IS HISTORY REALLY BUNK?

 

IS HISTORY REALLY BUNK?

“History is bunk”

- Henry Ford

Henry Ford is said to have made this famous comment in 1916. Ironically, Ford later created history himself, when he conceived the assembly line system that revolutionised not only automobile production but almost every other industry in the World. Today, like his other famous quote “People can have the Model T in any colour - so long as it's black”, these remarks are quoted only in jest by almost everyone, with one exception - the Corps of Signals of the Indian Army. For some unfathomable reason, we signallers seem to take Henry Ford’s comments as gospel truth and consider our own history as nothing but junk. 

The third volume of the History of the Corps of Signals covering the period 1947 t0 1972, was released on 15 February 2015. Actually, it had already been ‘released’ during the Centenary celebrations in Jabalpur in 2011, but could not be made available to units or veterans because MI clearance had still not been obtained. But that is another story that will come later. The point at issue is that out of 800 copies that were finally printed, only seven – yes seven - have been bought by veterans. This is strange, as there are thousands of veterans – officers, JCOs and Other Ranks- who took part in the operations in J&K in 1947-48, in Goa in 1961, and against Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 that have been extensively covered in the book. In fact, the name of almost every officer who was serving during these operations has been mentioned in the book. Is it not odd that none of them wants to read about what he has done, let alone his unit and the Corps as a whole?

At the time of Independence, the number of officers in the Corps was 293, which included 26 British officers who agreed to serve in India for some time. By 1972, the strength of officers had gone up to about 1800. The strength of JCOs had increased from 337 to 2562 and of OR from 11145 to 65890. In other words, there were almost 70,000 signallers serving in the Corps in 1972. Assuming that at least half of them are still alive, there should be around 35,000 living veterans who took part in the 1971 war. Why are they not interested in reading about their own role in the only war which resulted in a conclusive victory and the creation of a new nation – Bangla Desh. This is a conundrum that I have been unable to solve.  

            I will now dwell for a while on the history of the Corps History. In Volume II, which covered the period 1939 to 1947, an appendix titled “History of the History” describes the travails and tribulations the book went through before it saw the light of day in 1975. A brief synopsis is given below.

Though the Corps formally came into existence in 1911, it was only in 1953 that the SO-in-C, Brigadier CHI Akehurst, took the first step in recording its history, when he informed everyone that “It is intended to undertake the preparation of the Corps History covering the period from the early days of signalling in INDIA (Approx 1850) up to the constitutional changes in 1947.” Lt Col M Cohen, the Corps Monographer, produced a monograph before he left for England in 1954. Cohen’s monograph covers a period of about a hundred years, and is in fact a brief history of the Corps from the earliest times. The appointment of Corps Monographer lapsed in December 1954, and was never revived. By this time all Royal Signals officers, including Brigadier Akehurst, had returned to England.

 

The history of the Corps History might have ended at this point, were it not for Brigadier Tery Barreto, who voluntarily had begun collecting material in 1951, when he was at the Staff College, and continued his efforts during his subsequent tenures at Delhi, Poona, Simla and Mhow, from where he retired as Commandant School of Signals in 1965.  Though Brigadier Barreto had begun working on the Corps History project, on his own initiative, in the early fifties, it was only in 1957 that the Corps Committee formally requested him to undertake the assignment, and he became the official Corps Historian.

 

            Unfortunately, Brigadier Barreto had to seek premature retirement in June 1965, due to certain reasons that have been briefly mentioned in Volume III. By that time he had not only completed the draft of Volume I, but had also collected a considerable amount of material for the subsequent ones. Before he retired, he handed over all the material collected by him painstakingly over the previous ten years. Strange as it may seem, the project went into limbo after his departure, with the Corps not being able to get it printed until 1975, ten years after its completion by Brigadier Barreto. The book was a verbatim reproduction of the original draft, except for three changes. The title was changed from ‘HISTORY OF THE INDIAN SIGNAL CORPS’ to ‘THE HISTORY OF THE CORPS OF SIGNALS’; no credit was given to Brigadier Barreto for his efforts, and the Compiler’s Note (Preface) written by the author was omitted. The reasons for these changes are not difficult to fathom, but it was an unjust reward to Tery Barreto for his labours, extending over almost 15 years.

 

Let us now turn to Volume II, which was to cover the period from 1939 onwards. In 1967, the Corps Committee decided to publish Volumes I and II, and gave the responsibility to Lt Col GY Sowani, who waited for four years before expressing his inability to complete the task. In 1971 Major KS Kapur agreed to write Volume II and all available material from Mhow and Jabalpur was transported to Delhi and handed over to him. However, he also gave up due to ill health and in 1972, the task was entrusted to Brigadier KD Bhargava, the ISTT, even though he was reluctant to take it on. In 1973 the available material was again carted to Jabalpur and handed over to the ISTT. Lt Col JC Dhamija, who was working under the ISTT, now became the Corps Historian and began working on the project in 1973. However, there was no progress in the matter.  

