Corrupting India's Military History A Dangerous Trend

 

Corrupting India's Military History

A Dangerous Trend

Major General VK Singh (Retd)^@

 

Abstract

The article brings out that the trend of writing incorrect accounts of military actions, to glorify, portray military history incorrectly. Operations at Nathu La/Cho La in 1967 have been narrated to make the point. It states that it is important to portray failures, or less than perfect conduct of operations, so that lessons can be learnt and mistakes made in conduct of an operation are avoided in the future. Unfortunately, the military and military historians today have different views and failure in battle seems to carry with it a stigma and guilt, which is totally unwarranted. The article concludes that if handled correctly, even failures and lost battles can be used to glorify and motivate and yet we can learn constructive lessons from them.

 

Introduction

This article aims to highlight the trend of omission, distortion, and obfuscation of facts in records such as unit war diaries and regimental histories which are the basic documents referred

to by military historians. This phenomenon is rarely encountered in the documents pertaining to World War I and II, and even earlier. However, it is increasingly being noticed in the post-Independence period in the Indian Army'. Examples of such distortion of records are found in many tactical and operational level operations that the Indian Army was involved in after 1947. These may have been done in good faith to safeguard the honour of a person, unit, or country or because in the fog of war events get distorted. However, this distortion obfuscates the correct picture in official history and does not enable lessons to be learnt to take better decisions or do

 

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@Major General VK Singh (Retd) was commissioned into the Corps of Signals of the Indian Army on 27 June 1965. He retired in 2002. A keen writer since his younger days, in later years he took to professional writing and now writes in newspapers and professional journals on defence, intelligence, and security related issues. He has authored six books.

 

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLI, No. 625, July-September 2021.

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operations in a better manner the next time. To highlight the problem, the Nathu La — Cho La operations of 1967 have been chosen as a case study. This operation has once again come into the limelight in recent years. This trend is not limited to the Indian Army alone, or even to only the military; there is even a formal term for this — "historical negationism"².

 

 

The Accounts of the 1967 Skirmishes

 

The Nathu La Skirmish. The skirmish at Nathu La took place in September 1967. This was the first time that the Indian Army gave the Chinese a 'bloody nose'. The story has been narrated in several books including regimental histories and biographies of Lt Gen Sagat Singh³, who was commanding the division in Sikkim when the operation was conducted. In addition, several articles have been published in numerous journals written mostly by officers who were present or took part in the operation. Two recent events have brought the Nathu La skirmish in the limelight again. One is the publication of a book titled 'Watershed 1967 - India's Forgotten Victory over China" in 2020, written by Probal DasGupta⁴. The second is the episode concerning the Nathula and Chola battles of 1967 which was broadcast on TV in Tales of Valour on 09 and 10 Jan 2021 on the Times Now. There was also a Bollywood movie called 'Paltan' (battalion) which came out in 2018 and covered the operations at Nathu La. Sadly, these narrations have been less than truthful in recounting the events of the conflict.

 

At first glance, 'Watershed 1967 - India's Forgotten Victory over China' appears to be dealing with an important event in India's military history. Unfortunately, the book has several errors in the correlation of events and facts. A review of the book by this author has been published in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India, January — March 2021 and could be seen for further details.⁵

 

The most glaring lacuna in the book is the distortion of facts relating to 2 Grenadiers. In this author's knowledge, the only authentic unclassified version of the battle is the diary of Second Lieutenant (2/Lt) (later Colonel) NC Gupta, which gives a day-by-day account of the occurrences from 11-14 Sep 1967.⁶ Its authenticity is sound because it was written daily as the events occurred and not in hindsight after 40-50 years, like this book and some articles written

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by a few others. The diary brings out many lesser-known facts including instances of apparent cowardice, especially the vacation of South Shoulder at a critical juncture by a few soldiers of 2nd Grenadiers led by 2/Lt. Attar Singh. An account of this episode has been covered in detail in the articles The Skirmish at Nathula (1967)' published in the Indian Military Review in Aug 2018 and 'Remembering the War We Forgot 51 years ago — How India Gave China a Bloody Nose' by Vandana Menon and Nayanika Chatterjee in The Print on 01 Oct 2018.

 

The regimental history of The Grenadiers, titled 'The Grenadiers — A Tradition of Valour', was written by Colonel RD Palsokar in 1980. The book gives a different narrative. On page 365, the author writes:

"At one stage it appeared that the force fighting from the

South Shoulder was wiped out as it was the main target

of the Chinese. The troops could not hold it and had to

fall back. When the Chinese fire died down, they once

again occupied the feature. The South Shoulder would

have remained unoccupied had 2nd Lieutenant Attar Singh

 not been there. His personal example inspired the men to

stay fast."

 

Colonel RD Palsokar (Guards) is a well-known military historian who has penned many regimental histories and biographies. It is probable that the primary source for his use were the inputs given to him by The Grenadier Regiment from the accounts submitted by the unit.

 

Another example of this historical negationism syndrome is the article titled ‘The Nathu La skirmish: When Chinese Were Given a Bloody Nose', by Major General Sheru Thapliyal, in the `Force' magazine in 2004 and reprinted in the CLAWS website in 2011⁷. He writes:

 

"2 Grenadiers were initially shaken up due to the loss of

Captain Dagar and injury to their CO but found their man of

the moment in Lieutenant Attar Singh who went round from

trench to trench to rally the troops and was later promoted as

Captain on the spot."

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A short resume describing the events relating to South Shoulder on 11 Sep, as described in Gupta's diary, has been published in the Indian Military Review. It is reproduced below:

 

"During the first day's action, there was a loss of morale in 2 Grenadiers when troops occupying the South Shoulder vacated their positions. This became evident after breakdown of communications. Finding no response from the post on radio and observing about a dozen troops running down the slopes of South Shoulder minus their helmets, packs and rifles, the Brigade Commander asked his Signals officer, 2/Lt NC Gupta to go up to South Shoulder with a spare radio set. On reaching South Shoulder at around 10 am, Gupta found the post abandoned and informed Brigadier Bakshi, who asked him to hold the post until reinforcements reached. About an hour later, Brigadier Bakshi spotted six soldiers sitting behind a huge rock around 100 metre down South Shoulder and asked Gupta to investigate. On reaching the spot, Gupta found that they were from 2 Grenadiers, including 2/Lt Attar Singh who was in command of the post at South Shoulder. Their radio set had been switched off. Gupta made him speak to the Brigade Commander who gave him a mouthful and ordered them to return to the post, accompanied by Gupta. At about 12 pm, Gupta discerned some movement in one of the bodies lying next to the fence barely 10 metre from the Chinese . Taking dvantage of the fog, he went ahead to investigate. He discovered that it was a badly wounded Major Bishan Singh, 'Tiger Nathula, who had been injured in the initial firing. Bishan was a 6 foot tall jat while Gupta was a diminutive five foot three, almost half his weight. With great difficulty Gupta managed to drag Bishan into our defences and made him speak to the Brigade Commander. Bakshi ordered Gupta to evacuate him using four men from 2 Grenadiers while he stayed on with the post commander and one Havildar."

