by Col VA Subramanyam, was published by the Corps Committee in 1986.  This covered the entire period, from the earliest times to the date of writing, and thus  overlapped the period upto 1939 that had already been covered by the earlier book.  The coverage  of World War II was cursory, as was the treatment of operations after Independence.  Most of the present generation of officers have read or heard only about Subramanyan’s book, and believe it to be the regimental history of the Corps, which it is not.

The preface to Volume I of the book published in 1975 indicates that Volume II, when published, would cover the period of World War II up to the partition of the Corps in 1947, while Volume III would cover the post–independence history of the Corps. (According to Brigadier Tery Barreto, who wrote the draft, the title should have been 'History of The Indian Signal Corps and Its Antecedents'–it   was changed without his knowledge–since it was the Indian Signal Corps that existed before  Independence, and not the Corps of Signals.  Also Volume III was originally planned to contain only appendices).  A lot of work has been put in by various Corps historians and monographers in collecting material for Volume II during World War II and afterwards, but unfortunately, the book could not be published.  It is only recently that the Corps Committee has decided to make amends and publish Volumes II and III.  Once this is done, we will, God willing, have an authoritative regimental history of the Corps.

The earliest known attempt towards compilation of the history was in                 May 1923, when Major AW Pulverman, Commandant Signal Training Centre & Depot, addressed a letter to all commanding officers to forward material for compilation of a Digest of Service, in accordance with the King's Regulations. At about the same time, Major F Church, the Records Officer, wrote to several individual officers with a similar request. In 1934, Major CEJ Reynolds from the STC submitted to the SO-in-C a voluminous document entitled Notes For Historical Record Of Signals In India & The Indian Signal Corps. This covered the period up to 1933, and nobody seems to have made any addition to it after this date. In 1935, Major GLG Pollard attempted to obtain historical material, primarily for the souvenir for the 1936 Reunion. During the same year, Major WA Scott from the Signals Directorate began collecting material for a short history of the Corps after 1918. There appear to have been no further attempts in this direction till the outbreak of World War II in 1939.

During and after the War, efforts to compile the history gained momentum. This was primarily due to the designation of an officer as the 'Corps Monographer.' (Till very recently, I was not even aware that an appointment like this ever existed). The first one I came across was Lt Col EC Thomson, Royal Signals, who was posted as GSO 1 ( Signals  3) in Army Headquarters from 1940 to 43. He wrote an excellent account of the War, entitled The First Four Years, that covers the period from 1939 to 1943. The monograph covers almost every aspect of the Corps during the period, including personnel, organization, training, equipment, ciphers, development of communications, expansion and Indianisation and so on. In 1944, Major RN Batra was detailed to compile the Signals portion of the War Department history of World War II.

In 1947, the establishment for writing a monograph on Signals in World War II was formally sanctioned, and Major EG Lomas was appointed. He wrote a historical monograph entitled Signals And Intercommunication, which is a review of the activities of units of Royal and Indian Signals during World War II, though the history of Signals from the earliest times has been covered in brief. This was evidently prepared for the Historical Section of General Headquarters (India) by Signals Directorate, to enable a history of the Corps to be written at a later date. Only the first two chapters dealing with the early history of the Corps and the position up to 1939 were written. Of the remaining three chapters that were to cover events during the war, the post-war period and the lessons learnt, Lomas could only make brief notes, and these were perhaps not completed. This may be the reason why the Historical Section never came round to writing the official history of the Corps of Signals during World War II. Incidentally, the Combined Inter Services Historical Section (India and Pakistan) that was created after Independence produced the official history of the Indian Armed Forces in World War II in 17 volumes. Each arm and service has been covered, with Signals being the lone exception.

The next document was produced by Lt Col M Cohen, who held the appointment of Corps Monographer from 4 Dec 1953 to 4 Dec 1954. This covers a period of about a hundred years, and is in fact a brief history of the Corps from the earliest times. A large portion of it is based on Thomson's report prepared a decade earlier. In his note to the DD Sigs dated 4 Dec 1954, signed as GSO 1 (Mono), Cohen has made some very interesting comments and recommendations. Some extracts are given below : -

"For the future, may I suggest that any person writing a further history of the Corps of Signals should be allowed at least 18 months. That there be another officer, JCO or a senior NCO to assist in the research."

"If a history of World War is required in the immediate future, it is useful to allow the officer at least two months in the UK for most of the Commanding Officers during the war are there. Besides, it is known a lot of official information not held here is in the UK."

The appointment of Corps Monographer expired in December 1954, and was  never revived. This was also time when the Royal Signals officers, including the SO-in-C, Brigadier CHI Akehurst, returned to England. However, the task of writing or updating the Corps history continued, mainly due to the interest taken by the DD Sigs, Colonel Tery Barreto, who volunteered to compile the history of the Indian Signal Corps  up to 1947. He had started collecting material on his own in 1951 when he was doing the Staff Course and continued working on the project during his subsequent tenures as CO 20 Infantry Divisional Signal Regiment (1952–53); DD Sigs (1953–56); CSO Southern Command (1956–60); CSO Western Command (1960–63) and Commandant School of Signals (1963–65).

The 10th CCM held in March 1957 formally assigned to Brigadier Tery Barreto the responsibility of completing the Corps History on which he had been working on his own till then. From 1958 to 1965, Tery submitted an annual report to the CCM on the progress of the history, as the Chairman of the Corps History Committee. He corresponded with several hundred serving and retired signallers and their widows, both in India and abroad. He also interacted with Maj Gen Nalder who has acknowledged his contribution in his book on the history of the Royal Signals. He had letterheads printed with the title 'Chairman, Corps History Committee', and used this in his correspondence.

