THE INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY – A BRIEF HISTORY
Birth
of the INA
The INA was formally created in
December 1941 by Captain Mohan Singh of 1/14 Punjab Regiment and Major Fujiwara
Iwaichi of the Japanese Army. Mohan Singh claims that after his capture by the
Japanese in Malaya on 11 December 1941 he was inspired by a sudden burst of
patriotic feeling that had lain dormant until that time. According to him, he was encouraged by
Japanese propaganda that exhorted all Asian races to ‘kick out the white devils
from the East’, and thought that if he approached the Japanese to help him in
starting a movement for India’s independence, he would be able to attract a
large number of soldiers. At that time, Mohan Singh felt that his force ‘would
provide India with a new weapon, an organized and patriotic army to back up the
non-violent struggle being carried from within by the Indian National Congress’.1
1. Gen. Mohan Singh, Soldiers’
Contribution to Indian Independence, p.67
In
fact, the creation of the INA was part of a well-planned strategy evolved by
Japan even before the commencement of the war in the Pacific. Indian
nationalist movements had taken root in Thailand, Malaya, Burma and Sumatra,
under the leadership of Baba Amar Singh and Sardar Pritam Singh. In Japan, Rash
Behari Bose, Raja Mahendra Pratap and AM Sahay formed the nucleus of the Indian
nationalist movement. Even before Japan entered the war, the Imperial General
Headquarters in Tokyo sent Major Fujiwara Iwaichi to Bangkok to enlist the
support of the Indian nationalist elements in South East Asia and induce the
defection of Indian soldiers of the British Army, should war break out. An
agreement was signed between Amar Singh and Colonel Tamura of the Japanese Army,
according to which the Indian Independence League (IIL) agreed to collaborate
with the Japanese by inciting and undermining the loyalty of the soldiers of
the Indian Army. Leaflets in English, Gurmukhi and Hindustani were kept ready
to be thrown among them exhorting them to disobey the orders of their English
commanders if asked to fight against the Japanese.2
2. TR Sareen, Japan and the Indian
National Army, pp. 51-52
On 8 December 1941 the Japanese
invaded Malaya. Captain Mohan Singh’s battalion, 1/14 Punjab, was part of 15
Indian Infantry Brigade, then deployed near Jitra. After a preparatory
bombardment with mortars, Japanese tanks attacked the position on 11 December
1941. The battalion literally disintegrated, with most of the personnel being captured
immediately or during the course of the next few days, while trying to escape
southwards towards Singapore. Mohan Singh was part of a group that included his
CO, Lieutenant Colonel LV Fitzpatrick, who was wounded.3
3. Joyce C. Lebra, Jungle Alliance – Japan
and the Indian National Army, pp.16-18. (Lebra erroneously writes that
Mohan Singh was the second-in-command of the battalion. In fact, there were
several officers senior to him, including Major VDW Anderson, the 2ic).
On 15 December 1941 Mohan Singh’s group met Major
Fujiwara and Giani Pritam Singh, who had been following the Japanese as they
advanced through Malaya. Pritam Singh and Fujiwara explained to Mohan Singh
their plans for raising an army to fight for Indian independence. Mohan Singh
was highly impressed with Fujiwara, who was a genuine idealist and a great
believer in the concept of the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. With
arguments backed by phrases such as ‘Asia for Asiatics’ and India’s ‘shackles
of slavery’, Fujiwara convinced Mohan Singh that India was not going to be free
by non-violent methods being advocated by Mahatma Gandhi. If Indians wanted
freedom, they would have to fight for it. He told Mohan Singh, ‘If you
really want freedom for your country you must aspire to do something active.
You must raise an Indian National Army’. 4
4. Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger,
p.3.