 

From the words in the diary, Attar Singh was not trying to rally the troops but had abandoned the post along with his men. More than 30 soldiers were later court martialled for cowardice. Surprisingly, Attar Singh was not among them.

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The story of 2 Grenadiers would not be complete without relating the episode of the missing pages of Gupta's diary. It is given below in his own words:

 

"After the end of the event, a couple of officers of the brigade were asked to submit their versions of the battle to the brigade commander. Since I was in the habit of maintaining a daily diary since my NDA days, I had been maintaining the account of the activities leading to it and of the events of 11 Sept and beyond. I, therefore, submitted my account in a normal fauji file cover. The file had:

 

• Seven pages of important events leading to 11 Sept.

• Nine pages of events of 11 Sept.

• Ten pages of events from 11 Sept evening to cease fire.

 

After about a month, the file was returned to me but I did not bother to check if all pages had been returned. Like a good soldier, I carried it with me on all my postings and even after retirement in 1992. Around the early twenties, Major General VK Singh (he was Adjutant of 17 MDSR in 1967) was writing part three of the history of the Corps of Signals. He approached me for some gen on the operations. I decided to hand him over this file. Out of sheer curiosity to re-live the events, I started reading it and to my horror found ten pages missing. These were the most critical pages dealing with the events of 11 Sept.

 

I informed this to Gen VK who told me to try and remember the events and write them. I did this and gave him the file that contained the events leading to 11 Sept and events after 11 Sept in original. The events of 11 Sept were written on white paper and filed accordingly. I also made an endorsement on the first page of the events post 11 Sept that "Nine pages containing details of 11 Sept are missing".

 

In July 2016, Mr Vijay Dagar, nephew of Captain PS Dagar met me at Delhi where I had come from Australia for my knee operation. After the operation on 10 Aug

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2016, I went to Captain Dagar Museum in Najafgarh and presented this file to Mr Vijay Dagar and told him about the missing pages. To my utter shock, he produced those nine pages in original and the file become one as it was when handed to the Brigade HQ. This is a combine of destiny and a miracle waiting to happen. Mr Vijay Dagar found these pages with 2nd Grenadiers and was able to take them. Page 1 of these nine pages has an endorsement in red ink in commander's own hand "2/Lt Gupta's Battle Account". In June 2019, all the pages were laminated and then presented in original toits rightful owners — The Nathu La Brigade."

 

The Cho La Skirmish. The missing pages from Gupta's diary point to the disturbing trend already mentioned — the distortion of military records by units. Similar discrepancies were noticed in the records of the two battalions that were involved in the skirmish at Cho La that occurred about two weeks after the skirmish at Nathu La. These were 10 JAK Rifles and 7/11 Gorkha Rifles. The regimental histories available are 'The Path of Glory: Exploits ofthe 11 Gorkha Rifles' written by Gautam Sharma and the 'Soldiers of the Sun and Snow' published by the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles Regimental Centre at Jabalpur.

 

Cho La, located to the northwest of Nathu La, was held by 10 JAK Rifles which was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Mahatam Singh. During the last week of Sep 1967, the battalion was being relieved by 7/11 Gorkha Rifles. The area was under 63 Mountain Brigade under the command of Brigadier Kundan Singh. According to the relief plan, the changeover was to take effect from 01 Oct 1967. The raising day of 10 JAK Rifles was on the

same date and after briefing Lieutenant Colonel KB Joshi, CO 7/11 Gorkha Rifles, Lieutenant. Colonel Mahatam Singh had left on 30 Sep to conduct the Havan at the Battalion HQ at Changgu Lake next morning.

 

On the morning of 01 Oct, there was a scuffle at Point 15450 which had been handed over to the Gorkhas on the previous day. According to 10 JAK Rifles, the new post commander was Second Lieutenant Rana of 7/11 Gorkha Rifles. (According to the regimentalhistory of 11 Gorkha Rifles, Point 15450 was held by Lieutenant Rathore.) There was a boulder at the post and Chinese and Indian sentries usually stood on opposite sides. Since the Gorkhas were new

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to the post, the Chinese staked claim to the boulder, leading to heated argument between the two post commanders. During the argument, the Gorkha JCO rested his right foot on the boulder. The Chinese kicked his foot away. The JCO then put his foot back on the boulder and challenged his Chinese counterpart. The Chinese soldier bayoneted the Gorkha JCO injuring him in the arm. The Gorkhas retaliated by cutting off the arm of the Chinese with a kukri. The Chinese opened up with all they had, with the Indians responding in like fashion. The Chinese finally captured the post forcing the Gorkhas to withdraw.

 

Brigadier Kundan Singh, who was also officiating as the divisional commander, could not contact Lieutenant Colonel Joshi, CO 7/11 Gorkha Rifles, who had gone for a morning walk. Brigadier Kundan Singh then tried to contact Major Nair, the officiating CO of 10 JAK Rifles, but there was no answer from his telephone. Major SRR Aiyengar, the Brigade signal officer, told his B-1 operator, L/Nk Moga Singh, to take the radio set to Major Nair's bunker. When Moga Singh reached there, he found the telephone ringing repeatedly and the officer in a state of shock. Finally, Brigadier Kundan Singh was able to speak to Major Nair. After

giving him a piece of his mind, he ordered Nair to proceed to Cho La Post.

 

Brigadier Kundan Singh also ordered the rest of 7/11 Gorkha Rifles to move up from Tamze. He himself moved up to Twin Huts, to see things for himself. Joshi was missing and everyone thought that he has been killed. At 1700 hours, Joshi reached Twin Huts where he met Brigadier Kundan Singh and requested permission to recapture Point 15450, which was granted. According to the Gorkhas, the attack was launched next morning and the position was re-occupied by them, the Chinese having vacated it during the night. The battalion was awarded two Vir Chakras during the incident.

 

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Mahatam Singh, CO 10 JAK Rifles, who had been informed about the firing, immediately left the Battalion HQ for the road head at Tamze, from where he started walking up reaching Saddle at 1230 hours. He assumed command

and told Brigadier Kundan Singh that he would recapture Point 15450. He ordered Major Subhas Dogra, who had just handed over the post to the Gorkhas, to recapture it. Dogra

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Immediately proceeded with his men towards Point 15450. They found that the Chinese had withdrawn. The post was re-occupied at 1600 hours without firing a shot or a single casualty. In addition to the CO who was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), the battalion won three

Vir Chakras.

 

As can been seen, there are several discrepancies in the records of the two units. According to the Gorkhas, point 15450 was held by Lieutenant Rathore while 10 JAK Rifles claim to havehanded over the post to Second Lieutenant Rana of 7/11 Gorkha Rifles. Both units, viz. 7/11 Gorkha Rifles and 10 JAK Rifles, claim to have recaptured Point 15450 which, in fact, had already been vacated by the Chinese. Compared to the skirmish at Nathu La which lasted 5 days and resulted in many casualties, the oneat Cho La was relatively minor lasting just a day. Though this is not mentioned in their regimental history, Major KG Nair of 10 JAK Rifles was later court martialled.