 

After the publication of Volume I in 1975 Brigadier Surjit Singh, the ISTT, approached Brigadier Barreto in 1976 and requested him to assist in compilation of the Volumes II and III. Considering the manner in which he had been treated in the past, Brigadier Barreto was reluctant to take on the assignment. However, he finally agreed to do so, provided he was given staff support in Nagpur, where he was located. He also laid down certain other conditions, which unfortunately were not met, and the proposal was dropped.

 

 In February 1976 the mantle of Corps Historian fell on Lt Col Colonel SK Behl, who had just retired. Two years later, another retired officer, Col PN Luthra, who was based in Delhi, was assigned the task. The Corps History Cell, and all the material, was again moved from Jabalpur to Delhi. In 1982, Maj Gen J Mayadas, who had also retired, agreed to write the Corps History and was designated the Corps Historian.

At this stage, there was a strange development. The Corps Committee decided that the Corps History would be compiled in one volume, with a synopsis of the existing Volume 1 forming Chapter I of the proposed Corps History, which would cover the period up to 1981. In less than a year Maj Gen Mayadas also begged off on health grounds. Brigadier SP Sethi, who was then posted in Army HQ, was appointed the new Corps Historian in 1983. He recommended that the Corps History should be compiled for the period up to 1965 only, with the existing Volume 1 constituting the first three chapters. He also recommended that the task of writing the Corps History should be entrusted to a serving officer, which was approved by the Corps Committee.

 In 1983, a serving officer, Colonel VA Subramanyam, was entrusted with this task of compiling the Corps History. He was allotted an office room in Signals Enclave, with a team of officers to assist him, as well as secretarial facilities. This was the first time a deliberate effort was made towards writing the Corps History, with adequate resources being provided by the Corps. (Brigadier Barretto had worked on the project in his spare time, with no additional resources). By now the parameters of the assignment had undergone several changes. Instead of being compiled as Volume II, covering the period 1939 to 1947 as originally planned, the proposed history would cover the entire history of the Corps, from the earliest times to the present day. Since it was intended to release the book during the Diamond Jubilee of the Corps in February 1986, Col Subramanyam was asked to produce only a ‘concise’ history of the Corps, as mentioned in the Foreword and the Preface of the book, which was published in 1986 with the title ‘THE SIGNALS – A HISTORY OF THE CORPS OF SIGNALS’. 

While working on the coffee table book titled ‘THROUGH – Saga of the Corps of Signals’ which was published in February 2001, I had written to the SO-in-C regarding he need to bring out Volume II of the Corps History, which was long overdue. (At that time, I was not aware of the ups and downs in the ‘history’ of the Corps History, as given in the earlier paragraphs). As I should have expected, I was asked to take on this task in 2001. The dimensions of the project became clear only when I started working on it. By the end of 2001, the Corps History Team Office (CHTO) was set up in Signals Enclave along with the support staff and office equipment. Since I was then posted in the Cabinet Secretariat (RAW), I was able to visit the CHTO only on weekends. It was only after June 2004 when I finally retired that I was able to work full time on the project, which was completed towards the end of 2005.  Volume II covering the period 1939-47 was published in February 2006.

Ideally, work on Volume III should have commenced immediately after the publication of Volume II.   However, it was only in mid- 2007 that I was asked to undertake the project. Though insignificant when compared to the interval of over thirty years between the publication of the previous two volumes, this gap resulted in some additional delay. The CHTO that had been functioning since 2001 was wound up in 2006; the manpower and equipment had been redistributed to units; and the reference material returned to Jabalpur and Mhow. Consequently, it was only towards the end of 2007 that the cell was established and work started in earnest on the project. The draft of Volume III was completed by end of 2010 and one copy was formally released during the Centenary celebrations at Jabalpur in February 2011.

I was looking forward to a respite after almost ten years of work on the two Corps History projects, but this was not to be. The previous two volumes had been published by the Corps of Signals Association, while Volume III was published by the Signals Directorate. Unlike the previous two volumes that covered the period before Independence, Volume III covered the period from 1947-72. When the book was submitted to MI Directorate for clearance, they forwarded it to the MO Directorate, since major operations conducted in 1947-48, 1962, 1965 and 1971 had been covered, as well as relatively minor operations such as the police action in Hyderabad in 1948, the liberation of Goa in 1961, the skirmish at Nathu La in 1967 and so on. Since military records after 1961 have still not been officially de-classified, several objections were raised by the MO with regard to the accounts of these operations. After almost four years of nerve racking delay, during which the manuscript travelled up and down several times, each time with new observations, deletions and amendments, the book was finally cleared only towards the end of 2014, with the caveat that the entire chapter on the Sino-Indian war of 1962 will be removed; all references to the Mukti Bahini during the 1971 war would be deleted; names of tactical features including trig heights and local names would not be mentioned; there would be no derogatory references to units and personalities, and several others.

Naturally, I was incensed at this ostrich-like head-in-the sand attitude of the authorities, as the official histories of the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars had been written by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence and were available on the net. In fact, a printed book titled “The Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 – A History” had also been published in 2011. This was a verbatim copy of the book uploaded on the Internet and the copyright was with the Ministry of Defence. It quoted classified military records including war diaries, after action reports etc. I showed this book as well the downloaded copies of 1962 and  1971 war  to all and sundry but is did not cut much ice.  On a personal level, I even met the then COAS – he was my namesake, but I had never met him before - but it was too late. We had no choice except to publish the book with all the deletions and amendments directed by MO and MI Directorate. More than me, the veterans who took part in the 1962 war, many of whom are still living and have authored books about their experiences, were severely disappointed.