After detailed discussions with
Fujiwara, Mohan Singh agreed to raise the INA according to the model suggested
by the Japanese. It soon became apparent that the role that the Japanese
government was ready to allot to the INA was marginal. Instead of a fighting
force, the Japanese intended to use the INA for propaganda purposes,
particularly to foster anti-British feeling among Indian soldiers and the
Indians in the region, for controlling prisoners of war and for maintaining law
and order among the Indian population. Though Mohan Singh found Fujiwara to be
a well-informed person, he felt that his knowledge of the strength and position
of the Congress in India was poor. Whereas he had great regard for Mahatma
Gandhi as a saint, he had not the slightest faith in his glorified weapon of
non- violence. Mohan Singh tried to convince Fujiwara that under the prevailing
conditions in India, the Congress method of fighting the British was the only
practical one.5
5. Mohan Singh, p.78
It took less than 15 days for Mohan Singh to change
his opinion about Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress, and fall in line with the
stance of the Japanese. After discussions in Taiping on 30-31 December 1941,
during which the Japanese handed over a memorandum on the role of the INA,
Mohan Singh wrote to Fujiwara on 1 January 1942, agreeing to accept the
leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose and modifying his views with regard to the
Congress: “The day Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose’s name comes before us, we
promise that if it suits our purpose we will openly condemn the Indian National
Congress”. 6
6. Mohan Singh, p.86
After
the battle of the Shin River on 7 January 1942, three Indian infantry brigades
were dispersed. Many Indian prisoners of war, after being subjected to
intensive propaganda by Mohan Singh and his men, agreed to transfer their
allegiance to the Japanese. Singapore fell on 15 February 1942, and a large
number of Allied soldiers surrendered. Different figures have been given by
historians about the total number of Allied prisoners, the number of Indian
soldiers and the number that agreed to join the INA. According to Mohan Singh,
45,000 Indian soldiers were handed over by Lieutenant Colonel Hunt to Fujiwara
at Farrer Park on 17 February 1942, who handed them over to Mohan Singh.
However, Menezes gives the figure of Indian soldiers as 60,000, which is also
the number mentioned by Cohen, relying on Winston Churchill’s History of the
Second World War. After Mohan Singh spoke to the assembled Indian prisoners at
Farrer Park, most of them cheered enthusiastically. They were then sent to the
Bidadari Camp, but the officers were separated from the men and not allowed to
talk to the latter. During the next few days, the prisoners were asked to volunteer
for the INA, with implied threats by the Japanese that the non-volunteers would
be ill-treated, and the leaders in any non-cooperation would be shot.7
7. Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and
Honour – The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, p.382
Estimates vary as to the actual
numbers that joined the INA when it was formed. Mohan Singh writes that 42,000
men volunteered, while 13,000 remained non-volunteers. According to him, approximately one third
of the officers and one fifth of the VCOs did not join. Gerard Corr writes that
out of the 55,000-60,000 Indian prisoners, probably about 20,000 enlisted
immediately.8 Approximately the same figure is given by Joyce
Lebra, who writes that close to 25,000 of the 45,000 Indians taken prisoner at
Singapore did not volunteer.9
8. Gerard H. Corr, The War of the
Springing Tigers, p. 116
9. Lebra, p.83.
Mohan Singh promoted himself from
captain to general, and became the GOC (General Officer Commanding) of the
INA. He set about organizing the newly
formed Army, using novel techniques. All subedars and subedar majors were given
the rank of captain, while jemadars were made lieutenants. To gain the
confidence of these newly promoted officers, who were much older than the
Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs), Mohan Singh decided to give them command
of battalions and brigades, using the ICOs to fill staff appointments such as
brigade major, staff captain, adjutant etc. The command of the brigade was
given to Subedar Onkar Singh of 5/4 Punjab Regiment.
The
first INA division was raised on 1 September 1942. Mohan Singh wanted to raise
two divisions, but the Japanese agreed to only one. The division had three
brigades, which were commanded by Lieutenant Colonels IJ Kiani (Gandhi
Brigade), Aziz Ahmed Khan (Nehru Brigade) and Prakash Chand (Azad Brigade).
Lieutenant Colonel JKT Bhonsle was given command of No. 1 Field Force Group,
which had three infantry battalions and a heavy gun battalion. Lieutenant
Colonel Burhan-ud-din commanded the Bahadur Group. The other functionaries were
Major Jaswant Singh (Intelligence Group); Colonel MS Brar (Propaganda and
Welfare Group), Lieutenant Colonel Kulwant Rai (Medical Group), Major SA Malik
(Reinforcement Group), Lieutenant Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan (Officers Training School)
and Major AB Mirza (HQ POWs).
Gradually, Mohan Singh began to
realize that the Japanese had no intention of building up the INA into a strong
military force. They wanted to use the INA more as a political pawn than a
military weapon. In fact, the role that they had envisaged for the INA was
propaganda, fifth column duties and minor military operations. They hoped that
when they marched into India with the INA ‘they would be acclaimed as
liberators of India and Indians would automatically join them and the plum of
victory will fall into their lap, ripened by the heat of their own activity.
