Veekay's articles
Thursday, June 13, 2024
JUDICIAL PERFIDIES - RAVINDRAN
Friday, September 29, 2023
SOME MEMORIES OF SIKKIM – CIRCA 1965
Sunday, August 14, 2022
ADAPTING TO CHANGE - WHY DOES THE ARMY ALWAYS LAG BEHIND?
RANK, APPOINTMENT & DESIGNATION
Friday, October 29, 2021
Corrupting India's Military History A Dangerous Trend
Corrupting India's Military History
A Dangerous Trend
Major General VK Singh (Retd)@
Abstract
The article brings out that the trend of writing incorrect
accounts of military actions, to glorify, portray military history incorrectly.
Operations at Nathu La/Cho La in 1967 have been narrated to make the point. It
states that it is important to portray failures, or less than perfect conduct
of operations, so that lessons can be learnt and mistakes made in conduct of an
operation are avoided in the future. Unfortunately, the military and military
historians today have different views and failure in battle seems to carry with
it a stigma and guilt, which is totally unwarranted. The article concludes that
if handled correctly, even failures and lost battles can be used to glorify and
motivate and yet we can learn constructive lessons from them.
Introduction
This article aims to highlight the trend of
omission, distortion, and obfuscation of facts in records such as unit war
diaries and regimental histories which are the basic documents referred
to by military historians. This phenomenon is rarely
encountered in the documents pertaining to World War I and II, and even
earlier. However, it is increasingly being noticed in the post-Independence period
in the Indian Army'. Examples of such distortion of records are found in many
tactical and operational level operations that the Indian Army was involved in
after 1947. These may have been done in good faith to safeguard the honour of a
person, unit, or country or because in the fog of war events get distorted.
However, this distortion obfuscates the correct picture in official history and
does not enable lessons to be learnt to take better decisions or do
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Major General VK Singh (Retd) was commissioned into the Corps of Signals of the Indian
Army on 27 June 1965. He retired in 2002. A keen writer since his younger days,
in later years he took to professional writing and now writes in newspapers and
professional journals on defence, intelligence, and security related issues. He
has authored six books.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLI, No. 625, July-September 2021.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Corrupting India's Military History — A Dangerous Trend 323
operations in a better manner the next time. To highlight
the problem, the Nathu La — Cho La operations of 1967 have been chosen as a
case study. This operation has once again come into the limelight in recent
years. This trend is not limited to the Indian Army alone, or even to only the
military; there is even a formal term for this — "historical
negationism"2.
The Accounts of the 1967 Skirmishes
The Nathu La Skirmish. The skirmish at Nathu La took place in September 1967. This was the first
time that the Indian Army gave the Chinese a 'bloody nose'. The story has been narrated
in several books including regimental histories and biographies of Lt Gen Sagat
Singh3, who was commanding the division in Sikkim when the operation
was conducted. In addition, several articles have been published in numerous
journals written mostly by officers who were present or took part in the
operation. Two recent events have brought the Nathu La skirmish in the
limelight again. One is the publication of a book titled 'Watershed 1967 -
India's Forgotten Victory over China" in 2020, written by Probal DasGupta4.
The second is the episode concerning the Nathula and Chola battles of 1967
which was broadcast on TV in Tales of Valour on 09 and 10 Jan 2021 on
the Times Now. There was also a Bollywood movie called 'Paltan' (battalion)
which came out in 2018 and covered the operations at Nathu La. Sadly, these
narrations have been less than truthful in recounting the events of the
conflict.
At first glance, 'Watershed
1967 - India's Forgotten Victory over China' appears to be dealing with an
important event in India's military history. Unfortunately, the book has several
errors in the correlation of events and facts. A review of the book by this author
has been published in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India,
January — March 2021 and could be seen for further details.5
The most glaring lacuna in the
book is the distortion of facts relating to 2 Grenadiers. In this author's
knowledge, the only authentic unclassified version of the battle is the diary
of Second Lieutenant (2/Lt) (later Colonel) NC Gupta, which gives a day-by-day account
of the occurrences from 11-14 Sep 1967.6 Its authenticity is sound
because it was written daily as the events occurred and not in hindsight after
40-50 years, like this book and some articles written
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
324 U.S.I.
JOURNAL
by a few others. The diary brings out many lesser-known
facts including instances of apparent cowardice, especially the vacation of
South Shoulder at a critical juncture by a few soldiers of 2nd Grenadiers led
by 2/Lt. Attar Singh. An account of this episode has been covered in detail in
the articles The Skirmish at Nathula (1967)' published in the Indian Military Review
