THE
SIGNALS PLAN - A NEW CONCEPT
Col
VK Singh
INTRODUCTION
In
modern warfare, communications have proved to be an important battle winning
factor. The accent on mobile warfare, involving quick changing battle
situations, has enhanced this importance. The rapid growth of electronics, and
its application in almost every field,
including 'gunnery, navigation, target acquisition, electronic surveillance,
RADAR, communications and electronic warfare, makes it imperative for
commanders at all levels to consider its implications and effect on their
operational plans. It is, therefore, incumbent on commanders to actively
involve themselves in formulation of the communications plan and its
implementation at each stage, instead of leaving it to the Signals adviser. Communications
planning, like fire planning, is a command responsibility and commanders who
ignore or neglect it are likely to pay a heavy price.
AIM
The
aim of this paper is to discuss the importance of communications in the Army
and the methodology involved in formulation of the Signals Plan.
COMMUNICATIONS
IN THE ARMY
Present
Communications Set Up
In
the Army, the Corps of Signals is responsible for providing all types of
communications, down to the level of abattalion/regiment. Communications below battalion/regiment
are manned by regimental signallers, from within the unit. The means of
communications employed by Signals include line, radio, radio relay,
troposcatter and despatch riders. In addition, the Corps of Signalsis also
responsible for electronic warfare against all electronic emission used by
theenemy, including non- communication
electronics.
The
present concept of communications in the Army is linear, and follows the chain
of command. This implies that each level of command, or headquarters, is
connected to the one above and the one below it. Except in rare cases, there is
no lateral communication, and neither does it exist to levels other than the
ones immediately above or below. The basic Signals unit is a signal regiment,
one of which is provided for every headquarters at the level of a division or
above. Thus, there are divisional, corps, command and Army Headquarters signal
regiments. In addition, there are composite signal regiments which are not
affiliated to anyheadquarters, but provide communications rearward of the corps
zone, on line, radio or radio relay. There are other types of signals units,
for specialized communications for air support, for carrying out monitoring of
own radiolinks, for interception of enemy links, and for electronic warfare. At
eachheadquarters, down to the brigade, aSignals officer is available as adviser
tothe formation commander.
Importance of Communications in
Battle
The Army comprises Arms and Services. There
are five Arms, vizArmoured Corps, Artillery,Engineers, Signals and Infantry, of
which the first and last are also called the "teeth" Arms, the others
being "supporting" Arms. The rest,like AOC, EME, ASC, AMC, Postal,
Provost etc., are called Services. While every Arm or Service has its own
special role, and each is vital, in its own way, for success in battle, there
is one feature which distinguishes Arms from Services, and that is their role,
and the effect of their failure or success in fulfilling it. While the role of
Services is vital to the overall war effort, it does not affect the immediate
battle, where success or failure depends on the ability of the Arms to fulfil
their assigned tasks. For instance, consider the case of a division or brigade
going into attack. The immediate result of the battle will not be affected if
the Supply Point is closed down, or the Ordnance Depot catches fire, or the
Field Hospital fails to fetch up, or if the EME Workshop is shelled out. On the
other hand, consider the effect of the failure of any of the Arms. The Armoured
Corps and Infantry, who Physicallyassault and capture the objective, are
obviously beyond discussion. But can the attack go in, and succeed, without
covering fire from theArtillery, or before the Engineers have breached the mine
fields and made the bridges or if the radio communicationsfail? The answer is
No. And this is thesubtle difference, between Arms andServices, which has to be
understoodbefore the role of any of them, and theiremployment, is considered.
Organisation
and Employment of Signals
Considering
the Arms, there are Marked similarities, and differences, between their roles.
However, there are some peculiar characteristics in the organisation and
employment of Signals, Which are interesting to note. Some of these are asunder
:-
(a) Artillery,
Engineers and Signals are called "Supporting Arms". However, While
other Arms are affiliated withformations, the Signals element is integral, at
each level of command. For instance, there is no Army Headquarters Artillery
Regiment, Command Engineer Regiment, or Corps Armoured Regiment, but there are
signal regiments at these headquarters. Even at divisional, and brigade and
battalion level, all the artillery and engineer resources are not integral, but
allotted for a specific operation whereas the signal resources are integral to
the formation or unit. In fact, when a brigade moves, the signal company moves
alongwith it, but not the affiliated field regiment or field company.
