Review
Article 2
Watershed
1967 - India’s Forgotten Victory over China[*]
Maj
Gen VK Singh (Retd)[†]
Editor’s
Note
While reviewing the book by Probal Dasgupta, the
writer argues that military history books which attempt to gloss over failures
or less than ideal actions do a disservice as they corrupt India’s military history.
He feels that this is a dangerous trend as correct lessons cannot be drawn for
future applications.
A book titled “Watershed 1967 — India’s Forgotten
Victory over China” published in 2020 is authored by Probal DasGupta, a former Army
officer from the 11th Gorkha Rifles. The book starts with a section titled “Praise
for the Book”. After reading these words of praise from some well-known people,
the reader looks forward to an engrossing book on military history. The lay
reader is not disappointed. Even a military historian finds the book
interesting, unless he is aware of the actual occurrences. Unfortunately, the
truth is not correctly portrayed in the book.
The Book
In the Introduction (Page 9-12) to the
book, the author states that “The twin
victories at Cho La and Nathu La have only been covered in fragments through
articles and papers. This book, based on extensive interviews with the army men
who were present at the scene, captures the events truthfully and aims to fix
this blind spot in history. This was personally
important to me, being a former army officer myself.” The author’s claim
that the twin victories a Cho La and Nathu La have only been covered in
fragments through articles and papers is not correct. This subject has been covered in detail in
Chapter 8 of Volume III of the History of the Corps of Signals.[1]
It was also uploaded on the
blog http://veekay-militaryhistory.blogspot.com/2013/
in 2013. This includes extracts from the diary of 2/Lt (later Col) NC Gupta,
who was then the signal officer in HQ 112 Brigade. This is the most authentic
account of the Nathula skirmish, as it was written as and when the events
occurred. An account of the skirmish at Nathu La is also covered in the
biography of General Sagat Singh that forms part of the book Leadership in
the Indian Army – Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, written in 2005. This
is the earliest published account of the action.[2]
The 181-page book has eight chapters, followed by an
epilogue. Chapter 1 titled Secret Games: Spies, Soldiers and the Opening
Gambit has 18 pages, covering diverse subjects such as CIA plot to
encourage China and Pakistan to attack India; meetings between Sheikh Abdullah
and CIA operatives; Pakistani attacks in the Rann of Kutch in July 1965;
Operation Gibraltar in Kashmir in August 1965; the war on the Western Front in
September 1965; details of major battles such as Haji Pir, Asal Uttar, Dograi
etc. There are 48 notes, mostly referring to newspaper articles in Indian and
foreign journals.
Chapter 2 titled In the Shadow of the Dragon: The
War Moves East has nine pages covering the Goa operation in December 1961;
Pakistan’s failed attempts to obtain help from USA and China; and the cease
fire between India and Pakistan on 22 September 1965. Both these
chapters are irrelevant to the Nathula Operations of 1967 and have been added
just as fillers.
Chapter 3 titled Protests, Disagreements and a
Temporary Truce: Advantage China has 19 pages. It covers the diplomatic
exchanges between India and China after some sheep crossed over into India; the
agitation outside the Chinese embassy led by Atal Behari Vajpayee, the
ultimatum by China to India to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La; Sagat’s refusal to
vacate Nathula; minor skirmishes in 1965; the installation of loudspeakers by
the Chinese at Nathula; the marriage of Hope Cooke with Palden Thondup, the
Chogyal of Sikkim; her friendship with Gen Sagat; the Tashkent agreement; and
the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri. The only relevant parts are the ones
concerning the ultimatum by China to India to vacate Nathula and Jelepla;
Sagat’s refusal to vacate Nathula and the installation of loudspeakers by the
Chinese at Nathula; and minor skirmishes in 1965. The author has acknowledged
the source as the article The Skirmish at
Nathula (1967).[3]
Chapter 4 titled China’s Psychological Tactics: Softening
Up the Enemy Before the Storm covers the insurgency in Mizo Hills, the
bombing of Aizwal by IAF, the beginning of the Naxalite movement; machinations
of Hope Cooke in an effort to gain independence from India; and the stand-off
at Doklam. It again has limited relevance to the operations at Nathula and
Chola.
Chapter 5 titled 1966–67: Warriors Arrive at the Watershed
covers the organisation of the Indian Army into commands, corps, divisions,
brigades and battalions; brief biographical sketches of some officers (KB
Joshi, Parulekar, Ram Singh Rathore) and
men (Tinjong Lama, Debi Prasad) of 7/11 GR and some officers of 2 Grenadiers
(Rai Singh, Bishan Singh and PS Dagar). There is no mention of the names of
officers or men from 18 Rajput or 10 JAK Rifles, the two other units that
played a major role in the battles at Nathula and Chola.