Thus they intended to use us as spies, euphemistically calling us patriots and
freedom fighters’. 10
10. Mohan Singh, p.201
Disillusioned by the Japanese
attitude and his differences with Rash Behari Bose, the President
of the IIL, Mohan Singh decided to dissolve the INA. On 21 December 1942 he
signed a Special Order of the Day formally dissolving the INA. The Japanese
promptly arrested Mohan Singh, and placed the INA under the IIL, headed by Rash
Behari Bose, an Indian revolutionary who had married a Japanese and lived in
Tokyo. He was under the influence of the Japanese and Mohan Singh had earlier
refused to accept his authority over the INA, leading to differences between
them. Though Mohan Singh had taken a pledge from his officers that the INA
would not be raised again, this was soon forgotten. JKT Bhonsle became the new
Commander of the INA, with the title of Director, Military Bureau.
The
Arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose
Subhas Chandra Bose was then in
Germany, having reached there after his dramatic escape in January 1941 from
Calcutta, where he had been placed under house arrest by the British
authorities. With the support of the Germans, he had tried to raise the Indian
Legion from the Indian prisoners of war in North Africa. However, he met with
limited success, and only about three thousand prisoners agreed to join him. It
was only after a year that Bose was able to have an audience with Hitler, and
request him to recognize his movement or at least announce that India would be
granted independence after the war. Hitler felt that such a declaration was
premature, and asked Bose to wait until German forces had advanced far enough.
After German losses at Alamein and Stalingrad, it became clear that this would
not happen. Bose then requested the Germans to arrange his move to South East
Asia, where he had already been invited to take over the IIL and the INA. On 8
February 1943 Bose left Kiel in a German submarine, accompanied by Abid Hasan.
On 28 April 1943 he was transferred to a Japanese submarine near Madagascar,
reaching Sabang in Northern Sumatra on 6 May and Tokyo on 16 May 1943. This was
not the first, or indeed the last time that Bose left his followers to their
fate, moving to greener pastures. In the words of Fay: “Bose left behind
three thousand Indian men in Wehrmacht uniforms whose future would be half-hearted
participation in the manning of the Atlantic Wall and then a British prisoner
of war cage – three thousand men and a wife and child”. 11
11. Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army,
p.200
On his arrival in Tokyo, Bose found
the Japanese more accommodating than the Germans. Prime Minister Tojo received
him soon after his arrival, and was quite receptive to his project of forming a
provisional government in exile. On 16 June 1943 Tojo made a declaration in the
Diet that Japan was firmly resolved to extend all help to India to achieve full
independence. This was music to the ears of Bose, who had tried for almost two
years to get a similar commitment from Hitler, without success. He made a
series of radio broadcasts, publicizing his presence in South Asia, calling
Japan India’s greatest friend. He
received a tumultuous welcome when he reached Singapore on 2 July 1943, followed
by week-long celebrations that were later commemorated annually as ‘Netaji
Week.’ On 4 July he accepted the Presidency of the IIL and the allegiance of
the INA, which he reviewed on the next day, giving it the battle cry ‘Chalo
Dilli’ (To Delhi). Two days later,
another parade was held, at which Tojo himself took the salute.
On 8 August 1943 Subhas Chandra Bose
assumed personal command of the INA. Unlike Mohan Singh, who had taken the rank
of general, Bose held no military rank – he was just the Supreme Commander.
However, he wore a uniform that was neither Indian nor British, but was similar
to what he had seen in Italy and Germany – breeches, tunic and jack boots. (The
only other member of the INA to wear breeches was Captain Lakshmi Swaminathan,
who commanded the Rani of Jhansi Regiment). The uniform was not the only thing
Bose took from the Germans and Italians.
Hitler and Mussolini had titles – Fuehrer and Il Duce – and deciding
that he too must have one, he settled on ‘Netaji’ (The Leader). On 21
October 1943 Bose announced the formation of the Arzi Hukumat-e-Hind, or
the Provisional Government of Free India, which was recognized by Japan,
Germany, Italy and some other countries that were under Axis domination. A few
days later, the Provisional Government declared war on Great Britain and the
United States. Bose made the declaration of war at a rally of fifty thousand
Indians, who were asked to ratify it, by standing up and raising their hands if
they were prepared to lay down their lives. The audience rose instantly,
cheering, raising their rifles in the air, and shouting, “Netaji Ki Jai!
Inqilab Zindabad! Chalo Delhi!” The declaration proved to be a windfall for
the new government – during the next few days over thirteen million dollars
were collected from Indians in Singapore and Malaya. The money was spent as
soon as it poured in.12
12. Lebra, p.130; M. Sivaram, The Road to Delhi, p.158
In November 1943 Bose was invited to
Tokyo for the Greater East Asia Conference, which he attended as an observer.
During his visit, he met Prime Minister Tojo and requested that Japan formally hand
over to the Provisional Government of Free India the Andaman and Nicobar
islands in the Bay of Bengal, which the Japanese had occupied in early 1942.