The frustration was further aggravated when I discovered that very few people were interested in reading the book. Of course, copies were distributed to all Signals establishments and units, keeping some for sale to veterans. It was discovered that the few veterans who purchased copies were those who had given significant inputs and whose role in various operations had been covered in detail. The others just did not seem to be interested. Perhaps the price of Rs. 940 fixed by Signals Directorate was too high, compared to the previous volumes. The cost of Volume I was Rs. 300 and that of Volume II was Rs. 525 for veterans, a higher figure being charged from units. I think a similar equation would have encouraged more veterans to buy personal copies.

One cannot inculcate esprit-de-corps by forcing people to read the history of the Corps. However, I recall an excellent suggestion that was made by one of our senior veterans when the Coffee Table Book titled “Through – Saga of the Corps of Signals” was published in 2001. It is now customary to present accoutrements to young officers commissioned into Signals when they pass pout from IMA. Instead of accoutrements, why not give each one a set of the three volumes of the Corps History? Another idea is to have a quiz competition on the Corps history, on the lines of KBC, for those attending the YO’s course. Two teams comprising men and women officers can compete against each other. The event can be held in the auditorium, with officers and families being invited.  It is certain to generate a lot of interest and instil esprit-de-corps.

As it stands, work on the next volume has still to commence, since no suitable person has been found to undertake the task. I understand some veterans with a flair for writing have been approached but nobody has accepted the assignment. This is not surprising, considering that nobody would like to toil for several years writing a book that no one is going to read. Of course, the author should get some pecuniary benefit also. If he is still serving, he is usually given an honorarium. If the author is a veteran, he can negotiate his remuneration before signing a contract. I feel that if one has a lot of free time and literary inclinations, it is worth taking up the job. More than the financial reward, he will get the recognition and appreciation of his peers; in addition, he will have the satisfaction of knowing that he made a significant contribution to his parent Corps.

 

Maj Gen VK Singh

 

 

 

HOW THE ADSO BECAME THE DSO

 

HOW THE ADSO BECAME THE DSO

By
Maj Gen VK Singh

 

The article titled FOR DSOs ONLY (ADSOs in the days gone by) was published in the Signalman in Oct 1972. Recently, I circulated the article in various WhatsApp groups comprising veterans from Signals. This generated a lot of interest and several veterans shared their experiences as ADSOs. I think it is time to share some bits of history about how and why the ADSO became the DSO. It may come as a surprise to many that the person responsible for the change in the designation of this appointment was an Infantry officer – Major General IS Gill. 

 

After the YOs course, I was posted to 17 Mountain Divisional Signal Regiment in November 1965. I served in the unit up to July 1968 when I proceeded to CME for the SODE course. When I joined the unit, the Divisional HQ was located at MS 9 on the Gangtok – Nathula Road. Shortly afterwards it moved down to Gangtok. The GOC was Maj Gen Sagat Singh. After the skirmishes at Nathula and Chola in Sep-Oct 1967, the HQ was moved up to Kyangnosla or MS 17. Unlike the barracks at Gangtok, here we had make do with tin sheds. This was shade better than MS 9 where everyone was in tents except the signal centre and the officers’ mess. Of course, there were no bukharies in the tents and neither was there any snow clothing. By this time, Maj Gen IS Gill had taken over as the GOC. In February 1968 I was sent on the PWO course along with NC Gupta, who had played a stellar role in the Nathula operations. On my return from the course in May 1968, I was assigned the duties of DSO.

 

One day, at about 2200 hrs I got a call from the exchange informing me that the GOC wanted to talk to me. I was surprised and wondered why the GOC wanted to talk to me, instead of the CO or the 2ic. Anyway, I asked the exchange to put me through. When Gen Gill came on the line he asked “Are you the duty signal officer?” After I replied in the affirmative, he asked me my name. I told him that I was Captain VK Singh. He then said that he wanted a call to Delhi. I said “Certainly Sir. Please tell me the number”. He replied, “Don’t worry, Son, I will book the call with the exchange. I only wanted your permission, since it is a private call.” I was literally flabbergasted.   

 

Of course, the call was put through after some time. Next morning, I informed the OC 1 company who in turn informed the CO. I was told that the GOC was only adhering to the orders that private calls should not be booked on Miltrunks, except in an emergency. This was the first time I had heard of the GOC of a division taking permission for booking a trunk call. I also wondered why he called me instead of the ADSO. The mystery was solved many years later, when I began writing Volume III of the Corps History, covering the period 1947 -1972. Volume II covering the period 1939-1947 was published in 2006. The task of writing the next volume was assigned to me only after a year or so and work began on Volume III only in 2008.

 

Apart from operations, the history of various units was also covered in brief. I requested inputs from the large number of serving as well as retired officers who had served during the period 1947-72. I am giving below an extract from Chapter 9 of the Corps History.

