THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

BY

Major V K Singh

After reading Major Gokarn's excellent feature "Eclipsing the Communications Gap" in the January 1976 issue, I came to a startling conclusion - we don't really use the chain of command! Being essentially communicators, we probably do not pay attention to what can appropriately be called the bedrock on which the complex structure of the Army rests. Break it, and the edifice will come tumbling down. Lest that unfortunate day dawn on us, it would be worth our while to have a closer look at this facet of the Service.

In the few units that I have had the occasion to serve, I have found that the chain of command is taken to mean exactly what Major Gokarn has depicted - the CO, Adjutant, Subedar Major, Company SJCO, CHM, Section NCO, and the Jawan. It would not be entirely incorrect to assume that a similar concept of the term exists throughout our Corps! A little reflection on the issue, with its implications, will bring to mind the gravity of the situation. We are not only breaking, or not following the chain of command - we simply do not know what it means!

It is a well known rule of social, political and military science that authority cannot be divorced from responsibility. The man who makes the decisions is also the one who is answerable for failure or success-which are the sequel to these. Why, then do we adopt this parallel chain, for day to day administration, and sometimes even for operational tasks? There is only one chain of command- the CO, the Company Commander, the Section Commander and the Jawan. There can be no duplication in this, just as responsibility can never be divided. If a company or section fails to carry out its assigned tasks, its commanders are answerable, not the SJCO, or the CHM, or section NCO. Yet, it is a common practice to use this chain. Why?

Let us consider the case when an NCO is to be sent to the MCTE to collect the Corps diaries for the unit or to the Ordnance Depot to collect some equipment. The Adjutant passes the orders down the 'chain of command’, i.e., to the Subedar Major, who in turn passes it to the RHM or one of the company SJCOs. Hav XYZ is detailed, and despatched the same evening. The CO, next morning, orders No 1 comp-any commander to send out a radio detachment. The company commander suddenly finds that his detachment commander, Hay XYZ, is half way to Mhow. There are last minute changes, tempers go up, fur flies, and the job is not completed in time. Who is to blame? The company commander, by nature of his appointment, or the Adjutant, for using an incorrect channel for passing orders? Such instances occur every day, and we are all only too familiar with their effect on esprit-de- corps and harmony in an unit.

The Subedar Major occupies an unique position in an unit. He is the eyes and ears of the CO. So far so good. The trouble begins when he is used as the mouthpiece, a privilege which should be confined to the 2IC or Adjutant. The 'chain of command’ as we understand it, should be more correctly called an 'administrative chain' or a channel of information. It can, of course, be used for passing routine instructions, such as where the morning parade is to fall-in, what games are to be played that evening, and how many men are to go in a particular working party. Even in the matter of information, the chain of command should be followed if possible. Take for example, the case of a soldier running amok, or an affray in the barracks at night. The present system, in most units is that the CHM reports the matter to the RHM or the SJCO, who in turn reports it to the Subedar Major. In most cases, the company and section commander come to know only the next morning! At times, the CO comes to know of such cases earlier, and one (as a company or section commander) has perforce to give a blank look when questioned on the subject by the Old Man! Such a state of affairs is clearly not desirable.  It is perhaps a legacy of colonial India, when due to the difficulties posed by language, officers had to resort to this method to exercise command. The situation today is entirely different. The officer and the men speak a common tongue, and there is a close rapport between them. The need for interpreters is no longer there, and hence should be discouraged. I am not, for one moment, contemplating that we do away with JCOs and NCOs. They are an essential link in the chain of command, but only when they function as platoon or section commanders. They should not be used as 'staff officers', who disseminate the orders of their commander.

Returning to Major Gokarn's article, if one adopts PLAN AREN, and 'breaks' this chain, as suggested, the orders should reach the Jawan exactly as the CO wants!

Adopt AREN, but retain the chain of command! (With luck, the two might fall in love and result in a happy marriage!)

(Published in the Signalman, October 1976)