This would give his government a measure of legitimacy, he reasoned. Tojo
demurred, since the islands were strategically important, and the Japanese Navy
was bound to object strongly. Finally, a compromise was reached. Tojo announced
that Japan was ready to hand over the islands shortly, as the initial evidence
of her readiness to help in India’s struggle for independence. This was a declaration of intent, not a de
facto transfer. The distinction was significant, for the next step – the actual
transfer of administration – was never taken by the Japanese Government.13
13. Lebra, p.133
Military
Operations Conducted by the INA
From
the day of its inception, Mohan Singh had been pressing for the INA to be sent
to the front to take part in actual operations and wanted to raise two
divisions. However, the Japanese agreed to only one. Mohan Singh soon realised
that the Japanese were not serious about making the INA a strong force that
could conduct regular military operations. After the ‘dissolution’ of the first
INA in December 1942, its strength had dropped to 12,000. After the arrival of
Subhas Chandra Bose, about 10,000 prisoners agreed to join and it was decided
to raise two more divisions. The first operational exposure of the INA was in a
minor role in the Arakan, where it was employed in small detachments. This was followed by two operations in Imphal
and on the Irrawaddy, for which Bose was able to convince the Japanese to allot
specific sectors to the INA, instead of using it in penny packets. Bose
repeatedly stressed that advance into India must be led by the INA, and ‘the
first drop of blood to be shed on Indian soil should be that of a member of the
INA.’
In
the Arakan offensive in February 1944, INA special groups comprising espionage
and propaganda elements totalling about 250 men were part of the Japanese
offensive against the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions. These
men were organised in small parties that had mainly nuisance value, shouting
propaganda or confusing orders in encounters with British-Indian troops,
leading them sometimes into Japanese ambushes and spying out their defensive
positions. One of these parties led by Major LS Misra managed to subvert an
Indian outpost held by a platoon of Gwalior Lancers. This was touted as major
success by the INA, Bose calling it an ‘active and important’ part in a great
Japanese victory, which alas never materialized, the Arakan battle ending in a
shattering defeat for the Japanese.14
14. Toye, p. 105.
The
next operation in which the INA took part was the Japanese offensive against
Imphal in March 1944. A group of about 150 irregulars of the INA Special Forces
was attached to each of the three divisions that the Japanese employed in
Imphal. The only regular INA division available was the 1st INA
Division, under Colonel MZ Kiani – the 2nd Division was in Malaya -
which comprised the 1st (Subhas) Regiment with a strength of 3,000
men, and the 2nd and 3rd Regiments, each two thousand
strong. (The regiments were akin to brigades, and were sometimes referred to as
such). The first to be mobilized was the Subhas Regiment, under Lieutenant
Colonel Shah Nawaz Khan, which was sent to the front with great fanfare, after
a farewell speech by Bose himself on 3 February 1944. No. 1 Battalion, under
Major PS Raturi was despatched to the Kaladan Valley, while No. 2 and 3
Battalions (Majors Ran Singh and Padam Singh) were to proceed to Haka and Falam
area in the Chin Hills.
No.
1 Battalion reached the Kaladan Valley on 24 March, as the 81st West
African Division was withdrawing. It had
several skirmishes with the rear guards, suffering a few casualties. It
remained there intact, without further encounter, until September, posting a
company at Mowdok in the Sangu Valley, on Indian soil, during the monsoon. The
crossing of the border was accompanied by great jubilation. According to the
Japanese plan, Imphal was to be captured by 10th April 1944. The 2nd
and 3rd Guerilla Regiments reached Rangoon only in March, when the
offensive was well underway and there was little chance of them playing a role
in the battle. However, Bose had persuaded General Kawabe to let them at least
enter Imphal on the heels of the Japanese.
In any case, nobody expected
that these men would have to fight. They were to line the route at
Bose’s entry into Imphal and assist in the formation of the new divisions
there.15
15. Toye, p. 106
The
2nd Guerilla Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel IJ Kiani) together with
the headquarters of the 1st INA Division commenced their move from
Rangoon on 25 March. On his arrival at Maymyo on 28 March the Divisional
Commander, Colonel MZ Kiani, was told that if he wished to be present at the
fall of Imphal, he should immediately rush his force to Tamu and join the
Yamamoto Force, which was part of the Japanese 33rd Division. 2nd
Regiment moved post-haste, leaving behind all its heavy baggage, mortars and
machine guns at Kalewa, with the men carrying only a blanket, a rifle and fifty
rounds of ammunition. The Regiment reached the village of Khanjol towards the
end of April, and was informed that it would take part in the attack on Palel
airfield, in conjunction with the Japanese thrust, which was planned for 1 May.