In June 1964, Tery submitted the draft of Volume I to Lt Gen AC Iyappa who had relinquished the appointment of SO-in-C but was still the Chairman of the Corps Committee. Shortly afterwards, Tery decided to proceed on premature retirement and put in his papers. Before he left, he handed over all the material he had laboriously collected and meticulously catalogued over almost               15 years. In fact, by the time he retired in 1965, Tery had not only completed the draft of Volume I, but also collected a fair amount of material for Volumes II and III. Then why did it take ten years to publish Volume I ? And why were the subsequent volumes never published ? That is an interesting story.

Two years after Tery's retirement, the Corps Committee decided to publish Volumes I and II. The 17th CCM held in 1967 gave the responsibility to Lt Col GY Sowani. Four years were to elapse before he visited Jabalpur in 1971, and submitted a report after examining the records held there. After he expressed his inability to complete the task, various writers were contacted; including Lt Col CL Proudfoot, Colonel Pyara Lal and Colonel V Anantahraman. Finally Colonel Pyara Lal agreed to edit the draft of Volume I that had been prepared by Tery, and worked on it with the help of a professional editor from a leading national daily. Meanwhile, Major KS Kapur took on the assignment of writing Volume II, and all available material from Mhow and Jabalpur was carted to Delhi and handed over to him. However, he later gave up the task due to ill health, and in 1972, the job landed in the lap of the ISTT, Brigadier KD Bhargava, who expressed his reluctance to take on the assignment. The 24th CCM held in 1973 overruled the objections and decided that the ISTT would be responsible for writing both Volumes II and III. The available material was again carted to Jabalpur and handed over to the ISTT. Lt Col JC Dhamija was given the task to compile the Corps history and he began working on the project in 1973.

The History Of The Corps Of Signals–Volume I–Early Times To Outbreak Of Second World War (1939) Volume I, based on Tery's draft, was finally published in 1975 by the Corps of Signals Committee. Apart from changing the title, the author's note written by Tery was replaced by an unsigned preface. The Corps Committee published the book but there was no foreword by the Colonel Commandant or the SO-in-C. It gave no credit to the author, unlike the Royal Signals history, which gives full credit to General Nalder. As can be imagined, Tery Barreto was not exactly happy with the manner in which the book was published. Having worked on it with single-minded devotion for almost a decade, one can understand his feelings at being ignored on the occasion of the culmination of his labours. However, his love for the Corps remains untarnished even today–he has readily agreed to collaborate with the writing of Volume II, which is now underway.           This is a sterling example of esprit de corps and generosity that has few parallels.

Returning to the story of Volumes II and III, Brigadier Surjit Singh, the ISTT, became Chairman of the Corps History Committee in 1976. Realising that there had been no progress in the matter, he decided to approach Tery Barreto and request him to assist in compilation of the Volumes II and III. Considering the way he had been treated in the past, Tery's reluctance was understandable. However, he agreed to take on the job, provided certain conditions were guaranteed. Unfortunately, these were not met, and the proposal was dropped. The proposal seems to have been buried for several years, before it was revived almost a decade later, when Colonel VA Subramanyam was assigned the task of producing a history of the Corps. All the material was again carted from Mhow and Jabalpur to Delhi, and a cell comprising several officers and secretarial staff was established to assist in the project. Inexplicably, instead of writing Volume II, covering the period 1939 to 1947, it was decided to compile the history of the Corps from the very beginning. Though ample material was available for a comprehensive chronicle, it was decided to publish only a condensed and abridged version. It appears that the author was not given a free hand and there were restrictions in terms of the size of the book as well the deadline for completing the project.

More than twenty-five years have elapsed since Volume I was published. We have still not been able to bring out Volume II and III. Several units that took part in World War II went to Pakistan, and their war diaries are no longer available. Almost every officer who served during that period is dead, with a few exceptions. As a result, it will be almost impossible to get personal accounts, which are the essence of a regimental history, and which a technical monograph can never replace. A half-century has been wasted because of half-hearted attempts and the decline of institutions such as Corps Monographer and the Corps History Cell, which were created for the purpose of updating the Corps History. A Corps Directive exists, making the Corps History Cell a part of the Traditions and Publications Sub Committee based at Mhow. As long as he was in service, Tery Barreto looked after the Corps History Cell almost single-handedly. Ever since his retirement                 in 1965, this has been virtually defunct.

            The Corps Committee has recently decided to complete the long overdue publication of Parts II and III of the Corps History. A team headed by the author, based at Delhi, is now engaged in writing Volume II of the History of the Corps of Signals–or the Indian Signal Corps, to be precise–covering the period 1939  to 1947. This will be followed by  Volume III, which will cover the post-independence history of the Corps. As mentioned earlier, Brigadier Tery Barreto has agreed to lend a hand, in spite of his age–he is eighty-two–and failing eyesight. He has already loaned personal copies of several books and bound copies of The Signalman, and willingly gives his advice whenever it is solicited. All the existing archival material has recently been moved to Delhi to facilitate production of Volume II. This is a good time to revive the Corps History Cell, which could build up on the cell at Delhi. In fact, one of the officers from the team can be appointed the Corps Monographer, so that the momentum already gained is not lost. Perhaps the present and future generation of Signallers will take greater interest in preserving the heritage and history of the Corps than their predecessors.

(Published in the Signalman,  2001)