(b) The
resources and equipment authorised to Artillery, Engineers and Signals are based on their role, and employment.
However, it is interesting to note that only Signals has been authorised
reserve equipment at every level, down to the battalion. For instance, there
are no reserve guns in an artillery battery, or reserve minelayers, trawls or
bridges in an engineer regiment, but there are reserve radio sets in every
divisional signal regiment, brigade signal company, and battalion/regiment
signal section. Why? In an Army, where economy is the byword, and there are
restrictions on everything, how have Signals got away with such a lavish
allocation of resources? The reason will be explained a little later.
(c) Before
any operational plan is made, it is necessary to carry out an appreciation of
the situation. One of the factors considered is Relative Strength and
Assessment of Troops to Task. However, it is an interesting fact that while all
other Arms, like Armour, Artillery and Engineers are considered, alongwith
supporting weapons like MMG, rcl guns, as well as air support, there is no
mention of Signals. Why? Is it because Signals have no role in battle, and can
be ignored? Again, the answer will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.
(d) Every
commander, before finalising his tactical plan, ensures that the engineer plan
and the arty plan have been dovetailed into it. To do this, he relies on a
plethora of planning data which is available in pamphlets and hand books; such
as the Staff Officers Hand Book, issued by the Defence Services Staff College, and
the Commanders Hand Book, issued by the College of Combat. It is interesting to
note that while these hand books contain fairly exhaustive planning data for
Engineers and Artillery, there is little or no planning data for Signals. Thus,
while every commander knows the bridging and mine laying capabilities of a
field company, or the time take by a field battery to deploy, and the ranges of
its guns, as well as the rates of fire, effective area of neutralisation,
safety distances, and so on, hardly anyone knows the time taken to establish a
radio relay link, or to lay a kilometre of cable, or the maximum ranges
obtained by different types of radio sets. Needless to say, this data is
important in planning a tactical operation. In fact more often than not, certain
important operations such as siting and move of headquarters or rate of advance
of break out force, has to be dependent
entirely on the communications, and
restrictions imposed by ranges of radio sets or cable.
The
reason for making Signals integral at each level and for the lavish allocation
of resources is only one. Over the years, commanders, both vanquished and
victorious, have learned that in order to ensure that they are always in touch
with the battle situation, and that their orders can be passed quickly to their
command, they must have good communications. And to make sure that each
commander has his own communications, which he does not have to share with
anyone else, the signal resources have been given to him as an integral part of
his command, instead of being affiliated, like otherArms. And the reason for
the lavish allotment of resources is that no commander is willing to risk a
break in communications, even for a moment. Accordingly, reserve radio sets,
cable, telephones and generators have been catered for at every level.
Communications is one field where frugality is suicidal, and it is prudent to
cater for reserves, even though it is an expensive proposition.
Coming
to the Assessment of Troops to Task, the reason for not considering Signals is
the lavish allocation of resources, as discussed above. Every commander knows
that adequate signal resources have been catered for every possible
contingency, and he does not have to allocate them separately for a particular
operation of war. In a defensive battle, the radio sets may not be used at all.
Similarly, in mobile offensive operations, telephones and cable Will hardly be
used. But these resources are there, and that is what matters. Hence, the
reason for not considering Signals is not that they are least important, but
rather that they are most important - in fact, so important that there is no
scope for discussion. This is an important point, which commanders and their
staff be over the years, failed to grasp, often With disastrous consequences.
THE
SIGNALS PLAN
Present
Concept
It
is an anomalous fact that even though the importance of communications has been
underlined, hardly any time thought is devoted to this subject by commanders
while formulating their plans. Fairly exhaustive guidelines and treatises exist
on the methodology involved in making out a tacticalPlan, a fire plan, and an
obstacle plan, but there is no general staff publication Whichexplains the
procedure of evolving a communication plan. In fact, this vital aspect is
neglected even in the training institutions, such as the DSSC and the College
of Combat, and communication planning is left to Signals, who treat it as an
"in house" affair. In all operational orders and instructions, the
subject is brushed off with a line "Signal Instructions will be issued by
Chief Signal Officer (or Officer Commanding Signal Regiment)." Of course,
Signals have fairly detailed and exhaustive formats for their signal
instructions or operational orders, containing a vast amount of technical data.