With great difficulty the Regiment was able to muster 300 ex-Indian Army
soldiers, who were grouped in a task force under the command of Major Pritam
Singh, a staff officer at divisional headquarters who volunteered to lead the
assault. The force left Khanjol on the night of 30 April, but took almost two
days to travel the twelve miles to the assembly area, reaching there on 2 May.
The Japanese attack had gone in a day earlier from the East, but Pritam Singh
decided to attack from the South on his own.
The
attack was launched on the night of 2 May. At about 2230 hours the leading
company, moving in extended order, ran into a platoon of 4/10 Gurkha Rifles,
about five miles short of the objective. The INA soldiers had been assured that
neither British nor Indian troops would fire on them, and were talking and
smoking as they walked, with no semblance of discipline. The Gurkhas, forewarned of their approach,
waited for them to reach a suitable position and then opened fire. The INA
soldiers panicked and scattered, but Pritam Singh rallied some of them and
approached again, this time more cautiously. He tried to parley with the
Gurkhas, asking them not to fire. When this failed, the INA column attacked the
platoon, but was beaten back. Pritam Singh launched seven attacks, before
deciding to call it off. He ordered a withdrawal, sending a patrol to carry out
reconnaissance for a new attack and calling his regimental commander for help.
Two INA officers and many soldiers were killed; about thirty-five more
surrendered or were captured. The Gurkhas lost two killed. Shortly afterwards
the regimental headquarters was attacked by a company of the Frontier Force
Rifles, followed by an air strike, in which fifty INA soldiers were killed and
about the same number wounded. An artillery concentration severely shook the
morale of the rest, and Kiani ordered the 2nd Regiment to withdraw
to Khanjol. The reconnaissance patrol sent by Pritam Singh had also
surrendered.16
16. Toye, p. 226.
The
failure at Palel and the casualties were a severe jolt to the morale of the
INA, which had come to believe the assurance given by Bose that propaganda and
not firepower would decide the result when they would face Indian troops. Even
for the Japanese, the battle was not going according to plan. By the first week
of May the offensive of the Yamamoto Force had lost steam. The INA continued to
hold Khanjol and Mittong Khunue in spite of frequent attacks and temporary
withdrawals. Rains throughout May and
June restricted activity on both sides to patrolling and the 2nd
Guerilla Regiment did not fight any more battles. But the effects of climate,
hunger and malaria took a heavy toll and by the beginning of July, the strength
of the Regiment was down to 750 men. On 3 July an Indian battalion, the 4th
Mahratta Light Infantry, attacked and cleared Khanjol, which was held by just
50 men, and occupied Mittong Khunue. The Indian battalion did not advance
further, and continued to hold the end of the Mombi track until it finally
withdrew in the third week of July.
The
3rd Guerilla Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Gulzara Singh, did
not play any significant part in the Imphal battle. The Regiment reached Tamu
on 26 May after the monsoon had broken and was ordered to occupy a defensive
position around Narum. One battalion was used for transport duties with the
other two occupying the villages of Lamyang, Keipham and Khosat. The Regiment
was already depleted by sickness when it arrived in the battle area. The rains
and irregular supplies added to their woes, reducing the strength of the
battalions to almost half. Both the 2nd and 3rd Guerilla
Regiments and the remnants of the 1st Regiment began to withdraw on
18 July 1944.
Though
the campaign ended in July, by the end of April 1944 it had become clear that
the offensive against Imphal was not going well. However, INA headquarters in
Maymyo, without any means of communications with the forward troops, was
unaware of this development, and in mid-May, Bose sent three senior ministers
of his cabinet - Chatterji, Alagappan and AM Sahay – to Tamu, partly in order
that they might be at hand when Imphal was entered, and to buy up supplies,
relieve the INA difficulties and bring back an accurate report. Their report
reached Bose towards the end of June, but he was still unaware of the actual
state of affairs. Even on 10 July, when the Japanese officially informed Bose
that the Imphal campaign was being abandoned, he appeared to have no inkling of
the magnitude of the disaster. (No one has been able to explain the reason for
lack of communications between Bose and his field commanders. There must have
been hundreds of wireless sets in the equipment captured from the British at
Singapore. Bose also had a secret radio link to Germany, on which he sometimes
spoke to Nambiar, and also his wife). Netaji Week was celebrated in Rangoon
with customary gusto, including parades, speeches and cultural events. Bose
issued a statement on the year’s progress, and finalised the government
organisation that would be needed once Imphal was captured. He broadcast
messages to the people of India, including those who worked for the government,
and to soldiers of the Indian Army, assuring them that they would be taken into
the INA after victory, and their service would count towards their INA
pensions!