 

Extract

 

Lieutenant Colonel M. Sathesan, who served in 1 Army HQ Signal Regiment from 1969 to 1971, relates an interesting incident, which was probably responsible for the redesignation of the appointments of Assistant Duty Signal Officer (ADSO) and Duty Signal officer (DSO). He writes: -

Sometime in late 1969 while I was carrying out the duties of Duty Signal Officer (now Officer-in-Charge Signal Centre) of INDARMY Signal Centre I got a ring at about 10 PM from Maj Gen IS Gill then General Officer Commanding 17 Mountain Division and on leave at Delhi. He asked me for some information about certain office numbers and I replied that I shall check up and ring him back. He rang me again at 1030 PM and at 11 PM asking for additional info and I had to, on each occasion reply that “I would check up and let you know”. When I gave him the final information at about 1115 PM he asked me whether I was in the office or at home. When I told him that I was at home he wanted to know why the Duty Signal Officer was not on duty. I replied that the term Duty Signal Officer is a misnomer and it is the Assistant Duty Signal Officer who remains on duty in shifts all the time. Gen Gill accepted my explanation at that time but next day wrote a note to his friend Maj Gen EG Pettengell (then Deputy SO-in-C) asking why we have a name, that is Duty Signal Officer, which is a misnomer. In pursuance of his note the Signals Directorate asked all concerned for their views for a more suitable name for Duty Signal Officer. Through Commandant Army HQ Signals I had recommended that the only suitable name was OIC (Signal Centre).

I do not know if others also recommended the same name. Later vide AO 81/72 the name of the Duty Signal Officer was changed to OIC Signal Centre and that of Assistant Duty Signal Officer to Duty Signal Officer.

 

After reading the above write up, the reason for the call from Maj Gen Gill to me in 1968 became clear. He had naturally assumed that the duty signal officer is the one who remains on duty in the signal centre. In way, his observation was based on logical reasoning and ultimately resulted in the change in designation of the ADSO to DSO.

Writing for a living

Writing for a living

By

Major V K Singh

            It was the twenty-sixth of the month. We were having tea on the verandah. "The ayah wants five rupees. She is having a Satyanarayan ki katha in her house" said my wife.

            "Hmm"

            "What Hmm"?

            "I only said Hmm".

            "What is that supposed to mean?".

"OK. Give her five rupees"

"But I don't have any money".

"Now look, I gave you a tenner only this morning".

"You are drinking it now. The tea had finished, so I sent the boot-boy to get some from the canteen. And also some sugar. Now I've got only two rupees and some paise left".

"OK, take it from my purse".

She came out after a minute.

"There is only an eight anna bit left in your purse".

"That solves the problem. No fiver".

 "Very simple".

"Elementary".

"You're not funny".

"I wasn't trying to be".

"Oh God. I don't know why I married an Army officer. Now I'll have to borrow again from Pinky's piggy bank".

"She'll scalp you".

"I know. The poor thing was hysterical when she found it empty last time. Honestly, I just don't know what to do. And I wanted to see that picture in Dreamland tomorrow".

There was silence for a full minute. That chap who said it was like gold was talking sense, I'll say.

"Listen, didn't you get twenty rupees last month from the Signalman?".

"Yes".

She went inside, and returned with a pen and a pad.

“Write".

 "Write?"

"Yes, write".

"Write what?".

"Write anything. Just write. And from now on, you're going to write every month".

"But the Signalman comes out only once in three months".

"Never mind. We'll make those twenty rupees go for three months. In any case, we run short of just six or seven rupees every month".

"But what am I going to write?”

"Write anything. They're so bored up for contributions, they'll publish anything".

"But you can't write just anything. I need time to think".

"Listen, mister, today is the twenty-sixth. And you are supposed to send in contributions a month in advance. That leaves just few days for the deadline for the next issue, and there's no time to think. Get it?”

"Yes. Now beat it".

And that is how you came about reading this. I hope some other people get the idea too, and start writing. At least, I hope the gentlemen in the Third Pay Commission get the idea.

(Published in The Signalman, Apr 1973)

Victory Into Defeat

Victory Into Defeat

By

Lt Col VK Singh

The history of warfare is the history of man. No sooner there were two of them - Cain and Abel - they fought, and killed. Over the years, the art of war has flowered, and it has now crossed the dividing line, and become a science. Along with this transformation, warfare has become a complicated and sophisticated subject, making use of the latest developments in science and technology, and gobbling up almost a quarter of the resources, in terms of time and money, of the human race.

Though the science of warfare has made rapid progress, in no other sphere has this been as rapid as in communications. The developments in military communications during the last half century have revolutionised warfare. A modern army depends on communications for its very survival, and no Commander in his right mind would take the field today, without guaranteed communications. Understandably, communications is widely regarded as one of the most important battle winning factors today.

This, unfortunately, is far from the truth; good communications may have improved the passage of information and orders, but whether it also helps in winning battles, is doubtful, as we shall soon see. History is replete with instances of victories which were made possible only because of lack of communications between the field commander and his superiors, and defeats, which were the result of good communications.