 

Conclusion

Most regimental histories of the post-Independence period tend to glorify the actions of battalions as well as individuals. Hence, successes are highlighted but failures rarely mentioned. In battle, cases of units fighting to the last man are matched by instances of units breaking up and examples of audacious commanders by specimens of indecisive leaders. Not surprisingly, some earn medals and promotions while others are sacked. Like in any two sided

match, the odds of winning and losing in battle are equal and one would expect that the performance of units and commanders would conform to this pattern. The military profession has always placed a greater premium on valour, rather than victory. This is especially true in India, where the most famous military leaders — Porus, Prithvi Raj Chauhan, Rana Pratap, and Rani Laxmi Bai — lost their battles. Yet, their stories are part of legend and have acted as an inspiration to generations of Indians. Unfortunately, military historians today have different views and failure in battle seems to carry with it a stigma and guilt, which is totally unwarranted. Today, a misplaced sense of honour and `izzat’ impels units to hide mistakes and failures and magnify achievements. If not corrected, this may seriously impinge on the integrity of post-Independence military history of India.

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Endnotes

^1. The term 'Army' can be read by the reader to encompass all armed forces of the Union.

 

² Historical negationism, also called denialism, is falsification or distortion of the historical record. It should not be conflated with historical revisionism, a broader term that extends to newly evidenced, fairly reasoned academic reinterpretations of history. https://www.bing.com/

search?q=historical+negationism+&qs=n&form=QBRE&sp=-1&pq = historical+negationism +&sc=4-23&sk=&cvid=991856EE2F 9640EEBA 8279 F81986AC3F

 

3 A Talent for War: The Military Biography of Lt Gen Sagat Singh by Randhir Singh is one such book. This author's book Leadership in the Indian Army: Biographies of Twelve Soldiers also covers Lt Gen Sagat Singh.

 

⁴ Watershed 1967 — India's Forgotten Victory over China. By Probal DasGupta; Publisher: Juggernaut Books, New Delhi (April 2020), Pages 208; Price Rs 390/-, ISBN: 978-93-53450-93-9 (Paperback)

 

⁵ https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/reviews-of-recent-books-12/?sf_paged=2

 

⁶ For excerpts of the diary, see Veekay's History Book, Nathu La –the True Story at http://veekay-militaryhistory.blogspot.com/2013/04/nathula-1967-real-story.html

 

⁷ "The Nathu La skirmish: When Chinese Were Given a Bloody Nose" by Major General Sheru Thapliyal. Accessed Aug 24, 2021 from https://archive.claws. in/595/the-nathu-la-skirmish-when-chinese-were-given-a-bloody-nose-sheru-thapliyal.html

SUBHAS BOSE & THE INA – SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

 

SUBHAS BOSE & THE INA – SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

 

The Indian National Army remains an enigma, even today. Throughout its life span of three years, and even later, the INA has generated several controversies and given rise to conundrums some of which remain unsolved. Ironically, during its existence the activities of the INA remained shrouded in mystery and it was only after it ceased to exist that most of these controversies surfaced. Though there is a wealth of literature available about the INA and its leader, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, many questions still remain unanswered. These are often discussed at debates and seminars and provide the topic for articles and books. Some of these questions will be discussed in this chapter.

 

Q.1 Why did some Indian soldiers join the INA while others did not?

 

            In the Foreword to Toye’s book, Philip Mason, who was the Joint Secretary in the War Department in 1945-46, gives four motives for joining the INA. A few did so with the intention of re-joining British forces when they saw a chance; some were puzzled, misinformed, misled, and on the whole believed the course they took was the most honourable open to them; others were frankly opportunist and some really were fervent nationalists.

 

            Stephen Cohen has given a similar analysis. ‘At least three factors influenced the decision to join the INA: personal comfort, nationalist political beliefs, and the charismatic appeal of Subhas Bose.  A few of the defecting officers anticipated personal rewards for themselves when they transferred allegiance to the Japanese, and to this extent the British label of “treasonous rabble’ was accurate. No INA officer has ever admitted such a motive, but interviews with former INA leaders and British officers indicate that money and security were important considerations for a few Indians.’ ¹  

1.         Cohen, p.152

 

 

Major (later Major General) Shahid Hamid was the Private Secretary to Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India in 1946-47. According to him, ‘Most of the men who joined the INA were cowards and were not prepared to face the hardships of the prisoner of war camps. It was an escape from ill treatment and starvation. Very few joined for patriotic reasons.’ ²

2.         Major General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, p.17

 

Some of the reasons given by ex INA officers for joining the INA are interesting, even amusing. A number of officers such as Shah Nawaz, JKT Bhonsle, Gian Chand etc. did not join the INA initially, but later changed their minds. Shah Nawaz writes: ‘We decided that the best course was (a) for the senior officers to join the INA, gain control of it and prevent the ill treatment of prisoners of war, and also their exploitation by the Japanese. If we were unable to do this, then we would try and wreck the INA from within, if and when we had an opportunity to do so. (b) For the rank and file to remain out of the INA and if need be to undergo hardships and ill treatment, but the senior officers in the INA would do their best to help them. This at that time concerned mainly the Muslims’. ³

3.         Shah Nawaz, p. 47

 

 

The concern of Shah Nawaz for Muslims was one of the reasons that prompted his decision to join the INA. This has been confirmed by Harbaksh, who writes that Shah Nawaz joined the INA ‘because of some dispute over accommodation for a Muslim JQ.’ As for Bhonsle, Harbaksh does not mince words. “Bhonsle, I knew, had done it to save his skin. He had admitted as much to me.”⁴

4.         Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, In the Line of Duty – A Soldier Remembers, p.134

 

 

Prominent among those who did not join were Captain (later Lieutenant General) Harbaksh Singh, 5/11 Sikhs; Captain (later Major General) HC Badhwar; Captain (later Lieutenant General) KP Dhargalkar, both of the 3^rd Cavalry and Captain (later Lieutenant General) AC Iyappa, Signals. The reasons for these officers deciding against joining the INA were mainly two – distrust of the Japanese and lack of faith in the INA leadership. According to Harbaksh, ‘unless Mahatma Gandhi or Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru made an appeal over the air for every young man outside India to join the INA to liberate India with the help of the Japanese, we would not join, as we had no faith in its leadership’.⁵

5.         Harbaksh Singh, pp.111-112

 

            Cohen cites another reason for the professional soldier being less than sympathetic to the INA – his oath of loyalty. Many did not regard lightly the breaking of their oath, and preferred to spend the war in a prison camp undergoing privations at the hands of the Japanese or the INA. In India, the concept of loyalty is closely linked to ‘salt’. An employee is expected to be loyal to his employer, whose salt he has eaten. For many Indian soldiers joining the INA meant being untrue to their salt, and facing the stigma of faithlessness and disloyalty in their regiments and villages when they returned home.