The
decision to suspend the Imphal campaign was made public on 26 July, the day the
Japanese Prime Minister Tojo resigned. It was only in August when survivors
from the front began arriving in Rangoon with tales of horrible deaths due to
disease and starvation that Bose was enlightened of the magnitude of the
tragedy that had befallen his soldiers. On 19 August there was a desperate
appeal from Colonel Kiani to intervene with the Japanese to save hundreds of
sick men stranded by floods on the withdrawal route. Bose was helpless, for the
Japanese were themselves in dire straits and could do little to help the INA.
Bose blamed the Japanese for the debacle, by denying essential supplies to the
INA, and recommended the dissolution of the Hikari Kikan that had been
responsible for this task. In future, the INA would look after all their
administration themselves, he declared. He was enraged when he came to know of
the large number of desertions in the INA and publicly berated the officers for
their lack of leadership, which resulted in low morale of the troops. Of 6000
men that had been sent the front, at least 1500 had deserted or been captured.
In
October 1943, Bose received an invitation to visit Tokyo from the new Japanese
Prime Minister, General Koiso. Bose found the Japanese still receptive to his
demands, which included the appointment of an ambassador to his government,
increase in the size of the INA by at least 50,000, a loan agreement, better
weapons including tanks, planes and guns to supplement captured British stores,
distribution of propaganda literature written by himself and transfer of all
Indian POWs to the INA. At this time, American bombers were already paying
frequent visits to the Japanese capital, and many of these demands appeared to
be meaningless, which is probably the reason for the Japanese conceding them.
However, in return for sending a diplomat to his government, the Japanese asked
for a quid pro quo – Bose agreed to put the INA under Japanese command
during the defence of Malaya and Burma.17
17. Lebra, p.143, Sivaram, p.230
Though
the writing was on the wall, Bose continued to exhibit his confidence that the
Japanese would win the war. In an article in the Azad Hind on 6 November
1944, after the retreat from Imphal, he reiterated his firm conviction that the
final victory would belong to Japan and Germany. ‘A new phase of war was
approaching’, he wrote, ‘in which the initiative would again lie in the
hands of the Japanese’. Not surprisingly, Professor Joyce Lebra was
constrained to write: “Bose’s constant repetition of this faith throughout
and even after the Imphal campaign raises the question of the soundness of his
military judgement”. 18
18. Lebra, p.191
After
spending a month in Japan, Bose returned to Singapore in December 1944. He
spent over a month in Malaya, reviewing the functioning of the training camps
at Seletar and Kuala Lumpur, and going over the finances. On both counts he
found the outlook dismal. The number of new recruits barely matched those who
were shedding their uniforms and slipping away. The income of the Indian
Independence League was drying up, and when persuasion failed, draconian
measures were adopted to increase collections.
At
a press conference in Rangoon the day after his arrival, Bose asserted that the
war had now entered the third phase, which would be decisive, and Indians must
play their rightful part. “Had the rains not intervened,” he said, “we
should by now have occupied the Manipur basin”. During a rally in October,
he had given a new war cry – khun (blood). In the days that followed, he
repeated it at every opportunity. He no longer talked of the march to Delhi,
but blood. It was Indian blood that he wanted, and he asked for it because the
old slogan did not sound convincing now. The war was not over, but Bose knew
that his men were not going anywhere near Delhi. Yet, the fight must go on.
Freedom, he observed, carries a price – blood. And since blood was all that his
young recruits had to offer, it became his constant refrain in the months that
followed. “Tum mujhe khun do, main tumhen azadi dunga (give me blood,
and I will give you freedom)”, he said. As 1945 opened, this was all Bose had
to offer. 19
19. Fay, p.315.
After
their defeat at Imphal, Japanese forces had withdrawn to the Irrawaddy River,
where the next major battle was to take place. Two INA divisions, the 1st
and the 2nd, were to take part in the battle. In the event, only one
regiment of the 2nd Division, the 4th Guerilla Regiment
under Major GS Dhillon could take part, the rest still waiting in Rangoon for
their stores and equipment to arrive from Malaya. Mutiny and desertion had
become a serious problem in the INA, and troops were screened before being sent
to the front. About 150 men from Dhillon’s regiment were sent back as suspect,
leaving him with 1,200 men to defend twelve miles of the river. Bose ordered
several measures to raise the morale of the troops. They were protected from
contact with Imphal survivors and encouraged by glowing accounts of INA heroism
in battle. Gallantry awards were presented and there were accelerated
promotions, including four major generals, one of them being Shah Nawaz Khan,
the newly appointed commander of the 2nd INA Division.