in Aug 2018 and 'Remembering the War We Forgot 51 years ago — How India Gave
China a Bloody Nose' by Vandana Menon and Nayanika Chatterjee in The Print on
01 Oct 2018.
The regimental history of The
Grenadiers, titled 'The Grenadiers — A Tradition of Valour', was written by
Colonel RD Palsokar in 1980. The book gives a different narrative. On page 365,
the author writes:
"At one stage
it appeared that the force fighting from the
South Shoulder was
wiped out as it was the main target
of the Chinese. The
troops could not hold it and had to
fall back. When the
Chinese fire died down, they once
again occupied the
feature. The South Shoulder would
have
remained unoccupied had 2nd Lieutenant Attar Singh
not been there. His personal example inspired
the men to
stay
fast."
Colonel RD Palsokar (Guards) is
a well-known military historian who has penned many regimental histories and biographies.
It is probable that the primary source for his use were the inputs given to him
by The Grenadier Regiment from the accounts submitted by the unit.
Another example of this
historical negationism syndrome is the article titled ‘The Nathu La skirmish:
When Chinese Were Given a Bloody Nose', by Major General Sheru Thapliyal, in
the `Force' magazine in 2004 and reprinted in the CLAWS website in 20117.
He writes:
"2 Grenadiers
were initially shaken up due to the loss of
Captain Dagar and injury to their CO but found their man
of
the moment in Lieutenant Attar Singh who went round from
trench to trench to rally the troops and was later
promoted as
Captain on the spot."
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Corrupting
India's Military History — A Dangerous Trend 325
A short resume describing the
events relating to South Shoulder on 11 Sep, as described in Gupta's diary, has
been published in the Indian Military Review. It is reproduced below:
"During the first day's action, there was a loss of morale in 2
Grenadiers when troops occupying the South Shoulder vacated their positions.
This became evident after breakdown of communications. Finding no response from
the post on radio and observing about a dozen troops running down the slopes of
South Shoulder minus their helmets, packs and rifles, the Brigade Commander asked
his Signals officer, 2/Lt NC Gupta to go up to South Shoulder with a spare
radio set. On reaching South Shoulder at around 10 am, Gupta found the post abandoned
and informed Brigadier Bakshi, who asked him to hold the post until
reinforcements reached. About an hour later, Brigadier Bakshi spotted six
soldiers sitting behind a huge rock around 100 metre down South Shoulder and
asked Gupta to investigate. On reaching the spot, Gupta found that they were
from 2 Grenadiers, including 2/Lt Attar Singh who was in command of the post at
South Shoulder. Their radio set had been switched off. Gupta made him speak to
the Brigade Commander who gave him a mouthful and ordered them to return to the
post, accompanied by Gupta. At about 12 pm, Gupta discerned some movement in
one of the bodies lying next to the fence barely 10 metre from the Chinese .
Taking dvantage of the fog, he went ahead to investigate. He discovered that it
was a badly wounded Major Bishan Singh, 'Tiger Nathula, who had been injured in
the initial firing. Bishan was a 6 foot tall jat while Gupta was a diminutive
five foot three, almost half his weight. With great difficulty Gupta managed to
drag Bishan into our defences and made him speak to the Brigade Commander.
Bakshi ordered Gupta to evacuate him using four men from 2 Grenadiers while he
stayed on with the post commander and one Havildar."
From the words in the diary,
Attar Singh was not trying to rally the troops but had abandoned the post along
with his men. More than 30 soldiers were later court martialled for cowardice. Surprisingly,
Attar Singh was not among them.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
326 U.S.I.
JOURNAL
The story of 2 Grenadiers would
not be complete without relating the episode of the missing pages of Gupta's
diary. It is given below in his own words:
"After the end of the event, a couple of officers of the brigade were
asked to submit their versions of the battle to the brigade commander. Since I
was in the habit of maintaining a daily diary since my NDA days, I had been
maintaining the account of the activities leading to it and of the events of 11
Sept and beyond. I, therefore, submitted my account in a normal fauji file
cover. The file had:
• Seven pages of
important events leading to 11 Sept.
• Nine pages of
events of 11 Sept.
• Ten pages of events from 11 Sept evening to cease fire.
After about a month, the file was returned to me but I did not bother to
check if all pages had been returned. Like a good soldier, I carried it with me
on all my postings and even after retirement in 1992. Around the early twenties,
Major General VK Singh (he was Adjutant of 17 MDSR in 1967) was writing part
three of the history of the Corps of Signals. He approached me for some gen on
the operations. I decided to hand him over this file. Out of sheer curiosity to
re-live the events, I started reading it and to my horror found ten pages
missing. These were the most critical pages dealing with the events of 11 Sept.