But the important thing is that the Signals plan is not dovetailed into the
tactical plan, as a fire plan or an obstacle plan is. This is because the
Signals Plan is made by the Signals adviser in isolation, based on the tactical
plan, and there is no involvement of the commander or his staff. This is a
serious draw back, andresults in loss of flexibility andsubsequent disruption in communications when the
situation changes abruptly, for which communications have not been catered for.
This is because at present, the Signals adviser goes by his own intuition and
anticipation, in allocating reserves and catering for alternative circuits. In
case he has been able to read his commander's mind, all goes well. If not,
communications break down at a crucial moment, with disastrous results. This
situation can be avoided only if the commander himself approves the Signals
plan, and it is put into effect only once it has been thoroughly screened by him
and his staff, so that suitable modifications can be incorporated to cater for
all possible contingencies.
The
other serious drawback is that the Present system is wasteful, and does not
contribute to optimum utilisation of resources. In a division, all brigades are
rarely committed at the same time, andeven when they are, there is considerable
difference in their commitments. However, the signal resources of each brigade
are identical, and cannot be used by others. For instance, if one brigade is in
a holding role, and the other two are being used for an attack, the requirement
of radio communications for the latterwillbe more than that of, the former.
However, with the present set up, which has no flexibility, the Signals adviser
cannot, on his own, reallot signal resources, as can be done by the Artillery
or Engineer adviser, to ensure that optimum utilisation is made of all
equipment and manpower.
The following steps are
suggested in formulation of the Signals plan :-
(a) The commander, after carrying out his
appreciation, makes out a tactical plan in out line.
(b) The Commander gives out his
communications requirements to the Signals adviser. This is done in terms of
type of communications, ie. speech and/ or telegraph (and not means of
communication ie., line or radio), for each phase of the operation, including
contingencies.
(c) The Signals adviser makes out an outline
Signals plan, to cater for the commander's communication requirements, making
use of all available resources. He also decides the means of communication for
each unit or formation, such as radio, radio relay, line, or a suitable
combination of these.
(d) The Signals adviser puts up the Signals
plan to the commander for his approval, alongwith suggested modifications in
the tactical plan, wherever it is not possible to meet the communication
requirements within the existing resources.
(e) The commander suitably modifies the
tactical plan, if required, or arranges for additional resources. The Signals
plan is then approved by him, after suitable modifications.
(f) The Signals adviser affects the Signals
plan by issuing a Signals Operational Order, or Signal Instructions.
The
suggested concept would involve certain changes in the command and control set
up, and the functioning ofsignal units. Some of these are asunder :-
(a)
The commanding officer of a
divisional signal regiment will have the authority to move and deploy signal
resources within the division. This may involve certain changes in the concept
of integration of signal elements with their parentformation. A signal company
will not have to be allotted to each brigade on a permanent basis. However,
signal companies will be affiliated to brigades,like field companies or
artillery regiments.
(b) Allotment of signal resources to brigades
would be done in accordance with the Signals plan. Thus, the composition of
signal companies, in terms of manpower and equipment, will vary, depending on
the task in hand. This would be done by attaching or detaching detachments of
radio, line or radio relay. It may be mentioned that the smallest functional entity in Signals is a
detachment and this term includes thepersonnel, vehicles, and equipment carried
by them.
(c) The lowest level at which signal
communications will be planned will be a division. Communication plans will be
coordinated at corps field army by the respective Chief Signal Officers.
(d) To ensure reliability and flexibility,
reserves will be catered for in the form of reserve detachments.Reserve
detachments may be allotted to signal companies, based on the nature and likely
duration of the operation, terrain, weather conditions, and distance from the
Regimental HQ. In addition, some reserve equipment may be kept centrally with
the Quartermaster in the Regimental HQ.
(e) For communication tasks in the corps or
communication zone, specialist signal bricks, held by
composite signal regiments, may be attached or detached under orders of the
Chief Signal Officers at corps or command HQ. These bricks will be in the form
of sections, comprising a number of detachments, as at present.
For
the successful conduct of a battle in an environment saturated with electronic
activity, it is essential that commanders exercise utmost discretion and
caution in formulating their communications plans. Failure to do this would
leave their communications, weapon systems and other electronic devices
susceptible to enemy electronic counter measures, and this may well be the hinge
on which the eventual outcome of battle rests. It must be realised that communication
planning is a command responsibility. The Signals plan must beinitiated by the
commander, and approved by him before it is implemented by Signals, who are
responsible for its execution, and not its evolution.
(Published in The
Signalman, July 1992)