 

There is no doubt that those who refused to join face hardships, hard labour, and even torture, sometimes by their own men. Some of the officers who refused to join were subjected to third degree methods to bring them in line. Badhwar and Dhargalkar were locked in underground cages, which were about five feet long by five feet wide and seven feet high, and sometimes held five or six prisoners. They were kept inside these cages for 88 days, during which time they saw nothing of the outside world. ⁶

6.         Cohen, p.149 

 

The fate of those who refused to join the INA was uncertain. The fortunate ones remained in POW camps or were sent as working parties to depots and airfields. Many were sent to labour camps in Borneo, the Celebes and Thailand, where thousands died of disease and starvation. Those who joined the INA not only had a more comfortable life but also a better survival rate. According to Menezes, of the 40,000 prisoners of war who did not join the INA, 11,000 died in captivity, of disease, starvation or were murdered, some even cannibalized by the Japanese. Strangely enough, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind, which claimed the allegiance of all Indians and guaranteed equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, did nothing to alleviate the sufferings of these unfortunate soldiers.  Corr writes: ‘As for Gill, suffering in solitary confinement, he (Bose) did nothing. Neither did he do anything for the thousands of Indians in Thailand who were being worked to death on the Infamous Death Railway. He left them to their appalling fate’. ⁷

7.         Corr, p.149

 

 

            What is the truth? Did the majority of prisoners join the INA for patriotic reasons, or for pecuniary gains, better living conditions and to escape torture and harsh treatment at the hands of their Japanese captors?

 

 

Q.2 Were the aims of the INA practical and achievable?

 

In mid-January 1942 Mohan Singh said that the eventual object of the INA was to drive the British out of India. During the Bangkok Conference held in June 1942, the Indian Independence League resolved that the INA would be used for operations against British forces; to secure and safeguard Indian National Independence and for any other purpose that may assist the Independence of India. Soon after his arrival in South East Asia, Bose declared: ‘Indians outside India, particularly Indians in East Asia, are going to organise a fighting force which will be powerful enough to attack the British Army in India. When we do so, a revolution will break out, not only among the civil population at home, but also among the Indian Army, which is now standing under the British flag.’ ⁸

8.         Maj Gen Shah Nawaz Khan, My Memories of INA and its Netaji, p. 89

 

The aim of the INA, as envisaged by Mohan Singh, the IIL and also by Bose was twofold – to militarily defeat the British and to subvert the loyalty of the Indian Army. Were these aims achievable? Bose was confident that as soon as he entered India, Indian soldiers would lay down their arms. However, it was the height of military naiveté to believe that the ill-trained and ill-equipped INA would be able to defeat the British Army. Mohan Singh, Shah Nawaz as well as several others have written that the Japanese did not support them with weapons, ammunition and supplies. If this was true, why did they agree to send their men into battle, where they were bound to suffer heavy casualties?

 

Though Bose was not a professional soldier, even he must have known that the military objectives of the INA were not achievable. According to Corr, Bose made two fatal errors of judgement during his career. The first was his decision to challenge Gandhi, which set him on the road out of India. The second error was to believe that he could return through military means. ‘Bose was aware that the tide of war had turned against Japan and the Imphal offensive was a gigantic gamble. Yet he spoke to his men in a way that suggested the road to Delhi lay open. …. Becoming a victim of his own propaganda, Bose urged on his regiments to destruction. In the end he lost touch with reality.’⁹

9.         Gerard H. Corr, The War of the Springing Tigers, p.165

 

After the defeat at Imphal, when General Kawabe told him that the order to retreat had been given, Bose declared that the INA would continue the operations. “Increase in casualties, cessation of supplies, and famine are not reason enough to stop marching. Even if the whole army becomes only spirit we will not stop advancing towards our homeland. This is the spirit of our revolutionary army,” he said. Though Corr writes that Kawabe was much moved, he must also have been amused at Bose’s innocence. ‘Prodigal with emotional language, Bose did not seem to feel he had been sufficiently prodigal with the lives of his soldiers. He talked – to the amazement of even the Japanese – of sending the Rani of Jhansi Regiment up to the battle front.’¹⁰

10.       Corr, p.166

 

Having known that the INA did not have the military strength to defeat the British Army, why did its leaders send it into battle, to face death and destruction?

 

Q3. How did the INA perform in battle?

 

Almost all ex-INA officers eulogize the gallantry of its members during operations. Some even suggest that the INA planned and executed the attack on Imphal, with the Japanese playing a subsidiary role. Shah Nawaz writes: “While the INA was on the offensive there was not a single occasion on which our forces were defeated on the battle-field, and there was never an occasion when the enemy despite their overwhelming superiority in men and material were able to capture a post held by the INA. On the other hand there were very few cases where INA attacked British posts and failed to capture them”.¹¹

11.       Shah Nawaz, p. 159

 

            According to Dr. RM Kasliwal, who was the personal physician to Bose in 1945, “In the fighting in the Imphal sector our troops played a very prominent part. They pushed the enemy back everywhere ….. Our armies, along with those of our allies chased the British forces deep into Manipur sector. Some of our troops reached Kohima and occupied that town, and some penetrated up to Dimapur.”¹²  

12.       RM Kasliwal, The Impact of Netaji and INA on India’s Independence, p.20

 

            The war diaries of the Indian Army formations and units that fought in Imphal not only contradict the INA claims but also contain unflattering accounts of their performance, which are endorsed by the Japanese who were fighting alongside. The low casualty figures and the large numbers of INA personnel who surrendered and deserted are also indicative of the pedestrian performance of the INA. Several foreign writers have commented on the performance of the INA in battle. Cohen writes:“…the INA was starved of equipment, logistic support and information, and although it did occupy Indian soil briefly, it’s battle history was dismal.” ¹³. John Connell writes: “In every recorded clash between British and Indian forces and the INA in Burma, the INA was worsted. Their leadership was far from inspiring: three officers in all were killed in battle, one was killed by a Japanese sentry and one died in an air crash.”¹⁴

13.       Stephen Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, p.152

14.       John Connell, Auchinleck, p.97,

 

            One of the reasons for the INA’s poor performance was the quality of its leaders. Commenting on this aspect, Toye writes: “…few of the platoon and company commanders in the 1^st INA Division had been trained as officers at all: most of them had been promoted direct from the ranks by Mohan Singh… What quality of leadership could be expected of officers such as these in the war of 1944?”¹⁵

15.       Toye, p.120

 

In military terms, are the claims of INA victories genuine?

 

Q.4 How many INA soldiers were killed in battle?

 

            Apart from their performance in battle, INA veterans make tall claims about the number of soldiers who died in battle. Captain SS Yadav, an ex-INA officer has complied a book (Forgotten Warriors), listing the names of all members of the INA. The list contains about 13,000 names, with several appearing more than once and many addresses missing or incomplete. It has a list 131 persons who died in action and a Roll of Honour listing the names of 1602 persons who died from all causes, including wounds, sickness, accidents etc. Yet, he writes: “The valiant troops of the INA had to withdraw to Burma from the battlefronts of Kohima and Imphal. About twenty six thousand heroes of the Indian National Army laid down their lives”.¹⁶ Shah Nawaz is more conservative, stating that 4,000 INA soldiers were killed in the fighting in April and May 1944.