I informed this to Gen VK who told me to try and remember the events and
write them. I did this and gave him the file that contained the events leading
to 11 Sept and events after 11 Sept in original. The events of 11 Sept were
written on white paper and filed accordingly. I also made an endorsement on the
first page of the events post 11 Sept that "Nine pages containing details of
11 Sept are missing".
In July 2016, Mr Vijay Dagar, nephew of Captain PS Dagar met me at Delhi
where I had come from Australia for my knee operation. After the operation on
10 Aug
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Corrupting India's Military History — A Dangerous Trend 327
2016, I went to Captain Dagar Museum in Najafgarh and presented this file
to Mr Vijay Dagar and told him about the missing pages. To my utter shock, he produced
those nine pages in original and the file become one as it was when handed to
the Brigade HQ. This is a combine of destiny and a miracle waiting to happen. Mr
Vijay Dagar found these pages with 2nd Grenadiers and was able to take them.
Page 1 of these nine pages has an endorsement in red ink in commander's own hand
"2/Lt Gupta's Battle Account". In June 2019, all the pages were
laminated and then presented in original toits rightful owners — The Nathu La
Brigade."
The Cho La Skirmish. The missing pages from Gupta's diary point to the disturbing trend already
mentioned — the distortion of military records by units. Similar discrepancies
were noticed in the records of the two battalions that were involved in the
skirmish at Cho La that occurred about two weeks after the skirmish at Nathu La.
These were 10 JAK Rifles and 7/11 Gorkha Rifles. The regimental histories
available are 'The Path of Glory: Exploits ofthe 11 Gorkha Rifles' written by
Gautam Sharma and the 'Soldiers of the Sun and Snow' published by the Jammu and
Kashmir Rifles Regimental Centre at Jabalpur.
Cho La, located to the
northwest of Nathu La, was held by 10 JAK Rifles which was under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Mahatam Singh. During the last week of Sep 1967, the
battalion was being relieved by 7/11 Gorkha Rifles. The area was under 63 Mountain
Brigade under the command of Brigadier Kundan Singh. According to the relief
plan, the changeover was to take effect from 01 Oct 1967. The raising day of 10
JAK Rifles was on the
same date and after briefing Lieutenant Colonel KB Joshi,
CO 7/11 Gorkha Rifles, Lieutenant. Colonel Mahatam Singh had left on 30 Sep to
conduct the Havan at the Battalion HQ at Changgu Lake next morning.
On the morning of 01 Oct, there was a scuffle at Point
15450 which had been handed over to the Gorkhas on the previous day. According
to 10 JAK Rifles, the new post commander was Second Lieutenant Rana of 7/11
Gorkha Rifles. (According to the regimentalhistory of 11 Gorkha Rifles, Point
15450 was held by Lieutenant Rathore.) There was a boulder at the post and
Chinese and Indian sentries usually stood on opposite sides. Since the Gorkhas
were new
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
328 U.S.I.
JOURNAL
to the post, the Chinese staked claim to the boulder,
leading to heated argument between the two post commanders. During the
argument, the Gorkha JCO rested his right foot on the boulder. The Chinese
kicked his foot away. The JCO then put his foot back on the boulder and
challenged his Chinese counterpart. The Chinese soldier bayoneted the Gorkha
JCO injuring him in the arm. The Gorkhas retaliated by cutting off the arm of
the Chinese with a kukri. The Chinese opened up with all they had, with the Indians
responding in like fashion. The Chinese finally captured the post forcing the
Gorkhas to withdraw.
Brigadier Kundan Singh, who was
also officiating as the divisional commander, could not contact Lieutenant
Colonel Joshi, CO 7/11 Gorkha Rifles, who had gone for a morning walk.
Brigadier Kundan Singh then tried to contact Major Nair, the officiating CO of
10 JAK Rifles, but there was no answer from his telephone. Major SRR Aiyengar,
the Brigade signal officer, told his B-1 operator, L/Nk Moga Singh, to take the
radio set to Major Nair's bunker. When Moga Singh reached there, he found the
telephone ringing repeatedly and the officer in a state of shock. Finally, Brigadier
Kundan Singh was able to speak to Major Nair. After
giving him a piece of his mind, he ordered Nair to proceed to Cho La Post.