During the early part of the last century, Gulab Singh, the ruler of Jammu, despatched one of his Generals, Zorawar Singh to subdue hill tribes on the Frontier. Zorawar Singh went on to conquer Ladakh, Skardu, Gilgit, Hunza, and later Tibet. Gulab Singh came to know of these victories only from the treasure and •tribute which Zorawar Singh sent back to Jammu, after each conquest. If communications had existed between the two, it is inconceivable that Gulab Singh would have permitted Zorawar Singh to undertake the apparently foolhardy campaign in Tibet, in which he later lost his life.

Robert Clive is regarded by historians as the founder of British rule in India. However, there, are no two views that Clive was an extremely audacious adventurer, who succeeded, by intrigue and deceit, in creating dissensions among Indian rulers, thereby consolidating his own position. His victory in the Battle of Plassey laid the foundation of British dominance in the subcontinent. However, it is rarely that one wins a battle in which he is outnumbered 17 to 1, as Clive was, and his decision to take on a vastly superior enemy was definitely foolhardy. It is doubtful if the Hon'ble East India Company's Directors, in London, would have lent their countenance to Clive for this venture, had it been possible for the latter to obtain their concurrence on telephone. And perhaps, the British Empire in India would never have existed, but for the lack of communications between Clive and his superiors.

We have seen how important victories have been gained only due to lack of communications. Let us now consider the other side of the coin, and see the effect of good communications.

In May 1940, Hitler decided to put into effect an audacious and brilliant plan, suggested by Von Manstein for conquering Western Europe. As part of this offensive, German Panzers crashed through the Ardennes forest in Belgium and raced for the English Channel. Guderian, spearheading the advance, was almost within sight of Dunkirk, when he was ordered to halt, by an inexplicable order from Hitler, conveyed on the radio. This enabled the beleaguered British Expeditionary Force to cross the Channel at Dunkirk, and escape to England. If Guderian had not been halted, it is quite likely that over a million Allied soldiers would have been captured, and the Second World War brought to an end, with German suzerainty over Europe established. The history of the world may have been altered, had not Guderian's communications with Von Rundstedt been as good as they were.

On 24th April, 1980, American Commandos landed in Iran. Their task was to rescue 56 hostages, imprisoned in the US Embassy in Teheran. However, out of eight helicopters that took off from the aircraft carrier NIMITZ, only five landed at the rendezvous, the remainder having broken down, due to mechanical trouble. The force Commander, Col Charles Beckewith, relayed this information to the Pentagon, and this in turn was conveyed to President Carter, who gave orders to cancel the mission. Apart from resulting in loss of face, this incident was also instrumental in Carter losing the election for the US Presidency, later during the year. A hundred years ago, when communications were not as good as today, it is inconceivable that Colonel Beckewith would have cancelled the mission on his own. He still had five helicopters, he had not lost a. single man; and he had achieved complete surprise. It is ten to one that had he gone ahead with the mission, it would have succeeded, resulting in a well earned decoration for himself, as well as considerable increase in prestige for his country. However, this was not to be, and the reason is only one - good communications.

It follows, therefore, that while good communications may be an important factor for fighting battles, it is not necessarily so for winning them. Communications have deprived the field Commander of his precious prerogative - tactical decisions. In future wars, it is quite conceivable that even minor tactical decisions, will be taken at a political level. Military commanders will no longer be commanders - they will become messengers, just like the ambassadors of today, who no longer enjoy plenipotentiary powers, thanks to communications. This dilution of authority to take tactical decisions will severely curb the initiative of field commanders, who will have to look back over their shoulders for orders, before taking any step which involves the slightest amount of risk. It may well happen, as it did in the case of Heinz, Guderian and Charles Beckewith, that good communications turn out to be not a blessing, but a bane, and turn victory into defeat.

(Author's Note            :-Budding Sparrows are advised to take the article with a pinch of salt and not try too hard to ensure failure of communications. However, it is hoped that the instances quoted above will improve the health of some of our conscientious colleagues, who take their job too seriously, and get a stroke every time the line goes out, or a radio net is not through.

 A perusal of the above article, every Monday morning before breakfast, is guaranteed to prevent heart attacks, ulcers, and grey hair, which is taking a heavy tall of our Commanding Officers).

(Published in The Signalman, Sep 1985)

THE SIGNALS PLAN - A NEW CONCEPT

THE SIGNALS PLAN - A NEW CONCEPT

Col VK Singh

INTRODUCTION

In modern warfare, communications have proved to be an important battle winning factor. The accent on mobile warfare, involving quick changing battle situations, has enhanced this importance. The rapid growth of electronics, and its application  in almost every field, including 'gunnery, navigation, target acquisition, electronic surveillance, RADAR, communications and electronic warfare, makes it imperative for commanders at all levels to consider its implications and effect on their operational plans. It is, therefore, incumbent on commanders to actively involve themselves in formulation of the communications plan and its implementation at each stage, instead of leaving it to the Signals adviser. Communications planning, like fire planning, is a command responsibility and commanders who ignore or neglect it are likely to pay a heavy price.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to discuss the importance of communications in the Army and the methodology involved in formulation of the Signals Plan.