16.       Captain SS Yadav, Forgotten Warriors, p.50

 

            The INA figures appear to be grossly inflated. Quoting official figures given by GHQ India, Toye writes: “The INA Division had started out for Imphal six thousand strong: only two thousand six hundred returned, and of these about two thousand had to be sent at once to hospital. During the campaign 715 men deserted, about four hundred were killed in battle, about eight hundred surrendered, and about fifteen hundred died of disease and starvation.¹⁷

17.       Toye, pp.125-126

 

 

            In subsequent operations, the number of desertions increased, while fewer were killed in action. Menezes writes: “Of some 15,500 INA personnel in Burma in 1945, 150 were killed in action; 1,500 died of starvation or disease; 5,000 surrendered or deserted; 7,000 were captured; 2,000 escaped towards Bangkok. ¹⁸

18.       Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour – The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, p. 397

 

 

Q5. Were Indian soldiers in the pre-Independence Indian Army patriots or mercenaries?

 

The soldiers of the INA fought against their compatriots in the British Indian Army. The professed aim of the INA was to free India from British rule. Hence they considered themselves as patriots and the Indians serving in the British Indian Army as mercenaries. This question had baffled most Indians of that time and does so even today.       

 

Almost all officers who joined the INA claim that they did so for patriotic reasons. Of course, none of them has been able to explain why his sense of patriotism surfaced only after being captured. If they felt so strongly about serving under the British, they should have resigned. In the Preface to Toye’s book, Philip Mason wrote, “One must respect such a man as Subhas Chandra Bose, who resigned from the Indian Civil Service because he sincerely believed it his duty to India; that respect can hardly be extended to all who changed sides in adversity and who a second time chose the more comfortable path”^19.

19.       Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger, p. VIII

 

Mohan Singh feels differently, writing: In whatever dignified colours we may paint the pre-Independence Indian Army, we cannot hide one hard fact that, besides its responsibility for the defence and security of our country, it had to play its purely mercenary role.²⁰

20.       Mohan Singh, p. 65

 

Of course, there is an inherent contradiction in Mohan Singh’s statement – responsibility for defence of one’s country does not blend with a mercenary role. The primary task of the Indian Army, even under British rule, was defence and internal security of the country. In 1933 the War Office had spelt out the role of the Indian Army in the following words: “The duties of the army in India include the preservation of internal security in India, the covering of the lines of internal communication, and the protection of India against external attack. Though the scale of forces is not calculated to meet external attack by a great Power, their duties might well comprise the initial resistance to such an attack pending the arrival of imperial reinforcements.²¹

21.       Bisheshwar Prasad, ed. Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-45 – India and the War, p.35

 

The supplementary role implied the provision of an Imperial Reserve, for which the British Government agreed to grant an annual subsidy of 1.5 million pounds to the Government of India. This role was modified by the ‘1938 Plan’ (Document No. B-43746), which stipulated six tasks for the Indian defence forces, viz. defence of the Western Frontier against external aggression; defence of land frontiers other than the Western Frontier; maintenance of law and order and the suppression of disorder and rebellion; safeguarding strategic lines of communication within India; provision of a general reserve with mobile components; and provision of forces for possible employment overseas at the request of the Government of UK. In view of the enhancement in the responsibilities assigned to India, the Chatfield Committee was constituted in 1938 to recommend measures to modernize and increase the size of the Indian armed forces. The Committee recommended that a new contract be negotiated with the Government of India, to enable it to fulfill its task. The recommendations of the Committee were approved by the British Cabinet on 28 June 1939, but before they could be implemented, World War II broke out.

 

As will be obvious, the primary responsibility of the Indian Army – defence of India – never changed. The employment of Indian troops overseas was covered by a formal contract between the governments of UK and India.  By definition, a mercenary soldier fights for money or reward for a country other than his own. Strictly speaking, the term would be more appropriate for the INA soldiers who fought for a foreign power – Japan. It is pertinent that the salaries of all ex-Indian Army soldiers in the INA were paid by Japan, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind paying only for the civilian recruits.

 

Who were the mercenaries – Indian soldiers in the Indian Army or the Indian National Army?

 

Q.6 What is the truth about atrocities committed by the INA?

 

There were several reported instances of the INA soldiers committing atrocities on Indian soldiers who were captured and held in their custody, as well as on those who refused to join the INA. After the end of the war, some of them were tried by court martial and convicted, not only for waging war against the Crown but also murder, and causing grievous hurt. Of the three officers (Shah Nawaz Khan, P.K. Sahgal and G.S. Dhillon), who were tried in the Red Fort in 1945, Dhillon was charged with the murder of Duli Chand, Hari Singh, Daryao Singh and Dharam Singh, whereas the other two were charged with abetment to murder, in addition to waging war against the King. Later, Captain Burhanuddin was also tried for murder but found guilty only of causing grievous hurt. Apparently, “Teja Singh was stood on a table, his wrists tied to a rope eight feet from the ground, the table removed, and Teja Singh beaten by 120 men in succession under Burhanuddin’s orders until he lost consciousness, with the result that he subsequently died.”²²

            22.       Connell, p.817 

 

Commenting on the atrocities omitted by the INA, Shahid Hamid writes: ‘Most officers later realized that the INA was a trap, but once in they could not get out. They had no love for the Japanese and maintained that they were let down by them. The atrocities committed by the Kempatai (Japanese Special Military Police) did not help towards better relations. Taking their clue (sic) from the Kempatai the INA committed atrocious crimes in the name of patriotism against their own comrades. These are considered among the most degrading crimes in the history of soldiering’²³

23.       Hamid, p.17

 

However, there is a contrary view, which holds that stories of INA atrocities were sometimes concocted or deliberately exaggerated by British Intelligence, in order to protect Indian soldiers from falling prey to INA propaganda. According to Peter Ward Fay, in 1943 the British authorities adopted a programme that was intended to blacken the name of the INA, which was christened the JIFC (Japanese Indian or Inspired Fifth Column), which came to be known as Jiffs. Each unit was asked to form a  ‘josh group’, in which officers were detailed to educate and train in countering INA propaganda and possible seduction by contact parties of the INA as had occurred in the Arakan. Interrogation files were combed for instances of barbarous behaviour by the Japanese towards prisoners, and these were circulated among troops deployed on the Burma Front. “There is a purpose here. It is to instil hatred of the Japanese, contempt for traitors, and in general a desire to be ‘up and at them’ into the men”. ²⁴

24.       Fay, p.424

 

The INA executed some of its own members, who were accused of desertion. This was done after trials conducted by the INA under its own Act, whose legality was suspect. However, Bose had himself decreed that traitors would be executed, even though he had earlier announced that anyone who wished to leave the INA could do so at any stage. There was the well-known case of Captain Durrani, who not only instructed several intelligence agents sent to India to surrender, but gave them intelligence to pass on to authorities in India. At a secret midnight arraignment in the Bidadri Concentration Camp, Bose personally interrogated Durrani, who was weak and dazed after ten days of Japanese third degree. Bose would take no denial.  “You should be grateful to me”, he said, “that I have saved you from the Japanese firing squad, and that you will be shot by Indians”. ^25.

25.       Toye, p.112. (Durrani survived and was later decorated with the George Cross for his fortitude. Lebra erroneously calls it the VC)

 

 

 

Q7. Did the INA resort to coercion to collect funds?