The
7th Indian Division began to cross the Irrawaddy on 14 February 1945
at Nyangu and Pagan, where the 4th INA Regiment was deployed. The
attacking troops suffered some casualties from medium machine guns in the INA
defences, but managed to cross the river. About a hundred men of the 7th
INA Battalion under Lieutenant Hari Ram surrendered at Nyangu and one hundred
and forty of the 9th INA Battalion under Lieutenant Chandra Bhan
showed a white flag and laid down their arms at Pagan. Shah Nawaz has chosen to
gloss over these surrenders, mentioning only the gallantry of the INA troops
and the casualties they inflicted on the enemy. ‘Our men having used up all
their ammunition resorted to bayonet charges, but eventually most of the men of
the 7th Battalion were overpowered and had to surrender’.20
20. Maj Gen Shah Nawaz Khan, My Memories
of INA and its Netaji, p. 190
However, Bose was deeply pained when he heard
of the surrenders, and wrote to Dhillon: ‘I have heard with grief, pain and
shame of the treachery shown by Lieutenant Hari Ram and others. I hope that the
men of the 4th Regiment will wash away the blot on the INA
with their blood.’ Worried by the desertions, Bose wrote another
letter to an officer of the INA Police at Mandalay, ‘According to my
information the men who recently deserted from Mandalay … are still in the
Mandalay area. These men must be arrested and sent down to Rangoon under
escort. If you cannot arrest them, they must be shot at sight.’ 21
21. Toye, p. 139
On
17 March 1945 there was another action at Taungzin where Dhillon’s troops are
said to have redeemed their reputation, according to INA accounts. A British
motorized column attacked an INA company under the command of Second Lieutenant
Gian Singh Bisht, in which the company lost about forty men, including the
company commander. Shah Nawaz has
described the action thus: ‘In the name of India and Indian independence
they charged the enemy trucks. The enemy immediately debussed and hand to hand
fighting ensued which lasted for full two hours, but our heroes would not give
in. Forty of them sacrificed their lives after inflicting heavier losses on the
enemy. The enemy was so impressed by their determination that they beat a hurried
retreat’.22 A more down-to-earth version of the action
has been given by Fay, who writes: ‘Near Taungzin one day a company of his
let itself be trapped in the open by light tanks, armoured cars and infantry in
trucks, tried vainly to break out with the bayonet and lost several score men
dead or captured. ……But Dhillon was also prone to heroics. When the publicity
people at Rangoon heard about the Taungzin disaster, they transformed it into a
sort of latter-day Charge of the Light Brigade, and Dhillon was pleased’. 23
22. Shah Nawaz, p. 195
23. Fay, pp. 342-343.
The
next action occurred at Mount Popa on whose western slopes the 2nd
INA Regiment under PK Sahgal was occupying defences. Headquarters 2nd INA Division was
also at Popa, under its newly appointed commander, Major General Shah Nawaz
Khan. In February Bose decided to visit Mount Popa himself, to get a first-hand
account of the conditions there. His first visit to the front line had to be
cut short because the enemy got there first. He was in Meiktila on 25 February
when news came that British tanks had reached Mahling, just twenty miles away.
When Shah Nawaz advised that they should turn back, Bose refused, saying “England
has not produced the bomb that can kill Subhas Chandra Bose.” However,
reason finally prevailed over bravado, and he fled from Meiktila, accompanied
by a very anxious Shah Nawaz in the only staff car that they had. Everyone was
armed to the teeth and ready for the worst, Bose sitting with a loaded tommy
gun across his lap with Shah Nawaz beside him, his personal physician next to
the driver and the liaison officer on the running board. The scene is now a key
element of the Bose legend.
Soon
after his return to Rangoon Bose received the shocking news that five staff
officers of 2nd INA Division – four majors and one lieutenant - had
walked across to the British lines. Soon afterwards, British aircraft dropped
leaflets signed by one of them, advising others in the INA to surrender. The
shameful desertions soon became a topic of conversation in every Rangoon
household and the subject of laughter in every Japanese mess. Bose was rattled by the treachery, and said
that he would take his own life if such a thing happened again. He announced
the observance of a ‘Traitors’ Day’ in each INA unit, when deserters would be
publicly dishonoured. He issued two special orders, outlining a number of
measures to deal with the problem. One of these specified that ‘every member
of the INA - officer, NCO or sepoy - will in future be entitled to arrest any
other member of the INA, no matter what his rank may be, if he behaves in
cowardly manner, or to shoot him if he acts in a treacherous manner.’ 24.