Chapter 6 is titled The Tipping Point: A Tale of
Spies and a Breach at the Watershed. This is the longest chapter (20 pages)
covering the arrest and deportation of two Indian diplomats in Peking in June
1967; India’s retaliation by expelling a
Chinese diplomat followed by mob attacks on the Chinese embassy in New Delhi;
similar attacks on the Indian embassy in Peking; arrival of 2 Grenadiers at
Nathula in August 1967; commencement of laying the wire at Nathula by 2
Grenadiers on 20 August; objection by the Chinese; visit by the Corps Commander
and Gen Sagat Singh to the border on 1 Sep 1967; patrol led by Maj Bishan Singh
being surrounded by Chinese leading to a scuffle; commencement of fencing using
concertina coils on 5 Sep; brawl between Indian and Chinese soldiers at the
fence on 7 Sep resulting in injury to the political commissar; meeting held at HQ
112 Brigade by Gen Sagat Singh during which Maj Bishan Singh was given the task
of completion of fence; allotment of
additional troops from Engineers to assist him.
Chapter 7 titled Hellfire at Nathu La is the
most important chapter that covers the battle at Nathula. However, it has been
assigned only nine pages. Some extracts from the chapter are given here in
italics, along with comments. The opening paragraph gives details of signal
communications, including the new line laid overnight from the brigade
headquarters in Changgu to Sherathang where the mortars were located. All posts
were connected on telephone and radio. This network was patched to the
Divisional HQ. This information has obviously been obtained
from the diary of NC Gupta that is quoted in my articles as well as Chapter 8
of the History of the Corps of Signals, Volume III that is also on my blog. The
author has mentioned that the book includes extracts from NC Gupta’s diary. He writes “The
suddenness of the Chinese actions had forced a bunch of soldiers, over thirty
according to accounts, to instinctively make a run for their lives: some even
escaping from the scene. This unpleasant chapter of the battle is often dropped
from narrations, but to exclude this would undermine the heroism of the
soldiers who stood and fought gallantly. Months later, court martials would be
held to prosecute deserters, on charges of cowardice.”
The author only mentions that Major Bishan Singh was
injured. He has totally ignored the role of 2/Lt NC Gupta in saving his life.
One can only conclude that this was done deliberately, to conceal the fact of
2/Lt Attar Singh quitting his post at South Shoulder and being taken back to
the post by NC Gupta, under orders of the brigade commander.
The author also writes “Signal Officer Naveen Gupta and Second Lieutenant Attar Singh, who was
among the younger officers in the unit, joined in and ran from trench to trench
as he yelled at the men to keep the flock together and respond with fire. The
morale had to be kept up.” This is not true. Naveen did not join Attar
Singh and run with him from trench to trench. In fact, Attar Singh was at South
Shoulder while Naveen was with the brigade commander until he was sent up to
South Shoulder. The author adds “By then,
signal communication with the platoon on South Shoulder had also been lost. On the
brigade commander’s instructions, Naveen and a line repair party proceeded
towards South Shoulder with a radio set for the platoon there. On arriving at
the post, Naveen found the bodies of a few dead soldiers ahead of the defences.
The post wore a desolate look as most men had either been killed or had left
the post, barring an abandoned light machine gun (LMG). The author has
twisted the facts mentioned by NC Gupta in his diary. The diary runs into almost
30 pages of handwritten notes. It is not intended to reproduce the complete
diary in this article. It has been included in the History of the Corps of
Signals, Volume III.[4]
A short resume, describing the events relating to
South Shoulder on 11 September as described in Gupta’s diary has recently been
published in the Indian Military Review. It is reproduced below[5]
During
the first day’s action, there was a loss of morale in 2 Grenadiers, when troops
occupying the South Shoulder vacated their positions. This became evident after
breakdown of communications. Finding no response from the post on radio and
observing about a dozen troops running down the slopes of South Shoulder minus
their helmets, packs and rifles, the brigade commander asked his Signals officer, 2/Lt N.C. Gupta, to
go up to South Shoulder with a spare
radio set. On reaching South Shoulder at around 10 am, Gupta found the post
abandoned and informed Brigadier Bakshi, who asked him to hold the post until
reinforcements reached. About an hour
later Brigadier Bakshi spotted six soldiers sitting behind a huge rock, around
100 metres down South Shoulder and asked Gupta to investigate. On reaching the
spot, Gupta found that they were from 2 Grenadiers, including 2/Lt Attar Singh
who was in command of the post at South Shoulder. Their radio set had been switched off. Gupta
made him speak to the Brigade Commander, who gave him a mouthful and ordered
them to return to the post, accompanied by Gupta. At about 12 pm Gupta
discerned some saw movement in one of the bodies lying next to the fence barely
10 metres from the Chinese bunker. Taking advantage of the fog, he went ahead
to investigate. He discovered that it was a badly wounded Major Bishan Singh,
‘Tiger Nathula’, who had been injured in the initial firing. Bishan was a 6
foot tall Jat, while Gupta was a diminutive five foot three, almost half his
weight. With great difficulty Gupta managed to drag Bishan into our defences
and made him speak to the brigade commander. Bakshi ordered Gupta to evacuate
him using the four men from 2 Grenadiers, while he stayed on with the post
commander and one Havildar.
Chapter 8, titled The Battle of Cho La, describes the
actions of 7/11 GR in the battle of Chola.[6]
It is entirely based on the regimental history of the regiment. “The
Path of Glory: Exploits of the 11 Gorkha Rifles” written by Gautam Sharma
and the author’s conversation with Lt Col KB Joshi. The Author has totally
ignored the role of 10 JAK Rifles, which was awarded one MVC and three VrCs.