 

            Maintaining a large military force like the INA needed considerable amount of funds. The Japanese agreed to pay the salaries of the prisoners of war, and to supply the weapons, equipment and rations. Most of the weapons and equipment were captured from the British Army after the fall of Singapore, and as it retreated from Burma. However, the civilian recruits had to be paid by the IIL, which had to rely on contributions from the Indian community in South East Asia. In the initial period these contributions were voluntary, and sufficed to meet the needs of the INA. However, after the arrival of Bose, the IIL was expanded, with a secretariat and eight departments to handle its multifarious activities. By October 1943 the monthly expenses amounted to about a million local dollars or 116,700 pounds sterling.

 

The arrival of Bose infused new life into the movement, and Indians made generous contributions. A merchant named Habeeb donated his entire estate to the IIL. Even poor Indians did not lag behind and gave whatever they could afford. However, the contribution soon dried up and persuasion was replaced by threats.  On 25 October 1943 Bose addressed the merchants of Malaya with severity: Legally speaking there is no private property when a country is in a state of war. If you think that your wealth and possessions are your own, you are living in delusion.  Your lives and property do not belong to you; they now belong to India and India alone. ²⁶

26.       Toye, p.94

 

When Bose heard that some of the rich Indians of Malaya were murmuring that he was harassing them, and wanted to change their nationalities or avoid payment by some other means, he told them; ‘I stand here today representing the Provisional Government of Azad Hind which has absolute rights over your lives and properties…If you do not choose to come forward voluntarily, then we are not going to remain slaves on that account… Everyone who refuses to help our cause is…..    our enemy. ²⁷

27.       Toye, p.95

 

Bose soon recognized that cash donations would not be enough to meet his needs and decided that he must make a systematic levy on Indian property. From the beginning of 1944 Indians had to declare their assets. Levies of from ten to twenty five percent were imposed and collected with progressive vigour. After a state reception in Manila, Bose visited Saigon on 24 November 1943, where the Indian community was assembled to greet him.  He assessed its contribution to his funds at twelve million piastres and, when the leaders demurred, exclaimed, much as he had done in Malaya: ‘All your wealth would not buy back one life lost in battle. I have full jurisdiction over you and can order you to the front.²⁸

28.       Toye, p.98

 

 

The shortage of funds was aggravated once it became clear that Japan was losing the war. In November 1944 the collection in Malaya fell from $ 2,000,000 to $ 617,000, in six months. It became difficult to enforce assessments - now that people knew that time was on their side, they delayed payments and concealed assets. In December 1944 Bose toured the region, to collect funds. In Penang he ordered the arrest of a defaulter, which had a salutary effect on the others. On his return to Singapore, he threatened ten people with arrest. Letters were sent out to each defaulter, with a warning that if they did not pay up within three days, they would face arrest and imprisonment. On his way back to Rangoon in January 1945 Bose addressed a public meeting.   His speech was direct and bitter: those who opposed him should say so openly, they could then be put into concentration camps with the British and their property could be confiscated: if they wished to remain free they must pay their assessments. Bose left with the Japanese Security Police a list of ten persons for immediate arrest, and eighty others for varying degrees of surveillance and pressure: in the following two weeks the ten were arrested. ²⁹

29.       Toye, p.133

 

In July 1945 ‘Netaji Week’ was celebrated in Singapore. The rich Indians were called for a meeting to hear new demands for money. On the orders of Bose, five of the defaulters warned in January were arrested by the Japanese Security Police. Several demand notes went out from the IIL.  A man who had promised ten thousand dollars but sent only half received a terse note: ‘I regret that our instructions are not to accept part payments. Netaji made it very clear that promises must be fulfilled in a day or two. It is incumbent on you to pay your promised amount at once.’ Kuala Lumpur was similarly visited, where five defaulters were arrested. ³⁰

30.       Toye, p.162

 

 

Were these coercive methods to extort funds from Indians living in foreign countries lawful?

 

Q8 What is the truth about Bose’s marriage to Emilie Schenkel and the reasons behind keeping it hidden?

 

One subject that remains somewhat of a mystery is Bose’s secret marriage to Emilie Schenkl, an Austrian girl he first met during his visit to Europe in the thirties. She worked as his secretary and helped him produce The Indian Struggle in 1934. During a subsequent visit in 1937, she accompanied Bose to the health resort of Bad Gastein, where he wrote his autobiography, The Indian Pilgrim, which was published ten years later.³¹ Emilie was his secretary again in 1941, when he went to Germany after his dramatic escape from Calcutta and established the Free India Centre. Toye writes: ‘In July 1942 it became necessary for Fraulein Schenkl, who had been Bose’ private secretary for more than a year, to leave the Free India Centre. The dismissal was not what it seemed. Bose had known Emilie Schenkl ever since 1934; she was now secretly his wife, and in September 1942 was to bear him a daughter’. ³²

31.       Fay, p.195.

32.       Toye, p.75.

 

Though it is fairly certain Bose married Emilie Schenkl secretly 1in 1937 and they had a daughter named Anita Bose Pfaff  in 1942, some questions about the marriage remain. It has not been clearly established if there was an actual marriage ceremony. Bose chose to keep his marriage a secret and did not reveal it except to a chosen few. What could be reason for this? Several historians have written about it including members of his own family, such as Sugata Bose.   He writes:-

On 4 November 1937, Subhas sent a letter to Emilie in German, saying that he would probably travel to Europe in the middle of November. "Please write to Kurhaus Hochland, Badgastein," he instructed her, "and enquire if I (and you also) can stay there". He asked her to mention this message only to her parents, not to reply, and wait for his next airmail letter or telegram. On 16 November, he sent a cable: "Starting aeroplane arriving Badgastein twenty second arrange lodging and meet me. ...”.  He spent a month and a half—from 22 November 1937, to 8 January 1938—with Emilie at his favourite resort of Badgastein.³³

33.        Bose, Sugata (2011), His Majesty's Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose and India's Struggle against Empire, Harvard University Press. p. 127 

 

He goes on to write: On 26 December 1937, Subhas Chandra Bose secretly married Emilie Schenkl. Despite the obvious anguish, they chose to keep their relationship and marriage a closely guarded secret.³⁴

34.            Bose 2011, pp. 129–130.

 

Leonard A Gordon, who has written a biography of Netaji and his brother Sarat Chandra Bose, writes:-

Although we must take Emilie Schenkl at her word (about her secret marriage to Bose in 1937), there are a few nagging doubts about an actual marriage ceremony because there is no document that I have seen and no testimony by any other person. ... Other biographers have written that Bose and Miss Schenkl were married in 1942, while Krishna Bose, implying 1941, leaves the date ambiguous. The strangest and most confusing testimony comes from A. C. N. Nambiar, who was with the couple in Badgastein briefly in 1937, and was with them in Berlin during the war as second-in-command to Bose. In an answer to my question about the marriage, he wrote to me in 1978: 'I cannot state anything definite about the marriage of Bose referred to by you, since I came to know of it only a good while after the end of the last world war ... I can imagine the marriage having been a very informal one ...'... So what are we left with? ... We know they had a close passionate relationship and that they had a child, Anita, born 29 November 1942, in Vienna. ... And we have Emilie Schenkl's testimony that they were married secretly in 1937. Whatever the precise dates, the most important thing is the relationship."³⁵

35.          Gordon, Leonard A. (1990), Brothers against the Raj: a biography of Indian nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose, Columbia University Press, pp. 344–345.