COMMUNICATIONS IN THE ARMY

Present Communications Set Up

In the Army, the Corps of Signals is responsible for providing all types of communications, down to the level of abattalion/regiment.            Communications below battalion/regiment are manned by regimental signallers, from within the unit. The means of communications employed by Signals include line, radio, radio relay, troposcatter and despatch riders. In addition, the Corps of Signalsis also responsible for electronic warfare against all electronic emission used by theenemy,   including non- communication electronics.

The present concept of communications in the Army is linear, and follows the chain of command. This implies that each level of command, or headquarters, is connected to the one above and the one below it. Except in rare cases, there is no lateral communication, and neither does it exist to levels other than the ones immediately above or below. The basic Signals unit is a signal regiment, one of which is provided for every headquarters at the level of a division or above. Thus, there are divisional, corps, command and Army Headquarters signal regiments. In addition, there are composite signal regiments which are not affiliated to anyheadquarters, but provide communications rearward of the corps zone, on line, radio or radio relay. There are other types of signals units, for specialized communications for air support, for carrying out monitoring of own radiolinks, for interception of enemy links, and for electronic warfare. At eachheadquarters, down to the brigade, aSignals officer is available as adviser tothe formation commander.

Importance of Communications in Battle

The      Army comprises Arms and Services. There are five Arms, vizArmoured Corps, Artillery,Engineers, Signals and Infantry, of which the first and last are also called the "teeth" Arms, the others being "supporting" Arms. The rest,like AOC, EME, ASC, AMC, Postal, Provost etc., are called Services. While every Arm or Service has its own special role, and each is vital, in its own way, for success in battle, there is one feature which distinguishes Arms from Services, and that is their role, and the effect of their failure or success in fulfilling it. While the role of Services is vital to the overall war effort, it does not affect the immediate battle, where success or failure depends on the ability of the Arms to fulfil their assigned tasks. For instance, consider the case of a division or brigade going into attack. The immediate result of the battle will not be affected if the Supply Point is closed down, or the Ordnance Depot catches fire, or the Field Hospital fails to fetch up, or if the EME Workshop is shelled out. On the other hand, consider the effect of the failure of any of the Arms. The Armoured Corps and Infantry, who Physicallyassault and capture the objective, are obviously beyond discussion. But can the attack go in, and succeed, without covering fire from theArtillery, or before the Engineers have breached the mine fields and made the bridges or if the radio communicationsfail? The answer is No. And this is thesubtle difference, between Arms andServices, which has to be understoodbefore the role of any of them, and theiremployment, is considered.

Organisation and Employment of Signals

Considering the Arms, there are Marked similarities, and differences, between their roles. However, there are some peculiar characteristics in the organisation and employment of Signals, Which are interesting to note. Some of these are asunder :-

(a)    Artillery, Engineers and Signals are called "Supporting Arms". However, While other Arms are affiliated withformations, the Signals element is integral, at each level of command. For instance, there is no Army Headquarters Artillery Regiment, Command Engineer Regiment, or Corps Armoured Regiment, but there are signal regiments at these headquarters. Even at divisional, and brigade and battalion level, all the artillery and engineer resources are not integral, but allotted for a specific operation whereas the signal resources are integral to the formation or unit. In fact, when a brigade moves, the signal company moves alongwith it, but not the affiliated field regiment or field company.

(b)   The resources and equipment authorised to Artillery, Engineers and Signals are      based on their role, and employment. However, it is interesting to note that only Signals has been authorised reserve equipment at every level, down to the battalion. For instance, there are no reserve guns in an artillery battery, or reserve minelayers, trawls or bridges in an engineer regiment, but there are reserve radio sets in every divisional signal regiment, brigade signal company, and battalion/regiment signal section. Why? In an Army, where economy is the byword, and there are restrictions on everything, how have Signals got away with such a lavish allocation of resources? The reason will be explained a little later.

(c)    Before any operational plan is made, it is necessary to carry out an appreciation of the situation. One of the factors considered is Relative Strength and Assessment of Troops to Task. However, it is an interesting fact that while all other Arms, like Armour, Artillery and Engineers are considered, alongwith supporting weapons like MMG, rcl guns, as well as air support, there is no mention of Signals. Why? Is it because Signals have no role in battle, and can be ignored? Again, the answer will be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

(d)   Every commander, before finalising his tactical plan, ensures that the engineer plan and the arty plan have been dovetailed into it. To do this, he relies on a plethora of planning data which is available in pamphlets and hand books; such as the Staff Officers Hand Book, issued by the Defence Services Staff College, and the Commanders Hand Book, issued by the College of Combat. It is interesting to note that while these hand books contain fairly exhaustive planning data for Engineers and Artillery, there is little or no planning data for Signals. Thus, while every commander knows the bridging and mine laying capabilities of a field company, or the time take by a field battery to deploy, and the ranges of its guns, as well as the rates of fire, effective area of neutralisation, safety distances, and so on, hardly anyone knows the time taken to establish a radio relay link, or to lay a kilometre of cable, or the maximum ranges obtained by different types of radio sets. Needless to say, this data is important in planning a tactical operation. In fact more often than not, certain important operations such as siting and move of headquarters or rate of advance of break out force, has to be dependent            entirely on      the communications, and restrictions imposed by ranges of radio sets or cable.