The name of the brigade commander, Brig Kundan Singh has also not been
mentioned. The regimental history mentions the name of the brigade commander
and his conversation with Lt Col KB Joshi. It is not understood why the author
has chosen to ignore his name. It now appears that the whole aim of writing the
book is to eulogize the action of 7/11 GR. This would not be objectionable in
case the book had been about the 7/11 GR and not given the title it has, which
portrays it as a history of the full conflict.
The Epilogue covers subjects such as the war in 1971,
the creation of Bangla Desh and the merger of Sikkim with India with the assistance
of RAW. All these are irrelevant to the subject of the book, which is professed
to cover the battles of Nathula and Chola. Interestingly, the author has written
24 pages in the Epilogue, with 78 Notes. In comparison only 9 pages have been
devoted to the battle at Nathula (97-105) and 15 pages (106-120) to Chola.
General
Comments
The author seems to have done hardly any research, apart
from snippets from books and articles and some interviews. Except for the
regimental history of his own Regiment, the 11th Gorkha Rifles, he
has not consulted the regimental histories of The Grenadiers, The Rajput
Regiment and The Jammu & Kashmir Rifles. He has made no attempt to go
through the war diaries of the units or the formation HQ. This being his first
book he can perhaps be excused for gaffes such as using incorrect ranks, names,
and decorations. In the book, Ranjit Singh Dayal, the captor of Haji Pir is
called Rajinder Singh Dayal; Gen Shiv Charan Singh, GOC 27 Division is called
Ramcharan Singh. Brig MMS Bakshi is said to have been awarded a VrC in 1965,
whereas he got an MVC. He also has a disconcerting habit of giving names
without mentioning the rank. For instance, he mentions Kul Bhushan, Parulekar,
Tinjong Lama, Debi Prasad etc. without their ranks. Kulbhushan is sometimes
referred to as KB. His full name with rank Lt Col KB Joshi or Kul Bhushan Joshi
is rarely mentioned. Since the battalion has another KB (Krishna Bahadur), this
sometimes leaves the reader confused. Using names without ranks may be the norm
in articles and stories; it is almost never done in a book on military history.
As already mentioned in Chapter 8 - The Battle of Cho
La, the Author has totally ignored the role of 10 JAK RIF and its CO, Lt Col
Mahatam Singh, MVC. In addition to the MVC for the CO, the battalion was
awarded three VrCs. This is an unacceptable lapse and amounts to an insult to
the unit.
The most conspicuous feature of the book is the
distortion of facts relating to 2 Grenadiers. The only authentic version of the
battle is the diary of 2/Lt (later Brigadier) NC Gupta, which gives a day-by-day
account of the occurrences from 11-14 September 1967. Its authenticity cannot be questioned because
it was written daily as the events occurred, and not in hindsight. The original
handwritten pages with the Brigade Commander’s signature on the first page is
held in HQ 112 Mountain Brigade. This clearly
brings out the instances of cowardice, especially the vacation of South
Shoulder at a critical juncture.
In military histories —and the reviewer has noticed
this trend increasing in the period after Independence — successes are magnified
but failures are glossed over. As result, one gets the true picture only after
studying the after
action reports of formations of which they formed part and in accounts written
by those who participated in the operations. In most cases war diaries are written after an
event, and not as and when they occur. This leads to a disturbing
trend – the falsification of military records by units; often in the name of
the unit’s izzat (honour).
This is indeed a serious matter and needs urgent attention from those concerned
with our military heritage and history. It also makes it imperative that
military historians research their subject without bias, rancour or a desire to
write pulp fiction which can become the basis for a war film.
[*] Watershed 1967 - India’s Forgotten Victory over China, Probal DasGupta (New Delhi, Juggernaut Books, 2020). 274 pp, Rs 599/-, ISBN- 9789353450939.
[†] Major General VK Singh was commissioned in the Corps of Signals is 1965 and retired after 37 years of Service. A prolific writer on military history, biographies, intelligence and national security issues, he has written numerous articles and has authored six books.
Endnotes
[1] Major General VK Singh. History of the Corps of Signals, Volume III: Covering the First 25 Years of the Post –Independence History of the Corps from 1947 to 1972, (KW Publishers, New Delhi 2014), pp 330-337.
[2] Major General VK Singh. Leadership
in the Indian Army –Biographies of Twelve Soldiers, (Sage, New Delhi,
2005), pp 308-312
[3] Major General VK Singh. The Skirmish at Nathula (1967),
(Scholar Warrior, Autumn 2014).
[4] Major General VK Singh.
History of the Corps of Signals, Volume III. Op cit.
[5] Maj Gen VK Singh. The
Skirmish at Nathula (1967), (IMR August 2018).
[6] Lt. Col. Gautam Sharma, Path of Glory – Exploits of the 11th
Gorkha Rifles, (Allied Publishers, Delhi, 1988).
(Published in the USI Journal, Jan-Mar 2021)