Brigadier Kundan Singh also
ordered the rest of 7/11 Gorkha Rifles to move up from Tamze. He himself moved
up to Twin Huts, to see things for himself. Joshi was missing and everyone thought
that he has been killed. At 1700 hours, Joshi reached Twin Huts where he met
Brigadier Kundan Singh and requested permission to recapture Point 15450, which
was granted. According to the Gorkhas, the attack was launched next morning and
the position was re-occupied by them, the Chinese having vacated it during the
night. The battalion was awarded two Vir Chakras during the incident.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Mahatam Singh, CO 10 JAK Rifles,
who had been informed about the firing, immediately left the Battalion HQ for
the road head at Tamze, from where he started walking up reaching Saddle at
1230 hours. He assumed command
and told Brigadier Kundan Singh that he would recapture Point 15450. He
ordered Major Subhas Dogra, who had just handed over the post to the Gorkhas, to
recapture it. Dogra
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Corrupting India's Military History — A Dangerous Trend 329
Immediately proceeded with his men towards Point 15450.
They found that the Chinese had withdrawn. The post was re-occupied at 1600
hours without firing a shot or a single casualty. In addition to the CO who was
awarded the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), the battalion won three
Vir Chakras.
As can been seen, there are
several discrepancies in the records of the two units. According to the
Gorkhas, point 15450 was held by Lieutenant Rathore while 10 JAK Rifles claim
to havehanded over the post to Second Lieutenant Rana of 7/11 Gorkha Rifles.
Both units, viz. 7/11 Gorkha Rifles and 10 JAK Rifles, claim to have recaptured
Point 15450 which, in fact, had already been vacated by the Chinese. Compared
to the skirmish at Nathu La which lasted 5 days and resulted in many
casualties, the oneat Cho La was relatively minor lasting just a day. Though
this is not mentioned in their regimental history, Major KG Nair of 10 JAK
Rifles was later court martialled.
Conclusion
Most regimental histories of the post-Independence period
tend to glorify the actions of battalions as well as individuals. Hence, successes
are highlighted but failures rarely mentioned. In battle, cases of units
fighting to the last man are matched by instances of units breaking up and
examples of audacious commanders by specimens of indecisive leaders. Not
surprisingly, some earn medals and promotions while others are sacked. Like in
any two sided
match, the odds of winning and losing in battle are equal
and one would expect that the performance of units and commanders would conform
to this pattern. The military profession has always placed a greater premium on
valour, rather than victory. This is especially true in India, where the most
famous military leaders — Porus, Prithvi Raj Chauhan, Rana Pratap, and Rani
Laxmi Bai — lost their battles. Yet, their stories are part of legend and have acted
as an inspiration to generations of Indians. Unfortunately, military historians
today have different views and failure in battle seems to carry with it a
stigma and guilt, which is totally unwarranted. Today, a misplaced sense of
honour and `izzat’ impels units to hide mistakes and failures and
magnify achievements. If not corrected, this may seriously impinge on the integrity
of post-Independence military history of India.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
330 U.S.I.
JOURNAL
Endnotes
1. The term 'Army' can be read by the reader to encompass
all armed forces of the Union.
2 Historical
negationism, also called denialism, is falsification or distortion of the
historical record. It should not be conflated with historical revisionism, a
broader term that extends to newly evidenced, fairly reasoned academic
reinterpretations of history. https://www.bing.com/
search?q=historical+negationism+&qs=n&form=QBRE&sp=-1&pq = historical+negationism
+&sc=4-23&sk=&cvid=991856EE2F 9640EEBA 8279 F81986AC3F
3 A Talent for War: The Military Biography of Lt Gen Sagat
Singh by Randhir Singh is one such
book. This author's book Leadership in the Indian Army: Biographies of
Twelve Soldiers also covers Lt Gen Sagat Singh.
4 Watershed
1967 — India's Forgotten Victory over China. By Probal DasGupta; Publisher:
Juggernaut Books, New Delhi (April 2020), Pages 208; Price Rs 390/-, ISBN:
978-93-53450-93-9 (Paperback)
5 https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/reviews-of-recent-books-12/?sf_paged=2
6 For excerpts
of the diary, see Veekay's History Book, Nathu La –the True Story at
http://veekay-militaryhistory.blogspot.com/2013/04/nathula-1967-real-story.html
7 "The
Nathu La skirmish: When Chinese Were Given a Bloody Nose" by Major General
Sheru Thapliyal. Accessed Aug 24, 2021 from https://archive.claws. in/595/the-nathu-la-skirmish-when-chinese-were-given-a-bloody-nose-sheru-thapliyal.html