The reason for making Signals integral at each level and for the lavish allocation of resources is only one. Over the years, commanders, both vanquished and victorious, have learned that in order to ensure that they are always in touch with the battle situation, and that their orders can be passed quickly to their command, they must have good communications. And to make sure that each commander has his own communications, which he does not have to share with anyone else, the signal resources have been given to him as an integral part of his command, instead of being affiliated, like otherArms. And the reason for the lavish allotment of resources is that no commander is willing to risk a break in communications, even for a moment. Accordingly, reserve radio sets, cable, telephones and generators have been catered for at every level. Communications is one field where frugality is suicidal, and it is prudent to cater for reserves, even though it is an expensive proposition.

Coming to the Assessment of Troops to Task, the reason for not considering Signals is the lavish allocation of resources, as discussed above. Every commander knows that adequate signal resources have been catered for every possible contingency, and he does not have to allocate them separately for a particular operation of war. In a defensive battle, the radio sets may not be used at all. Similarly, in mobile offensive operations, telephones and cable Will hardly be used. But these resources are there, and that is what matters. Hence, the reason for not considering Signals is not that they are least important, but rather that they are most important - in fact, so important that there is no scope for discussion. This is an important point, which commanders and their staff be over the years, failed to grasp, often With disastrous consequences.

THE SIGNALS PLAN

Present Concept

It is an anomalous fact that even though the importance of communications has been underlined, hardly any time thought is devoted to this subject by commanders while formulating their plans. Fairly exhaustive guidelines and treatises exist on the methodology involved in making out a tacticalPlan, a fire plan, and an obstacle plan, but there is no general staff publication Whichexplains the procedure of evolving a communication plan. In fact, this vital aspect is neglected even in the training institutions, such as the DSSC and the College of Combat, and communication planning is left to Signals, who treat it as an "in house" affair. In all operational orders and instructions, the subject is brushed off with a line "Signal Instructions will be issued by Chief Signal Officer (or Officer Commanding Signal Regiment)." Of course, Signals have fairly detailed and exhaustive formats for their signal instructions or operational orders, containing a vast amount of technical data. But the important thing is that the Signals plan is not dovetailed into the tactical plan, as a fire plan or an obstacle plan is. This is because the Signals Plan is made by the Signals adviser in isolation, based on the tactical plan, and there is no involvement of the commander or his staff. This is a serious draw back, andresults in loss of flexibility andsubsequent           disruption in communications when the situation changes abruptly, for which communications have not been catered for. This is because at present, the Signals adviser goes by his own intuition and anticipation, in allocating reserves and catering for alternative circuits. In case he has been able to read his commander's mind, all goes well. If not, communications break down at a crucial moment, with disastrous results. This situation can be avoided only if the commander himself approves the Signals plan, and it is put into effect only once it has been thoroughly screened by him and his staff, so that suitable modifications can be incorporated to cater for all possible contingencies.

The other serious drawback is that the Present system is wasteful, and does not contribute to optimum utilisation of resources. In a division, all brigades are rarely committed at the same time, andeven when they are, there is considerable difference in their commitments. However, the signal resources of each brigade are identical, and cannot be used by others. For instance, if one brigade is in a holding role, and the other two are being used for an attack, the requirement of radio communications for the latterwillbe more than that of, the former. However, with the present set up, which has no flexibility, the Signals adviser cannot, on his own, reallot signal resources, as can be done by the Artillery or Engineer adviser, to ensure that optimum utilisation is made of all equipment and manpower.

The following steps are suggested in formulation of the Signals plan :-

(a)        The commander, after carrying out his appreciation, makes out a tactical plan in out line.

(b)        The Commander gives out his communications requirements to the Signals adviser. This is done in terms of type of communications, ie. speech and/ or telegraph (and not means of communication ie., line or radio), for each phase of the operation, including contingencies.

(c)        The Signals adviser makes out an outline Signals plan, to cater for the commander's communication requirements, making use of all available resources. He also decides the means of communication for each unit or formation, such as radio, radio relay, line, or a suitable combination of these.

(d)       The Signals adviser puts up the Signals plan to the commander for his approval, alongwith suggested modifications in the tactical plan, wherever it is not possible to meet the communication requirements within the existing resources.

(e)        The commander suitably modifies the tactical plan, if required, or arranges for additional resources. The Signals plan is then approved by him, after suitable modifications.

(f)        The Signals adviser affects the Signals plan by issuing a Signals Operational Order, or Signal Instructions.

The suggested concept would involve certain changes in the command and control set up, and the functioning ofsignal units. Some of these are asunder :-

(a)        The commanding officer of a divisional signal regiment will have the authority to move and deploy signal resources within the division. This may involve certain changes in the concept of integration of signal elements with their parentformation. A signal company will not have to be allotted to each brigade on a permanent basis. However, signal companies will be affiliated to brigades,like field companies or artillery regiments.

(b)        Allotment of signal resources to brigades would be done in accordance with the Signals plan. Thus, the composition of signal companies, in terms of manpower and equipment, will vary, depending on the task in hand. This would be done by attaching or detaching detachments of radio, line or radio relay. It may be mentioned that  the smallest functional entity in Signals is a detachment and this term includes thepersonnel, vehicles, and equipment carried by them.