 

According to Fay, Emilie had begun living with Bose almost from the moment he reached Europe. Since Bose had taken a vow that he would not marry until India was free, he was naturally reluctant to formalize their relationship. However, Emilie wanted to get married, and he could not refuse her. But he agonized over the repercussions when the secret became known, as it was bound to someday. Many years later, soon after the debacle at Imphal, during a rare moment when he was alone with Laksmi Swaminathan, he asked her, “Do you think people in India will understand?” ³⁶

36.          Fay, p.312.

 

Q. 9 Was Azad Hind Government a sovereign state?

 

On 21 October 1943, Bose announced the formation of the Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind, or the Provisional Government of Free India, with himself as the Head of State, Prime Minister and Minister of War. The INA was declared to be the army of Azad Hind. Immediately after its formation, the Provisional Government of Free India declared war against the Allied forces on the Indo-Burma Front. The Azad Hind Government also produced its own currency, postage stamps, court and civil code, and was recognised by some Axis powers.  To qualify as a sovereign state, the Azad Hind Government needed some territory of its own. In 1942, the Japanese took possession of Andaman and Nicobar Islands.  A year later, the Provisional Government of Azad Hind and the INA were established in the Islands with Lt Col. A.D. Loganathan as Governor General. The islands were renamed Shaheed (Martyr) and Swaraj (Independence). However, the Provisional Government’s civil authority was never enacted in areas occupied by the INA; instead, Japanese military authority prevailed and responsibility for administration of occupied areas of India was shared between the Japanese and the Indian forces.  During his interrogation after the war, Loganathan admitted that he had only had control over the islands' education department, as the Japanese had retained full control over the police force, and in protest, he had refused to accept responsibility for any other areas of Government. He could not prevent the Homfreyganj massacre of 30 January 1944, where forty-four Indian civilians were shot by the Japanese on suspicion of spying. Many of them were members of the Indian Independence League, whose leader in Port Blair, Dr. Diwan Singh, had already been tortured to death in the Cellular Jail after doing his best to protect the islanders from Japanese atrocities during the first two years of the occupation.^{37, 38}

37.             Dasgupta, Jayant (2002) Japanese in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Red Sun over Black Water. Delhi: Manas Publications. Pp. 67, 87, 91–95. 

38.             Mathur, L.P. (1985) Kala Pani. History of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands with a study of India's Freedom Struggle. Delhi: Eastern Book Corporation. pp. 249–251.

 

         Significantly, when the Japanese surrendered at the end of World War II, there was a formal surrender ceremony which Lt Col Nathu Singh, who was commanding 1/7 Rajput battalion of the Indian Army, accepted the formal surrender of Japanese troops in the Andaman and Nicobar islands from Vice Admiral Teejo Hara, on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia.³⁹

39.   Singh, Major General V.K. (2005), Leadership in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers: New Delhi, Sage Publications, p.65

 

Can the Azad Hind Government still claim that it was a sovereign state?

 

Q10. Was Netaji a military or a political leader?

Subhas Chandra Bose was only 24 years old when he returned to India from England in 1921, after having resigned from the ICS. He met Mahatma Gandhi who in turn advised him to meet CR Das, who was leading the freedom movement in Bengal. Bose found Das to be more flexible than Gandhi and sympathetic to the extremism that attracted idealistic young men such as Bose in Bengal. It was Das who launched Bose into nationalist politics. For the next 20 years, Bose worked within the ambit of the Indian National Congress politics even as he tried to change its course. ⁴⁰

40.  Gordon 1990, p. 69.

 

Bose's writings prior to 1939 shows that he disapproved of the racist practices and annulment of democratic institutions in Nazi Germany. However, he expressed admiration for the authoritarian methods which he saw in Italy and Germany during the 1930s, and thought they could be used in building an independent India. During the two years he spent in Germany from 1941 to 1943, he was able to open the Free India Centre in Berlin, and to set up a Free India Radio on which he broadcast every night. He also created the 3,000 strong Free India Legion from Indian prisoners of war captured by Germany’s Afrika Korps.  This restored his reputation as a politician, which had been adversely affected in the previous two years.

After his arrival in Singapore in 1943, Bose realized that the Japanese were more responsive to his aspirations than the Germans. He was able to obtain more support from Japan than he had from Germany. The Indian National Army that had been disbanded was revived and took part in some operations in Burma alongside Japanese forces. He also created the Provisional Government of Free India in Japanese occupied Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These efforts did not bear fruit and after the recapture of Singapore by British forces and the surrender of the remnants of the INA at Rangoon, Bose escaped to Manchuria, hoping to continue his campaign for liberating India with the help of the Soviet Union. His life ended in the plane before could complete his journey. 

There is little doubt that Bose had all the qualities needed by a successful political leader.  He was confident of his abilities and just a week after his arrival in Singapore said so himself. On 9 July, 60,000 people stood in pouring rain to hear Bose proclaim: ‘There is no nationalist leader in India who can claim to possess the many sided experience that I have been able to acquire.’ ⁴¹

41.       Toye, p. 82

 

But can the same be said about his military experience? He had not undergone any military training at all, yet when he raised the INA he chose to be its Commander-in-Chief. He emulated Adolf Hitler, not only in his actions but also in matters of dress, salutation and title. Hitler had some military experience having served in the German Army during World War I, but had risen to rank of corporal. He often overruled his marshals with disastrous results, which ultimately led to his downfall.

During Imphal campaign, though the Japanese appreciated the firmness with which Bose's forces continued to fight, they were endlessly exasperated with him. A number of Japanese officers, even those like Fujiwara, who were devoted to the Indian cause, saw Bose as a military incompetent as well as an unrealistic and stubborn man who saw only his own needs and problems and could not see the larger picture of the war as the Japanese had to.⁴²

42.       Gordon (1990) p. 517.

 

Fujiwara, who knew the INA and its leaders more than any other Japanese officer, writes: “As leader of the Army, Bose became the foundation of spiritual strength and was the pivot of the INA organisation. However, the standard of his operational tactics was, it must be said with great regret, low. He was inclined to be idealistic and not realistic. To this Toye adds: “The fact that he was neither a good soldier, nor the infallible political genius his disciples believed, makes only the more remarkable his power of fascination.”⁴³

 

43.       Toye, p.178

                   

Though Bose had worn the mantle of a military leader, in Germany as well as in Singapore, some of his actions show that he was not aware of the responsibilities that such a role entails. One of these was the safety and well-being of the men under his command, which is part of the motto of every Indian officer who passes out from the portals of the Indian Military Academy. 

After having created the Indian Foreign Legion in Germany, when he found that the Germans were not willing to give him the role that he wanted, he left for Singapore, to seek the help of Japan. He left 3,000 soldiers of the Indian Foreign Legion to their fate. He did something similar when he found that the INA had not failed to achieve its objectives, Ten days before the INA surrendered to British forces at Rangoon, Bose left for Manchuria, along with the women of the Rani Jhansi Regiment and a few others. He left 10,000 soldiers of the INA to their fate. This was contrary to the time honoured custom of a commander always surrendering with his troops, instead of leaving them to their fate.