24. Toye, p. 142. Special Order of the
Day, 13th March 1945
Unfortunately,
the desertions did not stop. Late in March, one of Dhillon’s battalion
commanders deserted. On the night of 2 April, just before a full-scale attack
on the 2nd INA Regiment at Legyi, three staff officers and some NCOs
deserted. The attack came at mid-day and the INA defences soon collapsed, even
the administrative area being overrun. Sahgal ordered a counter attack but the
two platoons concerned deserted. A second counter attack after nightfall
succeeded, but Sahgal then came to know that the whole of his 1st
Battalion – the CO, company commander and about three hundred men - had
deserted. The remainder could not face another attack and Sahgal withdrew them
on his own initiative during the night. What followed was a rout. Except for an
odd occasion when they decided to stand and fight, the 2nd INA
Division disintegrated and virtually ceased to exist. By the end of April, only
fugitives remained at large. On 13 May 1945, Shah Nawaz, Dhillon and about
fifty men surrendered at Pegu.
The End of
the INA
Rangoon
fell to British forces on 4 May 1946. A day earlier, the senior British officer
who was a prisoner in the Rangoon jail had ordered the disarming and
concentration of the INA, which was now under the command of Major General
Loganadhan, the Supreme Commander having left about ten days earlier along with
a few senior officers, about fifty League workers and the last contingent of
women of the Rani of Jhansi regiment. In his last message before leaving Bose
declared ‘I do not leave Burma of my own free will. I would have preferred
to stay on here with you and share with you the sorrow of temporary defeat.’
But his advisers had overruled him, he had other responsibilities in Siam and
Malaya that nobody else could fulfill, and for Indians this defeat was only an
incident in their struggle. ‘Go down as heroes’, he said, ‘go down
upholding the highest code of honour and discipline’.29
29. Toye, p. 146
Bose’s
last words to his men were to ‘uphold the highest code of honour’, which he was
even then violating, perhaps unknowingly.
Not being a professional soldier, he can be forgiven for not being aware
of the time honoured code that a captain always goes down with his ship and a
commander with his troops, be it death or captivity. (Percival surrendered with
85,000 of his men when Singapore fell in 1942 and Niazi with 93,000 troops in
1971 in East Pakistan. Captain Mulla went down with the INS Khukri in
1971). However, most of the senior INA officers had spent long years in
uniform, and it appears strange that they advised him to escape, leaving more
than ten thousand of his men to their fate.
It
has been suggested that Bose wanted to go to Russia and carry on the struggle
from there, but there appears no concrete proof of this. Another reason put
forward is that the British authorities would have executed him if he had been
captured, but this appears unlikely. Bose was never a member of the Indian Army
and could not have been tried for treason under the Indian Army Act, like Shah
Nawaz, Sahgal and Dhillon. His stature and prestige in India would have
deterred the British from even contemplating such a step. In fact, the wave of
sympathy that swept the country after the INA trials would have multiplied
manifold and united the Indian people against the British. Who knows, with Bose
being present at the final parleys, India may not been partitioned.
END
NOTES
1. Gen. Mohan Singh, Soldiers’
Contribution to Indian Independence, p.67
2. TR Sareen, Japan and the Indian
National Army, pp. 51-52
3. Joyce
C. Lebra, Jungle Alliance – Japan and the Indian National Army,
pp.16-18. (Lebra erroneously writes that Mohan Singh was the second-in-command
of the battalion. In fact, there were several officers senior to him, including
Major VDW Anderson, the 2ic).
4. Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger,
p.3.
5. Mohan Singh, p.78
6. Ibid,
p.86
7. Lt.
Gen. S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour – The Indian Army from the
Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, p.382
8. Gerard
H. Corr, The War of the Springing Tigers, p. 116
9. Lebra, p.83.
10. Mohan
Singh, p.201.
11. Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army,
p.200
12. Lebra, p.130. M. Sivaram, The Road to
Delhi, p.158
13. Lebra, p.133
14. Toye, p. 105.
15. Ibid, p. 106
16. Ibid, p. 226.
17. Lebra, p.143. Sivaram, p.230
18. Ibid, p.191
19. Fay, p.315.
20. Maj Gen Shah Nawaz Khan, My Memories
of INA and its Netaji p. 190
21. Toye, p. 139
22. Shah Nawaz, p. 195
23. Fay, pp. 342-343.
24. Toye, p. 142. Special Order of the Day,
13th March 1945
25. Ibid, p. 146
29 Sep 2021
No comments:
Post a Comment