(c)        The lowest level at which signal communications will be planned will be a division. Communication plans will be coordinated at corps field army by the respective Chief Signal Officers.

(d)       To ensure reliability and flexibility, reserves will be catered for in the form of reserve detachments.Reserve detachments may be allotted to signal companies, based on the nature and likely duration of the operation, terrain, weather conditions, and distance from the Regimental HQ. In addition, some reserve equipment may be kept centrally with the Quartermaster in the Regimental HQ.

(e)        For communication tasks in the corps or communication zone, specialist signal bricks, held by composite signal regiments, may be attached or detached under orders of the Chief Signal Officers at corps or command HQ. These bricks will be in the form of sections, comprising a number of detachments, as at present.

For the successful conduct of a battle in an environment saturated with electronic activity, it is essential that commanders exercise utmost discretion and caution in formulating their communications plans. Failure to do this would leave their communications, weapon systems and other electronic devices susceptible to enemy electronic counter measures, and this may well be the hinge on which the eventual outcome of battle rests. It must be realised that communication planning is a command responsibility. The Signals plan must beinitiated by the commander, and approved by him before it is implemented by Signals, who are responsible for its execution, and not its evolution.

(Published in The Signalman, July 1992)

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

BY

Major V K Singh

After reading Major Gokarn's excellent feature "Eclipsing the Communications Gap" in the January 1976 issue, I came to a startling conclusion - we don't really use the chain of command! Being essentially communicators, we probably do not pay attention to what can appropriately be called the bedrock on which the complex structure of the Army rests. Break it, and the edifice will come tumbling down. Lest that unfortunate day dawn on us, it would be worth our while to have a closer look at this facet of the Service.

In the few units that I have had the occasion to serve, I have found that the chain of command is taken to mean exactly what Major Gokarn has depicted - the CO, Adjutant, Subedar Major, Company SJCO, CHM, Section NCO, and the Jawan. It would not be entirely incorrect to assume that a similar concept of the term exists throughout our Corps! A little reflection on the issue, with its implications, will bring to mind the gravity of the situation. We are not only breaking, or not following the chain of command - we simply do not know what it means!

It is a well known rule of social, political and military science that authority cannot be divorced from responsibility. The man who makes the decisions is also the one who is answerable for failure or success-which are the sequel to these. Why, then do we adopt this parallel chain, for day to day administration, and sometimes even for operational tasks? There is only one chain of command- the CO, the Company Commander, the Section Commander and the Jawan. There can be no duplication in this, just as responsibility can never be divided. If a company or section fails to carry out its assigned tasks, its commanders are answerable, not the SJCO, or the CHM, or section NCO. Yet, it is a common practice to use this chain. Why?

Let us consider the case when an NCO is to be sent to the MCTE to collect the Corps diaries for the unit or to the Ordnance Depot to collect some equipment. The Adjutant passes the orders down the 'chain of command’, i.e., to the Subedar Major, who in turn passes it to the RHM or one of the company SJCOs. Hav XYZ is detailed, and despatched the same evening. The CO, next morning, orders No 1 comp-any commander to send out a radio detachment. The company commander suddenly finds that his detachment commander, Hay XYZ, is half way to Mhow. There are last minute changes, tempers go up, fur flies, and the job is not completed in time. Who is to blame? The company commander, by nature of his appointment, or the Adjutant, for using an incorrect channel for passing orders? Such instances occur every day, and we are all only too familiar with their effect on esprit-de- corps and harmony in an unit.

The Subedar Major occupies an unique position in an unit. He is the eyes and ears of the CO. So far so good. The trouble begins when he is used as the mouthpiece, a privilege which should be confined to the 2IC or Adjutant. The 'chain of command’ as we understand it, should be more correctly called an 'administrative chain' or a channel of information. It can, of course, be used for passing routine instructions, such as where the morning parade is to fall-in, what games are to be played that evening, and how many men are to go in a particular working party. Even in the matter of information, the chain of command should be followed if possible. Take for example, the case of a soldier running amok, or an affray in the barracks at night. The present system, in most units is that the CHM reports the matter to the RHM or the SJCO, who in turn reports it to the Subedar Major. In most cases, the company and section commander come to know only the next morning! At times, the CO comes to know of such cases earlier, and one (as a company or section commander) has perforce to give a blank look when questioned on the subject by the Old Man! Such a state of affairs is clearly not desirable.  It is perhaps a legacy of colonial India, when due to the difficulties posed by language, officers had to resort to this method to exercise command. The situation today is entirely different. The officer and the men speak a common tongue, and there is a close rapport between them. The need for interpreters is no longer there, and hence should be discouraged. I am not, for one moment, contemplating that we do away with JCOs and NCOs. They are an essential link in the chain of command, but only when they function as platoon or section commanders. They should not be used as 'staff officers', who disseminate the orders of their commander.

Returning to Major Gokarn's article, if one adopts PLAN AREN, and 'breaks' this chain, as suggested, the orders should reach the Jawan exactly as the CO wants!

Adopt AREN, but retain the chain of command! (With luck, the two might fall in love and result in a happy marriage!)

(Published in the Signalman, October 1976)