 

America declared its independence in 1776, but it took another five years to win freedom from the British. On October 19, 1781, the British General Charles Cornwallis surrendered in Yorktown, Virginia along with 8,000 British troops. During World War I, in the siege of Kut-al Amara, Major General Charles Townshend surrendered to the Turkish forces on 29 April 1916. He spent the rest of the war confined at Constantinople, while around 4,000 of the 10,000 troops which surrendered at Kut died either on the march to Turkish prison camps, or were worked to death in the camps. During World War II, Lieutenant General Arthur Percival surrendered at Singapore to the Japanese along with 136,000 men in February 1942. Churchill called it “the worst disaster in British history”. A more recent example is the surrender of Lieutenant General Niazi along with 93,000 Pakistani soldiers at Dacca in 1971, after the liberation of East Pakistan  by the Indian Army. Bose may not be aware of this military custom, but surely his military advisers must have been. It is surprising than none of them advised him about this tradition.

Shahnawaz mentions an interesting incident that occurred on 29 April 1945 during the journey after Bose left Rangoon. He writes:-

General Isoda of the Liasion Department asked Netaji to go in the car and the Rani Jhansi girls in the lorries. He said “Do you think I am Ba Mao of Burma that I will leave my men and run for safety? I have told you repeatedly that I will not go unless my men have gone ahead”.⁴⁴

44.      Shahnawaz,  p. 243.

 

In fact, this is exactly what Bose was doing – leaving his men and running for safety.

 

Q.11 Did the INA play a part in India’s independence? 

 

Most INA veterans assert that they played a stellar role in India’s independence from British rule. In support of this view, they cite various documents that show that one of the reasons that prompted the British decision to grant independence to India was the realisation that they could no longer rely on the Indian Army.  In note written in early 1946 Lord Wavell wrote: “It would not be wise to try the Indian Army too highly in suppression of it’s own people.”⁴⁵ In the Foreword to KC Praval's book on the Indian Army, Lieutenant General SK Sinha wrote, ‘There had also been the Naval mutiny at Bombay and the Army (Signals) mutiny at Jubbulpore. It was now clear as daylight to the British that they could no longer use the Indian Army to perpetuate their imperial rule over India…”⁴⁶

45.       Wavell, The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 197

 

46.       Major KC Praval, Indian Army After Independence, p. IX.

 

Menezes writes: ‘Now in early 1946, serious cases of mutiny suddenly occurred in the Royal Indian Navy (RIN), less serious in the Royal Air Force (RAF) (wanting early repatriation) and in the Royal Indian Air Force, and a lesser protest in the Indian Army, at Jubbulpore in the Signal Training Centre.⁴⁷ Though Menezes calls the Jubbulpore mutiny ‘a lesser protest’, in fact it was taken most seriously by the British authorities. The RIN and RIAF at that time were miniscule forces, with hardly any role in governance. The major instrument of British power was the Indian Army, and disaffection in its ranks was a cause for concern, however small. On 28 March 1946, less than a month after the suppression of the mutiny at Jubbulpore, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India, broadcast his famous appeal to all officers of the Indian Army. On 30 March 1946, the Hindustan Times commented editorially on the Auk’s appeal. “There is no doubt whatever that if the transfer of power is not quickly brought about, the foreign rulers of India cannot count upon the loyalty of the Indian Army…”^48.

47.       Menezes, p. 404

48.       Hamid, p.47

 

            While there is no doubt that nationalist feelings had taken root in the Indian Army, there is no proof that the INA was the catalyst. There were three prominent mutinies in 1946 – the RIN mutiny at Bombay, Karachi and other places; the Army mutiny at Jabalpur and the RIAF mutiny at several places. The root causes of all three were deficiencies in pay, food, accommodation etc; delay in demobilization and discrimination against Indian servicemen. Later, nationalist demands were added, and the movements were given a political twist. While it is true that after the INA trials - not before - there was a feeling of sympathy for the INA prisoners in certain quarters in the Armed Forces, there is nothing on record to show any direct correlation between these movements and the INA. In fact, after the fall of Rangoon so strong was the feeling against the INA prisoners amongst Indian soldiers that Auchinleck had to issue instructions for their safety. The assertion that these mutinies were inspired by the INA appears to be fallacious.

 

             0700, 30 Sep 21

 

 

 

 

END NOTES

 

 

1.         Stephen Cohen, The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, p.152

2.         Major General Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight, p.17    

3.         Maj Gen Shah Nawaz Khan, My Memories of INA and its Netaji, p. 47-48

4.         Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, In the Line of Duty – A Soldier Remembers, p.134

5.         Harbaksh Singh, pp.111-112

6.         Cohen, p.149 

7.         Gerard H. Corr, The War of the Springing Tigers, p.149

8.         Shah Nawaz p. 89

9.         Corr, p.165

10.       Corr, p.166

11.       Shah Nawaz, p. 159

12.       RM Kasliwal, The Impact of Netaji and INA on India’s Independence, p.20

13.       Cohen, p.152

14.       John Connell, Auchinleck, p.97,

15.       Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger,, p.120

16        Captain SS Yadav, Forgotten Warriors, p.50

17.       Toye, pp.125-126

18.       Lt. Gen. S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour – The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, p. 397

19.       Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger, p. VIII

20.       Mohan Singh, p. 65

21.       Bisheshwar Prasad, ed. Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War 1939-45 – India and the War, p.35

22.       Connell, p.817 

23.       Hamid, p.17

24.       Fay, p.424

25.       Toye, p.112. (Durrani survived and was later decorated with the George Cross for his fortitude. Lebra erroneously calls it the VC)

26.       Toye, p.94

27.       Toye, p.95

28.       Toye, p.98

29.       Toye, p.133

30.       Toye, p.162

31.       Fay, p.195.

32.       Toye, p.75.

33.       Bose, Sugata (2011), His Majesty's Opponent: Subhas Chandra Bose and India's Struggle against Empire, Harvard University Press. p. 127 

34.       Bose (2011), pp. 129–130.

 35.      Gordon, Leonard A. (1990), Brothers against the Raj: a biography of Indian nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose, Columbia University Press, pp. 344–345.

36.       Fay, p.312.

37.       Dasgupta, Jayant (2002) Japanese in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Red Sun over Black Water. Delhi: Manas Publications. Pp. 67, 87, 91–95. 

38.       Mathur, L.P. (1985) Kala Pani. History of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands with a study of India's Freedom Struggle. Delhi: Eastern Book Corporation. pp. 249–251.

41.            Singh, Major General V.K. (2005), Leadership in the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers: New Delhi, Sage Publications, p.65

42.             Gordon 1990, p. 69   

 

43.            Toye, p. 82

 

44.            Gordon (1990) p. 517.

43.       Toye, p.178

44.       Shahnawaz,  p. 243.

45.       Wavell, The Viceroy’s Journal, p. 197

46.       Major KC Praval, Indian Army After Independence, p. IX.

47.       Menezes, p. 404

48.       Hamid, p.47